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Social-communication impairments in autism spectrum disorder (ASD) are often 
ascribed to deficits in empathy. I argue that social-communicative deficits in ASD stem from 
impairments in specific aspects of empathy, rather than a general empathy impairment. 
Empathy is defined as the sharing of another’s emotion (affective empathy), understanding 
others’ mental states (cognitive empathy), and regulation of one’s own emotional state (self-
regulation). Empathy can also lead to muscle mimicry and empathic concern for another’s 
wellbeing. I argue that empathy should be measured on multiple levels: cognitive, subjective 
and physiological. Particularly, measurement of autonomic regulation can contribute to 
characterising the empathy profile in ASD. Furthermore, confounding factors such as lack of 
understanding of one’s own emotions, or alexithymia, must be accounted for when measuring 
empathy.  
I measured subjective trait empathy ratings in people with varying levels of autism 
traits (N1 = 519 & N2 = 98, ages 14 - 45). I also investigated the association between 
physiological arousal, trait empathy, and empathic concern for (1) sensory pain and (2) facial 
pain expressions, controlling for alexithymia (N = 98); and examined the evidence for 
atypical autonomic arousal at rest and during empathy-induction in individuals with ASD. 
Autism traits were negatively correlated with cognitive empathy and self-regulation, but were 
not associated with atypical affective empathy per se. However, individuals with poor self-
regulation showed heightened subjective affective states, whereas alexithymic individuals 
showed reduced affective empathy to facial pain expressions. Regarding the autonomic 
regulation of empathy, there was a significant association between autonomic arousal and 
affect regulation: Low sympathetic arousal and concurrent high parasympathetic arousal at 
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rest predicted smaller changes in personal distress during pain observation than did 
autonomic co-inhibition. However, resting state arousal did not predict absolute affective 
state levels or dispositional empathy, and was not associated with amount of autism traits.  
In conclusion, the findings do not support the hypothesis of global empathy deficits in 
ASD. The results suggest that interventions focusing on own-emotion identification and self-
regulation skills are important, but caution against the over-hasty adoption of interventions 




TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .............................................................................................. III 
ABSTRACT........................................................................................................................ V 
LIST OF TABLES ...........................................................................................................XV 
LIST OF FIGURES .................................................................................................... XVIII 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ........................................................................................ XXI 
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................... 1 
OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS .................................................................................................... 3 
CHAPTER 2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK.............................................................. 6 
AUTISM SPECTRUM DISORDER ............................................................................................ 6 
Core Symptoms .............................................................................................................. 7 
The Broad Autism Phenotype ......................................................................................... 7 
Psychiatric Comorbidities .............................................................................................. 8 
Summary ........................................................................................................................ 9 
THE FUNCTION AND IMPORTANCE OF EMPATHY ................................................................ 10 
What is Empathy? ........................................................................................................ 10 
Empathy in ASD ........................................................................................................... 15 
A disagreement in definitions. .................................................................................. 16 
A new look at empathy in ASD. ............................................................................... 18 
PHYSIOLOGICAL AFFERENTS AND EFFERENTS OF EMPATHY ............................................... 22 
Physiological Mechanisms of Empathy ........................................................................ 22 
Autonomic Regulation and Empathy............................................................................. 23 
viii 
 
Parasympathetic arousal. .......................................................................................... 26 
Sympathetic arousal. ................................................................................................. 29 
Autonomic regulation and ASD. ............................................................................... 32 
Summary. ................................................................................................................. 33 
Critique of the Polyvagal Theory.................................................................................. 34 
CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................... 36 
CHAPTER 3. EMPATHY FOR PAIN ............................................................................. 37 
AFFECTIVE AND PHYSIOLOGICAL RESPONSES TO PERCEIVED PAIN ..................................... 37 
Muscle Responses to Observed Pain ............................................................................ 39 
Empathy for Pain in ASD ............................................................................................. 40 
RATIONALE ...................................................................................................................... 42 
A Dimensional, Multilevel Approach to Studying ASD ................................................. 44 
Overview of the Studies ................................................................................................ 45 
SPECIFIC AIMS AND HYPOTHESES ..................................................................................... 46 
Research Questions ...................................................................................................... 47 
Hypotheses ................................................................................................................... 48 
Study 1: Trait empathy in ASD ................................................................................. 48 
Study 2: Empathy for sensory pain & Study 3: Empathy for facial expressions of pain
 ................................................................................................................................. 48 
CHAPTER 4. GENERAL METHODS ............................................................................ 50 
PARTICIPANTS .................................................................................................................. 50 
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS ............................................................................................... 53 
PHYSIOLOGICAL MEASUREMENTS ..................................................................................... 55 
Electromyogram (EMG) ............................................................................................... 55 
ix 
 
Autonomic Activity ....................................................................................................... 55 
DATA ANALYSIS .............................................................................................................. 59 
Mixed-Effects Modelling .............................................................................................. 59 
CHAPTER 5. STUDY 1: THE EMPATHY PROFILE IN ASD ..................................... 64 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES ......................................................................... 64 
METHODS ........................................................................................................................ 65 
Design ......................................................................................................................... 65 
Materials and Methods ................................................................................................ 65 
Observational measures. ........................................................................................... 65 
Self-report measures. ................................................................................................ 65 
Performance cognitive empathy. ............................................................................... 68 
Use of questionnaire and cognitive measures in a South African sample. .................. 70 
Procedure .................................................................................................................... 71 
Data Analysis ............................................................................................................... 72 
RESULTS .......................................................................................................................... 74 
Total Sample ................................................................................................................ 74 
Scale reliability. ........................................................................................................ 74 
Autism and trait empathy and alexithymia. ............................................................... 76 
Laboratory Sample ....................................................................................................... 79 
Demographic information. ........................................................................................ 79 
Scale reliability. ........................................................................................................ 81 
Autism and trait empathy and alexithymia. ............................................................... 83 
Autism and performance cognitive empathy. ............................................................ 86 
Emotion recognition. ............................................................................................. 86 
Response time. ...................................................................................................... 90 
x 
 
Faux pas. ............................................................................................................... 93 
Correlations between performance cognitive empathy scores. ............................... 97 
Correlations between empathy facets. ....................................................................... 98 
DISCUSSION ..................................................................................................................... 99 
Alexithymia .................................................................................................................. 99 
Dispositional Empathy ............................................................................................... 100 
Performance Cognitive Empathy ................................................................................ 102 
Questionnaire Reliability and Validity........................................................................ 105 
Limitations ................................................................................................................. 109 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION ......................................................................................... 110 
CHAPTER 6. STUDY 2: EMPATHY FOR SENSORY PAIN ..................................... 112 
METHODS ...................................................................................................................... 113 
Design ....................................................................................................................... 113 
Participants ............................................................................................................... 113 
Materials and Measures ............................................................................................. 113 
Previously reported measures. ................................................................................ 113 
Video stimuli. ......................................................................................................... 114 
Affective states and perceived pain. ........................................................................ 115 
Electromyogram (EMG). ........................................................................................ 116 
Autonomic activity. ................................................................................................ 117 
Procedure .................................................................................................................. 118 
Data Analysis ............................................................................................................. 119 
RESULTS ........................................................................................................................ 121 
Self-Reported Affective State and Perceived Pain ....................................................... 121 
Pain perception. ...................................................................................................... 122 
xi 
 
Affective state ratings. ............................................................................................ 126 
Muscle Reactivity ....................................................................................................... 129 
Average activity. .................................................................................................... 131 
Slope. ..................................................................................................................... 134 
Resting State Autonomic Arousal, Empathy and Autism ............................................. 137 
Autonomic Responses to Stimuli ................................................................................. 148 
DISCUSSION ................................................................................................................... 153 
Self-Reported State Empathic Concern and Distress .................................................. 154 
Muscle Reactivity ....................................................................................................... 158 
Autonomic Arousal ..................................................................................................... 161 
Resting state autonomic arousal. ............................................................................. 161 
Autism traits. ...................................................................................................... 161 
Empathy.............................................................................................................. 163 
Autonomic reactivity to perceived sensory pain. ..................................................... 165 
Coherence between autonomic and subjective measures of empathy. ...................... 167 
Limitations and Future Directions.............................................................................. 168 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ........................................................................................ 169 
CHAPTER 7. STUDY 3: EMPATHY FOR FACIAL EXPRESSIONS OF PAIN ....... 172 
METHODS ...................................................................................................................... 174 
Design ....................................................................................................................... 174 
Participants ............................................................................................................... 174 
Materials and Measures ............................................................................................. 175 
Previously reported measures. ................................................................................ 175 
Video stimuli. ......................................................................................................... 175 
Electromyogram (EMG). ........................................................................................ 176 
xii 
 
Autonomic activity. ................................................................................................ 177 
Procedure .................................................................................................................. 177 
Data Analysis ............................................................................................................. 178 
RESULTS ........................................................................................................................ 180 
Self-Reported Affective State and Perceived Pain ....................................................... 180 
Pain perception. ...................................................................................................... 181 
Affective state ratings. ............................................................................................ 182 
Muscle Reactivity ....................................................................................................... 188 
Average activity. .................................................................................................... 190 
Slope. ..................................................................................................................... 193 
Resting State Autonomic Arousal, Empathy and Autism ............................................. 197 
Autonomic Responses to Stimuli ................................................................................. 202 
DISCUSSION ................................................................................................................... 212 
Self-Reported Affective State and Perceived Pain ....................................................... 214 
Muscle Reactivity ....................................................................................................... 218 
Muscle response to observing facial expressions of pain. ........................................ 218 
Association between muscle reactivity and amount of autism traits......................... 220 
Empathy, perspective taking and muscle reactivity. ................................................ 221 
Autonomic Arousal ..................................................................................................... 224 
Resting state autonomic arousal. ............................................................................. 224 
Autonomic response. .............................................................................................. 226 
Limitations and Future Directions.............................................................................. 230 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION ......................................................................................... 231 
CHAPTER 8. GENERAL DISCUSSION ...................................................................... 234 
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF EMPATHY IN ASD ................................................................. 235 
xiii 
 
SELF-REGULATION AND AUTONOMIC AROUSAL .............................................................. 241 
LIMITATIONS .................................................................................................................. 243 
FUTURE DIRECTIONS ...................................................................................................... 248 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ........................................................................................ 250 
REFERENCES ................................................................................................................ 255 
APPENDIX A UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN ETHICS APPROVAL .................... 324 
APPENDIX B APPROVAL TO ADVERTISE RESEARCH ON CAMPUS ............... 329 
APPENDIX C WESTERN CAPE EDUCATION DEPARTMENT STUDY APPROVAL
 ......................................................................................................................................... 331 
APPENDIX D CONSENT FORMS ............................................................................... 334 
CONSENT FORM: ADULT PARTICIPANTS .......................................................................... 334 
CONSENT FORM: ADOLESCENT PARTICIPANTS ................................................................ 337 
APPENDIX E ASSENT FORM ..................................................................................... 341 
APPENDIX F DEBRIEFING FORM ............................................................................ 342 
APPENDIX G LIST OF STATISTICAL PACKAGES USED ..................................... 345 
APPENDIX H AUTISM SPECTRUM QUOTIENT ..................................................... 346 
APPENDIX I INTERPERSONAL REACTIVITY INDEX .......................................... 348 
APPENDIX J EMOTIONAL CONTAGION SCALE .................................................. 351 
APPENDIX K INTERNAL CONSISTENCY AND CONFIRMATORY FACTOR 
ANALYSIS OF EMPATHY SCALES ........................................................................... 352 
CONFIRMATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS ............................................................................... 356 
APPENDIX L TORONTO ALEXITHYMIA SCALE .................................................. 361 
xiv 
 
APPENDIX M SURVEY MONKEY QUESTIONNAIRE ............................................ 362 
APPENDIX N  AFFECTIVE STATE QUESTIONS ..................................................... 376 
APPENDIX O LIST OF MEDICATIONS ..................................................................... 378 
APPENDIX P ADDITIONAL FIGURES AND TABLES ............................................. 380 
STUDY 1 ......................................................................................................................... 380 
STUDY 3 ......................................................................................................................... 384 
Muscle Activity........................................................................................................... 384 
Muscle Slope .............................................................................................................. 387 
Autonomic Arousal ..................................................................................................... 388 
APPENDIX Q THE EMPATHY QUOTIENT .............................................................. 395 
xv 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 1  Internal Consistency of the Autism, Empathy and Alexithymia Subscales ............... 75 
Table 2  Empathy, Autism and Alexithymia Traits in the Full Sample .................................. 77 
Table 3  Participant Demographics ..................................................................................... 80 
Table 4 Excluded Items from the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) and Emotional 
Contagion Scale (ECS)........................................................................................................ 82 
Table 5  Empathy and Alexithymia Scores ........................................................................... 84 
Table 6  Emotion Recognition Accuracy and Response Times in Seconds ............................ 88 
Table 7  Linear Random-Effects Model Estimates of Emotion Recognition Accuracy from 
Medication Use, AI and Emotion Type ................................................................................ 90 
Table 8  Linear Mixed-Effects Models of Emotion Recognition Response Time ................... 91 
Table 9  Random Effects of the Linear Mixed-Effects Models of Emotion Recognition 
Response Time .................................................................................................................... 93 
Table 10  Generalised Linear Model Coefficients of Faux Pas Total and Emotion Recognition 
Scores ................................................................................................................................. 96 
Table 11  Correlations Between the Different Performance Cognitive Empathy Measures .. 97 
Table 12  Correlations Between Empathy Measures ............................................................ 98 
Table 13  Perceived Pain and Affective State Reports by Video Condition ......................... 123 
Table 14  Predictors of Pain Perception ............................................................................ 124 
Table 15  Predictors of Affective Responses to Painful and Non-Painful Conditions .......... 127 
Table 16  Average Change in Muscle Activity from Baseline (μV) During the Start (2.0 – 2.2 
s) and Peak (4.0 – 4.2 s) of the Pain Epochs, and Average Muscle Slope During Pain 
Observation ...................................................................................................................... 131 
Table 17  Correlation Coefficients for Muscle Activity at 4.0 – 4.2 s (Relative to Baseline) 133 
xvi 
 
Table 18  Linear Mixed-Effects Model Predicting Change in Muscle Activity over Time 
(Muscle Slope) to Painful and Non-Painful Conditions...................................................... 135 
Table 19  Autonomic Arousal to Painful and Non-Painful Conditions ............................... 138 
Table 20  Correlations Between Resting State Autonomic Arousal and Empathy Measures 139 
Table 21  Linear Regression Results of Resting State Autonomic Arousal and Autism and 
Empathy Traits .................................................................................................................. 142 
Table 22  Linear Mixed-Effects Model of Autonomic Arousal to Painful and Non-Painful 
Conditions ......................................................................................................................... 150 
Table 23 Linear Mixed-Effects Model of Pain Perception.................................................. 181 
Table 24 Linear Mixed-Effects Model of Affective State..................................................... 184 
Table 25 Linear Mixed-Effects Model of Affective State, Controlling for Alexithymia ........ 186 
Table 26 Change in Muscle Activity and Muscle Slope During Facial Expressions of Pain 189 
Table 27 Mixed-Effects Models of Average Muscle Activity Relative to Baseline ............... 192 
Table 28 Random-Effects Model of Change in EMG Activity Over Time (Muscle Slope) ... 195 
Table 29 Correlations Between Resting State Autonomic Arousal and Empathy Measures 198 
Table 30 Linear Regression Results of Resting State Autonomic Arousal and Autism and 
Empathy Traits .................................................................................................................. 200 
Table 31 Autonomic Changes to Viewing Painful Expressions........................................... 203 
Table 32  Changes in Autonomic Arousal and Respiration Rate Across Experimental Blocks
 ......................................................................................................................................... 204 
Table 33 Linear Mixed-Effects Models of Autonomic Arousal to Pain Observation ........... 206 
Table 34  Reliability Analysis of Affective Empathy Items .................................................. 352 
Table 35  Reliability Analysis of Cognitive Empathy Items ................................................ 354 
Table 36  Reliability Analysis of Self-Regulation Items ...................................................... 355 
Table 37  Confirmatory Factor Analysis Fit Indices .......................................................... 357 
xvii 
 
Table 38  Standardised Coefficients: Affective Empathy .................................................... 358 
Table 39  Standardised Coefficients: Cognitive Empathy and Self-Regulation ................... 359 
Table 40  Empathy Facet Covariance ................................................................................ 360 
Table 41  List of Empathic Concern and Personal Distress Questions ............................... 376 
Table 42  List of Medications ............................................................................................ 378 
Table 43  Generalised Linear Model Coefficients of Faux Pas Total and Emotion Recognition 
Scores (with Influential Values) ......................................................................................... 381 
Table 44 Preliminary Random-Effects Muscle Amplitude Model ....................................... 384 
Table 45 Alternative Mixed-Effects Models of Average Muscle Activity (Square Root 
Transformed) .................................................................................................................... 386 
Table 46  Linear Mixed-Effects Model Predicting Muscle Slope (incl. Cycle and Condition)
 ......................................................................................................................................... 387 
Table 47  Linear Mixed-Effects Model Outcomes Predicting Autonomic Arousal .............. 388 
Table 48  Linear Mixed-Effects Models of Cardiac Vagal Control and Skin Conductance 
(incl. Condition) ................................................................................................................ 389 
Table 49 Average Autonomic Arousal During the First and Second Cycles of Painful Facial 
Expressions ....................................................................................................................... 390 
Table 50  Autonomic Arousal During the First and Second Cycles of Painful Facial 




LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 1. Participant recruitment flowchart. ......................................................................... 52 
Figure 2. Electrocardiogram (EKG) and impedance cardiogram (ICG) electrode placement. 57 
Figure 3. Example stimuli from the emotion recognition task. ............................................. 69 
Figure 4. The relationship between autism traits, empathy and alexithymia in the total 
sample. ................................................................................................................................ 78 
Figure 5. The correlation between amount of autism traits (AI) and affective and cognitive 
empathy, self-regulation and alexithymia. ........................................................................... 85 
Figure 6. Emotion recognition accuracy (A) and speed by Autism Index (AI) and emotion. 87 
Figure 7. Autism Index scores were significantly negatively correlated with total Faux Pas 
scores (A) and with Faux Pas emotion recognition scores (B). ............................................. 94 
Figure 8. Empathy for sensory pain stimuli. ...................................................................... 115 
Figure 9. Placement of the electrodes to measure activity over the First dorsal interosseous 
(FDI) and Abductor digiti minimi (ADM) muscle areas. ................................................... 117 
Figure 10. Self-regulation skills (A) and medication use (B) predict absolute scores of 
perceived pain. .................................................................................................................. 125 
Figure 11. Self-regulation skills (A) and medication use (B) predicted absolute affective state 
scores. Self-regulation also predicted differences in affective state between painful and non-
painful conditions (C)........................................................................................................ 128 
Figure 12. The average change in muscle activity from baseline in the Abductor digiti minimi 
(ADM) and First dorsal interosseous (FDI) muscle regions. .............................................. 130 
Figure 13. Average muscle activity at 4.0 – 4.2 s (compared to baseline) to observing painful 
and non-painful stimulation of a target hand. ..................................................................... 134 
Figure 14. Muscle slope to observing painful and non-painful stimulation of a target hand.136 
xix 
 
Figure 15. The correlation between heart rate and AI scores, with (A) and without 
antidepressants (B). ........................................................................................................... 141 
Figure 16. The interaction between cardiac vagal control and pre-ejection period (PEP) on 
change in affective state ratings. ........................................................................................ 146 
Figure 17. Skin conductance levels (SCLs) to the different conditions (A). ....................... 152 
Figure 18. Clips from the painful facial expression videos showing the initial neutral and later 
painful facial expressions. ................................................................................................. 176 
Figure 19. AI (A), medication (B) and cycle (C) significantly predicted pain ratings. ........ 182 
Figure 20. Significant predictors of affective state arousal to facial pain. ........................... 185 
Figure 21. The influence of alexithymia (A) and self-regulation (B) on empathic concern and 
personal distress. ............................................................................................................... 187 
Figure 22. Activity in the M. corrugator supercilii, M. medial frontalis and M. orbicularis 
oculi regions from resting state to watching facial expressions of pain............................... 189 
Figure 23. Predictors of muscle activity during facial expressions of pain. ........................ 193 
Figure 24. Predictors of muscle slope. ............................................................................... 196 
Figure 25. Cardiac vagal control showed greater changes in participants with low Autism 
Index (AI) scores. .............................................................................................................. 208 
Figure 26. Heart rate (HR) responses to facial expressions of pain..................................... 210 
Figure 27. Skin conductance level (SCL) while observing facial expressions of pain. ........ 211 
Figure 28. Residual plots of the generalised least squares model predicting Faux Pas (FP) 
total scores. ....................................................................................................................... 382 
Figure 29. Residual plots of the generalised least squares model predicting Faux Pas emotion 
recognition (FP Emo Recog) scores. .................................................................................. 383 
xx 
 
Figure 30. Confidence intervals of the coefficient estimates for the preliminary random-
effects model predicting muscle amplitude from time (pain vs. no pain), condition (self vs. 
other) and muscle (M. orbicularis, M. zygomaticus, M. frontalis). ..................................... 385 
 Figure 31. Pre-ejection period (PEP) over the different empathy-for-facial-pain conditions.
 ......................................................................................................................................... 392 
Figure 32. Cardiac vagal control over the different empathy-for-facial-pain conditions. .... 393 
Figure 33. Skin conductance levels (SCL) over the different empathy-for-facial-pain 
conditions. ........................................................................................................................ 394 
xxi 
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
ADM   Abductor Digiti Minimi 
ADOS-2  Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule, Second Edition 
AI   Autism Index 
AQ   Autism Spectrum Questionnaire 
APA   American Psychiatric Association 
ASD   Autism Spectrum Disorder 
BOBYQA  Bound Optimisation by Quadratic Approximation 
dZ   Change in Impedance due to Respiration and Heart Beat 
EKG   Electrocardiography 
ECS   Emotional Contagion Scale 
EMG   Electromyography 
FDI   First Dorsal Interosseous 
FP    Faux Pas 
HR    Heart Rate 
ICG   Impendence Cardiography 
IRI   Interpersonal Reactivity Index 
PEP   Pre-Ejection Period 
xxii 
 
R2M   Marginal Coefficient (Fixed Factor Coefficient of Determination) 
R2C   Conditional Coefficient (Total Model Coefficient of Determination)  
RDoC   Research Domain Criteria 
REML   Restricted Maximum Likelihood 
RSA   Respiratory Sinus Arrhythmia 
SCL   Skin Conductance Level 
SRPP   Student Research Participation Programme 
TAS-20  Toronto Alexithymia Scale – 20 Item 
VU-AMS  Vrije Universiteit Ambulatory Monitoring System 






Humans are a social species. We rely heavily on establishing and negotiating 
partnerships and on social learning to survive (Cacioppo, 2002). In turn, bonding, working 
towards joint goals, and learning from others all rely on the ability to understand others’ 
mental states, to feel appropriate concern for others’ well-being, and to regulate our own 
behaviour. In short, social functioning requires empathy. 
Empathy involves a wide range of feelings and thoughts that can lead us to act in 
caring and compassionate ways. Empathy arises from and results in physiological changes in 
the central and peripheral nervous systems, such as activation of brain regions involved in 
feelings of emotion, and changes in heart rate and muscle activation, that allow us to 
represent another’s affective and mental state in ourselves. In brief, empathy involves the 
sharing of another’s emotion, understanding others’ mental states and the causes thereof, and 
regulation of one’s own emotional state. Emotion sharing leads, in turn, to feelings of 
concern for another’s wellbeing. It is these feelings that drive social interactions. 
Nowhere is the need for social functioning seen more clearly than in conditions where 
social functioning goes awry. Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is one such condition. 
Individuals with autism have difficulties with social-communication, so that they are less 
likely to initiate and maintain reciprocal conversations, respond appropriately to social 
interactions, and use socially-directed communication such as gestures, eye contact, and 
facial expressions. The result is that individuals with ASD are often socially isolated, even 
when they wish to establish relationships. The original description of autism was of an 
“inability to relate… in the ordinary way to people and situations” (Kanner, 1943, p. 242). 
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Building on this description, some have argued that a global deficit in empathy is the driving 
force behind the difficulties in social functioning seen in ASD (Baron-Cohen, 2009; Baron-
Cohen & Wheelright, 2004; C. Gillberg, 1992).  
This thesis examines the nature of empathy deficits in ASD. To correspond with 
recent movements toward studying biopsychological processes in a transdiagnostic and 
multidimensional manner (Cuthbert, 2014; Kozak & Cuthbert, 2016), I have measured 
empathy at several levels of analysis; particularly, the physiological, cognitive, and self-
report levels. Furthermore, autism is treated in a dimensional way, rather than focusing on 
between-group differences. Over the course of three studies, I examined the effect of 
affective, cognitive, and regulatory components of empathy on feelings of empathic concern 
for others and investigated the association between physiological arousal and these 
components of empathy. In particular, I (1) measured autonomic arousal and muscle 
reactivity during empathy-induction and (2) explored the correlation between these 
physiological indices of affective responses and participants’ subjective feelings of empathic 
concern or personal distress. Furthermore, I (3) examined whether there is evidence that 
abnormal autonomic regulation at rest is associated with autism traits, and correlated (4) 
resting state autonomic regulation with empathic responses. It was hypothesised that 
abnormal resting state arousal may contribute to abnormal empathic responses in ASD, if any 
exist.  
A novel contribution of this thesis is that activity in both branches of the autonomic 
nervous system are measured concurrently. This allows the interaction of the two systems to 
be modelled to predict empathic concern. Another novel contribution of this thesis is the 
application of the neurovisceral integration model and polyvagal theory, which state that 
resting state autonomic arousal influences social engagement and autonomic regulation, to 
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the study of empathy in ASD. A brief overview of the theories and their application to the 
study of empathy in ASD is provided in the chapter overview below.  
The characterisation of the physiology of empathy holds important ramifications for 
the diagnosis and management of ASD and other psychological disorders. For example, it 
leads the way towards new intervention techniques by pinpointing which facets of empathy 
are impaired in ASD, and suggesting physiological processes in which it may be possible to 
intervene. Alternatively, physiological arousal may be used as an indicator for intervention 
outcome. Furthermore, the characterisation of physiological arousal at rest and during 
empathy-induction may lead to earlier and more accurate diagnosis by identifying potential 
biological markers of risk. 
Overview of Chapters 
Following this chapter, I will draw on the neurobiological and developmental 
empathy literature in Chapter 2 to argue that empathy is not a unitary concept, and that some 
aspects of empathy can be impaired in ASD while others are intact. The deficit in empathy in 
ASD is not a global one as has been argued previously. I will argue that, although the 
understanding of others’ mental states (i.e., cognitive empathy) is impaired in ASD, the 
sharing of others’ emotions, or affective empathy, is intact. However, regulation of affective 
empathy may be impaired in ASD, leading to fluctuating empathic concern, or sympathy, and 
prosocial behaviour.  
I will present evidence from the neurovisceral integration (Thayer & Lane, 2000, 
2009) and polyvagal (Porges, 1992, 2001, 2003b) theories, which propose that the autonomic 
nervous system – divided into sympathetic and parasympathetic branches - plays an integral 
role in emotional arousal and regulation. As empathic emotions share the same neural circuits 
and peripheral physiology of self-emotions, this implies that atypical autonomic regulation 
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also affects the ability to perceive and share the emotion of others. Specifically, the models 
propose that the parasympathetic nervous system regulates activity in brain areas involved in 
emotion perception and regulation, thereby promoting social engagement. Given this 
proposition, resting state parasympathetic arousal should be associated with state and 
dispositional empathy (Diamond, Fagundes, & Butterworth, 2012; Liew et al., 2011). I will 
argue that dual activation of the parasympathetic and sympathetic nervous systems in 
response to empathy-inducing stimuli is important to generate feelings of affective empathy 
and simultaneously down-regulate these feelings so that the observer does not become over-
aroused and personally distressed. Atypical autonomic arousal may contribute to atypical 
self-regulation of empathy in ASD, explaining the high levels of distress and aversive 
reactions frequently reported in this group (A. Smith, 2009).  
Chapter 3 introduces the experimental paradigm for Studies 2 and 3. Empathy was 
studied within an empathy-for-pain paradigm that has been well-validated in neurotypical 
participant groups (e.g., Avenanti, Bueti, Galati, & Aglioti, 2005; Jackson, Meltzoff, & 
Decety, 2005; Singer et al., 2004). Empathy for another’s pain was chosen as pain stimuli 
elicit robust physiological and emotional responses; far greater than the observation of other 
emotions (Reicherts et al., 2012; Simon, Craig, Gosselin, Belin, & Rainville, 2008). Chapter 
3 describes typical physiological and emotional responses in empathy-for-pain studies, and 
examines the results of studies that have investigated empathy for pain in ASD. I also provide 
a rationale for the studies contained in this thesis, and discuss the hypotheses pertaining to all 
three studies. 
Chapter 4 introduces the general methods used within the three studies presented in 
this thesis. In this chapter I will explain details of participant recruitment and ethical 
approval. Physiological, cognitive and self-report measures that are used in more than one 
study are discussed. I will also describe the main method of data analysis, namely mixed-
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effects modelling, and its importance for use with repeated-measures dimensional data. 
Methods and measures specific to the individual studies are described in Chapters 5 to 7. 
Chapter 5 (Study 1) examines empathy at the self-report level, and asks the question: 
To what extent are each of the different components of empathy - affect, cognition, and self-
regulation - associated with autism traits? Self-report evidence is presented that dispositional 
and performance cognitive empathy as well as dispositional self-regulation are impaired in 
ASD, but affective empathy is intact in non-alexithymic individuals. 
Chapters 6 and 7 (Studies 2 and 3) expand on Chapter 5 by investigating empathy at 
the physiological level. I investigate the association between resting state physiological 
arousal, physiological reactivity to empathy-inducing stimuli, and self-reported empathic 
concern and personal distress using electrocardiographic, impedance cardiographic, 
electrodermal, and electromyographic methods. I investigate empathy for two types of stimuli 
within these chapters: empathy for sensory pain (Chapter 6) and empathy for facial 
expressions of pain (Chapter 7). These two sets of stimuli were chosen because the former 
does not require recognition of facial expressions, an ability which may be impaired in ASD. 
In the latter design (Chapter 7), participants can only rely on facial expressions to make 
judgements about the pain’s intensity. This design is closer to what may be experienced in 
everyday life, where an observer often only sees someone’s reaction to distress, not its cause, 
and needs to be able to interpret the facial communication of pain successfully to respond 
appropriately. 
Chapter 8 presents a general discussion of the three studies. I discuss the results in the 
context of current theoretical perspectives, and examine methodological issues and 
limitations of the studies. I conclude by examining the implication of the findings for the 






In this chapter I first describe autism spectrum disorder (ASD). Next I discuss 
common definitions of empathy and consider a proposed physiological mechanism of 
empathy. I argue that empathy is best understood from a neurobiological framework, and use 
a definition of empathy that best fits within this neurobiological framework. I explore how 
empathy has been conceptualised within the ASD literature, and how these different 
definitions have shaped thoughts around empathy in ASD. I present evidence that empathy is 
multi-faceted and that not all aspects of empathy are impaired in ASD. 
Having discussed empathy, I turn to theories on the association between autonomic 
arousal, social engagement and empathy. I discuss the implications of these theories for 
studies of autism spectrum disorder, and in particular, the capacity for feeling empathy and 
concern in ASD. Although theories of autonomic arousal make valuable contributions to the 
study of social engagement in ASD, they also have some limitations. I finish this chapter with 
a critique of the outlined autonomic theories, before turning in Chapter 3 to the specific 
aspect of empathy on which I focus in this thesis; namely, empathy for pain. 
Autism Spectrum Disorder 
ASD is defined as a heritable, lifelong neurodevelopmental disorder. Onset is usually 
before three years of age, although symptoms may only become apparent later in life. The 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition (DSM-5) defines ASD 
according to two core features: social-communicative deficits, and the presence of repetitive 
or stereotyped behaviour or restricted, unusually intense interests (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013). Unlike the fourth edition of the DSM, the DSM-5 no longer distinguishes 
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between classic autism and other pervasive developmental disorders such as Asperger’s 
Syndrome. Thus the terms autism and ASD are used interchangeably in this thesis. 
Core Symptoms  
The two core features of ASD broadly define the social and non-social aspects of 
autism. The term ‘social-communication’ encompasses a wide range of skills. Individuals 
with ASD struggle to learn language, and speech is either delayed, absent, or abnormal in 
quality. For example, speech may show pronoun reversal and have unusual pitch, tone or 
intonation. Furthermore, individuals with ASD are less likely to appropriately regulate eye 
contact, use or understand gestures, initiate and maintain peer friendships, and understand 
social communication such as body language and non-literal speech (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013). In short, individuals with ASD have difficulties with social engagement. 
Non-social behaviour is also affected in ASD, in that individuals with ASD may show 
unusually repetitive and ritualised patterns of verbal or non-verbal behaviour. Interests may 
either be focused on odd topics or objects (e.g. observing the spinning of a washing 
machine), restricted in range, or unusual in their intensity. Stereotyped motor movements, 
such as finger twisting, flapping or rocking, may also be present in ASD; as well as unusual 
sensitivity (either heightened or reduced) to or interest in sensory stimuli (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013). Though not part of the diagnostic criteria, individuals with 
ASD often have strengths in visual and auditory perception and rote memory (Caron, 
Mottron, Rainville, & Chouinard, 2004; Heaton & Wallace, 2004; Mottron, Dawson, 
Soulières, Hubert, & Burack, 2006).  
The Broad Autism Phenotype  
Autism is referred to as a spectrum disorder as the diagnosis includes a wide range of 
functioning and intellectual ability, from mild to severe impairment (American Psychiatric 
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Association, 2013). Furthermore, the social-communicative deficits and restricted or 
repetitive behaviours seen in ASD are not limited to this diagnostic group: These 
characteristics follow a normal distribution in the population, and symptoms are aggregated 
within families of persons with ASD (Constantino, 2011; Constantino & Todd, 2003). ASD 
merely represents the most severe end of this continuous distribution (Sasson et al., 2013). 
The presence of mild, but qualitatively similar, forms of autism symptoms in the non-clinical 
population has led to the term ‘broad autism phenotype’ (Piven, 2001; Piven & Palmer, 
1999). The broad autism phenotype describes individuals who do not meet diagnostic criteria 
for ASD, but who have social and communication deficits, anxiety, and restricted or 
ritualised behaviour, similar to individuals with ASD (Losh, Childress, Lam, & Piven, 2008). 
Both persons with ASD and those with the broad autism phenotype show high rates of 
comorbidities with other neurological and psychiatric disorders. Psychiatric comorbidities are 
of particular relevance to this study as social-communication and empathy deficits are found 
in many psychiatric conditions. 
Psychiatric Comorbidities  
Between 30 and 70% of individuals with ASD in the population (Doshi-Velez, Ge, & 
Kohane, 2014; Hofvander et al., 2009), and as many as 95% of clinically-referred individuals 
with ASD (Joshi et al., 2010), have one or more psychiatric comorbidities. The most frequent 
comorbid conditions are anxiety, mood disorders, attention-deficit and hyperactivity disorder, 
oppositional and conduct disorders and obsessive-compulsive disorder (Joshi et al., 2010; 
Simonoff et al., 2008).  
Important for this thesis, roughly half of all individuals with ASD meet clinical criteria 
for alexithymia (Berthoz, Lalanne, Crane, & Hill, 2013). Alexithymia is a multi-faceted and 
dimensional personality trait characterised by impairments in accurately identifying and 
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describing feelings, separating feelings from other bodily sensations, and sharing emotions 
within close relationships. Additionally, alexithymia is characterised by having a poor fantasy 
life preferentially thinking about external facts rather than internal conditions (Taylor, Bagby, 
& Parker, 2003). Alexithymia may exacerbate many of the social-communicative 
impairments found in ASD, such as impairments in emotion sharing. Alexithymia is relevant 
to the study of empathy because it can affect an individual’s ability to report on feelings of 
empathy, and to identify emotions in others (Cook, Brewer, Shah, & Bird, 2013; Lane et al., 
1996; Lane, Sechrest, Riedel, Shapiro, & Kaszniak, 2000). Importantly, alexithymia seems to 
characterise a discrete subgroup of individuals with ASD, rather than alexithymia always 
being associated with high amounts of ASD traits (Bird & Cook, 2013). I will return to 
alexithymia later in this chapter when I discuss task performance on empathy measures in 
ASD.  
Summary 
ASD is neurodevelopmental disorder that presents throughout the lifespan with social-
communication deficits and restricted or repetitive behaviours. The social-communication 
deficits in ASD seem particularly important to understanding the condition: From its earliest 
identification, clinicians have commented on the social nature of the disorder. The original 
description of autism was of an “inability to relate… in the ordinary way to people and 
situations” (Kanner, 1943, p. 242). However, social deficits are not limited to those 
diagnosed with ASD: The normal distribution of social-communication abilities within the 
general population has lead researchers to propose that studies should investigate identifiable 
constructs within the social domain in the whole population, not just the diagnostic category 
of ASD. One such construct which is proposed to underlie social functioning is empathy 
(Baron-Cohen, 2009; C. Gillberg, 1996). I therefore turn the discussion to the function and 
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importance of empathy, separate the different constructs commonly called empathy, and 
evaluate the evidence for deficits in empathy in ASD.  
The Function and Importance of Empathy 
Empathy involves a wide range of behaviours, feelings, and thoughts that allow 
individuals to recognise and respond appropriately to the emotional state of others (Carter, 
Harris, & Porges, 2009). Increased empathy is associated with cooperation, sharing, 
provision of help and support, and reduced aggression (Carlo, Allen, & Buhman, 1999; 
Eisenberg et al., 1989; Gini, Albiero, Benelli, & Altoè, 2007; Sze, Gyurak, Goodkind, & 
Levenson, 2012; Tone & Tully, 2014). Empathy is also related to increased social 
engagement and improved peer relationships (Bailey, Henry, & Von Hippel, 2008; Zhou, 
Hou, Zhou, & Chen, 2011).  
What is Empathy?  
Despite the obvious importance of empathy for social functioning, it is not easy to 
define empathy. Empathy has been conceptualised in many different ways, and there is a lot 
of controversy around what does and does not constitute empathy. The definition of empathy 
used in this thesis is similar to that of Decety (2011), who divides empathy into affective 
empathy, cognitive empathy and self-regulation. This definition was chosen because his 
components of empathy have strong support from the neurobiological and developmental 
literature (Carter et al., 2009; Decety, 2011; Decety & Jackson, 2004). Not all researchers 
follow this definition of empathy, and disagreement on the processes involved in empathy 
has shaped research in some areas, such as in ASD. I will return to this point later in the 
chapter; first, I examine each of the three constituent parts of empathy as defined here, and 




Affective empathy is the ability to be affected by and share another’s emotional state 
(Decety & Svetlova, 2012). This sharing of another’s emotion is thought to facilitate bonding 
and encourage perspective-taking and prosocial behaviour. Basic affective empathy is already 
present in infancy (Davidov, Zahn-Waxler, Roth-Hanania, & Knafo, 2013; Geangu, Benga, 
Stahl, & Striano, 2011; Geangu, Hauf, Bhardwaj, & Bentz, 2011; Roth-Hanania, Davidov, & 
Zahn-Waxler, 2011) and in non-human animals (Bartal, Decety, & Mason, 2011; Campbell 
& de Waal, 2014; Parr, 2001). Hence, cognitive empathy, which requires higher-order 
cognitive processes, is not necessary to feel affective empathy. However, some self-other 
distinction and emotion regulation seems important for affective empathy to lead to prosocial 
behaviour, as these behaviours do not usually emerge before age 2 in humans (Brownell, 
2013; Roth-Hanania et al., 2011) and are linked to levels of self-awareness (Bagby, Taylor, & 
Parker, 1994; Bird et al., 2010; Grynberg, Luminet, Corneille, Grèzes, & Berthoz, 2010; 
Moriguchi et al., 2007). This awareness of where the emotion originated from separates 
affective empathy from emotional contagion, also termed emotion mimicry. The latter 
construct does not require any reflection on the origin of the emotion. In practise, however, 
this awareness can be hard to ascertain, and furthermore, rudimentary self-other 
differentiation is already present during infancy and even in the neonatal period (Butterworth, 
1992; Dondi, Simion, & Caltran, 1999). Therefore, the key difference in outcome between 
affective empathy and emotional contagion may lie in ability to self-regulate. 
Automatic affective empathy responses to others’ emotions need to be down-
regulated by higher-order self-regulation mechanisms in order to facilitate empathic concern 
and prosocial behaviour. Hence, self-regulation is included as a key component of empathy 
within this definition. Preston and de Waal argue that “the outcome of empathic processes is 
not always positive… [contagion] effects have profound practical importance, since the 
spread of emotion from one individual to another may be a source of error in social 
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interactions.” (2002, p. 14). Perception of negative emotions in a target can lead to negative 
emotions such as anxiety or anger in an observer, even if the target’s state was not directed at 
the observer. In other words, affective empathy may lead either to (other-oriented) empathic 
concern or (self-oriented) personal distress, or a mixture of these two states (Davidov et al., 
2013). Which of these responses it leads to is influenced by the individual’s capacity for 
emotion regulation. Emotion regulation refers to the modulation of experienced or expressed 
emotion in the service of goal-directed behaviour and can occur via cognitive, neural, or 
physiological means (Miller, Seifer, Crossin, & Lebourgeois, 2015; White et al., 2014). This 
thesis will focus on the physiological component of self-regulation within empathy; in 
particular, the ability to regulate autonomic threat responses when seeing another’s pain.  
If affective arousal is appropriately regulated, the observer may feel empathic concern 
for someone in distress, and show prosocial, helping behaviour and attachment (Batson, 
2009; Decety & Svetlova, 2012; Eisenberg, Eggum, & Di Giunta, 2010). Whereas affective 
empathy is defined as feeling as another, empathic concern or sympathy is defined as feeling 
for another; stated differently, affective empathy is an emotional response, whereas empathic 
concern is the motivation to help another (Cuff, Brown, Taylor, & Howat, 2014; de 
Vignemont & Singer, 2006). It involves showing concern for others’ sadness, pain or distress, 
and is correlated with altruistic and helping behaviour (Batson, 2009; Decety & Svetlova, 
2012; Eisenberg et al., 2010). Empathic concern arises from appropriately regulated affective 
empathy, and can be heightened by cognitive empathy, but does not require sophisticated 
cognition (de Waal, 2008): Cats, dogs, primates and infants from the age of 6-8 months all 
express concern for others showing signs of pain, distress or sadness (Davidov et al., 2013; 
de Waal, 2008; Romero, Castellanos, & de Waal, 2010; Roth-Hanania et al., 2011). 
Furthermore, apes, children, dogs, and certain birds reconcile after fighting (Cools, Van 
Hout, & Nelissen, 2008; de Waal, 2008; Fraser & Bugnyar, 2011; Zahn-Waxler & Radke-
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Yarrow, 1990). Thus, empathic concern does not seem to require sophisticated cognitive 
empathy, but does require regulation of affective empathy. 
Without appropriate down-regulation of affective arousal, the observer may 
personally feel distressed. In contrast to empathic concern, during personal distress the 
observer’s focus is primarily self-directed, and concerned with their own welfare. For 
example, contagious crying in babies in response to the cries of others is thought to be due to 
poor self-regulation leading to distress (Davidov et al., 2013). Personal distress leads to 
avoidance or comfort-seeking behaviour and is associated with lower levels of dispositional 
helpfulness (Fabes, Eisenberg, & Eisenbud, 1993; Liew et al., 2011). Personal distress is 
thought to interfere with empathic concern by depleting attentional and cognitive resources 
and motivation to help (Decety & Svetlova, 2012; DeWall, Baumeister, Gailliot, & Maner, 
2008). Studies have found that starting from 1 year of age, children’s personal distress 
decreases and helping behaviours towards others increase (Davidov et al., 2013; Zahn-
Waxler & Radke-Yarrow, 1990). Although empathy involves some level of personal distress 
(Preston & de Waal, 2002), the key is that distress needs to be regulated for the observer’s 
affective state to lead to prosocial behaviour. 
Cognitive empathy involves conscious, purposeful awareness of others’ mental states 
without necessarily resonating with that state (Mazza et al., 2014). Some theorists limit 
cognitive empathy to the understanding of others’ emotions, while others use the term more 
generally to refer to the understanding of all mental states, including understanding beliefs, 
desires, and knowledge. This broader definition overlaps with the definition of theory of 
mind; the ability to understand that others have mental states and that these mental states lead 
to actions (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985; Premack & Woodruff, 1978). Here I use 
cognitive empathy to denote awareness of any mental state. Cognitive empathy includes the 
ability to imagine another’s thoughts and feelings (i.e., to take the perspective of the other) or 
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to imagine how you might feel if you were in the position of the other person (Batson, Early, 
& Salvarani, 1997; Lamm, Batson, & Decety, 2007). It also includes being able to accurately 
guess at another’s mental state given their posture, facial expressions or behaviour 
(Deschamps, Been, & Matthys, 2014; Schulte-Rüther et al., 2010; Schwenck et al., 2012). 
These abilities have at different times also been called emotion recognition, empathic 
understanding, or empathic accuracy (Ardizzi et al., 2013; Ponnet, Buysse, Roeyers, & De 
Corte, 2005). Other cognitive empathy tasks include understanding social intentions and faux 
pas (Baron-Cohen, 2008; Baron-Cohen, O’Riordan, Stone, Jones, & Plaisted, 1999). 
Evidence of very primitive cognitive empathy, such as distinguishing facial emotions (Field, 
Woodson, Greenberg, & Cohen, 1982), is present in the first year of life. However, cognitive 
empathy develops most rapidly from 2 years of age, and keeps developing throughout 
childhood and adolescence (Butterworth, 1992; Flavell, 1999).  
The affective, cognitive, and regulatory components of empathy are separate 
components that arise from different neural regions and have different developmental 
trajectories (Decety & Jackson, 2004; Decety & Meyer, 2008), with affective empathy 
appearing early in infancy and self-regulation and cognitive empathy developing throughout 
childhood. Empathic concern arises from the interplay of these components. It requires 
affective empathy and self-regulation, but in its most basic form, only requires rudimentary 
cognitive empathy. These components can be separately affected, as is the case in 
psychopathy, where cognitive empathy is intact and affective empathy and empathic concern 
are disrupted (Blair, 2008). Additionally, empathy can be thought of as both a disposition, or 
trait, and a specific state of being (Cuff et al., 2014). Stated differently, individuals are 
thought to differ in the levels of cognitive, affective and self-regulatory empathy which they 
can draw upon in a given situation (trait empathy). However, the magnitude of an 
individual’s empathic response may vary between different situations, depending on the 
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context (state empathy). Another related concept to empathy is muscle mimicry. Whereas 
empathic concern is the motivation to act on empathy, muscle mimicry is the unconscious, 
nonverbal communication of empathy. Mimicry is the propensity to imitate others’ facial 
expressions, tone of voice, and body language (Hess & Fischer, 2014). For example, the 
muscles involved in frowning are activated when watching facial expressions of sadness or 
anger. Empathy and mimicry are closely related, and though they are often equated, in this 
thesis I follow Hess’s distinction that affective empathy is the sharing of an emotional state, 
whereas mimicry is the imitation of bodily movements. Mimicry is unconscious and 
involuntary (Dimberg, Thunberg, & Elmehed, 2000), but not indiscriminate: In agreement 
with the argument that mimicry is a way to show others that you empathise (Hess & Fischer, 
2014), mimicry is context dependent and increases in the presence of those with whom we 
feel greater affiliation. In neurotypical adults, higher trait affective and cognitive empathy 
scores are associated with increased muscle mimicry (Dimberg & Thunberg, 2012; Likowski, 
Mühlberger, Seibt, Pauli, & Weyers, 2011; Sonnby–Borgström, 2002). Moreover, like 
affective empathy, there is evidence that mimicry facilitates social bonding: It increases 
liking and perceived similarity, and enhances social interaction and prosocial behaviour 
(Duffy & Chartrand, 2015; Hess & Fischer, 2013; Lakin & Chartrand, 2003). To summarise 
then, the core facets of empathy – affect, cognition, regulation – involve the process of 
becoming aware of another’s mental state and feeling as another; empathic concern is the 
motivation to act on this feeling, and mimicry is the communication of the feeling to others. 
Having defined empathy and its related constructs, I now turn to empathy in ASD. Empathy 
has been approached from a different perspective in ASD, with important repercussions for 
how the condition is described and researched. 
Empathy in ASD 
16 
 
A disagreement in definitions.  Neurobiological perspectives of empathy such as 
those of Decety (Decety & Jackson, 2004; Decety & Svetlova, 2012) and de Waal (2008) 
postulate that affective arousal sharing develops before cognitive empathy, and is not 
dependent on the latter. When observing another’s emotion, affective empathy also occurs 
more quickly - nearly instantaneously and automatically - than cognitive appraisal of the 
other’s mental state. However, other researchers, particularly those working within the autism 
field, have defined empathy in a way that puts the affective response to others’ states last. For 
example, Lazarus et al. defines empathy as “sharing another’s feelings by placing oneself 
psychologically in that person’s circumstance” (cited in Cuff et al., 2014, p. 3). Frith writes 
that “empathy presupposes, amongst other things, a recognition of mental states” (Frith, 
2003, p. 145). These definitions assume that a cognitive understanding of others’ minds must 
be present before any affective arousal sharing can take place. These researchers’ viewpoint 
that understanding others’ mental states allows for affective arousal sharing is heavily 
influenced by 18th century philosophers such as Adam Smith, whose stance is given in the 
following paragraph: 
“As we have no immediate experience of what other men feel, we can form no idea of 
the manner in which they are affected, but by conceiving what we ourselves should 
feel in the like situation. Though our brother is upon the rack, as long as we ourselves 
are at our ease, our senses will never inform us of what he suffers…it is by the 
imagination only that we can form any conception of what are his sensations…by the 
imagination we place ourselves in his situation, we conceive ourselves enduring all 
the same torments, we enter as it were into his body, and become in some measure the 
same person with him, and thence form some idea of his sensations, and even feel 
something which, though weaker in degree, is not altogether unlike them. … it is by 
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changing places in fancy with the sufferer, that we come either to conceive or to be 
affected by what he feels” (A. Smith, 1790, pp. 4–5) 
Adam Smith’s (1790) works have influenced the emphasis on fantasy, imagination 
and perspective-taking in some definitions of empathy (e.g., Davis, 1980). Unfortunately, the 
idea that cognitive empathy is necessary for affective empathy is not supported by modern 
developmental and biological studies that show that activation of affective neural areas 
happens automatically, and that affective arousal sharing is present in babies and animals, 
where complex cognitive perspective-taking skills are not developed (e.g., Bartal et al., 2011; 
Roth-Hanania et al., 2011). In fact, A. Smith himself commented that “upon some occasions 
sympathy may seem to arise merely from the view of a certain emotion in another person. 
The passions, upon some occasions, may seem to be transfused from one man to another, 
instantaneously and antecedent to any knowledge of what excited them in the person 
principally concerned” (A. Smith, 1790, p. 6). 
Because of the assumption that understanding leads to feeling, most previous research 
on empathy in ASD has heavily emphasized cognitive empathy tasks such as emotion 
recognition. Self-report measures such as the Empathy Quotient (Baron-Cohen & 
Wheelright, 2004) heavily favour questions on the attribution of mental states. Working from 
this perspective, Baron-Cohen and others (Baron-Cohen, 2009; C. Gillberg, 1992, 1996) have 
argued that there is a global deficit in empathy in ASD. However, I will argue that this is a 
one-sided view of the literature and the evidence needs to be re-examined from a 
developmental, multifaceted (affective, cognitive, motivation, regulation) perspective of 
empathy. I will review the evidence for intact or deficient cognitive empathy, affective 
empathy, self-regulation, and empathic concern in ASD, and discuss how these findings fit 
with theories of empathy in ASD. 
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A new look at empathy in ASD. Baron-Cohen and others (Baron-Cohen, 2009; C. 
Gillberg, 1992, 1996) have argued that there is a global deficit in empathy in ASD. There is 
long-standing evidence that cognitive empathy is impaired in ASD: Many individuals with 
ASD have deficits in recognising emotions from pictures or videos of faces (Harms, Martin, 
& Wallace, 2010). Likewise, it has been well established that most individuals with ASD 
struggle with cognitive perspective-taking tasks, attribution of intention, and understanding 
complex social situations, such as social faux pas (e.g., Abell, Happé, & Frith, 2000; Baron-
Cohen et al., 1999; Dahlgren & Trillingsgaard, 1996; Dziobek et al., 2006; Kaland et al., 
2002), though some individuals do perform well on the aforementioned tasks (Happé & Frith, 
1996; Harms et al., 2010; Kuroda et al., 2011; Ozonoff & McEvoy, 1994; Paynter & 
Peterson, 2010). There is also evidence for reduced ability to deduce the thoughts and 
emotions of a conversational partner in a real-life, structured social situation in ASD 
(Demurie, De Corel, & Roeyers, 2011; Ponnet, Roeyers, Buysse, De Clercq, & Van Der 
Heyden, 2004; Roeyers, Buysse, Ponnet, & Pichal, 2001). In sum, there is good evidence that 
this aspect of empathy is impaired in ASD. 
Although studies have generally demonstrated impairments in cognitive empathy in 
ASD (e.g., Baron-Cohen, 2000; Mathersul, McDonald, & Rushby, 2013; C. Peterson, 2014), 
the case for impaired affective empathy is much less firm. Contrary to the global empathy 
deficit hypothesis, most studies find intact self-reported or observer-reported affective 
empathy (e.g., de Coster, Wiersema, Deschrijver, & Brass, n.d.; Deschamps et al., 2014; 
Jones, Happé, Gilbert, Burnett, & Viding, 2010; Rogers, Dziobek, Hassenstab, Wolf, & 
Convit, 2006; Schwenck et al., 2012). Studies that do show reduced self-report trait affective 
empathy in ASD (Demurie et al., 2011; Lombardo, Barnes, Wheelwright, & Baron-Cohen, 
2007; Mathersul et al., 2013b) or in persons with greater autism traits (aan het Rot & 
Hogenelst, 2014), have often not controlled for factors such as alexithymia, which is 
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negatively correlated with affective empathy. Thus, impaired affective empathy may only be 
present in a subgroup of ASD individuals with alexithymia, and may not be characteristic of 
ASD per se (Bird et al., 2010; Silani et al., 2008).  
As alexithymia and communication difficulties may confound self-report of empathy 
in ASD, researchers have also investigated affective reactions such as autonomic arousal or 
brain activation to empathy-inducing stimuli (e.g., viewing facial emotions or distress). At 
the physiological level, children with autism show appropriate autonomic arousal to the 
distress cues of others (Blair, 1999), do not show differences in overall levels of arousal when 
viewing facial emotions (though they may show less habituation; Mathersul, McDonald, & 
Rushby, 2013a), and show no differences in empathic brain activity once alexithymia has 
been controlled for (Bird et al., 2010; Hadjikhani et al., 2014). The results from these studies 
suggest that affective empathy is at least intact. Results from other studies suggest that 
affective empathy responses may even be heightened in ASD: Several studies have found 
increased threat-related arousal changes in children with ASD to social interactions with a 
novel person (Neuhaus, Bernier, & Beauchaine, 2015; Vaughan Van Hecke et al., 2009), to 
social stressors (Edmiston, Jones, & Corbett, 2016), and when viewing others’ pain (Gu et 
al., 2015). In sum, the weight of physiological evidence suggests that affective empathy is 
intact or even heightened in ASD. The inconsistency in results, and occasional threat-like 
responses seen in social behaviour, suggest that individuals with ASD may have impaired 
regulation of affective empathy. This proposition will be discussed further in the next section. 
Most studies of muscle mimicry have found that both spontaneous and voluntary 
imitation of expressions are intact in high-functioning individuals with ASD (Deschamps, 
Coppes, Kenemans, Schutter, & Matthys, 2015; Magnée, De Gelder, Van Engeland, & 
Kemner, 2007; Press, Richardson, & Bird, 2010; Rozga, King, Vuduc, & Robins, 2013). 
Though some studies found impaired (McIntosh, Reichmann-Decker, Winkielman, & 
20 
 
Wilbarger, 2006) or delayed (Oberman, Winkielman, & Ramachandran, 2009) spontaneous 
mimicry, these results are inconsistent and have not been replicated. These studies suggest 
that individuals with ASD show nonconscious communication of shared affect. 
At the behavioural level, the results in favour of intact versus impaired empathic 
concern are mixed. Children with ASD show displays of basic empathic responsiveness, such 
as concern or comforting behaviour, when observing others in distress (Scheeren, Koot, 
Mundy, Mous, & Begeer, 2013; though see C. Peterson, 2014). Furthermore, Deschamps and 
colleagues (2014) reported equal prosocial behaviour in a computer-based task in ASD and 
neurotypical groups. At other times, individuals with ASD seem to show less concern for 
others in distress (Hobson, Harris, García-Pérez, & Hobson, 2009; Sigman, Kasari, Kwon, & 
Yirmiya, 1992). Parents also report less prosocial behaviour in children with ASD (Scheeren 
et al., 2013). Again, these inconsistencies may be due to poor self-regulation coupled with 
intact or heightened affective responses in ASD, leading sometimes to empathic concern and 
prosocial behaviour, and other times to personal distress. In this conceptualisation, neither 
affective empathy nor empathic concern is impaired in ASD per se, but how stressful the 
situation is perceived to be, and how well the individual regulates this distress, influences the 
outcome. 
The self-regulation aspect of empathy has almost completely been overlooked in 
ASD. Many studies have implicated poor general emotion regulation in a range of emotional 
and behavioural problems in ASD, including anxiety, aggression, and depression (see Weiss, 
Thomson, & Chan, 2014; White et al., 2014). Imaging studies suggest that brain areas 
involved in regulation, such as the prefrontal cortex and amygdala, are abnormally activated 
in ASD (Mazefsky et al., 2013). These findings from the general emotion regulation literature 
suggest that self-regulation of empathy may be impaired in ASD. Three previous studies have 
addressed issues around self-regulation of empathy in ASD: First, there is some self-report 
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evidence of heightened trait distress in ASD (Rogers et al., 2006). Second, two neuroimaging 
studies found heightened brain and autonomic activation when actively watching others’ 
pain, which they argue stem from a reduction in self-inhibition of areas related to self-other 
representations (Y.-T. Fan, Chen, Chen, Decety, & Cheng, 2014; Gu et al., 2015). In short, 
though self-regulation of empathic responses has rarely been studied in ASD, findings of 
general emotion dysregulation suggest that this is an area that needs further investigation. 
From a neurobiological perspective, there is little evidence of global empathy deficits 
in ASD. Though cognitive empathy and emotion regulation may be impaired, affective 
empathy appears intact or heightened. If self-regulation is impaired, it would explain why 
empathic concern sometimes seems to be present in ASD and at other times not. This 
hypothesis is similar to that of a different Adam Smith’s (2009) theory, the empathy 
imbalance hypothesis of ASD, wherein cognitive empathy is impaired but affective empathy 
is heightened, but places emphasis on the critical role of self-regulation in the pathway from 
affective empathy to either empathic concern or personal distress. Whereas A. Smith (2009) 
hypothesises that cognitive empathy regulates affective responses, I view regulatory 
processes as much more broad than purely cognitive mechanisms, though an understanding 
of other minds can of course influence affective responses (e.g., perception of intent 
modulates empathic reactions; Akitsuki & Decety, 2009; Singer et al., 2006). Self-regulation 
can take place at the cognitive level, through strategies such as reappraisal and distraction, as 
well as at the autonomic level (White et al., 2014). I will focus on autonomic regulation in 
this thesis. In the next section I will discuss how resting state physiological regulation primes 
the individual for social engagement and emotion regulation, and what this means for the 




Physiological Afferents and Efferents of Empathy 
Physiological Mechanisms of Empathy  
The perception-action model (Preston & de Waal, 2002) posits that perceiving others’ 
actions or emotion states (via their facial expressions and body language or via abstract 
representations) automatically and unconsciously activates brain areas responsible for the 
representation of those actions or states in the observer. This activation leads to activation of 
motor areas, autonomic arousal and activation of affective states in the observer. There is 
ample evidence that the perception of emotions or pain in others leads to neuronal activation 
responsible for perceiving own emotions and pain (Azevedo et al., 2013; Singer et al., 2004; 
Wicker et al., 2003), as well as the sensorimotor brain areas involved in muscle activation 
(Avenanti et al., 2005; Marcoux, Michon, Voisin, Lemelin, & Jackson, 2013). In other words, 
empathy is associated with measurable physiological changes in the central and peripheral 
nervous systems (Carter et al., 2009). Hence, empathy can be tested by measuring peripheral 
physiology, and resting state physiological arousal may influence the experience of affective 
empathy. 
Preston and de Waal (2002) speculate that empathy processes likely follow two 
pathways: A fast, reflexive sub-cortical (and therefore unconscious) pathway leading to 
affective arousal sharing (affective empathy), and a slower cortical pathway that is 
responsible for cognitive empathy. Although the activation of empathic pathways happens 
spontaneously in the observer, it can be regulated: Neuronal activation differs for people who 
are more similar to us or whom we have stronger affiliations with (Singer et al., 2006) and 
decreases with increased exposure, such as in the case of physicians perceiving painful 
stimuli of others (Cheng et al., 2007; Decety, Yang, & Cheng, 2010). These observations 
have lead researchers to speculate that emotion regulation takes place both at the slower, 
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cortical level and at the bottom-up level, before affective empathy occurs (Blair, 2011; 
Decety & Svetlova, 2012). A major focus of this thesis is bottom-up autonomic regulation of 
empathy. 
Autonomic Regulation and Empathy  
Empathic concern is not just a dispositional factor, but can change from moment to 
moment depending on environmental and physiological factors. For example, non-optimal 
physiological arousal can result in lower motivation to care for another, poorer perception of 
another’s mental state, or high personal distress (Liew et al., 2011; Park & Thayer, 2014; 
Zahn-Waxler, Cole, Welsh, & Fox, 1995). Imagine, for example, that you are in a shopping 
centre, you are tired and hungry, and a child in front of you is crying. Though at other times 
you may feel concern for the child and wish to console it, you may now instead feel 
mounting distress or annoyance. You may also fail to appropriately perceive the mental state 
of the child’s mother, who may feel embarrassed. Your response in this situation may be very 
different from that in another situation where you are physiologically in a better position to 
regulate your own affective responses. Thus the measurement of resting state physiology is 
an important indicator of the capacity for state affective empathy and concern, cognitive self-
regulation, and even cognitive empathy, which is most often thought of as a trait rather than 
state variable.  
This section outlines the argument that baseline autonomic regulation affects our 
cognitive and affective processes, including our capacity for empathy and our ability to 
regulate affective states. I will discuss two models linking autonomic regulation to personal 
and social emotion regulation; namely, the neurovisceral integration model and polyvagal 
theory. Secondly, I will discuss the evidence that autonomic dysregulation may contribute to 
the combination of reduced cognitive empathy and self-regulation seen in ASD.  
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The neurovisceral integration (Thayer & Lane, 2000, 2009) and polyvagal (Porges, 
1992, 2001, 2003b) theories propose that the autonomic nervous system plays an integral role 
in emotional arousal and regulation, as well as flexible responding. The two theories have 
much in common and share many of their predictions, so they will be discussed together here. 
To give some background, the autonomic nervous system is divided into two systems that can 
work cooperatively or antagonistically. The sympathetic nervous system allows orientation to 
salient stimuli and initiates a ‘fight or flight’ reaction in response to threatening situations, 
which includes heart rate acceleration, increased cardiac output and increased skin 
conductance. The parasympathetic system is active during calm, restful states and digestion, 
and is associated with heart rate deceleration.  
In healthy individuals, both the sympathetic and parasympathetic systems are active at 
rest so that the individual has sufficient flexibility to respond to any situation. However, the 
resting state inhibition of heart rate by the parasympathetic system is particularly important 
for cardiac responsiveness and flexibility (Thayer & Lane, 2000) as parasympathetic arousal 
has a shorter latency period and wider chronotropic range (Appelhans & Luecken, 2006; 
Berntson, Cacioppo, Quigley, & Fabro, 1994). High parasympathetic arousal allows efficient 
energy exchange and cardiac responsiveness (Grossman & Taylor, 2007), and is indicative of 
the organism’s capacity to integrate behavioural and metabolic demands. Chronic 
sympathetic arousal without appropriate parasympathetic down-regulation is also undesirable 
as a continuous stress response can lead to sleep disturbances, burnout and chronic fatigue in 
the long term (Malpas, 2010; Melamed et al., 1999; Wyller, Eriksen, & Malterud, 2009). 
The central tenet of the neurovisceral integration theory is the reciprocal connectivity 
between the heart and the Central Autonomic Network. The Central Autonomic Network, 
comprising of, among others, the insular cortex, ventromedial prefrontal cortex and the 
amygdala, is implicated in emotion perception, inhibition and regulation of arousal (Adolphs, 
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2008; Etkin, Egner, & Kalisch, 2011; Kohn et al., 2014; Wu et al., 2016). The components of 
the Central Autonomic Network are reciprocally interconnected to the sinoatrial node of the 
heart via the vagus nerve and stellar ganglia (Benarroch, 1993; Thayer, Hansen, Saus-Rose, 
& Johnsen, 2009), meaning that the Central Autonomic Network both sends output to and 
receives input from the autonomic nervous system, so that there are continuous positive and 
negative feedback loops between these brain areas and the heart (Sakaki et al., 2016; Thayer 
& Lane, 2000). Dysregulation of vagally-mediated parasympathetic arousal, or cardiac vagal 
control (also called vagal cardiac tone), can lead to dysregulation at its efferent sites in the 
Central Autonomic Network, disrupting functioning in the areas related to emotion 
perception and regulation (e.g., Brosschot, Van Dijk, & Thayer, 2007; Melzig, Weike, 
Hamm, & Thayer, 2009).  
Two predictions from the neurovisceral integration and polyvagal theories are of 
particular importance to empathy. The neurovisceral integration model stresses the 
importance of resting state parasympathetic inhibition of the Central Autonomic Network in 
emotion regulation. As discussed previously, regulation of affective empathy plays a large 
role in feeling empathic concern for a target and inhibiting personal distress. Whereas the 
neurovisceral integration model mainly focuses on intra-personal self-regulation and 
emotions, the polyvagal theory extends the work on self-regulation of emotion to predict 
social behaviour. The polyvagal theory (Porges, 2003a, 2003b) emphasises that, through 
vagus nerve efferents to the pharynx, larynx and neck, and connectivity with ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex areas (Hänsel & von Känel, 2008), cardiac vagal control influences 
“affective experience, emotional expression, facial gestures, vocal communication, and 
contingent social behaviour” (Carter et al., 2009, p. 170). In other words, optimal cardiac 
vagal regulation predicts well-regulated social behaviour. As empathic emotions result from 
the same physiological processes as self-emotions, the two theories’ predictions can be 
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expanded to affective empathy and its regulation. The predictions that both resting state 
parasympathetic inhibition of the Central Autonomic Network and changes in cardiac vagal 
regulation are involved in (1) emotion regulation, and (2) affective experience and social-
communicative behaviour, suggest that parasympathetic regulation is critical to the 
experience of empathy, and in particular the regulatory component of empathy.  
Parasympathetic arousal. Parasympathetic regulation is hypothesised to be strongly 
associated with emotion regulation ability and social engagement. Parasympathetic influence 
on heart rate, or cardiac vagal control, can be estimated non-invasively by measuring changes 
in heart rate variability. Heart rate variability reflects the beat-to-beat changes in heart rate 
associated with respiration (Cacioppo, Tassinary, & Berntson, 2007). High-frequency heart 
rate variability, or respiratory sinus arrhythmia (RSA), is mainly under parasympathetic 
control (Grossman & Taylor, 2007), and is associated with a slowing in heart rate1. In other 
words, high RSA is indicative of high parasympathetic arousal and is reflective of the 
functioning of the Central Autonomic Network (Napadow et al., 2008). 
Higher resting state RSA and lower heart rate are associated with greater 
assertiveness, prosocial emotions, and social competence (Beauchaine, Gatzke-Kopp, & 
Mead, 2007; Kogan et al., 2014; Kok & Fredrickson, 2010; Stellar, Cohen, Oveis, & Keltner, 
2015). Higher resting state RSA is also associated with frequency of social support seeking, 
self-regulation (Geisler, Kubiak, Siewert, & Weber, 2013), trait agreeableness and positivity 
(Oveis et al., 2009; Z. Wang, Lü, & Qin, 2013), joint attention, and conventional gestures 
(Patriquin, Scarpa, Friedman, & Porges, 2013). Furthermore, higher resting state RSA is 
correlated with better attentional, affective, and behavioural regulation (Butler, Wilhelm, & 
Gross, 2006; Porges, 1992; Segerstrom & Nes, 2007). The evidence therefore suggests that 
                                                   
1 RSA does not exclusively indicate vagal tone: RSA is influenced by respiration rate and tidal volume, even 
under relatively sedentary conditions. RSA is also influenced by beta-sympathetic arousal (Berntson, Cacioppo, 
& Grossman, 2007; Grossman & Taylor, 2007). However, RSA can be used as an indicator of phasic cardiac 
vagal control when respiratory factors are controlled. 
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greater vagally-mediated resting state parasympathetic regulation, or vagal cardiac control, 
enhances affective regulation and primes the individual for better social interactions.  
Despite the literature on resting state RSA and social competence, very few studies 
have measured the association between RSA and empathy. Given the association between 
RSA, social engagement and regulation, resting state RSA should also predict the capacity to 
regulate affective empathy. Thus, high resting state RSA should be associated with higher 
empathic concern and lower personal distress (as argued in Diamond et al., 2012). In 
agreement with this hypothesis, an early study found that typically developing girls (though 
not boys) with high heart rate variability2 to a neutral stimulus had greater dispositional 
empathic concern and lower self-reported distress (Fabes et al., 1993). Similarly, high resting 
state RSA showed a small but significant correlation with empathic concern in neurotypical 
toddlers (Liew et al., 2011). Others have suggested that resting state RSA may be associated 
with cognitive empathy: Children with ASD who had higher resting state RSA had better 
emotion recognition, as well as better conventional gestures, communication, and social skills 
(Bal et al., 2010; Patriquin, Lorenzi, Scarpa, & Bell, 2014; Vaughan Van Hecke et al., 2009). 
However, a study of neurotypical mother-adolescent dyads found that resting state RSA only 
predicted empathic sensitivity (similar to my definition of cognitive empathy, though limited 
to the perception of affective states) in adolescents with low attachment anxiety (Diamond et 
al., 2012). A recent set of studies in neurotypical adults also found inconsistent relations 
between resting state RSA and empathic concern (Stellar et al., 2015). Thus, it is not clear 
whether a significant association between resting state RSA and empathy exists. Certainly, 
results from the broader literature suggest that such a link should exist: Reduced resting state 
RSA is associated with blunting of subjective emotional reactions (Sollers et al., 1997, in 
Thayer & Lane, 2000) and disruptive behaviour disorder with callous-unemotional traits, 
                                                   
2 These authors do not specify whether they measured high-frequency heart rate variability. Thus this variability 
may also be reflective of changes in sympathetic arousal. 
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where lack of empathy is a defining feature (Beauchaine et al., 2007; de Wied, Boxtel, 
Matthys, & Meeus, 2011). Clearly, more research on the association between resting state 
RSA and empathy is needed. The association between empathy and cardiac vagal control 
may also be more evident during changes in arousal to empathy-inducing stimuli. 
Parasympathetic responsiveness, or cardiac vagal reactivity, is also thought to be 
important for regulating empathy. Cardiac vagal reactivity is hypothesised to reflect attention 
and effortful emotion regulation (Liew et al., 2011; Porges, 1992). There is strong evidence 
for RSA withdrawal, or decreases in RSA, during concentration and to stressors such as 
mental arithmetic tasks (Berntson et al., 1994; Chen, Matthews, Salomon, & Ewart, 2002), 
and as such, many studies have specifically focused on RSA withdrawal when examining 
cardiac vagal reactivity (e.g., Muhtadie, Koslov, Akinola, & Mendes, 2015). However, there 
is inconsistent evidence for the association between RSA reactivity and empathy, or more 
broadly, social engagement. RSA withdrawal in response to empathy-inducing stimuli has 
been associated with lower affective displays of concern, and greater distress and freezing 
responses (Gill & Calkins, 2003; Kreibig, 2010; Liew et al., 2011). Additionally, RSA 
withdrawal has mostly been associated with reduced social engagement and fewer prosocial 
behaviours in threatening social environments (Muhtadie et al., 2015; Obradović, Bush, 
Stamperdahl, Adler, & Boyce, 2010). In keeping with the idea that RSA withdrawal could be 
an index of greater threat, one study found RSA withdrawal in typically developing children 
during social interaction with a stranger (a potentially distressing situation), but increasing 
RSA during interaction with a familiar partner (positive situation; Neuhaus et al., 2015). 
Similarly, empathic concern to sad empathy-eliciting stimuli is associated with increases in 
RSA, or RSA augmentation (Hastings & Miller, 2014; Kreibig, 2010). RSA augmentation 
has also been associated (albeit inconsistently) with verbal and non-verbal expressions of 
empathic concern (Stellar et al., 2015). Thus, there is tentative evidence of correlations 
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between RSA withdrawal and distress, as well as with RSA augmentation and feelings of 
sadness or empathic concern. 
Inconsistent findings may be explained by the fact that although the two autonomic 
systems are both continuously active, studies have often only measured one type of response. 
It is important to measure the interaction of the two systems to understand elicited emotions 
(Alkon et al., 2003; Beauchaine et al., 2007; Berntson et al., 1994). For example, non-crying 
sadness generally corresponds to sympathetic and parasympathetic co-activation, whereas 
fear corresponds to sympathetic activation with concomitant parasympathetic inhibition (see 
Kreibig, 2010, for a review). It is critical to examine both parasympathetic and sympathetic 
contributions to autonomic function when measuring physiological reactivity. With this in 
mind, I turn to a discussion of the behavioural and affective correlates of sympathetic arousal. 
Sympathetic arousal. The main focus in studies of autonomic regulation of 
behaviour, affect and cognition has been the parasympathetic system. However, as discussed 
in the previous section, this system works in conjunction with the sympathetic system. 
Inconsistencies in autonomic arousal findings may partly be due to studying only one half of 
the regulation that occurs at any one time, as well as from neglecting to separate sympathetic 
from parasympathetic influences. For example, RSA augmentation is not only associated 
with concern, but also with externalising behaviours in children (Hinnant & El-Sheikh, 
2009). However, this association changes when taking sympathetic activity into account:  
Increased cardiac vagal control in the presence of increased sympathetic activity to stressors 
(i.e., autonomic co-activation) is associated with lower family conflict and child conduct 
problems (Salomon, Matthews, & Allen, 2000). Thus, in predicting social functioning, it is 
critical to study the interaction between the autonomic branches.  
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Until fairly recently sympathetic arousal has been hard to study, because the most 
convenient measures of arousal, skin conductance, and heart rate are influenced by both 
nervous systems and are not pure measures of sympathetic arousal. Hence sympathetic 
regulation, and its role in empathy, has received much less attention than parasympathetic 
regulation. New non-invasive techniques to study cardiac sympathetic activity, such as 
measurement of the pre-ejection period (PEP), make it possible to study both sympathetic 
and parasympathetic influences on the heart. The pre-ejection period is a relatively pure 
measure of beta-adrenergic sympathetic arousal, or cardiac sympathetic activity. It is defined 
as the time, in milliseconds, from cardiac electrical depolarisation to the time when the aortic 
valve opens and blood is expelled from the ventricle (Cacioppo et al., 2007). The more 
sympathetic activation there is, the faster the time to contraction, and the shorter the pre-
ejection period. Measurement of the pre-ejection period thus allows the study of the 
relationship between empathy and cardiac sympathetic activity. 
Sympathetic activity is most clearly linked to feeling of anxiety and distress, with a 
tentative link between heightened sympathetic arousal and lower empathy. Early research 
found associations between increases in heart rate to challenge and feelings of personal 
distress and anxiety (Eisenberg et al., 1989). More recent research examining pre-ejection 
period reactivity has found positive correlations between sympathetic reactivity and social-
evaluative stress (Berntson et al., 1994). For example, sympathetic reactivity was positively 
correlated with self-reported shame in neurotypical adults during a negative feedback social 
stress task (Muhtadie et al., 2015). A recent study found a correlation between higher 
baseline skin conductance (indicative of greater sympathetic arousal) and poorer self-reported 
affective and cognitive empathy in neurotypical adults (Mathersul, McDonald, & Rushby, 
2013). Similarly, Neuhaus et al. (2015), who measured pre-ejection period reactivity and 
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parent-report social skills in children with and without ASD, found a negative correlation 
between sympathetic arousal and social skills.  
Not all research supports the link between high sympathetic reactivity and reduced 
empathy: A study on empathy found that higher skin conductance responses were related to 
helping others at a later time, even if that came at some cost to the individual (Hein, Lamm, 
Brodbeck, & Singer, 2011). Furthermore, psychopathology research indicates that too little 
sympathetic arousal to others’ distress is detrimental to empathic concern. Attenuated 
sympathetic responses to stimuli are implicated in social and behavioural maladjustment 
(Stifter, Dollar, & Cipriano, 2011), conduct disorder (Beauchaine et al., 2007; Marsh, 
Beauchaine, & Williams, 2008) and psychopathy (van Goozen, Fairchild, Snoek, & Harold, 
2007). In summary, some sympathetic response – neither too much nor too little – may be 
optimal for empathy and social engagement. Whereas reciprocal sympathetic arousal (i.e., 
sympathetic activation and parasympathetic inhibition) may occur during greatest threat 
(Alkon et al., 2003), autonomic co-activation, in other words, increases in sympathetic 
activity accompanied by increases in parasympathetic activity, may best predict prosocial 
behaviour (Salomon et al., 2000). Autonomic co-activation may prevent unchecked fight-or-
flight responses and best predict empathic concern.  
These studies create a strong argument for studying sympathetic and parasympathetic 
arousal at the same time. Understanding the interaction of these two systems can shed light 
on how patterns of autonomic arousal during attention-demanding or challenging states 
facilitate different forms of empathy. Next I discuss what is known about resting state 
parasympathetic and sympathetic arousal, as well as autonomic reactivity to empathy-related 
stimuli in ASD, before turning to some caveats of the polyvagal theory. 
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Autonomic regulation and ASD. Some studies have found that parasympathetic 
arousal is reduced at rest in ASD (Althaus et al., 2004; Cohen, Masyn, Mastergeorge, & 
Hessl, 2015; Matsushima et al., 2016). However, results are mixed, and a recent review 
article concluded that resting state RSA is not affected in ASD (Benevides & Lane, 2015). 
Even if ASD is not associated with changes in resting state arousal in general, those 
individuals with higher cardiac vagal control may show better social functioning. Several 
studies have found that children with ASD with higher baseline RSA have better emotion 
recognition, conventional gestures, communication and social skills (Bal et al., 2010; 
Patriquin et al., 2014; Sheinkopf, Neal-Beevers, Levine, Miller-Loncar, & Lester, 2013; 
Vaughan Van Hecke et al., 2009). 
There is also some evidence, albeit inconsistent, of atypical autonomic regulation in 
ASD during social tasks. As discussed previously, two studies have found evidence of 
reduced parasympathetic (Vaughan Van Hecke et al., 2009) and heightened sympathetic 
arousal (Neuhaus et al., 2015) to strangers, indicating a heightened perception of threat and 
initiation of fight-or-flight responses in ASD. Neuhaus et al. (2015) showed that boys with 
ASD did not differentiate between novel and familiar social situations in their autonomic 
response, whereas typically developing boys did. In agreement with the greater distress 
response, two studies have found evidence for heightened (predominantly sympathetic) 
reactivity to direct eye gaze in children with ASD (Kylliäinen et al., 2012; Kylliäinen & 
Hietanen, 2006), and other studies have found greater neural activation or diminished 
habituation of skin conductance responses to human faces (Dalton et al., 2005; Mathersul et 
al., 2013). These results suggest that the physiological regulation of affect may be atypical in 
ASD. However, other studies have found no difference in sympathetic or parasympathetic 
responses to social stress (Hollocks, Howlin, Papadopoulos, Khondoker, & Simonoff, 2014; 
Levine et al., 2012; Sheinkopf et al., 2013), or have even found social-specific hypoarousal 
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(Hirstein, Iversen, & Ramachandran, 2001; Hubert, Wicker, Monfardini, & Deruelle, 2009) 
in ASD. The inconsistency of the findings suggest that rather than differences in absolute 
levels of arousal, individuals with ASD may have less flexible responding, as was found in 
Neuhaus and colleagues’ study. A difficulty in interpreting many of these studies is that 
stimuli vary widely, and have often not been validated in other studies. Thus, Chapter 3 
discusses performance on one specific well-validated paradigm for empathy; empathy for 
pain. 
Summary. The sympathetic and parasympathetic divisions of the autonomic nervous 
system can work cooperatively or antagonistically. The sympathetic nervous system is 
responsible for orienting the organism to salient stimuli and initiates a ‘fight or flight’ 
reaction, whereas the parasympathetic system is associated with calm, restful states, and is 
normally active during social engagement. The neurovisceral integration model (Thayer & 
Lane, 2000, 2009) and polyvagal theory (Porges, 1992, 2001, 2003b) propose that the 
autonomic nervous system is essential for emotion arousal and regulation, as well as flexible 
responding. The autonomic nervous system affects, and is affected by, central nervous system 
activity through the vagus nerve. Dysregulation of vagally-mediated parasympathetic arousal, 
or cardiac vagal control, is therefore predicted to lead to disrupted emotion perception and 
regulation, as well diminished empathy.  
In support of the two theories, high resting state parasympathetic arousal is associated 
with better emotion regulation, increased prosocial and positive emotions, and better social 
competence (including more support-seeking, using more gestures, and better joint attention).  
Evidence for an association between resting state cardiac vagal control and empathic concern 
is inconsistent at best; however, there is evidence of an association between parasympathetic 
regulation, or vagal flexibility, and empathy: Cardiac vagal control is heightened during 
empathic concern, whereas reductions in cardiac vagal control from rest are associated with 
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personal distress. Parasympathetic regulation is thus thought to represent active emotion 
regulation. In contrast with parasympathetic arousal, heightened sympathetic arousal is 
correlated with feelings of anxiety and distress, and lower empathic concern. However, some 
sympathetic arousal is important to notice others’ distress, and thus co-activation of the 
sympathetic and parasympathetic branches is proposed to be the optimal response to others’ 
distress or pain. In ASD, there may be less flexible regulation of these two branches of the 
autonomic system, potentially associated with atypical subjective affective responses and 
social functioning. 
There are, however, some caveats to the interpretation of RSA. Likewise, some of the 
assumptions of the polyvagal theory have been criticised. I briefly review the flaws in 
previous cardiac vagal control research designs before turning to suggestions for 
improvement in Chapter 3. 
Critique of the Polyvagal Theory 
Although the neurovisceral integration model is largely an extension of the polyvagal 
theory, there are some important differences. A primary assumption of the polyvagal theory 
is that there are two evolutionary and functionally distinct sets of brainstem nuclei controlling 
heart rate: One that is responsible for fast respiratory-related changes in heart rate (i.e., RSA) 
in mammals and influences social behaviour and communication, as well as one that controls 
subdiaphramatic visceral organs and behaviour immobilisation (Porges, 2003b) and does not 
influence RSA. There is currently no way to separate the influence on the heart of one set of 
nuclei from the other (Berntson, Cacioppo, & Grossman, 2007), and neither is there evidence 
that RSA is only present in mammals; thus, the current thesis follows the example of the 
neurovisceral integration model, and will not speculate on any functional differences between 
vagal nuclei.   
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The polyvagal theory has also been heavily criticised on several other grounds. The 
first criticism, which is that under rare circumstances RSA and cardiac vagal control are not 
associated with each other, does not directly affect this study. Such a dissociation has only 
been shown under extreme events such as during pharmacological augmentation of the 
cardiac baroreflex or during experimentally-induced changes in respiration by stimulation of 
carbon dioxide receptors (Grossman & Taylor, 2007). These methods will not be used within 
the current studies, and RSA will only be measured within the range of normal functioning.  
Secondly, several factors other than cardiac vagal control can affect RSA. 
Respiration, physical activity and beta-adrenergic sympathetic tone influence RSA and 
potentially confound the association between RSA and cardiac vagal control. Both respiration 
rate and volume can substantially influence RSA magnitude, even when participants are 
stationary. Similarly, even relatively small changes in sympathetic activity can lead to large 
reductions in RSA, either because of suppression effects or because of interactions between 
the sympathetic and vagal systems (Grossman & Taylor, 2007; Kollai & Mizsei, 1990). 
These factors must be measured and controlled for when using RSA as a measure of phasic 
vagal cardiac control.  
Thirdly, although within-subject correlations between RSA and cardiac vagal control 
are generally strong, the association between these variables can be weak between subjects as 
there are many different processes which affect cardiac vagal control. Between-subject 
associations may therefore not be identifiable in typical between-group research designs 
(Berntson et al., 2007; Grossman & Taylor, 2007). Measuring within-person changes over 
time, rather than between-groups differences, therefore provides a more accurate indicator of 
cardiac vagal control.  
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In sum, there are several methodological limitations to current RSA research, and 
these need to be addressed when studying the autonomic correlates of empathy. However, if 
individual differences between participants and respiratory factors are taken into account, 
RSA can be a reliable indicator of cardiac vagal control, and, as postulated by the polyvagal 
theory, social engagement. 
Conclusion 
Autism is characterised by a spectrum of deficits in social-communicative behaviour. 
In this chapter I have argued that the social impairments in ASD are likely not due to a global 
deficit in empathy, as has previously been suggested. Empathy is not a unitary concept, but is 
an umbrella term defining several different abilities which can be separately affected. 
Although cognitive empathy is impaired in ASD, the sharing of other’s emotions, or affective 
empathy, may be intact. However, poor regulation of affective empathy may lead to high 
levels of distress and fluctuating, often reduced, levels of empathic concern and prosocial 
behaviour in ASD. Poor regulation at the autonomic level may contribute towards the deficits 
in affect regulation and social engagement seen in ASD. To best describe the empathic 
profile of ASD, studies should take a multilevel approach, examining empathy at, among 
others, the physiological, cognitive and subjective levels. 
In the next chapter I introduce the specific paradigm in which empathy was studied in 
this thesis; namely empathy for pain. I review the typical autonomic, muscular and subjective 
responses to observing others in pain, and what the study of these responses can tell us about 




EMPATHY FOR PAIN 
 
“pain insists upon being attended to” (Lewis, 1940) 
 
Perception of pain is a well-validated paradigm in which to study empathy. The 
ability to perceive and react swiftly to others’ pain is essential to survival. Accordingly, 
images of others’ pain are extremely salient: Facial expressions of pain are perceived as more 
arousing and more unpleasant than other emotions of similar arousal levels (Simon et al., 
2008), and are processed in a more sustained fashion than other facial expressions (Reicherts 
et al., 2012). Observation of others’ physical pain evokes even larger reactions than do facial 
expressions of pain (Vachon-Presseau et al., 2011), and elicits strong empathic responses 
from participants, making this paradigm ideal to study the different components of empathy. 
Empathy for pain has mostly been studied from a neural perspective, with less attention given 
to peripheral responses to observed pain. This chapter summarises what is known about 
autonomic, muscular and affective reactivity to observed pain. I will discuss the typical 
autonomic and muscle responses associated with empathic concern or personal distress, and 
then review the results of studies of empathy for pain in ASD. I end with a discussion of the 
aims and hypotheses of this thesis. 
Affective and Physiological Responses to Perceived Pain 
The perception of pain in others activates affective brain areas responsible for perceiving 
self-pain (Bird et al., 2010; Singer et al., 2004) and rapidly elicits defensive reactions 
characterised by decreases in heart rate and increases in skin conductance (Lamm, Porges, 
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Cacioppo, & Decety, 2008; Lanzetta & Englis, 1989). Under non-threatening conditions, this 
initial and automatic affect sharing is quickly down-regulated (Han, Fan, & Mao, 2008). This 
down-regulation is thought to assist empathic concern, rather than a pure distress response to 
witnessing pain. Studies of event-related potentials to observed pain show evidence that the 
initial affective response and secondary evaluation are separate; occurring in different neural 
areas and at different times (Y. Fan & Han, 2008). Parasympathetic activation may assist 
down-regulation by moderating the initial affective response: Studies have found that 
children who respond with greater heart rate deceleration – potentially led by increases in 
parasympathetic regulation - show more prosocial behaviour, whereas children who show 
higher skin conductance responses show less prosocial behaviour (see Eisenberg et al., 2010 
for a review). Given the importance of cardiac vagal control in emotion regulation, it is 
surprising that so far only one study has looked at parasympathetic reactivity to others’ pain. 
As expected, this study found evidence for increases in RSA when perceiving others in pain 
(Lepron, Causse, & Farrer, 2015). These results correspond to findings of RSA augmentation 
during empathic concern for others’ distress (Stellar et al., 2015), but need to be replicated 
under different conditions of pain.  
Cognitive processes modulate the magnitude of the affective downregulation response 
(Y. Fan & Han, 2008; Li & Han, 2010); for example, participants display greater affective 
responses to confederates who show greater fairness to others (Singer et al., 2006). Likewise, 
switching perspectives from imagining how the other person feels to imagining how you 
would feel increases affective arousal, particularly personal distress (Lamm et al., 2008; Li & 
Han, 2010). On the other hand, alexithymia is associated with reduced neural responses to 
viewing others’ pain and lower estimates of the pain intensity (Bird et al., 2010; Moriguchi et 
al., 2007). Thus, though the initial affective response does not seem to depend on cognitive 
empathy (Y. Fan & Han, 2008), the ability to understand and describe mental states may 
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modulate the extent of the ultimate affective response. Particularly, greater identification with 
the target and greater understanding of own emotions leads to greater affective responses. 
Cognitive regulation may also influence muscle responses to observed pain.  
Muscle Responses to Observed Pain 
Two predictions for muscle reactivity to others’ pain have been put forth. One 
prediction is that of an automatic freezing reaction to avoid possible harm (Avenanti, Minio-
Paluello, Sforza, & Aglioti, 2009). Recent research has focused predominantly on this 
prediction, through the study of corticospinal inhibition of muscle-evoked potentials 
(Avenanti, Paluello, Bufalari, & Aglioti, 2006; Avenanti, Sirigu, & Aglioti, 2010; Minio-
Paluello, Baron-Cohen, Avenanti, Walsh, & Aglioti, 2009). These authors have found that 
participants show diminished motor-evoked potentials specific to the area of the muscle 
observed to be hurt (Avenanti et al., 2006). Additionally, individuals with higher cognitive 
empathy show greater corticospinal inhibition (Avenanti, Minio-Paluello, Bufalari, & Aglioti, 
2009). However, not all studies have found such an inhibition response: Increased 
identification with the target, either by having the observer imagine themselves in the other’s 
position or by having the target imitate the observer’s movements, seems to lead to increased 
muscle-evoked potentials (de Coster, Andres, & Brass, 2014) and muscle activation (Lamm 
et al., 2008; Sonnby-Borgström, Jönsson, & Svensson, 2003; Sun, Wang, Wang, & Luo, 
2015), as is also observed in participants’ subjective and neural responses. These results are 
more consistent with unconscious muscle mimicry of the target, similar to the muscle 
mimicry seen for non-pain expressions. Corresponding to this hypothesis, studies have 
reported increased reactivity to others’ pain in the muscles responsible for orbit tightening 
and furrowing the brow (Caes et al., 2012; Lamm et al., 2008; Lanzetta & Englis, 1989). 
Furthermore, there is evidence that such muscle reactivity is not purely an automatic 
avoidance response, because muscle reactivity increases with an observer’s sense of 
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responsibility for the pain (Lepron et al., 2015), and differs depending on the social context, 
including whether the target is cooperating or competing with the observer (Lanzetta & 
Englis, 1989). Moreover, pain-induced muscle flexion reflexes when observing others’ pain 
(Vachon-Presseau et al., 2011) and facial mimicry of basic emotions have been correlated 
with trait empathy (e.g., Dimberg & Thunberg, 2012; Sonnby-Borgström et al., 2003). 
Increased communicative opportunity also predicts greater muscle reactivity (Bavelas, Black, 
Lemery, & Mullett, 1986). Hence, rather than being an avoidance response, muscle reactivity 
seems to be part of an overall empathy response. In particular, Bavelas and colleagues (1986) 
propose that muscle reactivity to pain has a communicative function, indicating concern for 
the person being hurt, and facilitating social cohesion.  
On the whole, neurotypical individuals show an involuntary and unconscious 
response to seeing others’ pain. Neural areas involved in own-pain perception are activated; 
at the autonomic level, empathic concern is associated with the co-activation of the 
sympathetic and parasympathetic nervous systems; and at the muscular level, individuals 
may show mimicry of others’ pain. Though this response is automatic, it is not 
indiscriminate: Cognitive empathy and alexithymia, among other factors, determine the scale 
of the affective response. These factors also modulate empathic responses in ASD. 
Empathy for Pain in ASD 
Empathy for pain in ASD has only recently gained attention, and has focused on 
empathy for others’ physical pain. An early study examining motor-evoked potentials found 
reduced corticospinal inhibition to others’ pain in ASD (Minio-Paluello, Baron-Cohen, et al., 
2009). The authors of this study attributed the reduced inhibition to reduced affective 
empathy, or mirroring of pain, in ASD. However, subsequent studies of neural and autonomic 
reactivity in ASD have found contrasting results: Participants with ASD perceive a target’s 
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pain as equally intense as participants without ASD once alexithymia is controlled for (Bird 
et al., 2010). Furthermore, when asked to engage with empathy-for pain-stimuli, individuals 
with ASD personally experience a target’s pain as more unpleasant than neurotypical 
individuals do (Gu et al., 2015). These results suggest that ASD individuals do experience 
automatic affect sharing, but fail to down-regulate their response. Diminished regulation of 
arousal could be due to reduced cognitive empathy, reduced cognitive self-regulation, or 
atypical physiological regulation in ASD. In evidence of the reduced regulation argument, 
participants with ASD show similar or heightened skin conductance and startle reflex 
responses, and diminished fronto-insular cortex inhibition, during observation of a target’s 
pain compared to neurotypical adults (Y.-T. Fan et al., 2014; Gu et al., 2015; Hadjikhani et 
al., 2014).  Individuals with ASD also show decreased ability to discriminate between painful 
and non-painful conditions, in keeping with diminished cognitive empathy in this group. 
Minio-Paluello and colleagues’ (2009) finding of reduced inhibition may thus be better 
explained by an impairment in regulation of affective (corticospinal) responses to pain, rather 
than an impairment in affective empathy. What is not known is whether these results are 
limited to seeing the pain being inflicted (i.e., empathy for physical pain), as was investigated 
in the studies above, or whether it extends to feeling empathy for others’ expressions of pain.  
In sum, empathy for pain is characterised by an initial and involuntary affect sharing, 
which is quickly down-regulated under optimal conditions to lead to empathic concern. 
Dispositional cognitive empathy, perspective-taking, autonomic regulation, and the ability to 
understand one’s own emotions may all facilitate this down-regulation. In ASD, there is 
tentative evidence of reduced self-regulation of affective responses, so that subjective 
distress, distress-related autonomic arousal (i.e., increased sympathetic arousal and/or 
decreased parasympathetic arousal), and muscle activity may be expected to be heightened 
when observing others’ pain. Moreover, if affective empathy is not efficiently regulated in 
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individuals with high amounts of autism traits, empathic concern for others may be reduced. 
Studies have also found decreased ability to discriminate between painful and non-painful 
states in participants with high amounts of autism traits, though this may partly be 
attributable to alexithymia. In individuals with alexithymia, both affective empathy and 
empathic concern can be expected to be reduced.  
Rationale 
I have presented evidence that affective empathy appears to be intact in ASD, and that 
general emotion regulation is impaired. Social-communicative deficits in ASD may stem not 
from a general deficit in empathy, but from deficits in cognitive empathy paired with deficits 
in regulation of affective empathy. However, to my knowledge, no study has looked at the 
autonomic contributions to the regulation of empathy within ASD. It is clear that 
physiological regulation of affective responses is critical in determining whether responses 
are predominantly other-focused (empathic concern) or self-focused (personal distress) in 
nature. Furthermore, studies that have investigated the associations between autonomic 
regulation and empathy, or autonomic regulation and social engagement, have for the most 
part only investigated either parasympathetic or sympathetic arousal, not both. Yet the 
reviewed literature creates a strong argument for studying sympathetic and parasympathetic 
arousal at the same time. A novel contribution of this thesis is that sympathetic and 
parasympathetic reactivity to empathy-inducing stimuli was measured concurrently. This 
allows the modelling of the interaction between the two systems and their association with 
empathic concern.  
Furthermore, the limited empathy-for-pain studies that have been done in ASD have 
only used stimuli featuring direct pain application, such as seeing a body part being injured. 
However, humans also have the capacity to feel empathy for others showing signs of distress, 
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even if the painful incident was not observed. It is therefore also very important to study 
empathy for distress signals of pain (e.g., facial expressions of pain) in autism. Many 
individuals with autism have difficulties in interpreting facial expressions, in particular rapid 
and dynamic facial expressions (Clark, Winkielman, & McIntosh, 2008; Sato, Uono, & 
Toichi, 2013), and other non-verbal communications (e.g., Bedford et al., 2012; Boria et al., 
2009; Vivanti et al., 2011). Moreover, individuals with ASD may be slower to spontaneously 
mimic facial expressions (Oberman et al., 2009). Thus individuals with ASD may not have 
the same responses to viewing facial expressions of pain as to viewing sensory pain, and may 
have slower reactions to facial expression of pain than neurotypical individuals do. 
Accordingly, this thesis investigates both empathic responses to perception of physical pain 
and perception of facial expressions of pain. 
Finally, this thesis improves on the methodology of autonomic arousal measurement 
and analysis. Previous research measuring RSA has been criticised for not controlling for 
factors that influence RSA but are not reflective of cardiac vagal control, such as respiration, 
physical activity and beta-adrenergic sympathetic arousal. Furthermore, researchers have 
argued that the correlation between RSA and cardiac vagal control may not be identifiable in 
a between-groups design (Berntson et al., 2007; Grossman & Taylor, 2007). This thesis 
addresses the flaws in previous research by (1) using a research design where participants 
remain stationary while stimuli are shown, (2) measuring and statistically controlling for 
respiration rate and volume and beta-adrenergic sympathetic activity, and (3) employing 
mixed-effects model analyses whereby individual (within-subject) differences can be 
statistically modelled. A further strength of this thesis is that it follows a dimensional and 




A Dimensional, Multilevel Approach to Studying ASD 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the core features of autism are normally distributed in the 
population, and are not specific to autism. Additionally, within the DSM-5 category ASD 
there is remarkable heterogeneity of both symptom presentation and symptom severity 
(London, 2014; Pinto et al., 2014). Yet there is a paucity of research examining features of 
autism and their associated biopsychological processes at different levels of severity. Most 
research still operates within the traditional paradigm of comparing different diagnostic 
categories, or comparing members of a diagnostic category to a healthy control group. 
However, the problem with the traditional approach is that overlaps in symptoms between 
groups reduces the statistical power to detect between-group differences, and furthermore, 
even if statistical power is sufficient, it is unlikely that there is a single biopsychological 
pathway leading to a specific disorder (Cuthbert, 2014; Kozak & Cuthbert, 2016). This is 
particularly true in ASD, where many researchers have argued that we should use the term 
‘the autisms’ or ‘autism spectrum disorders’ to recognise that all individuals with ASD do not 
necessarily share the same symptoms, outcomes, or underlying causes of the disorder 
(Geschwind & Levitt, 2007). This thesis aims to address the problem by taking a dimensional 
approach to the study of autism and empathy. The Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) is such 
an approach to studying psychiatric conditions.  
In 2008, the United States National Institute of Mental Health brought in the RDoC 
project in recognition of the fact that the study of the traditional DSM psychiatric categories 
has not led to major advances in understanding the underlying biological mechanisms of 
these conditions. Part of the problem is that an arbitrary number of symptoms are needed to 
qualify for diagnosis, meaning that (1) different individuals with the same disorder may have 
very different behavioural and cognitive presentations (and presumably also different genetic 
and social causes), (2) there can be considerable symptom overlap between different 
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diagnostic conditions, for example between ASD and obsessive-compulsive disorder or 
specific language impairment, and (3) severity of a disorder or its symptoms is not accounted 
for in an all-or-none categorical system. Thus, the goal of the RDoC project is to use 
dimensions of functioning that cut across traditional diagnostic boundaries, and to measure 
constructs that are fine-grained enough to map onto psychobiological bases (Cuthbert, 2014).  
 The RDoC approach is to study process constructs within a continuum of behaviour, 
from typical to atypical, in order to enhance understanding of the causes, diagnosis, 
prevention, and treatment of mental disorders (MacNamara & Phan, 2016). Core features of 
the RDoC approach are that it encourages dimensional measurement and analysis of 
constructs, and that construct measurement should ideally be at multiple levels of trait 
conceptualisation; for example, at the neural, physiological and self-report levels. This 
approach will hopefully lead to more reliable and valid measures of psychological processes.  
In accordance with the RDoC approach, this thesis discusses and measures empathy 
and ASD in a dimensional way, and explores these concepts at several levels of analysis; 
particularly, the physiological, cognitive and self-report levels. By using different levels of 
analyses, and a clear definition of empathy that conforms to our biological understanding of 
its origin and function, this thesis will improve the reliability of empathy measurement in 
ASD. 
Overview of the Studies 
Study 1 tests the hypothesis that trait levels of cognitive empathy and self-regulation 
are negatively correlated with autism traits, while affective empathy is not correlated with 
autism. Trait levels of the different facets of empathy, alexithymia, and autism are measured 
via self-report. Furthermore, cognitive empathy is measured with two cognitive tasks, a 
dynamic emotion recognition task and a social faux pas recognition task. To my knowledge, 
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this is the first study to examine empathy in ASD from the perspective of three facets of 
empathy (affective, cognitive, self-regulation) that may be independently affected. 
Furthermore, many previous studies of empathy in ASD are difficult to interpret because they 
did not control for the effect of alexithymia on empathy. Thus alexithymia is used as a co-
variate in all analyses.  
Of course, there are limitations to measuring empathy purely on the basis of self-report. 
Lack of emotion awareness, heightened social desirability, language comprehension, and 
other factors may influence responses. Thus Studies 2 and 3 investigate physiological 
reactions to empathy-induction, specifically autonomic arousal and muscle mimicry, and 
correlate these with self-reported dispositional and state empathy and empathic concern. 
Monitoring physiology serves two goals: It provides information on affective responses that 
are not otherwise observable; secondly, it describes a potential causal mechanism for deficits 
in empathy. Though the aim of this thesis is not to test the causes of empathy, describing the 
physiological profile associated with good empathic skills leads the way to more mechanistic 
studies. 
Specific Aims and Hypotheses 
The aim of this thesis is to investigate the extent to which state and trait levels of 
empathy (affective, cognitive and self-regulation) are associated with ASD traits, to describe 
the physiological processes occurring during an empathy-inducing situation, and to predict 
the magnitude of the empathic response from resting state autonomic regulation. I 
investigated whether the magnitude of autonomic and muscular responses is correlated with 
the amount of autism spectrum traits, and whether there is evidence that abnormal autonomic 
regulation is associated with autism traits. In particular, I focused on empathy for pain. 
Because of the importance of pain perception to survival, perceiving the pain of others 
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reliably elicits robust empathic responses (e.g., Craig, Versloot, Goubert, Vervoort, & 
Crombez, 2010; Lamm, Decety, & Singer, 2011; Reicherts et al., 2012; Singer et al., 2004). I 
investigated empathy for two types of stimuli: empathy for sensory pain (Study 2) and 
empathy for facial expressions of pain (Study 3). 
Research Questions 
1. To what extent are the trait levels of the different facets of empathy (affective, 
cognitive, self-regulation) associated with ASD? (Study 1) 
2. Is there evidence of resting state autonomic dysregulation in ASD? (Studies 2 & 3) 
3. Is resting state autonomic regulation correlated with trait affective, cognitive and self-
regulatory empathy? (Studies 2 & 3) 
4. Are physiological (muscle and autonomic reactivity) and subjective (pain perception) 
indices of affective empathy and empathic concern correlated with amount of autism 
traits? 
a. When observing sensory pain (Study 2) 
b. When observing facial expressions of pain (Study 3) 
5. If not, what other factors are correlated with empathic concern (versus personal 
distress)? 
a. When observing sensory pain (Study 2) 





Study 1: Trait empathy in ASD 
To what extent are the trait levels of the different facets of empathy (affective, cognitive, self-
regulation) associated with amount of autism traits? 
Hypothesis I: Amount of autism traits will be negatively correlated with trait 
cognitive empathy and self-regulation, even after alexithymia is controlled for. 
Amount of autism traits will not be correlated with trait affective empathy once 
alexithymia is controlled for. 
Hypothesis II: Amount of autism traits will be negatively correlated with 
performance cognitive empathy.  
Study 2: Empathy for sensory pain & Study 3: Empathy for facial expressions of pain 
Is there evidence of resting state autonomic dysregulation in participants with greater autism 
traits? Is resting state autonomic activity associated with empathy? 
Hypothesis III: Higher resting state parasympathetic arousal (vagal cardiac control) 
will be associated with higher trait affective empathy and self-regulation scores. 
Are physiological (muscle and autonomic reactivity) and subjective (pain perception) indices 
of affective empathy and empathic concern correlated with amount of autism traits? 
Hypothesis IV: Pain perception (unpleasantness and intensity) will be positively 
correlated with amount of autism traits once alexithymia is controlled for.  
Hypothesis V: Amount of autism traits will be negatively correlated with empathic 
concern and positively correlated with personal distress.  
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Hypothesis VI: Amount of autism traits will be positively correlated with muscle 
activity.  
Hypothesis VII: Amount of autism traits will be positively correlated with 
sympathetic reactivity and/or negatively correlated with parasympathetic reactivity, 
resulting in hyperarousal. 
What other factors (dispositional and physiological) are associated with pain perception 
and empathic concern (versus personal distress)? 
Hypothesis VIII: Self-regulation scores will be positively correlated with empathic 
concern and negatively correlated with perception of pain and personal distress. 
Hypothesis IX: Cognitive empathy will be positively correlated with empathic 
concern and perceived pain. 
Hypothesis X: Higher resting state parasympathetic arousal (vagal cardiac control) 
will be associated with increased state empathic concern, whereas higher baseline 
sympathetic arousal will be associated with increased personal distress. 
Hypothesis XI: Poorer self-regulation and cognitive empathy will be associated with 
increased muscle reactivity. 
Hypothesis XII: Increased empathic concern and better self-regulation will be 
associated with increased parasympathetic reactivity and potentially increased 







Participant characteristics and methods applicable to all three studies are described in 
this chapter. Stimuli and procedures unique to each study are described in Chapters 5 to 7. 
Participants 
Individuals with and without ASD were invited to participate. Participants were 
recruited from existing ASD participant databases, support groups, through advertisements 
on websites, in local newspapers and via the university network, and through the UCT 
Department of Psychology’s Student Research Participation Programme (SRPP). The 
recruitment and inclusion flowchart is shown in Figure 1. Individuals were invited to 
participate if they were between 14 and 45 years old and fluent in English. This age range 
was chosen because physiological reactions change before puberty and after menopause. 
Participants (N = 841) were first screened on the Autism Spectrum Questionnaire (AQ) and a 
demographic questionnaire asking about mental and physical health. Those who completed 
the AQ and who did not report any psychiatric or neurological conditions besides ASD 
formed the total online sample (N = 519; this sample contained neurotypical and ASD 
participants).  
Based on an a priori power analysis for the level 1 (between-subjects) and level 2 
(within-subjects) predictors done with G*Power 3.1 (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 
2009), a subsample from the total online sample was selected to participate in the empathy 
for pain and cognitive empathy assessments. The aim of this study was not to compare a 
diagnosed ASD group with a neurotypical group, but to recruit participants at different levels 
of the autism spectrum continuum, ranging from no to high ASD traits. The AQ was used to 
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identify individual differences in autism traits as the questionnaire has good discriminative 
validity (Woodbury-Smith, Robinson, Wheelwright, & Baron-Cohen, 2005). Additionally, 
scores on this questionnaire has been shown to be normally distributed in the population 
(Hoekstra, Bartels, Cath, & Boomsma, 2008). From the online group, all participants who 
scored over a threshold of 32 points on the AQ (high likelihood of ASD) and who did not 
report any history of cardiovascular disorder were invited to participate in the laboratory-
section of the study. The high autism trait individuals who agreed to participate were each 
case-matched with a low and a medium-autism-trait individual on age, sex, and race. The 
closest low and medium-trait matches were invited to participate in the study. Where there 
were multiple exact matches who all met the inclusion criteria, participants were randomly 
selected, and the next-best match was invited if the first match declined to participate. In this 
way, participants with a range of autism traits were recruited. Participants with high autism 
traits had social-communication deficits and restricted, repetitive or stereotyped behaviours 
that typically met diagnostic criteria for ASD and impacted on daily functioning. Medium-
autism-trait individuals had some features of ASD, such as difficulties with maintaining 
conversations or peer relationships and inflexibility of behaviour or thoughts, but did not 
meet criteria for ASD. Low-autism-trait individuals did not have psychiatric diagnoses and 






Figure 1. Participant recruitment flowchart.  P. cognitive empathy = performance cognitive 
empathy, EMG = electromyogram, PEP = pre-ejection period, SCL = skin conductance level. 
* Data are missing due to technical problems. 
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In total, 147 individuals were invited to participate. Potential participants were 
excluded if they had a cardiovascular disorder, were currently taking cardiovascular 
medication (e.g., beta-blockers), or had an acute medical condition that could influence 
cardiovascular function. In addition, neurotypical candidates were excluded from the study if 
they had any previously diagnosed neurological or psychiatric disorders. 
All participants in the laboratory sample received an Autism Diagnostic Observation 
Schedule (ADOS-2) assessment to calculate their amount of autism traits. Of the respondents 
who were invited to participate in the lab-based part of the study, 30 declined, 15 were 
excluded after the ADOS-2 assessment because of suspected psychiatric or heart conditions 
which were not originally reported, and 7 did not complete the laboratory session. Ninety-
eight participants (79 males) between the ages of 14 and 45 therefore formed the laboratory 
sample, of which 21 met criteria for ASD on the ADOS-2. The same individuals participated 
in Studies 1 to 3. However, three participants who completed Studies 1 and 3 did not 
complete Study 2 (N = 95).  
The racial composition of the total sample was 47% White, 27% Black, 14% Mixed-
Race, 8% Indian and 3% Other. The racial composition of the laboratory sample was 63% 
White, 14% Black, 14% Mixed-Race and 8% Indian. The racial composition between the two 
samples differed because of an over-representation of autism traits in some groups (White) 
and an under-representation of autism traits in others (Black and Other). 
Ethical Considerations 
The study followed the Declaration of Helsinki’s ethical guidelines for research with 
human subjects, as well as the guidelines of the Health Professions Council of South Africa, 
and the University of Cape Town. The study had approval from the Department of 
Psychology (see Appendix A) and from the Department of Student Affairs (Appendix B) at 
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the University of Cape Town to advertise on campus. Additionally, approval was obtained 
from the Western Cape Education Department to recruit participants from public schools in 
Cape Town (Appendix C). Written informed consent was obtained electronically beforehand 
(Appendix D). For underage participants (14 – 17 years), informed consent was obtained 
from parents beforehand and informed assent (Appendix E) was obtained on the day of 
testing. The study was explained verbally and in writing and participants were given the 
chance to ask questions about the study and view the recording equipment and laboratory 
space before they consented to participation. Every effort was made to ensure that 
participants understood the task demands and the potential benefits and risks of the study.  
Participants were reassured that all information would be kept confidential and would 
only be used for research purposes. To restrict access to sensitive information, all data from 
the behavioural and psychophysiological assessments have been kept strictly confidential. 
Participant data were recorded electronically and stored on password-protected servers at the 
University of Cape Town. Participants were each assigned a unique code and their data were 
stored with only this unique identifier. No names or other identifying information were stored 
with the experimental results. The recorded ADOS-2 interviews were only watched by 
ADOS-trained researchers to ensure accurate diagnostic scoring, and are stored on password-
protected servers that are only accessible by the study investigators. No identifiable 
information or participant names will be used in publications. 
Participants were reassured that their participation was voluntary and that they could 
discontinue the study at any time without any negative consequences. Participants were also 
allowed to take breaks between tasks if they felt tired or uncomfortable. All participants were 
compensated (R100 in total; approximately $9 at the time of the study) for their time at the 
end of the last session and were debriefed afterwards (see Appendix F). Participants were 
given general feedback about the nature and results of the study and the ADOS assessment, 
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and were given information about ASD if they requested it. Participants who suspected that 
they had a diagnosis of ASD were referred to the University of Cape Town’s Student 
Wellness Centre or to a private clinical psychologist in Cape Town. Participants requesting 
further support for ASD were referred to psychologists, support groups and non-
governmental organisations working with families with ASD. 
Physiological Measurements  
Electromyogram (EMG) 
Surface EMG data was recorded with the BioSemi ActiveTwo system 
(www.biosemi.com, Amsterdam) with sintered 4 mm inner/ 11 mm outer diameter Ag-AgCl 
active electrodes (BioSemi TP FLAT) in a bipolar arrangement. Data were collected at a 
sampling frequency of 2048 Hz and a recording bandwidth of 417 Hz. Raw signals were 
digitised and filtered off-line with 30 Hz high-pass, 500 Hz low-pass and 50 Hz notch filters. 
Additionally, 125 ms moving average filters were applied to the data, as recommended in 
EMG guidelines (Fridlund & Cacioppo, 1986; Reicherts et al., 2012). 
Autonomic Activity  
The Vrije Universiteit Ambulatory Monitoring System (VU-AMS, Version 5fs; de 
Geus & van Doornen, 1996; Goedhart, Kupper, Willemsen, Boomsma, & de Geus, 2006; 
Willemsen, de Geus, Klaver, van Doornen, & Carrofl, 1996) was used for continuous 
recording of electrocardiogram (EKG), impedance cardiogram (ICG) and skin conductance 
(SCL) data. EKG was recorded using disposable, pregelled Ag-AgCl electrodes attached in a 
triangular, equidistant configuration on the precardium. Signals were sampled at 1000 Hz. 
ICG signals were measured by placing a four spot-electrode configuration whereby two 
electrodes supplying high-frequency current were placed on the back and two measuring 
electrodes were placed on the chest to detect the reduction in voltage over the thorax. The 
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two electrodes on the chest were placed at the suprasternal notch above the top of the sternum 
and at the processus xiphodius at the bottom of the sternum. The other two ICG electrodes 
were placed on the back, 3 cm higher than the suprasternal electrode and 3cm lower than the 
processus xiphodius electrode, respectively (see Figure 2).  Respiration-related change in 
impedance (dZ) signals were sampled at 1000 Hz and raw impedance (Z0) signals at 250 Hz. 
SCL was recorded using the constant voltage method (0.5 V), sampled at 10 Hz. An offline 
60 Hz low-pass filter was applied to the ICG signal to minimise movement artefacts (Vrije 
Universiteit, 2015). Skin conductance was measured on the distal phalanx surfaces of 
participants’ middle and index fingers of the left hand. Ag-AgCl, non-polarisable finger 
electrodes (6 mm diameter contact area; Biopac Systems, Inc.) and isotonic, 0.5% saline gel 





Figure 2. Electrocardiogram (EKG) and impedance cardiogram (ICG) electrode placement. 
From Data Analysis and Management Software (DAMS) for the Vrije Universiteit 
Ambulatory Monitoring System (VU-AMS), version 1.2, 2015, p. 11. Copyright 2015 by the 
Vrije Universiteit. 
 
VU-AMS data were analysed using the Vrije Universiteit Data Analysis and 
Management Software (VU-DAMS). The data were visually inspected for artefacts and these 
were manually corrected. The pre-ejection period was calculated (as detailed by Sherwood et 
al., 1990) as the time (in milliseconds) between the onset of the EKG Q-wave and the B-point 
in the ICG. ICG complexes were averaged over the entire period of interest using the Large 
Scale Ensemble Averaging method (Riese et al., 2003). Ensemble-averaged waveforms for 
each epoch of interest were visually inspected and the B-point and Q-wave onset were 
manually identified. Each participant was given an overall signal quality score (1 ̶ 10; best = 
10) for the non-discarded epochs and a confidence score in the B-point location (1–10; best = 
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10). The following anchor points were used when scoring signal quality: 10 = excellent signal 
quality, undisputable B-point location; 7 = some noise, but patterns are still clearly 
discernible; 3 = a great deal of noise/ inconsistency in the B-point location, or many 
discarded segments; 1 = signal is not discernible above the noise, many segments discarded. 
Signals with confidence scores less than 4 on either signal quality or B-point location were 
removed from the analyses, as recommended by the Vrije Universiteit (2015). Similarly, 
electrodermal (SCL) signal quality was rated from 1 to 10 (best = 10)3 and signals with 
quality scores less than 4 were excluded from the analyses. Details of the amount of 
discarded data are given within each study. 
Respiration rate was obtained from the filtered dZ signal. Respiration rate (in breaths 
per minute) was calculated from the time of the total respiratory cycle, starting from the 
beginning of an inhalation and terminating at the end of an exhalation. Tidal volume was 
calculated from the difference in amplitude between peaks and valleys in the dZ signal. RSA 
was calculated per experimental block. RSA scoring was done within the VU-DAMS 
software using the peak-valley method, which is highly robust against artefacts (de Geus, 
Willemsen, Klaver, & van Doornen, 1995; Goedhart, van der Sluis, Houtveen, Willemsen, & 
de Geus, 2007; Grossman, van Beek, & Wientjes, 1990). In other words, RSA was calculated 
by subtracting the shortest interbeat interval within an inspiration period from the longest 
interbeat interval within an expiration period. To control for the influence of respiration on 
RSA, RSA was predicted from participants’ respiration rate and tidal volume per condition 
(as suggested in Grossman, Karemaker, & Wieling, 1991; Grossman & Taylor, 2007), and 
the residuals from analysis were used in subsequent analyses.  
                                                   
3 Anchor points similar to that used for the ICG signal analysis were used when scoring SCL 
quality: 10 = excellent signal quality; 7 = some noise, but skin conductance reactions are still 
clearly discernible; 3 = a great deal of noise relative to skin conductance reactions; 1 = signal 




Mixed-Effects Modelling  
Mixed-effects modelling is the main type of analysis used for the repeated measures 
data in this thesis. Mixed-effects modelling, also termed hierarchical linear modelling or 
multilevel modelling, is a statistical technique that is often used when multiple repeated 
measures are taken from the same participant or when participants are clustered into groups, 
such as schools. Psychophysiological studies are increasingly using mixed-effects modelling 
as it addresses the statistical challenges of having both within- and between-subject 
measurements (see Diamond et al., 2012; English, John, Srivastava, & Gross, 2012; Geisler 
et al., 2013; Marsh et al., 2008, for recent examples). Rather than averaging over trials or 
conditions, which reduces the amount of available information and may not accurately 
represent what is happening within a specific trial or condition, all trials or conditions are 
analysed. Linear mixed-effects modelling is similar to linear regression or mixed-repeated 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) in that it assumes that the outcome variable is continuous and 
that the residuals are normally distributed. Unlike mixed-repeated ANOVA, the independent 
variables do not need to be categorical, allowing greater statistical power. The use of 
continuous predictors rather than categorical ones, such as using amount of autism traits 
rather than diagnostic categories, is also consistent with the RDoC approach (Cuthbert, 
2014). Unlike regression, the residuals do not need to be independent, as clusters of related 
data can be defined as part of the model (e.g. all data from the same participant). 
Furthermore, the residuals do not need to have constant variance, as nonconstant variance can 
be modelled as part of the analysis (Pinheiro & Bates, 2000; West, Welch, & Galecki, 2006). 
Mixed-effects models contain two types of predictors: Fixed effects are parameters 
that contain all levels of a population variable, whereas random effects represent 
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experimental units sampled at random from a population - often participants in the case of 
repeated measures data (Pinheiro & Bates, 2000). Regression models contain only fixed 
effects; in other words, the predictors have unchanging (fixed) intercepts. In mixed-effects 
modelling, instead of estimating one fixed slope and intercept for the regression line (which 
applies to all participants) of a predictor, slopes and intercepts are allowed to vary across 
participants and across conditions within a participant. Intercepts that are not fixed are 
referred to as random intercepts and slopes that are allowed to vary are referred to as random 
slopes. A model may have one or many random intercepts, and additionally, may or may not 
contain multiple slopes. Simply put, fixed effects provide estimates of group averages (e.g., 
means and regression coefficients), whereas random effects provide estimates of group 
variance (Merlo, Yang, Chaix, Lynch, & Råstam, 2005). The estimated (unstandardized) 
average of the correlation coefficients of the fixed effects in a mixed-effects model is 
indicated by the symbol β.   
In the analyses presented in this thesis, all variables of interest were added as fixed 
effects in the models. Additionally, most of the mixed-effects models presented in this thesis 
have participant ID as a random intercept (in other words, a different intercept for the 
regression line is estimated for each participant) and have a maximal random-effect structure 
as is recommended for experimental and quasi-experimental designs (Barr, Levy, Scheepers, 
& Tily, 2013). In other words, slopes were allowed to vary for all experimentally controlled 
manipulations, much as experimental conditions are used as independent variables in a 
mixed-repeated ANOVA. For example, in Study 2, the experimentally-controlled factors 
were condition and muscle. Hence, condition, muscle and their interaction were entered into 
the model as random slopes. Thus each condition-muscle combination within a participant 
was allowed an independently varying slope. If a model did not converge, a simpler random-
effect structure was specified. After the random-effect structure was chosen, fixed effects 
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were removed in a top-down fashion to select the optimal model (Zuur, Ieno, Walker, 
Saveliev, & Smith, 2009). In order for the correlation coefficients to be comparable and to 
reduce collinearity between fixed effects, continuous fixed effects were scaled so that they 
had a mean of zero and standard deviation of one. 
  The advantages of using mixed-effects modelling are that (1) it is more accurate in 
identifying relationships when observations are not independent, such as when data are 
collected from the same participant at multiple time points, and that (2) it is more robust to 
missing data. Unlike ANOVA, which utilises listwise deletion of missing data, mixed-effects 
models use all available observations for a given participant (West et al., 2006). (3) Mixed-
effects modelling is also robust to violations of homoscedasticity, as a specific variance 
pattern (e.g. exponentially increasing variance) can be modelled as part of the analysis. This 
makes mixed-effects modelling a far more flexible and powerful means of analysis for 
repeated measures data than either multiple regression or mixed-repeated ANOVA. However, 
because of the random components in the model, significant values and effect sizes are 
guidelines rather than exact values. The reporting of significance and coefficients of 
determination (effect sizes) are controversial (Bates, 2006). However, for ease of comparison 
with the more familiar regression model, I have reported both in this thesis. Two coefficients 
of determination are reported: The marginal coefficient (R2M) is an index of the amount of 
variance explained by the fixed factors; whereas the conditional coefficient (R2cond), is an 
index of the amount of variance that is explained by the cumulative effects of the fixed and 
the random factors (Johnson, 2014; Nakagawa & Schielzeth, 2013). Some authors report the 
degree of similarity between cases within a cluster or unit of analysis (given by the intraclass 
correlation coefficient). However, the intraclass correlation coefficient cannot be 
meaningfully calculated for models with both random intercepts and random slopes, as the 
amount of similarity differs for each value of the predictor (Goldstein, Browne, & Rasbash, 
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2002). Rather than reporting intraclass correlation coefficients for models, I have reported the 
model variance components throughout. 
Though mixed-effects models are fairly flexible in their application, they do make 
some assumptions regarding the data. First, residuals should be independent within a cluster 
or level (e.g. within a participant, in the case of repeated measures). If residuals covary, 
temporal or spatial correlations between residuals should be explicitly modelled. Second, the 
residuals should be normally distributed, with a mean of zero, within a cluster. Third, error 
variance should be homogenous or should be explicitly modelled within the analysis. Fourth, 
linear mixed-effects models assume a linear relationship between each of the predictors and 
the outcome variable. Fifth, predictor variables should not have high correlations with each 
other (multicollinearity). Lastly, predictor variables should not contain an overabundance of 
zeroes (zero-inflation), as this can affect model accuracy. To determine whether assumptions 
were satisfied for each model, each model was inspected by creating scatterplots of the 
relationship between the predictor and outcome variables. Furthermore, residual plots were 
inspected for independence of errors, normality, homogeneity of variance and the absence of 
outlying values. Residuals were also plotted against fitted values to test for nonlinearity. 
Collinearity was examined by calculating the variance inflation factor, a measure of the 
extent to which variance in the estimated regression coefficients is inflated due to the 
presence of correlated variables. Coefficient confidence intervals were also examined for 
unwanted patterns. Histograms of the variables were inspected for normality and zero-
inflation. More information about these procedures can be found elsewhere (Zuur, Ieno, & 
Elphick, 2010; Zuur et al., 2009). Unless specifically reported, assumptions were upheld for 
each model. Heterogeneity of variance was addressed by first modelling the variance patterns 
within the mixed-effects or generalised least squared model, and if this was not successful, 
transforming the outcome variable. To address multicollinearity, variables with high variance 
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inflation factors (> 3) were systematically removed from the models to improve fit. Where 
scatterplots indicated possible nonlinear correlations, higher-order terms (e.g. quadratic or 
cubic terms) were included in the models. Influential values were removed and reported. 
There were no cases of temporal correlation between residuals or zero-inflation in any of the 
models. 
 Data analysis was done in R version 3.2.5 (R Core Team, 2015) and RStudio (RStudio 
Team, 2015). Most random and mixed-effects models reported within this thesis were 
computed with bound optimisation by quadratic approximation (BOBYQA; Powell, 2009) 
and restricted maximum likelihood (REML) estimation using the lmerTest package 
(Kuznetsova, Brockhoff, & Christensen, 2015). The exception is where heterogeneous 
variance was modelled as part of the analysis. These models were run using the nlme 
package (Pinheiro, Bates, DebRoy, Sarkar, & R Core Team, 2016), as lmerTest does not 
allow variance structures. Cells with missing data were omitted from the analysis. 
Throughout the studies, type III ANOVA results with Satterthwaite correction for degrees of 
freedom are reported. Conditional and marginal coefficients of determination (effect sizes) 
for the mixed-effects models were estimated using the r.squaredGLMM function in the 
MuMIn package (Bartoń, 2016; Nakagawa & Schielzeth, 2013). Where appropriate, 
significant differences in categorical fixed effects were examined post hoc using the 
multcomp package (Hothorn, Bretz, & Westfall, 2008), or by doing one-way paired t-tests 
of the specific groups of interest, as suggested in Howell (2004). Data visualisation was done 
using the ggplot2 (Wickham, 2009) and sjPlot (Lüdecke, 2016) packages. Appendix G 





STUDY 1: THE EMPATHY PROFILE IN ASD 
 
This study examined whether trait levels of cognitive empathy and self-regulation are 
negatively correlated with autism traits, while affective empathy is not correlated with 
autism. Trait levels of the different facets of empathy, alexithymia and autism were measured 
via self-report. Furthermore, cognitive empathy was measured with two cognitive tasks, a 
dynamic emotion recognition task and a faux pas recognition task. The correlation between 
empathy and autism traits was examined in two samples: An online sample representing the 
typical distribution of autism traits in the population, and a laboratory sample of roughly 
equal numbers of low, medium and high autism trait individuals case-matched on age, sex, 
and race (participant details are described in Chapter 4). A secondary aim of this study was to 
create affective empathy, cognitive empathy and self-regulation composite scores for each 
individual to use as predictors in Studies 2 and 3. 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
To what extent are the different facets of empathy (affective, cognitive, self-regulation) 
associated with ASD? 
 Hypothesis I: Amount of autism traits, measured by Autism Index (AI) scores, will 
be negatively correlated with trait cognitive empathy and with self-regulation, even after 
alexithymia is controlled for. AI scores will not be correlated with trait affective empathy. 
 Hypothesis II: Amount of autism traits, measured by AI scores, will be negatively 






The study used a correlation design. Amount of autism traits was correlated with trait 
affective empathy, trait cognitive empathy, trait self-regulation and alexithymia in both the 
online (N = 519) and laboratory samples (N = 98) described in Chapter 4. Additionally, 
performance measures of cognitive empathy were taken in the laboratory sample, and 
correlated with amount of autism traits. 
Materials and Methods 
Observational measures. The Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule, second 
edition (ADOS-2; Lord et al., 2012), is a semi-structured observational interview designed to 
elicit behaviours related to autism. The ADOS-2 adolescent and adult module (Module 4) 
was used for all participants. This module features scores for communication, reciprocal 
social interaction, and stereotyped behaviour and repetitive interests. A diagnostic algorithm 
score is calculated from the diagnostic items on the communication and reciprocal social 
interaction sections. The ADOS-2 has good predictive validity against best estimate 
diagnoses (Gotham, Pickles, & Lord, 2008; Lord et al., 2000). The ADOS-2 was 
administered by research-trained ADOS administrators. All observations were recorded for 
coding purposes. Difficult cases were coded by a team of three research-reliable coders and 
consensus coding was used for these cases (10% of participants). 
Self-report measures. The Autism-Spectrum Quotient (AQ; Baron-Cohen, 
Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 2001) is a 50-item self-report questionnaire on 
social and communicative skills, imagination, attention to details, and attention switching. 
Questions are rated on a 4-point Likert scale ranging from definitely agree to definitely 
disagree. The Autism-Spectrum Quotient was designed as a screening tool for adults with 
66 
 
ASD and has good internal consistency (.63 - .77) and test-retest reliability (.70). Higher 
scores indicate greater amounts of autistic traits, and scores above 26 are indicative of 
potential ASD (Woodbury-Smith et al., 2005). To increase the range of scores, the scoring 
for the AQ was changed so that definitely disagree = -2, slightly disagree = -1, slightly agree 
= 1 and definitely agree = 2. The original scoring was definitely disagree and slightly 
disagree = 0, and slightly agree and definitely agree = 1. The questionnaire items are given in 
Appendix H. 
Trait empathy was measured using the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Appendix 
I) and Emotional Contagion Scale (ECS; Appendix J). The Interpersonal Reactivity Index 
(Davis, 1980) is a widely used self-report measure of dispositional empathy. It is composed 
of four subscales: perspective taking, fantasy, empathic concern, and personal distress. Items 
are scored on a 5-point Likert scale from does not describe me well to describes me very well. 
All subtests have acceptable internal consistency (.70 - .78) and test-retest reliability (.62 - 
.81), with fantasy having the highest test-retest reliability and perspective taking the lowest. 
The Emotional Contagion Scale (Doherty, 1997) consists of 15 questions and measures 
susceptibility to 'catching' others’ emotions. The Emotional Contagion Scale focuses on five 
emotions; happiness, sadness, anger, fear, and love. Each emotion is measured by three items 
that are scored on a 5-point Likert scale from not at all to always. The Emotional Contagion 
Scale has excellent internal consistency (.90) and test-retest reliability (.84). Both measures 
have been used successfully with participants with ASD (Lombardo et al., 2007; Mathersul et 
al., 2013; Silani et al., 2008). On both measures, high scores indicate greater empathy. 
To reduce the number of subscales and to correspond to Decety’s (2011) definition of 
empathy, the items from the ECS and IRI were combined to form affective empathy, 
cognitive empathy and self-regulation scales. Items were assigned to the different facets 
based on theory by two raters familiar with the empathy literature. Where there were 
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disagreements, a consensus was reached over which facet an item falls under. Internal 
consistency was calculated for each of the subscales (see Results, p. 74 and p. 81, and 
Appendix K). Appendix K shows the results of a confirmatory factor analysis of the empathy 
facets and gives a list of the items on each scale. Example items for the different facets are “I 
often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me” (affective empathy), 
“I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things look from their 
perspective” (cognitive empathy), and “When I see someone who badly needs help in an 
emergency, I go to pieces” (self-regulation; negatively keyed). IRI item 1 (“I daydream and 
fantasize, with some regularity, about things that might happen to me”) did not fit well with 
any of the empathy scales, and was excluded. The scores on the affective, cognitive, and self-
regulation scales were used as predictors for the analyses in this study, as well as Studies 2 
and 3. 
Alexithymia was measured using the 20-item Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20; 
Bagby, Parker, & Taylor, 1994; Bagby, Taylor, et al., 1994). The scale measures difficulties 
in identifying and describing emotions, and the tendency to focus on external information 
rather than emotional experience. It consists of 20 items that are rated using a 5-point Likert 
scale (where 1 = strongly disagree and 5 = strongly agree; i.e., higher scores indicate greater 
alexithymia). Overall, the 20-item Toronto Alexithymia Scale has acceptable test-retest 
reliability (.77), good internal consistency (.81) and has been used with ASD populations 
(e.g., Lombardo et al., 2007; Silani et al., 2008), where it has shown good test-retest 
reliability (Berthoz & Hill, 2005). The internal consistencies of the subscales range from .66 
(Externally Oriented Thinking) to .78 (Difficulty Identifying Feelings; Bagby, Parker, et al., 
1994). The questionnaire items are given in Appendix L. 
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Performance cognitive empathy. Accuracy and speed in recognising basic emotions 
was measured using emotional expressions from The Montreal Set of Facial Displays of 
Emotion (Beaupré & Hess, 2005). Video morphs were created from the static images using 
FantaMorph 4 (Abrosoft, Lincoln, NE). Black and white morphed videos, all 14s in length, 
showed faces slowly transitioning from a neutral expression to one of six emotions (anger, 
fear, sadness, disgust, happiness or shame). Equal numbers of Black and White male and 
female faces were presented for each of the emotions. Example stimuli are shown in Figure 3. 
Participants pressed a button as soon as they recognised the emotion, and then chose the 
correct emotion from a list. The software captured participants’ responses and the time taken 
to respond. Response latency was measured in two ways: Time spent looking at the face 






Figure 3. Example stimuli from the emotion recognition task. Three clips from one of the 
videos representing happiness are shown on the left, and three clips from one of the videos 
representing anger are shown on the right. From 
http://www.psychophysiolab.com/en/download.php. 
The Faux Pas task (Stone, Baron-Cohen, & Knight, 1998) was administered as a 
measure of higher-order cognitive empathy. This task contains 10 stories wherein a character 
says something that is awkward or embarrassing, and 10 control stories wherein no 
embarrassing events take place. After reading the story, participants were asked whether 
anyone said anything awkward or anything they should not have said. If the participant 
indicated that something awkward was said, the researcher asked “Who said something they 
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shouldn't have said or something awkward?”, “Why shouldn't he/she have said it or why was 
it awkward?”, and “Why do you think he/she said it?”. Each story also contained an emotion 
understanding question, “How do you think X felt [upon hearing the faux pas]?” and two to 
three control questions that assessed the participant’s comprehension of the story. Three 
scores were derived for this task: A Faux Pas Total Score, out of 120, which consisted of all 
the faux pas inference questions; a Faux Pas Emotion Recognition Score, out of 10, which 
contained only the results of the emotion understanding questions; and a Faux Pas Control 
Score, out of 41, which consisted of only the control question totals.  
Use of questionnaire and cognitive measures in a South African sample.  The 
Interpersonal Reactivity Index has shown good internal consistency in South African samples 
(e.g., MacRitchie, 2006; Robins, Meltzer, & Zelikovsky, 2009). The 20-item version of the 
Toronto Alexithymia Scale (Erhabor & Ndlovu, 2013) has also been used in South Africa, 
though the authors unfortunately do not report any reliability indices. As far as I am aware, 
the Emotional Contagion Scale and the Autism-Spectrum Quotient have not been used in a 
South African sample before. To investigate possible problems with the reliability of the 
scales in this sample, the internal consistency of all the questionnaires were assessed before 
starting inferential statistics. 
Regarding the performance measures, both the child and the adult versions of the faux 
pas test have been used in South African samples (Hoogenhout & Malcolm-Smith, 2014; 
Lindinger et al., 2016; Mc Grath, 2009). Underperformance on the faux pas test within 
certain South African population groups has been reported (Lazarus, 2009), but as 
participants with low, medium and high autism traits were matched on age, sex and race, 
such an effect should not bias the relationship between autism traits and cognitive empathy. 
The specific dynamic facial displays have to my knowledge not been used in a South African 
sample, but South African adults were found to perform well on related static facial 
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expression images (Leppänen et al., 2006, 2008). To my knowledge, there is no published 
work on the use of the adolescent and adult module (module 4) of the ADOS-2 in South 
Africa. However, the ADOS-2 has been used successfully in several different countries, 
including Romania, Korea, Norway and the Netherlands (Bildt, Sytema, Meffert, & 
Bastiaansen, 2015; Lord et al., 2012; Pantelis & Kennedy, 2016). A pre-pilot of the Afrikaans 
translation of ADOS-2 revealed that participants deemed the social interaction tasks 
appropriate for use in South Africa (L. Smith, Malcolm-Smith, & de Vries, 2016). 
Procedure 
All participants gave informed consent and completed the self-report measures online 
on the survey website Survey Monkey (http://www.surveymonkey.com; see Appendix M for 
full survey). Survey Monkey access is password-controlled to ensure participant anonymity 
and adheres to the US-EU and US-Swiss Safe Harbour Frameworks regarding the collection, 
use and storage of personal information. Participant responses were sent over secured, 
encrypted Secure Sockets Layer and Transport Layer Security (SSL/TLS) connections. 
Participants had the option of completing the survey in the laboratory, with assistance from 
the experimenter as needed (e.g., definitions of some words). 
The smaller laboratory sample was selected based on their scores on the online AQ, as 
described in Chapter 4, and were invited to participate in the lab-based part of the study. 
Participants in the laboratory sample were given further verbal information about the study 
and confirmed consent at the start of the two laboratory sessions. The ADOS-2 assessment 
was completed during the first session, and the emotion recognition and faux pas tasks on 
separate days. The laboratory sessions lasted approximately 30 – 40 minutes each. Emotion 
recognition stimuli were presented within E-Prime 2 (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, 
PA) on a 19-inch 4:3 aspect ratio monitor. Instructions were presented verbally and on the 
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screen, and participants were given a practise trial before starting the experiment. Participants 
were instructed to identify the displayed emotions as quickly and accurately as they could. 
They were asked to press Enter as soon as they recognised the emotion, and advised that once 
they pressed Enter they would no longer be able to view the expression. Each emotion was 
displayed three times (18 trials in total) in random order. The faux pas stories were presented 
in book format. Instructions were read to the participants. Printed stories were kept in front of 
the participants as a memory aid and participants were told that they could consult the story 
at any time during the questions. Stories were always presented in the same order. 
Data Analysis 
 Total scores on the ADOS-2 diagnostic algorithm (i.e., the social and 
communication algorithm totals) and AQ were centred and scaled and then aggregated to 
calculate an Autism Index (AI) score. Autism Index scores are indicative of amount of autism 
traits, with positive scores indicating higher than average autism traits. Autism Index scores 
were used as a continuous variable in most analyses. To make the comparison of 
demographic information easier, autism index scores were also split into tertiles to form low, 
medium, and high autism traits groups. The groups’ demographic profiles were compared 
with ANOVA or chi-squared tests, according to the nature of the data.  
To correspond to Decety’s (2011) definition of empathy, items from the ECS and IRI 
were combined to form affective empathy, cognitive empathy, and self-regulation scales. The 
reliability of the original scales and new subscales were assessed using the packages psych 
(Revelle, 2015) and lavaan (Rosseel, 2012). Reliability analyses were done for the total 
sample and again separately for participants who also completed the lab-based component of 
the study. In both samples, linear regressions were used to correlate the new affective 
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empathy, cognitive empathy, and self-regulation indices with AI scores and with each other. 
Alexithymia was used as a control variable in analyses with AI.  
I used linear random-effects models to predict emotion recognition accuracy and 
response times. Medication use, AI, alexithymia, and type of emotion were used as fixed 
effects. Participant ID was used as the random intercept, and emotion type was used as the 
random slope (response time models only). Next, Faux Pas total and emotion recognition 
scores were predicted from control question accuracy, medication use, alexithymia, and AI. 
Generalised least squares models with an exponential variance structure were used for these 
models, as both the total and the emotion recognition scores showed increasing variance with 
increasing AI scores (as recommended in Zuur et al., 2009). The packages lmerTest 
(Kuznetsova et al., 2015) and nlme (Pinheiro et al., 2016) were used to calculate the 
random-effects models and general least squares models, respectively. Finally, a performance 
cognitive empathy aggregate was calculated from the two tasks that were predicted to be 
most sensitive to subtle cognitive empathy deficits: emotion recognition response time and 






 The total sample who completed the online questionnaires was of mean age 22.73 
years, SD = 5.71 (253 males, 266 females; 230 White, 157 Black, 74 Mixed Race, 41 Indian, 
5 Other). 
Scale reliability. The reliability of the scales and subscales was assessed using 
Cronbach’s alpha. Overall, both the original and new scoring versions of the AQ had high 
internal consistency (αnew = .86, αoriginal = .83, N = 518). The AQ subscales also had 
satisfactory internal consistencies with the new scoring (see Table 1). One item, AQ item 30 
(“I don’t usually notice small changes in a situation, or a person’s appearance”) was 
negatively correlated with the rest of the items (rcor = -. 16) in both AQ versions, though it is 
meant to be positively correlated with ASD.  
As shown in Table 1, the empathy and alexithymia questionnaires had high internal 
consistency in this sample: All questionnaires had Cronbach’s α values of .85 – .86 (95% 
confidence intervals all between .83– .88). The internal consistencies of the questionnaire 
subscales were also good, except for the External Thoughts subscale of the TAS-20, which 
had low internal consistency (see Table 1). Two of the items in this subscale were 
problematic: Item 5 on the TAS-20 had a negative correlation with the rest of the items (rcor = 
- .17), and item 16 had a correlation < .20 with the other items. To reduce the number of 
subscales and to correspond to Decety’s (2011) definition of empathy, the items from the 
ECS and IRI were combined to form affective empathy, cognitive empathy and self-
regulation scales. IRI item 1 (“I daydream and fantasize, with some regularity, about things 
that might happen to me”) did not fit well with any of the empathy scales, and was excluded. 
The new scales had high internal consistency. The specific items in each of the new scales are 
discussed more fully in the Laboratory Sample section. 
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Table 1  
Internal Consistency of the Autism, Empathy and Alexithymia Subscales 
Questionnaire Cronbach’s α 95% Confidence Interval N 
AQ (new) .86 .85 - .88 518 
  Social skill .81 .78 - .83  
  Attention switching .65 .60 - .69  
  Attention to detail .69 .65 - .73  
  Communication .74 .70 - .77  
  Imagination .64 .59 - .68  
ECS .86 .84 - .88 519 
IRI .85 .83 - .87 518 
  Empathic concern .83 .81 - .85  
  Personal distress .72 .68 - .76  
  Perspective taking .75 .71 - .78  
  Fantasy .81 .79 - .84  
TAS-20 .85 .83 - .86 518 
  Identify emotions .88 .86 - .89  
  Describe emotions .81 .79 - .84  
  External thoughts .54 .48 - .60  
New scales    
Affective empathy .90 .89 – .921 518 
Cognitive empathy .76 .73 – .79 518 
Self-regulation .73 .69 – .76 518 
Note. ECS = Emotional Contagion Scale; IRI = Interpersonal Reactivity Index; TAS-20 = 20-
Item Toronto Alexithymia Scale. 
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Autism and trait empathy and alexithymia. The sample had autism, empathy and 
alexithymia scores within previously reported average ranges (Bagby, Taylor, et al., 1994; 
Baron-Cohen et al., 2001; Davis, 1980; Doherty, 1997; Franz et al., 2007). AQ scores, using 
the original scoring criteria, ranged from 0 (no/minimal autism traits) to 48 (very high 
likelihood of ASD; max = 50). Descriptive statistics for the sample are presented in Table 2. 
AQ scores were negatively correlated with cognitive empathy (r [512] = - .35, p < .001), 
affective empathy (r [512] = - .32, p < .001), and self-regulation (r [512] = - .19, p < .001). In 
contrast, AQ scores were positively correlated with alexithymia (r [513] = .56, p < .001). 
Figure 4 shows the uncorrected correlations. 
 After controlling for alexithymia, AQ scores still significantly predicted trait 
affective empathy, β = - 0.15, SE = 0.03, ∆R2 = .03, t = - 4.69, p < .001, and trait cognitive 
empathy, β = -0.06, SE = 0.01, ∆R2 = .05, t = -5.62, p < .001, but not self-regulation, β = - 




   
Table 2  
Empathy, Autism and Alexithymia Traits in the Full Sample 
Questionnaire M SD 
 
Questionnaire M SD 
Empathy scales 
   
Autism traits 
  ECS (max = 60) 36.43 9.71 
 
AQ rescaled (max = 100) - 16.95 24.56 
IRI (max = 112) 67.51 14.37 
 
AQ original (max = 50) 19.78 7.66 
Empathic concern 19.82 5.41 
    Personal distress 12.33 4.96 
    Perspective taking 17.08 4.94 
 
Alexithymia 
  Fantasy 18.29 5.95 
 
TAS-20 (max = 100) 50.65 12.2 
Affective empathy  
(max = 96) 61.5 15.08 
 
Identify emotions 16.89 6.69 
Cognitive empathy  
(max = 28) 17.38 4.96 
 
Describe emotions 15.01 4.82 
Self-regulation  
(max = 32) 17.77 5.55   External thoughts 18.76 4.36 
Note. ECS = Emotional Contagion Scale; IRI = Interpersonal Reactivity Index; TAS-20 = 20-





Figure 4. The relationship between autism traits, empathy and alexithymia in the total 
sample. Shaded areas indicate the 95% confidence intervals around the prediction. 
Correlation coefficients are not corrected for alexithymia.  
 Males had significantly higher AQ scores than females (MM = -13.78, SDM = 25.12, 
MF = - 19.93, SDF = 23.59, t [720] = - 3.52, p ≤ .0005, d = 0.25). In contrast, females had 
significantly higher affective (MM = 56.00, SDM = 16.74, MF = 66.70, SDF = 17.99, t [500] = 
8.58, p < .001, d = 0.76) and cognitive empathy scores (MM = 16.74, SDM = 4.90, MF = 17.99, 
SDF = 4.96, t [514] = 2.90, p ≤ .004, d = 0.25), but lower self-regulation scores (MM = 19.14, 
SDM = 5.39, MF = 16.48, SDF = 5.41, t [514] = - 5.58, p < .001, d = 0.49). In other words, 
females had better affective and cognitive empathy, but poorer regulation of emotion during 
distress. Males had significantly higher alexithymia scores than females (MM = 52.10, SDM = 
12.02, MF = 49.27, SDF = 12.24, t [515] = -2.66, p ≤ .008, d = 0.23). Affective empathy was 
significantly positively correlated with cognitive empathy, r (517) = .51, p < .001, and 
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negatively correlated with self-regulation scores (r [517] = - .43, p < .001). Cognitive 
empathy and self-regulation were not correlated (r [517] = - .08, p ≤ .057). 
Laboratory Sample 
Demographic information. The low, medium and high ASD groups did not differ in 
age, F (2, 95) = 0.29, p ≤ .750, η2 = .006; race, χ2 (6, N = 98) = 10.86, p ≤ .092, Cramer’s V = 
.24; or sex, χ2 (2, N = 98) = 2.31, p ≤ .314, Cramer’s V = .154. Medication use was 
significantly higher in the high autism traits group than the low and medium groups, χ2 (2, N 
= 98) = 25.77, p < .001, Cramer’s V = .52 (std. residuals: Low = - 2.26, Medium = -2.77, 
High= 5.07).5 The medications included antidepressants (citalopram, escitalopram, 
amitriptyline, fluoxetine; 7% of participants), stimulants (methylphenidate; 4% of 
participants), antipsychotics (risperidone, ziprasidone; 4% of participants), anticonvulsants 
(sodium valproate, lamotrigine, phenytoin; 3% of participants) and others (allergy and asthma 
medication, oral contraceptives, cholesterol medication; 9% of participants). Of the 98 
participants, 6% were on more than one type of medication. For a full list of medications, see 
Appendix O.  
 As the groups did not differ in age, sex or race, these variables were not included in 
subsequent analyses. Medication use was included in all analyses as it could potentially affect 
physiological and behavioural outcomes. Group demographics are shown in Table 3. 
  
                                                   
4 The results of the Chi-squared test should be interpreted with caution, as more than 20% of the cells had low 
expected frequencies. However, a linear regression predicting AI score from Race also had a non-significant 
result; R2adj = 0, F (3,94) = 0.68, p ≤ .569. 
5 Similarly, a logistic regression predicting medication use from AI showed that with every one-unit increase in 
AI, participants were 1.77 times more likely to be on medication, 95% CI [1.31, 2.39], z (97) = 3.69, p ≤ .0002.  
80 
 
Table 3  
Participant Demographics 
 Autism traits 
 Low Medium High 
N 33 33 32 
Sex: Male 24 27 28 
Age 25.52 (7.65) 24.18 (9.80) 25.69 (8.75) 
Race  







Medication: Yes* 3 2 17a 
ADOS-2 communication 0.03 (0.17)a 0.52 (0.71)b 3.03 (2.19)ab 
ADOS-2 social interaction 0.21 (0.42)a 0.85 (0.91)b 6.16 (3.11)ab 
ADOS-2 diagnostic* 0.24 (0.44)a 1.36 (1.37)b 9.19 (4.94)ab 
ADOS-2 total* 1.79 (2.12)a 5.48(4.36)b 21.50 (12.88)ab 
AQ original* 12.79 (3.73)a 22.70 (6.09)a 32.50 (7.55)a 
AQ rescaled* - 38.97 (14.9)a - 6.76 (18.37)a 26.09 (27.30)a 
AI* - 1.63 (0.41)a - 0.44 (0.56)a 2.13 (1.09)a 
Note. For continuous variables, means are given with standard deviations in parentheses. 
Asterisks (*) indicate significant between-group differences. ADOS-2 diagnostic = ADOS-2 
diagnostic algorithm score, consisting of the communication and social interaction algorithm 
totals; ADOS-2 total = ADOS-2 total score (all items); AQ = Autism Spectrum Quotient; AI 
= Autism Index.  
a,b Between-group differences on Tukey’s post hoc testing. Groups with the same superscript 




Scale reliability. Similar to the results from the total sample, both the original and 
new scoring versions of the AQ showed high reliability (αnew = .92, αoriginal = .90); as did the 
AQ subscales (αs = .74 - .86). The ADOS-2 diagnostic algorithm (α = .92), IRI (α = .83) and 
ECS (α = .88) also showed high reliability. AQ item 30 was again negatively correlated with 
autism traits (rraw = - .13, rcor = -. 16) in both AQ versions. The TAS-20’s reliability was 
satisfactory overall (α = .84), but poor for the Externally-Oriented Thinking subscale (α = 
.49). To keep the scales consistent with the original versions, problem items were not 
removed from the scale total calculations.  
Reliability analysis of the new affective empathy, cognitive empathy and self-
regulation scales revealed that three items had correlations < .35 with their respective 
subscales (affective empathy: IRI 12, ECS13; self-regulations: ECS7; cognitive empathy: 
IRI15). These items were removed from the scales and the reliability was reassessed (see 
Table 4 for item descriptions). The final affective empathy scale had a reliability of .91, 95% 
CI [.87, .94], the cognitive empathy scale had a reliability of .72, 95% CI [.59, .84], and the 
self-regulation scale had a reliability of .80, 95% CI [.71, .90]. For a list of the items 





Excluded Items from the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) and Emotional Contagion Scale 
(ECS) 
Item Description Correlation 




IRI 12a rarely becomes extremely involved in book/movie .20 








ECS7a gets irritated around angry people .24 
Note. Correlations are corrected for item overlap and scale reliability (Cureton, 1966; 
Revelle, 2015).  
a Negatively keyed items. 
 
 Some individual items had moderately low correlations with other scale items (.35 
≤ r ≤ .40). These items were kept in the scales, but are noted here. IRI 7 (“I am usually 
objective when I watch a movie or play, and I don't often get completely caught up in it”), 
IRI 18 (“When I see someone being treated unfairly, I sometimes don't feel very much pity 
for them”) and ECS 10 (“I tense when overhearing an angry quarrel”) had low correlations 
with the affective scale total.  Similarly, IRI 3 (“I sometimes find it difficult to see things 
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from the "other guy's" point of view”) and 8 (“I try to look at everybody's side of a 
disagreement before I make a decision”) had low correlations with the cognitive empathy 
total, and IRI 10 (“I sometimes feel helpless when I am in the middle of a very emotional 
situation”) had a low correlation with the self-regulation total. 
Autism and trait empathy and alexithymia. The mean ADOS-2 diagnostic 
algorithm total for the sample was 3.54 (SD = 4.93; see Table 3 for group totals). Scores 
higher than 2 on Communication, 4 on Social Interaction, and 7 on the diagnostic 
Communication-Social Interaction Total are necessary to meet the cut-off for ASD on the 
ADOS-2. Likewise, scores higher than 3 on Communication, 6 on Social Interaction, and 10 
on the diagnostic Communication-Social Interaction Total are necessary to meet the cut-off 
for autism on the ADOS-2. In total, 21 participants in the high AI group met the criteria for 
ASD, of which 14 also met the criteria for autism. Similarly, 24 participants had scores of 32 
or higher on the original AQ algorithm, indicating a high likelihood of ASD (Baron-Cohen et 
al., 2001). The mean AQ score for the sample was -6.88 (SD = 33.54) on the rescaled 
algorithm and 22.53 (SD = 9.82) on the original algorithm. ADOS-2 algorithm and AQ 
rescaled algorithm scores were significantly positively correlated, r (96) = .50, p < .001.  
 The descriptive statistics for the empathy and alexithymia subscales are given in 
Table 5. Participants in the low AI group performed in the average range on affective 
empathy, cognitive empathy, self-regulation and alexithymia. On average, the high AI group 
(M = 62.13, SD = 11.31) fell within the clinical range for alexithymia, which is defined as 
scoring 61 or higher on the TAS-20 (Bagby, Taylor, et al., 1994). Fifteen of the high AI 
group participants (48%) met criteria for alexithymia, whereas only 27% of the medium AI 





Table 5  




Low Medium High Total 
 M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Empathy scales 
        ECS (max = 60) 35.00 8.10 31.12 10.87 30.75 12.42 32.31 10.66 
IRI (max = 112) 64.76 13.04 62.27 12.78 58.03 16.31 61.80 14.18 
Empathic concern 19.42 4.62 17.24 5.73 17.17 5.74 17.97 5.43 
Personal distress 10.21 5.29 11.48 4.78 14.37 5.17 11.95 5.31 
Perspective taking 18.82 4.48 16.45 4.24 12.20 4.23 15.94 5.07 
Fantasy 16.30 5.51 17.09 5.16 14.30 6.48 15.95 5.77 
         Trait affective empathy  
(max = 96) 58.39 13.72 53.82 14.58 51.30 18.63 54.60 15.80 
Trait cognitive empathy  
(max = 28) 18.67 4.31 16.55 4.57 12.80 4.74 16.10 5.09 
Self-regulation  
(max = 32) 11.79 6.08 13.06 5.63 16.20 6.04 13.60 6.13 
         Alexithymia scales 
        TAS-20 (max = 100) 47.00 11.22 54.88 10.09 62.13 11.31 54.52 12.41 
Identify emotions 14.79 5.82 18.18 6.41 23.58 6.50 18.75 7.16 
Describe emotions 13.82 4.77 16.61 4.49 17.90 4.53 16.07 4.86 
External thoughts 18.39 4.02 20.09 3.44 20.65 5.07 19.69 4.28 
Note. ECS = Emotional Contagion Scale; IRI = Interpersonal Reactivity Index; TAS-20 = 20-




 The aggregated AI score (M = 0, SD = 1.73), indicating amount of autism traits, was 
significantly negatively related to trait cognitive empathy (r [94] = - .54, p < .001) and self-
regulation scores (r [94] = - .37, p < .001) scores. AI scores were positively related to 
alexithymia (r [95] = 0.55, p < .001) and not correlated with self-reported affective empathy 
(r [94] = - .19, p ≤ .068; see Figure 5)6. After controlling for alexithymia in a linear 
regression model, AI scores still significantly predicted trait cognitive empathy, β = - 1.34, 
SE = 0.32, ∆R2 = .13, t = - 4.13, p < .001 and self-regulation, β = - 1.26, SE = 0.44, ∆R2 = .08, 
t = - 2.88, p ≤ .005.   
 
Figure 5. The correlation between amount of autism traits (AI) and affective and cognitive 
empathy, self-regulation and alexithymia. Shaded areas indicate the 95% confidence interval 
of the linear regression. 
                                                   
6 To compare this analysis to the analysis using the total sample, affective empathy scores were also correlated 
with AQ scores. Similar to AI, there was no significant correlation between AQ scores and affective empathy, r 
[94] = - .19, p ≤ .053. 
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Autism and performance cognitive empathy. 
Emotion recognition. Descriptive statistics for emotion recognition accuracy and 
speed are shown in Figure 6 and Table 6. Speed was measured in two ways: time spent 
looking at the face before keypress (Response Time 1), and time spent selecting an emotion 
(Response Time 2). One participant responded considerably more slowly on the emotion 
recognition task than other participants, and was removed from all the emotion recognition 
analyses, leaving 97 participants. On average, happiness was recognised fastest and with the 
most accuracy. The response times until the first keypress (Response Time 1) were similar 
for the negative emotions. Average response times for the negative emotions at Time 2 
ranged between 2.40 s (SD = 2.42) for Disgust and 4.07 s (SD = 4.49) for Fear. Emotion 
recognition accuracy and speed was predicted from type of emotion, AI and medication use. 
Linear mixed-effects models were run to predict average accuracy scores7 over the three 
trials, and to predict response times. 
                                                   
7Average scores rather than accuracy per trial were used as binomial mixed-effects models of accuracy per trial 




Figure 6. Emotion recognition accuracy (A) and speed by Autism Index (AI) and emotion. 
Response Time 1 (B) denotes time spent viewing the face until keypress; Response Time 2 
(C) denotes time spent selecting an emotion. Shaded areas indicate the 95% confidence 






Table 6  
Emotion Recognition Accuracy and Response Times in Seconds 
Autism traits Emotion Accuracy Response time 1 Response time 2 
  
M SD M SD M SD 
Low Happiness 1.00 0.00 4.93 2.60 1.65 0.73 
 
Sadness 0.80 0.40 7.21 3.60 3.20 3.21 
 
Anger 0.80 0.40 7.96 4.02 2.96 2.70 
 
Disgust 0.65 0.48 6.77 3.02 2.13 1.41 
 
Fear 0.81 0.40 7.48 3.78 3.39 2.67 
 
Shame 0.69 0.47 6.52 3.00 2.64 1.89 
Medium Happiness 1.00 0.00 4.82 2.11 1.60 0.78 
 
Sadness 0.61 0.49 7.67 4.21 2.94 2.24 
 
Anger 0.74 0.44 8.81 3.67 2.77 2.38 
 
Disgust 0.65 0.48 6.57 2.50 1.96 1.12 
 
Fear 0.71 0.46 7.45 4.05 3.96 4.87 
  Shame 0.70 0.46 6.72 3.13 2.49 1.55 
High Happiness 0.99 0.10 4.84 2.98 2.22 3.73 
 
Sadness 0.73 0.45 5.84 4.22 4.26 4.88 
 
Anger 0.65 0.48 6.35 4.95 3.73 3.40 
 
Disgust 0.59 0.50 5.57 4.03 3.15 3.76 
 
Fear 0.67 0.47 5.92 4.51 4.92 5.44 
  Shame 0.66 0.48 5.95 3.83 3.27 2.97 
Total Happiness 1.00 0.06 4.87 2.57 1.81 2.21 
 Sadness 0.71 0.45 6.93 4.08 3.45 3.61 
 Anger 0.73 0.45 7.73 4.34 3.14 2.86 
 Disgust 0.65 0.48 6.32 3.26 2.40 2.42 
 Fear 0.73 0.45 6.97 4.16 4.07 4.49 
  Shame 0.68 0.47 6.41 3.33 2.79 2.22 
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Accuracy. Emotion recognition accuracy was modelled in a random-effects model. 
The interaction between AI and emotion type was not significant and was removed from the 
final model. Overall, participants were significantly more accurate at recognising happiness 
than all other emotions, F (5, 480) = 25.69, p < .001, especially disgust (see Table 7). Post 
hoc tests showed no significant differences in accuracy between the other emotions. AI was 
negatively correlated with accuracy, β = - 0.04, SE = 0.02, F (1, 94) = 5.26, p ≤ .020. 
Medication use did not significantly predict accuracy; F (1, 94) = 1.13, p ≤ .290. The model 
was fit with a random intercept for ID, σ̂ 2ID = 0.017, σ̂ 
2
resid = 0.06.  
Additionally, I performed a chi-squared goodness-of-fit test to see whether the low, 
medium and high autism traits groups selected the different emotions at the same frequency. 
There were no differences between the AI groups in their selection frequencies of the six 




Table 7  
Linear Random-Effects Model Estimates of Emotion Recognition Accuracy from Medication 
Use, AI and Emotion Type 
Fixed effects β SE df t-value Probability 
Medication: Yes 0.05 0.04 94 1.06 .290 
AI - 0.04 0.02 94 - 2.29 .024 
Sadness - 0.29 0.04 480 - 7.95 < .001 
Anger - 0.27 0.04 480 - 7.47 < .001 
Disgust - 0.37 0.04 480 - 10.25 < .001 
Fear - 0.27 0.04 480 - 7.47 < .001 
Shame - 0.32 0.04 480 - 8.81 < .001 
Note. Number of observations = 582, number of groups (ID) = 97. R2M = .16, R
2
C = .34. AI = 
Autism Index. 
Response time. There was a significant interaction effect between AI and Emotion on 
Response Time 1, as well as significant main effects for AI and Emotion. Coefficient 
estimates suggest that the pattern of responses with increasing AI are mostly similar for all 
emotions: Higher AI scores were associated with shorter response times on anger, fear, 
sadness and disgust (all p < .05; see  
Table 8 for exact figures). This association was greatest for fear (β = - 0.91, SE = 
0.30, t (126) = - 3.04, p ≤ .003). On average, participants had the fastest response times to 
happiness (all p < .001). 
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AI scores and Emotion also significantly predicted Response Time 2. On this 
analysis, there was no significant interaction between AI and emotion type. Higher AI scores 
were associated with longer response times for selecting the appropriate emotion. On 
average, participants selected happiness significantly faster than all other emotions (see  
Table 8). The greatest time difference was between happiness and fear, β = 2.27, SE = 
0.29, t (111.8) = 7.92, p < .001. Post hoc tests also showed that after happiness, disgust was 
recognised significantly faster than sadness (p < .001), and fear was recognised significantly 
slower than anger, disgust and shame (all ps < .001). The variance and correlation between 
the random effects are given in Table 9. Adding alexithymia to the models did not improve 
their fit. 
Table 8  
Linear Mixed-Effects Models of Emotion Recognition Response Time 
Fixed effects SS MS dfeffect dferror F-value Probability 
Response time 1 
      
 Medication 12.41 12.41 1 94.97 1.27  .260 
 AI 47.92 47.92 1 96.25 4.92  .030 * 
Emotion 980.36 196.07 5 149.28 20.13 < .001 *** 
AI*Emotion 120.18 24.04 5 149.28 2.47  .040 * 
Response time 2 
       Medication 18.51 18.51 1 102.35 2.95  .09 
 AI 82.25 82.25 1 100.59 13.12 < .001 *** 
Emotion 484.94 96.99 5 212.17 15.47 < .001 *** 





Table 8 (cont.) 
      
 
Fixed effects β SE df t-value Probability 
Response time 1 
     
 Medication: Yes - 0.52 0.46 94.97 - 1.13  .262 
 AI 0.09 0.23 140.99 0.39  .698 
 Sadness 2.06 0.32 108.89 6.37 < .001 *** 
Anger 2.86 0.30 116.71 9.45 < .001 *** 
Disgust 1.45 0.26 642.90 5.51 < .001 *** 
Fear 2.09 0.30 125.88 6.98 < .001 *** 
Shame 1.54 0.27 433.25 5.74 < .001 *** 
AI* Sadness - 0.65 0.32 108.89 - 2.02  .046 * 
AI* Anger - 0.72 0.30 116.71 - 2.40  .018 * 
AI* Disgust - 0.57 0.26 642.90 - 2.15  .032 * 
AI* Fear - 0.91 0.30 125.88 - 3.04  .003 *** 
AI*Shame - 0.31 0.27 433.25 - 1.14  .253 
 Response time 2 
      Medication: Yes - 0.56 0.32 102.35 - 1.72  .089 
 AI 0.53 0.17 200.49 3.10   .002 ** 
Sadness 1.64 0.30 100.16 5.54 < .001 *** 
Anger 1.33 0.25 142.25 5.25 < .001 *** 
Disgust 0.59 0.22 284.79 2.65  .009 ** 
Fear 2.26 0.29 111.77 7.92 < .001 *** 
Shame 0.98 0.23 240.62 4.30 < .001 *** 
AI* Sadness - 0.01 0.30 100.16 - 0.03  .975 
 AI* Anger - 0.05 0.25 142.25 - 0.21  .831 
 AI* Disgust 0.15 0.22 284.79 0.67  .503 
 AI* Fear 0.52 0.29 111.77 1.83  .071 
 AI*Shame - 0.10 0.23 240.62 - 0.45  .657   
Note. Response time 1: R2M = .08, R
2
C = .32. Response time 2: R
2
M = .09, R
2
C = .39. AI = 
Autism Index. 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
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Table 9  
Random Effects of the Linear Mixed-Effects Models of Emotion Recognition Response Time8 
Random effects   
Group N Slope Variance Correlation 
Response time 1   
      
ID 97 (Intercept)  1.47 
     
 
 Sadness  3.62 - .01 
    
 
 Anger  2.37  .19  .69 
   
 
 Disgust  0.20  .75  .42  .65
  
 
 Fear  2.20  .17  .67  .18  .06 
 
 
 Shame  0.47  .67  .60  .78  .75  .52
Residual 1746   9.74 
     Response time 2   
      ID 97 (Intercept)  0.48 
     
 
 Sadness  4.33  .19
    
 
 Anger  2.03  .11  .99
   
 
 Disgust  0.65  .32  .99  .98
  
 
 Fear  3.78  .95  .38  .29  .48
 
 
 Shame  0.81  .12  .99 1.00  .98  .29
Residual 1746   6.27 
     
Note. Random effects: ID (intercept); emotion (slope). 
Faux pas. On average, participants scored 40 out of a possible 41 (SD = 3.69) on the 
control questions, 107 out of 120 (SD = 3.69) on all the Faux Pas questions, and 8 out of 10 
(SD = 2.48) on the Faux Pas emotion recognition questions. Control question scores were 
                                                   
8 The variances and correlations of the random effects are displayed so that the model validity can be evaluated. 
The variance of the intercept indicates the amount of variability in response time between individuals. The 
variance coefficient for each emotion indicates the amount of variability in response time within that emotion 
(e.g., sadness). The correlations indicated in the table show the correlation between the intercept and slope of 
each emotion.  
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correlated with AI, r (87) = - .35, p ≤ .0008; hence, control accuracy was used as a control 
variable in the analyses of total Faux Pas and Faux Pas emotion recognition. The variance in 
both total Faux Pas and Faux Pas emotion recognition scores increased with increasing AI 
scores (see Figure 7). As heterogeneous presentation is an often-described part of ASD 
(Hoogenhout & Malcolm-Smith, 2014; Nuske, Vivanti, & Dissanayake, 2013), generalised 
least squares analyses with variance covariates were used to model the variance, rather than 
transforming the response variables to artificially reduce heterogeneity (Zuur et al., 2009). A 
non-linear increase in variance was allowed within the models. 
 
Figure 7. Autism Index scores were significantly negatively correlated with total Faux Pas 
scores (A) and with Faux Pas emotion recognition scores (B). The row-like patterning in B is 
because scores were integers from 1 to 10. Shaded areas indicate the 95% confidence interval 




Faux Pas total score was predicted from control question accuracy, medication use 
and AI. A generalised least squares model with an exponential variance structure was fit as 
the variance in Faux Pas scores increased with increasing AI scores and with medication use 
(Figure 7). After inspection of the residuals, two influential values were removed and the 
regression was rerun, resulting in a better model fit (for model diagnostics, see Appendix P, 
Figure 28, p. 382). AI was significantly negatively correlated with Faux Pas scores, β = - 
4.01, SE = 1.33, t (85) = - 3.02, p ≤ .003, even after controlling for the effect of control 
question accuracy (see Table 10). Medication use was similarly negatively correlated with 
Faux Pas scores. Control question accuracy was positively correlated with Faux Pas scores. 
Adding alexithymia did not change the model fit. The original model with the influential 





Table 10  
Generalised Linear Model Coefficients of Faux Pas Total and Emotion Recognition Scores 
Predictors β SE dfeffect dferror F-value Probability 
FP Total a 
       
Control Score 4.13 1.53 1 85 15.55 .002 ** 
Medication - 4.76 2.51 1 85 4.71 .033 * 
AI - 4.35 1.36 1 85 10.25   < .002 ** 
FP Emotion 
Recognitionb 
      Control Score 0.37 0.28 1 85 4.99 .028 * 
Medication - 0.88 0.47 1 85 3.32 .041 * 
AI - 0.37 0.25 1 85 2.20 .142   
Note. FP = Faux pas; AI = Autism Index.  
a variance covariate exponent δ = 0.27. b variance covariate exponent δ = 0.24.  
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
 
A generalised least-squares model with an exponential variance structure was fit to 
predict emotion recognition on the Faux Pas task. The same two cases as in the previous 
analysis were identified as influential values, and these cases where removed from the final 
analysis (for model diagnostics, see Appendix P, Figure 29, p. 383). Control question 
accuracy was once again positively correlated with the Faux Pas emotion recognition scores, 
though this correlation was not significant on the marginal t-test, t (85) = 1.33, p ≤ .188. 
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Medication use was negatively correlated with Faux Pas emotion recognition scores. AI 
scores were not significantly correlated with Faux Pas emotion recognition scores. The 
original model is again shown in Appendix P, Table 43, p. 381. 
Correlations between performance cognitive empathy scores. The Faux Pas and 
emotion recognition scores were all significantly correlated with each other (see Table 11), 
except for the Faux Pas total score and emotion recognition accuracy, r (86) = .20, p ≤ .065. 
Total Faux Pas and the reverse-scored emotion recognition Response Time 2 (where higher 
values now indicate better performance) were centred, scaled and aggregated to form a 
performance cognitive empathy score. These two tasks were chosen because they represent 
the most complex cognitive empathy tasks. Participants who were excluded in either the Faux 
Pas or emotion recognition analyses were not given a performance cognitive empathy total. 
Like its aggregates, the total performance cognitive empathy score was significantly 
correlated with AI (M = 0.20, SD = 0.99, r [86] = - .46, p < .001). This performance cognitive 
empathy aggregate was used as a predictor in subsequent analyses of affective and 
physiological states. 
Table 11  
Correlations Between the Different Performance Cognitive Empathy Measures 
  ER-RT1 ER-RT2 FP-ER FP Total 
ER .21* - .23*   .25*   .20 
ER-RT1 
 
- .35***   .28**   .57*** 
ER-RT2 
  
- .32** - .53*** 
FP-ER       .63*** 
Note. ER = emotion recognition; RT = response time; FP = faux pas.  
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
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Correlations between empathy facets. Trait affective empathy scores were 
significantly correlated with both trait cognitive empathy and self-regulation. Similar to the 
total sample, there was no significant correlation between trait cognitive empathy and self-
regulation. Additionally, performance cognitive empathy was not significantly related to trait 
cognitive empathy, trait affective empathy or self-regulation (see Table 12). 
Table 12  
Correlations Between Empathy Measures 





 Affective .58 *** .07 
 






 Cognitive (P)        .17   
Note. T = trait; P = performance.  
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
In summary, AQ scores were significantly negatively correlated with trait affective 
and trait cognitive empathy in the total sample. These correlations remained significant after 
alexithymia was controlled for. In the laboratory sample, AI scores were not correlated with 
trait affective empathy. As expected, AI scores were significantly negatively correlated with 
both trait and performance cognitive empathy and with self-regulation ability (Hypotheses I 
and II), even after controlling for alexithymia. Though there were significant correlations 
between trait affective empathy and self-regulation, and trait affective empathy and trait 





The aim of this preliminary study was to examine whether self-reported trait levels of 
cognitive empathy, affective empathy and self-regulation are correlated with autism traits 
once alexithymia is controlled for. Trait affective empathy, cognitive empathy and self-
regulation scales were assembled from questions on the Emotional Contagion Scale and the 
Interpersonal Reactivity Index. The study examined empathy, alexithymia and autism traits in 
a large online sample, and in a smaller sample that came to the laboratory for additional 
autism and cognitive empathy assessments. In both samples, participants ranged from having 
high autism traits, in other words, having social-communication deficits and restricted, 
repetitive or stereotyped behaviours that met diagnostic criteria for ASD and impacted on 
daily functioning, to having low autism traits. Low autism trait individuals did not have 
psychiatric diagnoses and had minimal or no features of ASD. In between were individuals 
with some features of ASD, such as difficulties with maintaining conversations and peer 
relationships, as well as inflexibility of behaviour or thoughts, but who did not meet criteria 
for ASD. 
In the next section, the correlations between empathy, autism traits and alexithymia in 
the two samples will be discussed. The discussion is followed by an overview of the internal 
consistency of the original questionnaires and the newly-constructed empathy facets 
(affective, cognitive and self-regulation). 
Alexithymia 
Autism traits were positively correlated with alexithymia. On average, the high AI 
group fell within the clinical range for alexithymia, and 48% of high AI participants met 
criteria for alexithymia. This result is in keeping with reports of high rates of alexithymia in 
autism spectrum disorder (Berthoz & Hill, 2005; Lombardo et al., 2007; Silani et al., 2008) 
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and the broader autism phenotype (Berthoz et al., 2013). Similar to this study, Berthoz and 
Hill (2005) reported that most individuals with autism have at least some alexithymia, and 
found “severe degrees of alexithymia” in 50% of individuals with ASD. Alexithymia was not 
limited to those with high amounts of autism traits, however, and was also found in 
individuals with low amounts of autism traits. 
Dispositional Empathy 
Trait affective empathy scores were significantly correlated with both trait cognitive 
empathy and self-regulation. As expected, trait cognitive empathy was negatively correlated 
with amount of autism traits. Similarly, autism traits were negatively correlated with self-
regulation capacity in the laboratory sample. Individuals with ASD have previously reported 
higher levels of personal distress and less frequent and successful use of regulation strategies 
such as reappraisal than neurotypical individuals (Samson, Huber, & Gross, 2012). 
Individuals with ASD may rely more heavily on suppression as an emotion regulation 
strategy, which has been associated with reduced displays of positive affect and heightened 
negative emotions (Gross & John, 2003). As expected, autism traits were negatively 
correlated with trait cognitive empathy (Dziobek et al., 2007; Mazza et al., 2014; Rueda, 
Fernández-Berrocal, & Schonert-Reichl, 2014), even after controlling for alexithymia. There 
was no significant correlation between trait cognitive empathy and self-regulation.  
The association between amount of autism traits and affective empathy differed 
between the samples. Autism traits were negatively correlated with trait affective empathy in 
the full sample, but not in the laboratory sample. One possible explanation for the differing 
results is that the correlation between ASD and affective empathy is very small, so that there 
was insufficient power to detect a significant effect in the laboratory sample. Given the size 
of the laboratory sample, the study had a 53% chance to detect a significant effect at the 
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effect size found in the total sample. However, trait cognitive and affective empathy has 
similar effect sizes in the total sample, and cognitive empathy was significantly correlated 
with autism traits in the laboratory sample, so lack of power is unlikely to be the only 
explanation for the nonsignificant correlation between affective empathy and autism traits in 
the laboratory sample. Another explanation is that reporting was biased in high ASD trait 
individuals, perhaps due to lack of insight into their own emotions, so that very high autism 
trait participants reported high affective empathy. This argument does not explain why a 
significant correlation was still found between cognitive empathy and autism traits, which 
should presumably be equally susceptible to impairments in insight. Another possibility is 
that, as I did not assess the total sample, it may have included individuals with undiagnosed 
and unreported psychiatric conditions that resulted in both higher AQ scores and lower 
affective empathy.  
Previous self-report studies have found evidence of both diminished affective 
empathy (e.g., aan het Rot & Hogenelst, 2014; Demurie et al., 2011; Lombardo et al., 2007) 
and intact affective empathy in ASD (Dziobek et al., 2007; Rogers et al., 2006). Studies of 
physiological arousal, however, have more consistently shown intact affective empathy in 
ASD, including finding no difference in brain activation between ASD and neurotypical 
groups when observing others’ pain (Hadjikhani et al., 2014). Others have found increased 
affective arousal to observing the pain of another in ASD (Gu et al., 2015). The overall 
picture suggests that affective arousal sharing is intact in ASD; however more, evidence from 
multiple sources is needed. Studies 2 and 3 examine the relationship between affective states 




Performance Cognitive Empathy 
Performance cognitive empathy was measured using emotion recognition and faux 
pas tasks. Emotion recognition patterns corresponded to previous studies and were not 
correlated with amount of autism traits. That is, all participants recognised happiness the 
fastest and with the most accuracy. All the negative emotions took longer to recognise than 
happiness, which was used as the baseline. Fear took longest to recognise. Accuracy rates for 
sadness, anger, shame and fear were comparable, as was recognition speed for sadness, 
anger, shame and disgust. These results in adolescence and adulthood mirror the development 
of emotion recognition in children. The recognition of fear and disgust typically develops 
slightly later in childhood than the recognition of happiness or sadness does (Durand, Gallay, 
Seigneuric, Robichon, & Baudouin, 2007; Rump, Giovannelli, Minshew, & Strauss, 2009).  
Autism traits were negatively correlated with emotion recognition accuracy across all 
emotions, even after controlling for alexithymia. These results correspond to recent meta-
analyses of emotion recognition in ASD whose authors concluded that individuals with ASD 
have problems with emotion recognition across a range of emotion expressions (Lozier, 
Vanmeter, & Marsh, 2014; Uljarevic & Hamilton, 2012). These authors concluded that 
emotion recognition deficits are pervasive and not limited to certain subgroups of ASD. The 
discrepancy between the significant differences in my study and the non-significant results of 
other studies, which have predominantly focused on emotion recognition in children with 
ASD, may be because individuals with ASD show little improvement in emotion recognition 
with age, so that group differences become more marked in adulthood (Rump et al., 2009). 
Unlike previous studies (Cook et al., 2013; Lane et al., 1996, 2000), I did not find that 
alexithymia was correlated with emotion recognition. Differences may be due to different 
methodologies: Lane and colleagues (1996, 2000) focused on emotion recognition in social 
stories in their studies, not facial emotion recognition. Cook and colleagues (2013) used 
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morphed facial expression, but presented cross-morphed emotion stimuli where participants 
only had to distinguish between two emotions at a time (anger versus disgust and fear versus 
surprise). Their task is thus subtly different from the one used in the current study: First, 
participants only had to choose between two emotions at any time, making it easier for their 
ASD participants; secondly, participants had to choose the point at which one emotion 
changes into another, rather than choosing which one emotion was shown on the face. These 
different task demands may require somewhat different skills.  
Greater autism traits were associated with shorter response times on seeing the 
emotion (i.e., Time 1, the time taken to recognise the emotion). This analysis included 
response times for both accurate and inaccurate responses. It was decided not to remove 
inaccurate responses from the analyses because of the significant correlation between autism 
traits and accuracy. Removing inaccurate responses would have inordinately removed 
participants with high amounts of autism traits from the analyses. Participants with higher 
levels of autism traits may have been more likely to perceive an emotion on the neutral 
starting expression, which could explain the shorter response times in these participants. 
Durand and colleagues (2007) has found that young children, who are not yet proficient in 
recognising emotions, are more likely than adults to ascribe an emotion – usually happiness 
or sadness – to a neutral expression. Participants with greater amounts of autism traits, who 
are less adept at accurately recognising emotions, may do the same. There were no group 
differences in the frequency at which each emotion was chosen, so if high autism trait 
participants were ascribing an emotion to the neutral expression, they did not preferentially 
pick a specific emotion above another. Alternatively, it is possible that participants with high 
amounts of autism traits were more likely to try to guess the emotion, and thus spent less time 
observing the videos before keypress. Besides autism traits, the type of emotion also 
predicted the amount of time participants spent looking at the video before recognising the 
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emotion: All the negative emotions took longer to recognise than happiness, which was used 
as the baseline. Response latency at Time 2, when participants had to decide on and select an 
emotion, was negatively correlated with amount of autism traits. This result is consistent with 
the hypothesis that individuals with more autism traits have more difficulties in recognising 
facial expressions of emotion. In summary, autism traits were negatively correlated to both 
accuracy and speed of emotion recognition when selecting an emotion. Participants with 
more autism traits may be more likely to try to guess the emotion quickly or to ascribe 
emotions to neutral expressions.   
Cognitive empathy does not only encompass the ability to read visible affective 
expressions, but also involves the ability to imagine the emotional state of someone who is 
not present, or of a fictional character. The faux pas task assesses participants’ perception of 
social missteps, as well as their understanding of the emotions of the character that was 
accidentally slighted. As such, it assesses a more complex aspect of cognitive empathy than 
the emotion recognition task. Amount of autism traits was significantly negatively correlated 
with the ability to recognise social faux pas after controlling for accuracy in answering the 
control questions. This result suggests that differences in performance on the faux pas 
questions were not primarily related to comprehension, attention or working memory 
difficulties in participants with higher amounts of autism traits. 
Besides identifying social faux pas and explaining why they were awkward, 
participants had to predict the story characters’ emotional responses to the faux pas. Though 
amount of autism traits was not significantly correlated with faux pas emotion recognition 
scores, medication use was. As medication use was significantly correlated with amount of 
autism traits, it may be an indicator of ASD in this analysis rather than a true effect of 
medication. Of the participants taking medication, 77% had high amounts of autism traits. 
However, a negative effect of medication on faux pas performance cannot be ruled out.  
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Medications such as antipsychotics have been implicated in cognitive empathy 
deficits. In this study, 4% of participants were on antipsychotics, mainly risperidone. 
Previous studies of schizophrenia have reported that individuals on risperidone and typical 
antipsychotics perform worse on cognitive empathy tasks than individuals on other 
antipsychotics such as clozapine and olanzapine (Savina & Beninger, 2007). However, not all 
studies have found negative effects (Kucharska-Pietura & Mortimer, 2013; Sergi et al., 
2007). It is also not clear whether risperidone worsens cognitive empathy or whether other 
antipsychotics improve cognitive empathy in schizophrenia more than risperidone does 
(Savina & Beninger, 2007). To my knowledge, there are no published studies of the effects of 
medication on cognitive empathy in ASD. Furthermore, antipsychotics reportedly do not 
affect the core social features of ASD (Anagnostou & Hansen, 2011; Francis, 2005). It is 
therefore more likely that the significant correlation between medication and faux pas 
performance can be attributed to ASD. Several previous studies have shown that individuals 
with ASD are less able to accurately identify faux pas (Baron-Cohen et al., 1999; Spek, 
Scholte, & Berckelaer-Onnes, 2009), and perform worse on the emotion recognition 
questions than neurotypical individuals (Zalla, Sav, Stopin, Ahade, & Leboyer, 2008).  
Questionnaire Reliability and Validity  
Overall, the internal consistencies of the questionnaire subscales were good. 
However, there were some individual items which were problematic. AQ item 30 (“I don’t 
usually notice small changes in a situation or a person’s appearance”) was negatively 
correlated with the rest of the items in both AQ versions in the total and laboratory samples. 
The original AQ study also reports that control participants scored higher on this item, as 
well as on item 29 (“I am not very good at remembering phone numbers”) than participants 
with ASD (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). In the current study, item 29 was not negatively 
correlated with the other scale items, but had a low correlation to the other items, similar to 
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previous findings (Hoekstra et al., 2010; Wakabayashi, Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, & Tojo, 
2006). These two items seem to test general attention and memory skills rather than traits 
associated with the core features of ASD, and do not seem to be valid indicators of ASD. 
Both of these items were left out of a subsequent short form of the AQ (Hoekstra et al., 2010; 
Kloosterman, Keefer, Kelley, Summerfeldt, & Parker, 2011). However, I took a conservative 
approach in this study and used all the original items to calculate AI scores.  
The TAS-20 scale for alexithymia had low internal consistency on its External 
Thoughts subscale. The internal consistency for the External Thoughts subscale was also 
low-to-moderate in the original publication of the TAS-20 (Bagby, Parker, et al., 1994), and 
ranged from very low to acceptable in translated versions of the TAS-20 (see Taylor et al., 
2003, for a summary). Three of the items in this subscale were problematic: Item 5 (“I prefer 
to analyze problems rather than just describe them”) had a negative correlation with the rest 
of the items, and items 18 (“I can feel close to someone, even in moments of silence”) and 20 
(“Looking for hidden meanings in movies or plays distracts from their enjoyment”) had low 
correlations with the other items. These results may be due to cultural differences in 
describing emotion, or to the inherent problem of adequately measuring difficulties in self-
awareness with a self-report scale (Lane, Sechrest, & Riedel, 1998). The TAS-20 has been 
translated and used in several cultural contexts, including Korean and Indian populations 
(Lee et al., 2010; Pandey, Mandal, Taylor, & Parker, 1996), where the authors found that the 
factor structure was adequate. However, most studies have found poor inter-item correlations 
on some of the items; particularly those in the External Thoughts subscale (Haviland, 1996; 
Kooiman, Spinhoven, & Trijsburg, 2002). Thus, the current study’s findings may reflect 
problems with the questionnaire rather than peculiarities of this South African sample. Seeing 
that the overall internal consistency on the TAS-20 was good, no items were removed from 
the calculation of the final TAS-20 alexithymia score. All three subscales, External Thoughts, 
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Identifying Feeling and Describing Feelings were used to keep the results of this study 
comparable to those of previous studies. 
The two empathy questionnaires, the ECS and the IRI, had adequate to good internal 
reliability, and no individual items with very low or negative correlations with the other 
items. Items from the IRI and ECS were then divided into three scales representing affective 
empathy, cognitive empathy and self-regulation based on theory. Trait affective empathy 
questions assessed the tendency to share or ‘catch’ the emotions of others (e.g., “I get filled 
with sorrow when people talk about the death of their loved ones”, whereas cognitive 
empathy questions assessed the ability to understand others’ mental states, and the tendency 
to take the perspective of other people in order to better understand them (e.g., “I try to look 
at everybody's side of a disagreement before I make a decision”). The items in the self-
regulation subscale all came from the IRI’s Personal Distress subscale. They were labelled as 
self-regulation here because their content really addresses the ability to function well under 
difficult circumstances (i.e., the ability to self-regulate), rather than an emotional state per se. 
For example, two items from the self-regulation subscale are “I am usually pretty effective in 
dealing with emergencies” (positively keyed) and “I tend to lose control during emergencies” 
(negatively keyed). These questions first and foremost assess regulatory ability and executive 
functioning, rather than emotional disposition.  
The newly formed affective empathy, cognitive empathy and self-regulation scales 
had good internal consistencies in the both the laboratory and total samples. Some individual 
items had moderately low correlations with other scale items in the laboratory sample, though 
the correlations were still within conventional standards. IRI 7 (“I am usually objective when 
I watch a movie or play, and I don't often get completely caught up in it”), IRI 18 (“When I 
see someone being treated unfairly, I sometimes don't feel very much pity for them”) and 
ECS 10 (“I tense when overhearing an angry quarrel”) had low correlations with the affective 
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scale total. Similarly, IRI 3 (“I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the "other guy's" 
point of view”) and 8 (“I try to look at everybody's side of a disagreement before I make a 
decision”) had low correlations with the cognitive empathy total, and IRI 10 (“I sometimes 
feel helpless when I am in the middle of a very emotional situation”) had a low correlation 
with the self-regulation total. These items were not excluded, as their inter-item correlations 
fell within the recommended acceptable standards (Briggs & Cheek, 1986). The affective 
empathy, cognitive empathy and self-regulation scale scores were correlated with 
alexithymia, gender and autism traits, and were used in Studies 2 and 3 to predict state 
affective and physiological responses. 
As some of the measures, such as the Emotional Contagion Scale, have not been used 
in a South African context before, performance on the scales were correlated with gender, 
which is known to be associated with empathy in other samples. Studies consistently find 
higher empathy in females than males, not only in self-report measures, but also in 
performance cognitive empathy when participants are not specifically incentivised (Klein & 
Hodges, 2001; R. L. Smith & Rose, 2011) and in psychophysiological and developmental 
measures of empathy. For example, studies have found that females have greater amplitude 
and longer-latency brain responses to observing others’ pain (Han et al., 2008; Yang, Decety, 
Lee, Chen, & Cheng, 2009), and faster development of perspective taking skills (van der 
Graaff et al., 2014). Similar to previous findings (Davis, 1980; Derntl et al., 2010; Eisenberg 
et al., 1994; Rueckert & Naybar, 2008), females scored higher on self-reported trait cognitive 
and affective empathy in this study. Females in this sample reported poorer trait regulation of 
emotion during distressing situations. This corresponds to previous reports that girls have 
greater empathic concern but also greater personal distress in friendships than boys (R. L. 
Smith & Rose, 2011; van der Graaff et al., 2014). Similarly, the alexithymia and autism 
quotient scores were consistent with international performances on the scales. Males reported 
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significantly higher levels of alexithymia than females, as has been found in previous studies 
(Kokkonen et al., 2001; Lane et al., 1998; Parker, Taylor, & Bagby, 2003). In keeping with 
the gender profile of ASD (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001), males also had significantly more 
autism traits than females. Furthermore, as has been reported previously in this chapter, 
autism traits and alexithymia were positively correlated. Thus, although not all the 
questionnaires used in this sample have been used in a South African context before, the 
internal consistencies of the questionnaires were good, and correlational results are consistent 
with international findings. These results support the conclusion that the questionnaires 
reliably and validly measured empathy in this sample. The limitations specific to Study 1 are 
discussed next. Limitations that apply to all the studies are discussed in Chapter 8. 
Limitations  
Self-report measures of emotion and behaviour are prone to distortions of memory 
and social desirability. Self-report can also be difficult to use in a population group that has 
difficulties with identifying and describing emotions, and with social-communication in 
general. However, all the self-report measures used in this study have previously been used 
successfully in studies with participants with ASD (e.g., Bird et al., 2010; Dziobek et al., 
2007; Minio-Paluello, Lombardo, Chakrabarti, Wheelwright, & Baron-Cohen, 2009). 
Furthermore, the limitation of self-reporting of emotion is addressed in Studies 2 and 3, 
where physiological measurements of affective arousal are used to supplement subjective 
reports. 
Participants in the total sample filled in an online questionnaire. Participants who 
reported neurological or psychiatric conditions were excluded from the analyses, but 
unreported mood or personality disorders may have influenced responses on the empathy and 
autism questionnaires. For example, participants with schizophrenia may score higher on 
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both the empathy and autism questionnaires because of impairments in cognitive empathy 
(Montag et al., 2011), and depression has been related to poorer cognitive empathy and 
increased personal distress (Schreiter, Pijnenborg, & aan het Rot, 2013). This limitation is 
true of all self-report studies, and is not limited to the current study. It was addressed in the 
laboratory sample, where participants with overt psychiatric disorders where excluded after 
the ADOS-2 assessment. 
Processing speed was not assessed in the laboratory sample. Differences in processing 
speed between low and high autism trait participants could have affected the timed tasks of 
emotion recognition; specifically, participants with slower processing speed may have taken 
longer to select the appropriate emotion. However, multiple measures were used to assess 
performance cognitive empathy, not just response time, and processing speed should not have 
affected the other measurements (which were not timed). 
Summary and Conclusion 
The aim of this study was to examine the hypothesis that, whereas trait levels of 
cognitive empathy and self-regulation are negatively correlated with autism traits, affective 
empathy is not correlated with autism. Empathy, alexithymia and autism traits were measured 
via self-report in a large online sample.  Part of this sample was invited to the laboratory for 
further autism and cognitive empathy assessment and to participate in Studies 2 and 3.  
As expected, amount of autism traits was significantly negatively correlated with both 
trait and performance cognitive empathy. Amount of autism traits was also negatively 
correlated with self-regulation ability in the laboratory sample. This result is in keeping with 
previous studies that have reported less successful emotion reappraisal and greater use of less 
beneficial regulation strategies such as suppression in ASD (Konstantareas & Stewart, 2006; 
Samson et al., 2012), which may ultimately heighten personal distress. However, from the 
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self-report there remains some uncertainty in whether autism traits are correlated with 
affective empathy: Autism traits were not correlated with affective empathy in the laboratory 
sample, but were negatively correlated with affective empathy in the total sample, as would 
be predicted from the global empathy deficit hypothesis. Neither set of results support the 
empathy imbalance (A. Smith, 2009) theory of autism that predicts that individuals with 
autism have increased rather than decreased affective arousal. However, autism traits were 
also significantly positively correlated with alexithymia, which may have influenced these 
individuals’ abilities to answer about their internal states. Thus, Studies 2 and 3 were 
designed to investigate affective empathy at different levels of analysis. Specifically, 
measurement of physiological arousal gives insight into affective states without having to 
rely on self-report. Study 2 examines the possible associations between affective empathy, 
self-regulation and autism traits by measuring autonomic reactivity, muscle reactivity and 
subjective reports of empathic concern or personal distress to witnessing others’ physical 




STUDY 2: EMPATHY FOR SENSORY PAIN  
 
When we see a stroke aimed, and just ready to fall upon the leg or arm of another 
person, we naturally shrink and draw back on our leg or our own arm; and when it 
does fall we feel it in some measure… The mob, when they are gazing at a dancer on 
the slack rope, naturally writhe and twist and balance their own bodies, as they see 
him do. (A. Smith, 1790, p. 5) 
Study 1 found that autism traits were negatively correlated with self-regulation and 
cognitive empathy, but were not consistently correlated with affective empathy. The focus of 
Study 2 was to expand these findings to the physiological level. Given the results of Study 1, 
I predicted that, in comparison to individuals with low autism traits, individuals with more 
autism traits would report similar levels of empathic concern but heightened personal distress 
to images of others in pain. At the physiological level, heightened personal distress should be 
reflected in heightened muscle reactivity, heightened sympathetic arousal and reduced 
parasympathetic arousal to the images of pain. At the cognitive level, potential contributors to 
heightened affective, muscular and autonomic reactions are self-regulation and cognitive 
empathy deficits, as were reported in Study 1 in participants with high autism traits. In turn, 
self-regulation and cognitive empathy deficits may be caused or exacerbated by tonic 
autonomic dysregulation, as predicted by the neurovisceral integration and polyvagal 
theories. Study 2 therefore aimed to explore (1) the association between resting state 
autonomic arousal and dispositional empathy measures, as well as (2) the association 
between resting state autonomic arousal and autism traits. Furthermore, Study 2 explored (3) 
the contributions of resting state autonomic arousal and dispositional empathy to state 
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The study followed a multilevel correlational design, investigating within-subject 
changes in physiological and subjective affective states, and correlations between 
participants’ autism traits and their empathic responses. Participants were shown videos of 
either painful or non-painful stimulation of a target. Muscle amplitude and slope, heart rate, 
SCL and pre-ejection period were predicted from video condition and AI scores. (1) Self-
reported affective responses to the videos and (2) perceived pain intensity/unpleasantness 
were used to predict physiological arousal. 
Participants 
Of the 98 participants who formed the laboratory sample in Study 1 (see Chapter 4, 
Participants, p. 50), 95 completed Study 2. Due to equipment failure, EMG data were 
available for 93 participants and skin conductance and cardiac data for 92 participants. Self-
report data were available for all participants.  
Materials and Measures 
Previously reported measures.  AI scores, as calculated from ADOS-2 and AQ 
scores in Study 1, were used as an indicator of amount of autism traits. For dispositional 
empathy, the trait affective empathy, trait cognitive empathy, and trait self-regulation 
aggregates calculated in Study 1 were used (see Table 5, p. 84). However, as trait and 
performance cognitive empathy were not correlated in Study 1, performance cognitive 
empathy (rather than trait cognitive empathy) was used as the primary indicator of cognitive 
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empathy in the analyses. Performance scores were judged as more reliable measures of 
cognitive empathy than self-report measures. Total scores on the 20-item Toronto 
Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20) were used to indicate alexithymia, as was done in Study 1.  
Video stimuli. Four types of video clips, lasting approximately 4 s each, were 
presented on a computer screen. The videos showed a static left hand, a needle deeply 
penetrating a hand, a cotton swab gently touching a hand (Bos, Montoya, Hermans, Keysers, 
& van Honk, 2015), and a needle deeply penetrating a tomato (Minio-Paluello, Baron-Cohen, 
et al., 2009). The videos were mirrored to show a left hand instead of a right hand (see Figure 
8), as EMG responses were measured from the participants’ left hands (see Procedure, p. 
118,  for more details). The videos have been used in several previous studies to measure 
empathy-related affective states and muscle-evoked potentials, as well as autonomic 
responses such as pupil dilation (Avenanti et al., 2005; Azevedo et al., 2013; Bos et al., 2015; 






Figure 8. Empathy for sensory pain stimuli. The top row shows the final clip from each of the 
four video conditions: a needle stabbing a hand (top, far left), a static hand (top, centre left), a 
cotton swab gently touching a hand (top, centre right), or a needle penetrating a tomato (top, 
far right). The bottom row shows the order of stimulus presentation. Each 4.5 s video was 
preceded by a 1 s fixation cross and followed by questions asking participants to rate the pain 
intensity/unpleasantness and their affective state. Adapted from “Absence of Embodied 
Empathy During Pain Observation in Asperger Syndrome” by Minio-Paluello, Baron-Cohen, 
Avenanti, Walsh and Aglioti, 2009, Biological Psychiatry, 65, p. 57. Copyright 2015 by 
Elsevier and the Society of Biological Psychiatry. 
Affective states and perceived pain. Levels of empathic concern and personal 
distress were calculated from aggregates of 13 different emotional state scores (see Appendix 
N, p. 376), as described in Batson et al. (1997). I excluded the question, “How warm did you 
feel?” because of the likelihood of participants responding based on literal rather than 
emotional warmth (Batson et al., 1997). Affective states and perceived pain (both intensity 
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and unpleasantness) were rated on 7-point Likert scales from not at all to extremely. 
Participants were offered definitions of all the affective states. Besides absolute affective 
state and pain perception scores, difference scores between the painful and non-painful 
conditions were calculated to get a measure of sensitivity of affective responding and pain 
perception. Difference scores ranged from - 6 (reduced affective response/perceived pain 
during the pain condition) to + 6 (heightened affective response/perceived pain during the 
pain condition).  
Batson and colleagues reported good internal consistency for the empathic concern 
(.85) and personal distress (.93) subscales. Similar affective state and perceived pain scales 
have been used in previous studies with South African child and adult samples (Cowell et al., 
2016; Meiring, Subramoney, Thomas, Decety, & Fourie, 2014); however, the studies did not 
provide reliability estimates. The list of questions comprising the empathic concern and 
personal distress subscales, and their definitions, are given in Appendix N. 
Electromyogram (EMG).  EMG data were recorded for two muscles in the left hand: 
The First dorsal interosseous (FDI; the muscle targeted on the video) and the Abductor digiti 
minimi (ADM; control muscle). The reference electrode was placed on the left wrist. Figure 
9 illustrates the electrode placement. Stimulus-evoked EMG activity was scored as the 
change in activity from a 1 s prestimulus baseline and was averaged over 200 ms periods 
from 0 to 4.4 s to create a reasonable number of measurements for subsequent calculations 
(similar to Dimberg & Thunberg, 2012; Dimberg et al., 2000). Trials that had EMG activity 
above 8 µV during the baseline period or activity above 30 µV or below -30 µV during 
stimulus presentation (0.20% of data) were excluded to prevent large resting state differences 
and extreme values that cannot be considered as involuntary reactions (Reicherts et al., 
2012). Two measures of EMG activity were used. The average EMG amplitude (relative to 
117 
 
baseline) in the 200 ms after the period of greatest pain in the videos, time 4.0 – 4.2 s, was 
calculated as a measure of response magnitude, and compared to the average EMG amplitude 
at time 0 – 200 ms. To get an indication response latency, the slope of the average EMG 
activity over consecutive 200 ms periods was calculated (Malmo & Davis, 1956; Malmo & 
Malmo, 2000).  
 
Figure 9. Placement of the electrodes to measure activity over the First dorsal interosseous 
(FDI) and Abductor digiti minimi (ADM) muscle areas. 
Autonomic activity. Heart rate, pre-ejection period, SCL and RSA were measured 
during a 2-minute resting state baseline. Heart rate and pre-ejection period were measured 
and averaged over each of the 4 s videos. Because of the longer response latency of SCL, 
SCLs were recorded over an 8 s period starting from pain onset and compared to the first 2 s 
of the stimuli, before pain onset started, which acted as the baseline. RSA was only recorded 
during resting state, as the stimuli were not long enough for RSA measurement during the 
experiment. As recommended, EKG artefacts were removed (3.58% of data) and corrected 
using cubic spline interpolation of missed interbeat intervals (Berntson & Stowell, 1998; 
Vrije Universiteit, 2015). According to international standards (Sherwood et al., 1990; 
Willemsen et al., 1996), beats with bad ICG signal quality were automatically detected and 
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removed from individual complexes (0.38% of data). Additionally, ensemble-averaged ICG 
complexes were manually inspected and those with poor signal quality were discarded 
(2.20% of data). One SCL epoch was shortened due to movement artefact (Liew et al., 2003). 
Procedure  
The experiment was conducted in a temperature and lighting-controlled room. 
Participants were asked not to smoke, eat, exercise, or drink caffeinated beverages or alcohol 
for 2 hours prior to the experiment. On arrival at the laboratory, the VU-AMS and ActiveTwo 
electrodes were fitted. Participants were separated from the researcher by dark, opaque 
curtains. The researcher could monitor whether participants were paying attention to the 
stimuli, and were not moving unduly, through an opening between the curtains. Participants 
were asked to remain seated and rest their left hand (to which the EMG and skin conductance 
electrodes were attached) on the table throughout the experiment. Participants were further 
asked to refrain from talking or moving excessively during tasks. The left hand was chosen to 
monitor EMG responses so that participants were free to use the keyboard with their right 
hand. Before starting the experiment, participants listened to music (Clair de Lune, 
Schmalfuss, 2010) for five minutes, after which two minutes of resting state data were 
collected while participants sat with their eyes closed. The music served as time for 
participants to relax and get used to the electrodes (Fridlund & Cacioppo, 1986), as well as 
time to get better electrical contact between the electrodermal electrodes and the sweat gland 
ducts. 
The video clips were presented using E-Prime 2 (Psychology Software Tools, 
Pittsburgh, PA) on a 19-inch, 4:3 aspect ratio monitor, positioned approximately 65 cm away 
from the participants. The pain videos were presented in three blocks of 12 videos each (3 
videos of each of the conditions). Videos were randomised within each block. Between trials, 
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participants viewed 10 s luminance-matched scrambled static images to reduce potential 
muscular and arousal responses to changes in luminance (Lamm et al., 2007, 2008). Stimuli 
were preceded by a 1 s display of a centred fixation cross. To control for attention, 
participants answered a multiple-choice control question after each block of videos (“What 
gender was the hand?”; “What was the age of the hand?”; “Which object was not used in the 
videos?”). Once EMG recording was completed, participants were shown each image again 
and were asked to rate the intensity and unpleasantness of the pain shown in the video, as 
well as their level of empathic concern and personal distress.  
Data Analysis  
Descriptive statistics and zero-order correlations were calculated for the physiological 
and subjective data. For the physiological measurements, responses to the same condition 
were averaged within a block. The static hand condition was used as the comparison group in 
each of the analyses. First, preliminary linear random-effects models with participant ID as 
the random intercept were done to assess whether the stimuli elicited significant changes in 
the various physiological indices. Second, separate mixed-effects models were done to 
predict pain perception (i.e., pain intensity and unpleasantness) and subjective affective state 
(i.e., empathic concern and personal distress) from amount of autism traits (AI), self-
regulation and performance cognitive empathy. Models were built for absolute affective state 
and pain perception scores, as well as difference scores between the painful and non-painful 
conditions. In both sets of models, the outcome variable for pain perception was rating (out of 
7, where 7 = extreme unpleasantness/intensity), and pain unpleasantness versus pain intensity 
was entered as a binary predictor variable (fixed effect). Thus, except in cases where there 
was a significant interaction, pain perception refers to both pain unpleasantness and pain 
intensity. Similarly, the outcome variable for the affective state responses was rating (out of 
7, where 7 = extreme concern/distress) and state type (concern versus distress) was coded as 
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a binary predictor variable. Thus, affective state refers to both empathic concern and personal 
distress. Where graphs of affective state are presented, the scores represent the average of the 
empathic concern and personal distress scores. Likewise, pain perception ratings in graphs 
represent the average pain intensity and unpleasantness scores. 
Third, a series of linear mixed-effects models were run to model the effect of 
condition (type of video), alexithymia, self-regulation, performance cognitive empathy and 
AI on muscle activity and physiological arousal (muscle activity and slope, pre-ejection 
period, SCL, heart rate). The analyses with muscle activity also included muscle type (FDI, 
ADM) as a fixed effect. Block order (one to three), medication use (yes/no) and alexithymia 
were included as control variables in all the above analyses. Last, resting state cardiac arousal 
variables (cardiac vagal control, pre-ejection period and heart rate) were used to predict AI 
scores, trait affective empathy, trait and performance cognitive empathy, and trait self-
regulation in separate linear regressions. Baseline arousal was furthermore used as a control 
variable in each of the autonomic arousal models. To calculate resting state cardiac vagal 
control, RSA was predicted from respiration rate and tidal volume. The residuals of that 
regression, free from the effects of respiration, were used as an indicator of cardiac vagal 
control. All analyses were preceded by an investigation of the distribution of the data and 
inspection for outliers. Models were also examined for multicollinearity, outliers and 
influential values, heteroscedasticity, dependence of errors, and other patterning of the 
residuals. Continuous predictors were centred and scaled (M = 0, SD = 1). 
To model pain perception responses, participant ID was used as the random intercept, 
with condition and perception type (intensity, unpleasantness) and their interaction as random 
slopes (as recommended by Barr et al., 2013). To model affective state, participant ID was 
used as the random intercept, with condition and state type (personal distress, empathic 
concern) and their interaction as random slopes. In the models of muscle activity, participant 
121 
 
ID was used as the random intercept with muscle type, condition and the interaction between 
muscle and condition as random slopes. For the physiological arousal models (pre-ejection 
period, heart rate, SCL), participant ID was used as the random intercept with condition as 
the only random slope. If a model did not converge, an iterative simplification process was 
followed (Bates, Kliegl, Vasishth, & Baayen, 2015): First, a simpler random slopes structure 
without an interaction was tried, and if this model also did not converge, a nested intercept 
structure (e.g. participant ID and condition within participant ID as intercepts) was attempted. 
Where within-group variance was zero and model fit indices indicated a poor fit with a more 
complex model, responses were aggregated across conditions, as detailed in the Results 
section.  
Results 
Self-Reported Affective State and Perceived Pain 
Are subjective indices of affective empathy and empathic concern correlated with amount of 
autism traits? 
Hypothesis IV: Pain perception (unpleasantness and intensity) will be positively correlated 
with amount of autism traits once alexithymia is controlled for. 
Hypothesis V: Amount of autism traits will be negatively correlated with empathic concern 




What other factors are associated with pain perception and empathic concern (versus 
personal distress)? 
Hypothesis VIII: Self-regulation scores will be positively correlated with empathic concern 
and negatively correlated with perception of pain and personal distress. In other words, better 
self-regulation will be associated with higher empathic concern and lower personal distress 
and perceived pain intensity/unpleasantness. 
Hypothesis IX: Cognitive empathy will be positively correlated with perceived pain and 
empathic concern. 
Three control questions related to the video content were asked to test attention. 
Accuracy on the control questions ranged between 77% (age of hand) and 93% (object used). 
Six participants answered more than one of the control questions incorrectly. These 
participants were excluded from analyses of perceived pain and affective state ratings.  
Pain perception. Table 13 shows that, on average, participants perceived the pain 
delivery as very intense and unpleasant (M = 5.12 and 5.18, respectively; where 7 = 
extremely and 1 = not at all). Intensity and unpleasantness scores were very highly correlated 





Table 13  
Perceived Pain and Affective State Reports by Video Condition 
 Condition Pain unpleasantness Pain intensity Concern Distress 
 
M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Static hand 1.45 1.33 1.45 1.32 1.40 1.00 1.30 0.89 
Cotton bud 1.29 1.01 1.33 1.00 1.43 0.99 1.31 0.91 
Tomato 1.40 1.16 1.48 1.29 1.39 0.98 1.37 0.90 
Needle 5.18 1.68 5.12 1.67 3.53 1.79 3.54 1.80 
 
For the mixed-effects model, pain perception responses to the pain videos were 
predicted from medication use, condition (where the Static Hand condition was used as the 
comparison group), AI, self-regulation, performance cognitive empathy, and the interaction 
between these variables and perception type (unpleasantness, intensity). The model was fit 
with a random intercept for ID, σ̂ 2ID = 2.35, σ̂ 
2
resid = 0.11. Non-significant interactions and 
variables were dropped from the final analysis, leaving medication, condition and self-
regulation as significant predictors of pain perception, R2M = .63, R
2




Table 14  
Predictors of Pain Perception 
Fixed effects SS MS dfeffect dferror F-value Probability 
Medication 2.55 2.55 1 81.29 4.65 .034 * 
Condition 312.29 104.10 3 83.18 189.63 < .001 *** 
Self-regulation 3.10 3.10 1 81.28 5.64 .020 * 
 
 Random effects 
Group N Slope Variance Correlation 
ID 84 (Intercept) 0.78 
         Cotton bud 0.64 - .65 
        Tomato 0.93 - .38 .47 
       Needle 2.61 - .33 .31  .17 
      Pain Intensity 0.01 - .28 .02 - .33  .42 
     Cotton bud*Pain 
intensity 0.01 - .02 
 
.19 - .39 - .16 .68 
    Tomato*Pain intensity 0.14 - .55 .45 - .17  .28 .85 .77 




      
Note. Random effects: ID (intercept), condition (slope), pain perception type (slope). Resid = 
residuals. 




 In general, participants rated the pain condition videos as significantly more painful 
than the non-pain conditions, β = 3.81, SE = 0.17, t (83.09) = 22.50, p < .001. Those with 
poorer self-regulation rated the pain as more unpleasant and intense than those with good 
self-regulation skills, β = - 0.16, SE = 0.06, t (81.28) = - 2.37, p ≤ .020. Furthermore, across 
all conditions, participants using medication had significantly higher scores on both pain 
unpleasantness and pain intensity, β = 0.34, SE = 0.16, t (81.29) = 2.16, p ≤ .034. Figure 10 
shows the correlations. Participants’ sensitivity to empathy-inducing situations was also 
calculated by taking the difference scores between the average response to the pain condition 
and the average response to the non-pain conditions. However, no variables significantly 
predicted change in pain perception. 
 
Figure 10. Self-regulation skills (A) and medication use (B) predict absolute scores of 
perceived pain. As there was no difference between pain intensity and unpleasantness, the 
responses were averaged in these plots. Shaded areas indicate the 95% confidence interval of 
the linear regression. The lower and upper whiskers of the box plot represent the values 




Affective state ratings. Internal consistency for state empathic concern was very high 
at each of the affective state rating times (αs = .94 - .97), indicating that item ratings were 
nearly identical. State personal distress had similarly high internal consistency at each time 
point (αs = .96 - .98).  Additionally, state empathic concern and personal distress were highly 
correlated at each time point (rs = .62 - .88, all ps < .001). On average, participants reported 
moderate empathic concern and personal distress during the pain condition (M = 3.53, SD = 
1.79 and M = 3.54, SD = 1.80, respectively; where 1 = not at all and 7 = extremely) and no 
concern or distress (Ms = 1.30 – 1.43, SDs = 0.90 – 1.34) during the non-pain conditions (see 
Table 13, p. 123). 
 Affective state responses were predicted from medication use; the interaction 
between state (concern, distress), condition and AI; the interaction between state and self-
regulation; and the interaction between state and performance cognitive empathy. Non-
significant interactions and variables were dropped from the final analysis, leaving condition, 
medication and self-regulation, R2M = .42, R
2
C = .89 (see Table 15). In general, participants 
reported significantly more empathic concern and personal distress during the pain condition 
videos (β = 2.22, SE = 0.18, t [83.03] < 12.55, p ≤ .001). Medication use was associated with 
higher affective states, with no difference between empathic concern and personal distress (β 
= 0.40, SE = 0.17). Participants with poorer self-regulation reported increased affective 
responses (both empathic concern and personal distress) to all conditions (β = - 0.23, SE = 





Table 15  
Predictors of Affective Responses to Painful and Non-Painful Conditions 
Fixed effects SS MS dfeffect dferror F-value Probability 
Medication 1.49 1.49 1 81.03 5.90  .017 * 
Condition 46.81 15.60 3 83.00 61.94 < .001 
 Self-regulation 2.85 2.85 1 81.03 11.29  .001 *** 
Random effects 
        Group N Slope Variance Correlation 
ID 84 (Intercept) 0.50 
       
 
 Cotton bud 0.29 - .35
      
 
 Tomato 0.42 - .41 .43 
     
 
 Needle 2.88 - .31 .42 .32 
    
 
 Distress 0.20 - .05 - .02 .10 .02 




*Distress 0.02 - .02 - .10 .24 - .23 .41 
  
 
 Tomato*Distress 0.19 - .06 .06 - .29 - .19 - .14 18 
 
 




       
Note. Random effects: ID (intercept), condition (slope), affective state (slope).  




Difference scores between pain and non-pain conditions were again calculated to 
estimate participants’ sensitivity to empathy-inducing situations. Similar to the previous 
analyses, empathy and personal distress difference scores were highly correlated (r = .91,  
p < .001). Affective state difference scores were predicted from the same fixed effects used to 
predict absolute affective state. The analysis had a random intercept for ID, σ̂ 2ID = 2.01,  
σ̂ 2resid = 0.26, and no random slope. In this model, only self-regulation significantly predicted 
differences in affective state, R2M = .08, R
2
C = .89, F (1, 82) = 8.04, p ≤ .006. Those with 
poorer self-regulation reported larger differences in affective states between pain and non-
pain videos (β = - 0.45, SE = 0.16; see Figure 11).  
 
Figure 11. Self-regulation skills (A) and medication use (B) predicted absolute affective state 
scores. Self-regulation also predicted differences in affective state between painful and non-
painful conditions (C). As there was no difference between empathic concern and personal 
distress, the responses were averaged in plots A and B. Shaded areas indicate the 95% 
confidence interval of the linear regression. The lower and upper whiskers of the box plot 




 In summary, perceived pain, empathic concern and personal distress were higher in 
the pain than the non-pain conditions. Contrary to the hypotheses, AI was not correlated with 
either pain perception (neither intensity nor unpleasantness; Hypothesis IV) or affective state 
(neither empathic concern nor personal distress; Hypothesis V). However, medication use 
was associated with higher affective state and pain perception ratings. Self-regulation scores 
were negatively correlated with absolute levels of empathic concern and personal distress, 
and with changes in affective states. Contrary to hypotheses, there was no difference in the 
direction of the relationships between self-regulation and empathic concern and self-
regulation and personal distress. I had predicted that poor self-regulation would be associated 
with lower empathic concern and greater personal distress. As expected, poorer self-
regulation was associated with greater absolute levels of perceived pain 
intensity/unpleasantness (Hypothesis VIII). Contrary to what was hypothesised, performance 
cognitive empathy did not predict pain perception or empathic concern (Hypothesis IX). 
Muscle Reactivity 
Are physiological indices of affective empathy and empathic concern correlated with amount 
of autism traits? 
Hypothesis VI: Amount of autism traits will be positively correlated with muscle activity.  
What other factors are associated with pain perception and empathic concern (versus 
personal distress)? 
Hypothesis XI: Poorer self-regulation and cognitive empathy will be associated with 




On average, muscle activity decreased from baseline in the non-pain conditions. In 
the needle condition, muscle activity first decreased and then increased in both the FDI and 
ADM muscle regions from the time the needle penetrated the hand (2.1 s) to the time of 
maximum penetration (4 s; see Figure 12). Table 16 shows the mean muscle activity relative 
to baseline at the 2.0 – 2.2 s and 4.0 – 4.2 s epochs.  
 
Figure 12. The average change in muscle activity from baseline in the Abductor digiti minimi 
(ADM) and First dorsal interosseous (FDI) muscle regions. Time 0 indicates the start of the 




Table 16  
Average Change in Muscle Activity from Baseline (μV) During the Start (2.0 – 2.2 s) and 
Peak (4.0 – 4.2 s) of the Pain Epochs, and Average Muscle Slope During Pain Observation 
 Muscle Time  Static hand Cotton bud Tomato Needle 
    M SD M SD M SD M SD 
ADM Pain start - 0.03 0.67 - 0.05 0.43 - 0.03 0.70 - 0.03 0.72 
 
Pain peak - 0.01 0.94 0.00 0.77 - 0.07 0.71 0.17 1.30 
 
Slope - 3.55 33.17 - 2.80 35.70 - 1.43 36.49 5.88 36.50 
FDI Pain start - 0.03 0.44 - 0.04 0.46 - 0.08 0.82 0.00 0.66 
 
Pain peak - 0.01 0.42 - 0.06 0.44 - 0.08 0.84 0.10 0.98 
  Slope 0.32 32.54 0.93 35.18 - 2.27 32.02 2.60 31.75 
Note. ADM = Abductor digiti minimi; FDI = First dorsal interosseous. 
Average activity. To test whether the empathy induction was successful, I ran a 
preliminary linear mixed-effects model predicting muscle activity from time (3 levels: video 
start, pain start, pain peak), muscle, and condition9. The analysis showed a significant 
interaction between time and condition, F (6,1440) = 3.28, p ≤ .003, but no other significant 
interactions. As I was interested in whether muscle activity was greater during the pain 
condition than the non-pain conditions at the time of the most intense pain, but not at the start 
of the video, I conducted two dependent t-tests comparing the experimental conditions (pain 
vs. ‘no pain’, with ‘no pain’ conditions aggregated) at 200 ms and 4.2 s. There was no 
significant difference in muscle activity between conditions at 200 ms, MD = 0.03, t (90) = 
                                                   
9 This analysis is essentially equivalent to a three-way repeated-measures ANOVA with muscle, time and 
condition as the independent variables. 
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1.24, p ≤ .101, d = 0.12. In contrast, at 4.2 s, muscle activity was significantly greater in the 
pain condition than the non-pain condition, MD = 0.17, t (90) = 2.52, p ≤ .006, d = .24. 
To test the hypotheses that AI, as well as self-regulation and cognitive empathy, 
predict muscle mimicry, I predicted muscle activation in the 200 ms after the period of 
greatest pain in the videos, time 4.0 – 4.2 s. This was an a priori time window, based on the 
time in the videos where the inflicted pain was the greatest (i.e., the needle had fully 
penetrated the hand). Video block (one, two, or three) was used as a fixed effect to test 
whether muscle activity habituated over the course of the experiment, and alexithymia was 
used as a control variable. As a maximal model did not converge, a nested random-effects 
model was used. Muscle activity was higher in the pain than the non-pain conditions in both 
the ADM and FDI muscles (see Table 17 and Figure 13). However, no other variables 




Table 17  
Correlation Coefficients for Muscle Activity at 4.0 – 4.2 s (Relative to Baseline) 
Fixed effects β SE df t-value Probability 
Cotton bud 0.01 0.06 547.98 0.13 .898  
Tomato - 0.04 0.06 549.20 -0.63 .526  





Group N Variance 
Condition in muscle in ID 736 0.11 
Muscle in ID 184 0.08 
ID 92 0.11 
Residual 2206 0.78  
Note. R2M = .01, R
2







Figure 13. Average muscle activity at 4.0 – 4.2 s (compared to baseline) to observing painful 
and non-painful stimulation of a target hand. Participants showed greater activity in both 
muscles to the needle condition. Error bars show 1 SD above and below the mean; with SDs 
corrected for repeated measures. 
Slope. Using the slope of muscle activity during the videos, condition predicted a 
significant but small change in muscle activity over time, F (3, 341.85) = 4.26, p ≤ .006. 
Participants experienced increased change in activity over time in both muscles when 
observing the pain condition compared with the non-pain conditions. Medication use, type of 
muscle, AI scores, empathy and alexithymia were not correlated with change in activation 





Table 18  
Linear Mixed-Effects Model Predicting Change in Muscle Activity over Time (Muscle Slope) 
to Painful and Non-Painful Conditions 
Fixed effects β SE df t-value Probability 
Cotton bud 1.04 2.08 270.58 0.50 .617  
Tomato - 0.13 2.05 370.37 - 0.06 .950  
Needle 6.31 2.13 257.70 2.96 .003 ** 
 
Random effects         
Group N Slope Variance Correlation 
ID 91 (Intercept) 22.63        
  FDI 119.00 - .69       
  Cotton bud 141.02 - .08 - .17      
  Tomato 77.00  .28  .45 - .06     
  Needle 165.76  .57 - .69  .61  .05    
  FDI*Cotton bud 114.83  .16  .14 - .98  .09 - .64   
  FDI*Tomato 267.20 - .01 - .66  .62 - .78  .49 - .61  
  FDI*Needle 139.88 - .78  .51  .03 - .43 - .73  .02 .13 
Residuals 2182  1066.46        
Note. Random effects: ID (intercept), muscle (slope), condition (slope). R2M = .01, R
2
C = .10. 
AI = Autism Index; FDI = First dorsal interosseous.  






Figure 14. Muscle slope to observing painful and non-painful stimulation of a target hand. In 
the needle condition, participants showed increases in activity over time in both muscles. 
Error bars show 1 SD above and below the mean; with SDs corrected for repeated measures. 
In summary, muscle amplitude and slope were greater in the pain condition than the 
non-pain conditions. Contrary to expectations, AI scores were not significantly correlated 
with muscle activity (Hypothesis VI). Affective states during the conditions and trait empathy 




Resting State Autonomic Arousal, Empathy and Autism 
Is there evidence of resting state autonomic dysregulation in ASD? Is resting state autonomic 
activity associated with empathy? 
 Hypothesis III: Higher resting state parasympathetic arousal (vagal cardiac control) 
will be associated with higher trait affective empathy and self-regulation scores.  
 Hypothesis X: Higher resting state parasympathetic arousal (vagal cardiac control) 
will be associated with increased state empathic concern, whereas higher resting state 
sympathetic arousal will be associated with increased personal distress. 
Resting state autonomic arousal indices are presented in Table 19. Pre-ejection period 
and SCL at rest (baseline) were not correlated, r (73) = .07, p ≤ .523, so these scores were 
kept separate and not aggregated to a single sympathetic arousal variable. Baseline RSA 
values had a wide range, M = 82.59 ms, SD = 41.63 ms, 95% CI [26.75, 173.82]. As a 
reminder, RSA was not collected during the experimental conditions as the stimulus duration 




Table 19  
Autonomic Arousal to Painful and Non-Painful Conditions 
Condition HR (bpm) PEP (ms) SCL (μS) 
 M SD M SD M SD 
Baseline 72.19 11.93 115.53 17.80 4.12 2.17 
Static hand 71.01 12.48 117.66 20.06 4.34 2.16 
Cotton bud 70.60 12.82 117.43 20.13 4.35 2.15 
Tomato 71.09 13.13 117.26 20.00 4.33 2.11 
Needle 70.67 12.62 117.10 20.12 4.39 2.22 
Note. HR = heart rate; bpm = beats per minute; PEP = pre-ejection period; SCL = skin 
conductance level.  
Correlations between the resting state measures are given in Table 20. The between-
subject correlation between RSA and respiration rate was significant, r (89) = - .32, p < .001. 
Thus, I predicted RSA from participants’ resting state respiration rate (M = 15.41 breaths per 
minute (bpm), SD = 2.51, 95% CI [10.14, 20.47]) and tidal volume (M = 86.05 mΩ/s, SD = 
45.91, 95% CI [27.40, 217.02]), and used the residuals of that analysis as an indicator of 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































To test the hypotheses that resting state arousal is associated with autism traits and 
with empathy, resting state arousal variables were used to predict AI scores, trait affective 
empathy, trait and performance cognitive empathy, and trait self-regulation in separate linear 
regressions. Affective state difference scores (i.e., the difference in affective state rating 
between painful and nonpainful conditions) were also predicted from resting state arousal in a 
random-effects model with participant ID as the random intercept.  
Resting state heart rate was positively correlated with AI scores, β = 0.57, SE = 0.21,  
t (75) = 2.80, p ≤ .005. However, when participants on antidepressants (n = 5) – which have 
been associated with higher resting heart rate (Mathewson et al., 2011) -  were excluded, 
heart rate was no longer positively correlated with AI, β = 0.41, SE = 0.21, t (70) = 1.96,  
p ≤ .054 (see Figure 15). This may have been the result of reduced power in the smaller 
sample, as the coefficient estimates were similar; however, in both models (with and without 
antidepressants), the overall effects sizes were small (R2adj = .09 and R
2
adj = .04, respectively). 
Resting state vagal cardiac control, resting state pre-ejection period, and their interaction did 
not predict AI scores in either model (see Table 21). Overall, the model without participants 
on antidepressants was not significant, F [4, 70] = 1.75, p ≤ .149. The residuals were 
moderately positively skewed in both models. Adding variance structures to the models or 
transforming the variables did not improve model fit. The general conclusion is that 





Figure 15. The correlation between heart rate and AI scores, with (A) and without 







Table 21  
Linear Regression Results of Resting State Autonomic Arousal and Autism and Empathy 
Traits 
Fixed effects β SE dferror SS MS F-value Probability 
AIa 
        Vagal control - 0.05 0.21 
 
7.16 7.16 2.93 .091 
 PEP 0.11 0.23 
 
0.51 0.51 0.21 .651 
 HR 0.57 0.21 
 
19.95 19.95 8.15 .006 ** 
Vagal control * PEP 0.21 0.26 
 
1.56 1.56 0.64 .427 
 Residuals   75 183.67 2.45 
   Affective empathy (T) 
  
      Vagal control - 1.02 2.01 
 
512.37 512.37 2.30 .134 
 PEP - 1.89 2.20 
 
299.57 299.57 1.34 .250 
 HR 2.83 1.97 
 
456.39 456.39 2.05 .157 
 Vagal control * PEP - 0.51 2.48 
 
9.32 9.32 0.04 .839 
 Residuals   74 16492.71 222.87 
   Affective stateb 
        Statec - 0.12 0.08 72 0.55 0.55 2.25 .138 
 Vagal control - 0.29 0.22 71 0.65 0.65 2.66 .107 
 PEP - 0.27 0.24 71 0.08 0.08 0.35 .558 
 HR - 0.25 0.21 71 0.32 0.32 1.33 .254 
 State* Vagal control - 0.14 0.09 72 0.63 0.63 2.56 .114 
 State* PEP 0.26 0.11 72 1.43 1.43 5.84 .018 *
Vagal control * PEP - 0.40 0.27 71 0.14 0.14 0.57 .453 





Table 21 (cont.) 
Cognitive Empathy (T) 
        Vagal control - 0.44 0.68 
 
1.13 1.13 0.04 .833 
 PEP 0.69 0.74 
 
9.48 9.48 0.37 .543 
 HR - 0.39 0.66 
 
6.88 6.88 0.27 .604 
 Vagal control * PEP 0.81 0.84 
 
24.04 24.04 0.95 .333 
 Residuals   74 1873.56 25.32 
   Cognitive Empathy (P) 
        Vagal control 0.05 0.12  0.01 0.01 0.02 0.895 
 PEP - 0.07 0.13  0.07 0.07 0.09 0.764 
 HR 0.03 0.12  0.06 0.06 0.07 0.788 
 Vagal control * PEP - 0.09 0.16  0.28 0.28 0.36 0.550 
 Residuals   70 54.65 0.78 
   Self-regulationa 
  
      Vagal control 0.05 0.77 
 
57.32 57.32 1.74 .191 
 PEP - 0.23 0.85 
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 .999 
 HR - 1.66 0.76 
 
158.26 158.26 4.81 .031 * 
Vagal control *PEP 0.14 0.95 
 
0.76 0.76 0.02 .880 
 Residuals   74 2434.88 32.90       
Note. All models: dfeffect = 1. AI = Autism Index; PEP = pre-ejection period; HR = heart rate; 
T = trait; P = performance.  
a Model uncorrected for antidepressant use. b Mixed-effects model; number of observations = 
152, number of groups (ID) = 74. Coefficient estimates are provided for the fixed effects. The 
model was fit with a random intercept for participant ID, σ̂ 2ID = 2.22, σ̂ 
2
resid = 0.24.  
c Concern versus personal distress (baseline).  
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
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Pre-ejection period and cardiac vagal control did not predict affective state difference 
scores on their own. However, the interaction between state type (empathic concern versus 
personal distress), cardiac vagal control and pre-ejection period significantly predicted the 
amount of difference in affective responses between the pain and non-pain conditions. From 
Figure 16, p. 146, the biggest difference seems to be in participants with long pre-ejection 
periods (low sympathetic arousal): Participants with low sympathetic arousal and low 
parasympathetic arousal (low vagal cardiac control) at rest had greater changes in affective 
state than participants with low sympathetic arousal and high parasympathetic arousal, β = 
0.40, SE = 0.12, t (72) = 3.32, p ≤ .001. This effect remained when participants on 
antidepressants were excluded. To examine the interaction further, participants with higher 
than average pre-ejection period (i.e., low sympathetic arousal) and lower than average 
cardiac vagal control were compared with participants with higher than average pre-ejection 
period (i.e., low sympathetic arousal) and higher than average cardiac vagal control (i.e., high 
parasympathetic arousal) on empathic concern and personal distress. These groups are 
referred to as the ‘co-inhibition’ (n = 24) and ‘predominantly parasympathetic’ (n = 17) 
groups, respectively. Both groups had low sympathetic arousal, but differed on 
parasympathetic arousal, with the ‘predominantly parasympathetic’ group having greater 
parasympathetic arousal than the ‘co-inhibition’ group. These specific groups were selected 
for comparison, as they showed the greatest differences in Figure 16. As difference scores 
were not normally distributed, the groups were compared using Wilcoxon signed-rank tests. 
The predominantly parasympathetic group had significantly smaller changes in personal 
distress to the pain videos than the co-inhibition group (W = - 284, p ≤ .016); however, there 
were no differences in magnitude of change in empathic concern between the groups (W = - 
263.5, p ≤ .065). It should be noted, however, that the fixed effects only explained a small 
proportion of the variance, R2M = .06, R
2
C = .90. As can be seen from the conditional effect 
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size (R2C), the majority of the variance was explained by inter-individual differences (i.e., 
participant ID). The predominantly parasympathetic and co-inhibition groups also had small 


















































































































































































































































Difference in affective state (min = -6, max = 6) 
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In a series of linear regressions, the autonomic variables did not significantly predict 
trait affective empathy (R2 adj = .02, F [4, 74] = 1.43, p ≤ .235), or trait or performance 
cognitive empathy (R2 adj = 0, F [4, 74] = 0.41, p ≤ .800, and R
2 
adj = 0, F [4, 70] = 0.41, p ≤ 
.969, respectively). Neither did autonomic arousal predict self-regulation (R2 adj = .03, F [4, 
73] = 1.69, p ≤ .162). Again, resting state heart rate was significantly negatively correlated 
with self-regulation scores in the overall sample, β = - 1.66, SE = 0.76, t (74) = - 2.20, p ≤ 
.031, but did not significantly predict self-regulation in participants who were not on 
antidepressants, β = - 1.25, SE = 1.13, t (69) = - 1.61, p ≤ .113. Resting state pre-ejection 
period, vagal cardiac control, and their interaction did not significantly predict self-
regulation. Three potentially influential values were identified, but these cases were not 
removed as their removal did not change the interpretation of the model. Results from the 
analyses are displayed in Table 21, p. 142. 
In summary, AI scores were not correlated with pre-ejection period or cardiac vagal 
control at rest. Though baseline heart rate had a small but significant positive correlation with 
AI scores, this correlation was no longer significant when participants with antidepressants 
were excluded.  Furthermore, resting state autonomic arousal was not significantly associated 
with trait affective empathy (Hypothesis III). Increased heart rate at rest, but not pre-ejection 
period or vagal cardiac control, significantly predicted poorer self-regulation skills; however, 
this correlation was also not significant when participants on antidepressants were 
excluded10. Hypothesis X was partially upheld: As expected, the combination of high resting 
state parasympathetic arousal) and low sympathetic arousal (i.e., predominantly 
parasympathetic arousal) was associated with significantly smaller changes in personal 
distress relative to autonomic co-inhibition at rest. In contrast, changes in empathic concern 
                                                   
10 Similarly, medication significantly predicted heart rate, F (1,78) = 8.43, R2 = .09, p = .005, but did not 
significantly predict pre-ejection period, F (1,78) = 1.23, R2 = .002, p = .270, or cardiac vagal control, F (1,81) = 
1.41, R2 = .004, p = .238.  
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did not differ between the predominantly parasympathetic (high resting state parasympathetic 
arousal and low sympathetic arousal) and co-inhibition (low resting state parasympathetic 
arousal and low sympathetic arousal) groups. 
Autonomic Responses to Stimuli 
Are physiological indices of affective empathy and empathic concern correlated with amount 
of autism traits? 
Hypothesis VII: Amount of autism traits will be positively correlated with sympathetic 
reactivity. 
What other factors are associated with pain perception and empathic concern (versus 
personal distress)? 
Hypothesis XII: Increased empathic concern and better self-regulation will be associated 
with increased parasympathetic reactivity and potentially increased sympathetic reactivity 
(autonomic co-activation). 
Preliminary random-effects models with condition as the only predictor were run to 
test whether physiological arousal during the videos differed significantly from baseline. The 
effect of condition was significant for pre-ejection period, F (4, 316) = 6.71, p < .001, heart 
rate, F (4, 316) = 7.64, p < .001, and SCL, F (4,376) = 5.60, p < .001. RSA was not tested as 
it was not recorded during the videos. Tukey’s post hoc tests showed that SCLs were 
significantly higher in the needle condition than baseline and any of the non-pain conditions 
(all ps < .001). In contrast, heart rate reduced and pre-ejection period increased significantly 
for all the videos compared to baseline conditions (all ps < .001), but was not significantly 
different between the pain and non-pain conditions (ps > .05). This did not change when 
interactions between AI and heart rate/pre-ejection period or block and heart rate/pre-ejection 
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period were added to the models. Refer back to Table 19, p. 138, for the descriptive statistics 
of the autonomic variables. 
To test Hypotheses VII and XII, physiological arousal was predicted from medication 
use, condition, AI, empathic concern and self-regulation. To test for different habituation 
rates, the interactions between condition, AI and block were also added to the models. Three 
different linear mixed-effects models were run predicting pre-ejection period, SCL and heart 
rate (see Table 22). In each case, arousal at resting state and block significantly predicted 
arousal during the video conditions. Later blocks were associated with significantly longer 
pre-ejection periods and lower SCL, but also increased heart rate. However, there were no 
interactions between block and AI in pre-ejection period, SCL or heart rate. SCL was the 
only physiological indicator which had significant predictors other than resting state arousal 
level and block. There was a significant interaction between condition and resting state SCL: 
SCL was significantly greater after the pain condition than the static hand condition in 
participants who had higher resting state SCLs (β = 0.04, SE = 0.02, t [446] = 2.08, p ≤ .038).  
Figure 17 shows the interaction effect. There was also a significant interaction between 
resting state SCL and block, with skin conductance being greater during the first stimulus 
block in participants who had high resting state SCLs. There were no other significant 





Table 22  
Linear Mixed-Effects Model of Autonomic Arousal to Painful and Non-Painful Conditions 
Fixed effects β SE SS MS df F-value Probability 
PEP 
        Base PEP 18.26 0.54 47363.37 47363.37 1, 78.09 1133.17 < .001 *** 
Block 0.57 0.17 470.73 470.73 1, 87.06 11.26  .001 ** 
SCL 
        Base SCL 2.05 0.04 70.02 70.02 1, 96.17 1461.51 < .001 *** 
Cotton bud 0.01 0.02 0.26 0.09 3, 362.52 1.81 .145 
 Tomato 0.00 0.02      
 Needle 0.04 0.02      
 Block - 0.06 0.02 0.33 0.33 1, 88.23 6.86 .010 * 
Base SCL * Cotton bud 0.01 0.02 0.53 0.18 3, 362.52 3.66 .013 * 
Base SCL * Tomato - 0.03 0.02      
 Base SCL * Needle 0.04 0.02      
Base SCL * Block - 0.05 0.02 0.25 0.25 1, 88.23 5.23 .025 * 
HR 
        Base HR 10.68 0.31 31543.42 31543.42 1, 89.77 1153.55 < .001 *** 









Group Slope Variance Correlation 
PEP ID (Intercept) 27.85 
       
  
Block 3.72 -  .43
      
  
Cotton bud 5.83 -  .50  .71
     
  
Tomato 9.32 -  .24  .47  .91
    
  
Needle 4.15 -  .34  .06  .74  .81
   
  
Block * Cotton bud 1.58  .52 - .95 - .77 - .59 - .17 
  
  
Block * Tomato 1.26  .25 - .69 - .96 - .94 - .70 .73 
 
  





       SCL ID (Intercept) 0.48 
       
  
Block 0.05 -  .91
      
  
Cotton bud 0.07 -  .79  .95
     
  
Tomato 0.06  .97 - .82 - .74
    
  
Needle 0.08 -  .83  .66  .67 - .94
   
  
Block * Cotton bud 0.01  .87 - .98 - .89  .74 - .53
  
  
Block * Tomato 0.01  .80 - .96 -1.00  .75 - .66 .90
 
  





       HR ID (Intercept) 37.10 
       
  
Block 3.45 -  .90
      
  
Cotton bud 0.92 -  .58  .32
     
  
Tomato 4.71 -  .21  .44  .38
    
  
Needle 1.13 -  .94  .79  .82  .37
   
  
Block * Cotton bud 0.38  .63 - .47 - .97 - .59 - .86
  
  
Block * Tomato 2.55  .23 - .43 - .45 -1.00 - .41 .65
 
  
Block * Needle 0.60  .49 - .41 - .89 - .75 - .74 .97 .80
 Resid   27.34               
Note. Random effects: ID (intercept), block (slope), condition (slope). PEP: Number of 
observations: 2863, number of groups: 80, R2M = .83, R
2
C = .89; SCL: Number of 
observations: 1032, number of groups: 86, R2M = .94, R
2
C = .99; HR: Number of 
observations: 3275, number of groups: 91, R2M = .74, R
2
C = .82.  
HR = heart rate; PEP = pre-ejection period; SCL = skin conductance level.  




Figure 17. Skin conductance levels (SCLs) to the different conditions (A). To better see the 
interaction between resting state SCL and condition, SCL during pain perception was 
predicting from resting state SCL, and the residuals of that analysis (corresponding to 
changes from resting state) are depicted in the plots. Skin conductance changes were 
significantly greater in the needle condition compared to the non-pain condition in 
participants who had higher resting state SCLs. Skin conductance showed the biggest change 
from baseline during the first stimulus block (B). Shaded areas indicate 95% confidence 
intervals around the prediction. 
In summary, the hypothesis that sympathetic arousal would be heightened during 
observation of the painful conditions was only partially upheld: SCL increased from non-pain 
to pain conditions in participants with higher resting state arousal, but the pre-ejection period 
did not. AI scores were not correlated with sympathetic arousal to the stimuli (Hypothesis 
VII). Empathic concern and self-regulation ratings were not significantly correlated with 





This study investigated muscle and autonomic reactivity to observing another’s 
sensory pain. To test the global empathy deficit and empathy imbalance theories, the study 
investigated whether autism traits were correlated with subjective empathic concern and 
personal distress, muscle reactivity, and sympathetic and parasympathetic autonomic arousal. 
The analyses controlled for cognitive empathy, self-regulation and alexithymia, which have 
been correlated with empathic concern and perceived pain in previous studies (Bird et al., 
2010; Mailhot, Vachon-Presseau, Jackson, & Rainville, 2012; Moriguchi et al., 2007; 
Vachon-Presseau et al., 2011). 
With regards to predictions of the neurovisceral integration and polyvagal theories, I 
investigated the correlation between resting state autonomic arousal (both sympathetic and 
parasympathetic) and subjective trait empathy and state empathic concern for sensory pain. In 
particular, I hypothesised that there would be a correlation between resting state autonomic 
arousal and trait self-regulation, so that high parasympathetic arousal and low sympathetic 
arousal at rest would predict better self-regulation, and in turn, lower personal distress and 
sympathetic reactivity to observed sensory pain. Lastly, I tested the predictions from the 
polyvagal theory (Porges, 2005; Porges et al., 2013) that resting state autonomic arousal 
would be correlated with autism traits, and that this proposed atypical arousal could explain 
problems with self-regulation and empathic concern (if such problems were found) in ASD. I 
will first discuss the results of the self-reported pain perception and affective state analyses, 





Self-Reported State Empathic Concern and Distress 
Participants rated the pain condition videos as significantly more painful than the non-
pain conditions, and reported feeling more empathic concern and personal distress during 
these videos. These ratings suggest that the videos were effective in eliciting empathic 
concern and distress in the participants. However, the empathic concern and personal distress 
responses were highly correlated at each measurement time. The current questions do not 
seem to adequately distinguish between the two concepts of empathic concern and personal 
distress. This result corresponds with earlier investigations into these scales’ properties that 
found that participants reported similar levels of empathic concern and personal distress to 
empathy-inducing videos (Batson et al., 1991, 1997). Indeed, although Batson and colleagues 
argued that empathic concern and personal distress are separate constructs, a principal 
components analysis of the 14 emotion state adjectives used in their studies (and in this one) 
indicated that a single factor solution best portrays the different affective state responses 
(Batson et al., 1991, 1997). Batson and colleagues argue that participants report other-
oriented distress along with self-oriented distress, and thus that the personal distress items are 
partially assessing empathic concern. In their study, participants were explicitly asked 
whether they felt distress for the other person or for themselves. When specifically asked to 
distinguish between other-oriented distress and self-oriented distress, participants 
predominantly reported experiencing other-oriented distress. Thus, personal distress may not 
have been adequately captured by the affective state questions. However, there was some 
indication that the affective state change scores differentiated between empathic concern and 
personal distress, as concern and distress were differentially predicted by resting state 
autonomic arousal, as is discussed later in this chapter. 
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 Amount of autism traits was not correlated with either state empathic concern or 
distress11. These results concur with trait empathy results from Study 1 and with two previous 
studies that found no differences in subjective empathy for pain between ASD and 
neurotypical participants when participants were focused on the stimuli (de Coster et al., n.d.; 
Y.-T. Fan et al., 2014). Analogously, three more studies found no differences in brain 
activation or physiological arousal between ASD and neurotypical participants (Hadjikhani et 
al., 2014; Krach et al., 2015) or ASD and alexithymic participants (Bird et al., 2010) when 
viewing others’ physical pain. Thus, in contrast to predictions of global empathy deficits 
(e.g., C. Gillberg, 1992, 1996), pain perception and empathic concern seem to be at least 
intact in individuals with high amounts of autism traits.  
 Use of medication was correlated with both affective state and perceived pain in the 
current study. Participants using medication reported greater affective reactions and higher 
ratings of pain unpleasantness and intensity. As discussed in Study 1, since nearly all 
participants on medication (77%) had high amounts of autism traits, medication use could be 
acting as a proxy for autism. A recent study found that individuals with ASD experience a 
target’s pain as more unpleasant than neurotypical individuals do, and that individuals with 
ASD show decreased ability to discriminate between painful and non-painful conditions (Gu 
et al., 2015). If medication is an indicator of high ASD traits, this study corroborates their 
findings that individuals with high amounts of autism traits show greater affective reactions. 
Furthermore, though it was expected that distress scores would be positively correlated with 
autism traits because of poor self-regulation in this group (see, e.g., Gu et al., 2015), the non-
significant results may be explained by the fact that the affective state questions did not 
adequately assess personal distress. 
                                                   
11 Because of the similarity between the empathic concern and personal distress responses, these states will be 
collectively referred to as ‘affective state’ responses. 
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 It is also possible that medication use has direct effects on affective states and 
perceived pain. Medication use, particularly antidepressant use, was associated with higher 
resting state heart rate in the current study, as is discussed in more detail in the Autonomic 
arousal section (this chapter) and in the Limitations section in Chapter 8, p. 245. 
Psychotropic medications have been associated with lowered heart rate variability (Alvares, 
Quintana, Hickie, & Guastella, 2016; Kemp et al., 2014; Licht, de Geus, van Dyck, & 
Penninx, 2010) and increased sympathetic activity at rest, independent of type of psychiatric 
disorder. It is thus conceivable that the effects of medication on resting state autonomic 
arousal primes the individual for heightened general subjective arousal. 
 In this study, neither autism traits nor medication use predicted change in affective 
state or pain scores, implying that participants on medication tended to give higher ratings 
overall, rather than having heightened reaction only to the pain conditions. These findings 
may indicate that participants on medication - and if medication is a proxy for autism, 
potentially also participants with high amounts of autism traits - do not have a greater distress 
response to empathy stimuli in particular, but rather show heightened general reactivity. 
These results correspond to physiological studies which have found heightened general 
activity in ASD (Ming, Julu, Brimacombe, Connor, & Daniels, 2005).  
 Cognitive empathy skills were not associated with pain perception or empathic 
concern. Likewise, alexithymia was not correlated with perceived pain ratings in this study, 
or in previous studies of participants with alexithymia (Silani et al., 2008) or comorbid ASD 
and alexithymia (Bird et al., 2010). Though understanding of own and others’ emotions does 
not seem to be associated with pain perception, regulation of emotion is. Participants with 
poor trait self-regulation skills had increased affective responses (both empathic concern and 
personal distress) to the pain condition and gave higher ratings of pain unpleasantness and 
intensity. Poorer trait self-regulation was also associated with greater increases in affective 
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state from the non-pain to the pain conditions. The significant correlation between trait self-
regulation and change in affective state (with greater changes indicative of less state 
regulation) suggests that participants’ subjective reports of their self-regulation are reliable. 
Contrary to expectations, self-regulation scores were negatively correlated with both 
empathic concern and personal distress. I had hypothesised that self-regulation scores would 
be negatively correlated with distress only, and not with empathic concern. However, as 
discussed previously, empathic concern and personal distress responses were very highly 
correlated, raising doubts about whether the different questions really assessed different 
constructs. Given the similarity between the empathic concern and personal distress 
responses, it is unlikely that it would have been possible to find an interaction between self-
regulation and type of affective state, or between autism traits and type of affective state, 
even if such interactions exist. 
 In summary, autism traits were not correlated with affective states or perceived 
pain. However, two factors that were both correlated with amount of autism traits in Study 1 
predicted affective states and perceived pain: medication use and self-regulation ability. 
Medication use was associated with heightened general arousal and greater perceived pain. 
Better self-regulation was associated with lower absolute affective state ratings, and smaller 
changes in affective state when observing others’ pain. Extrapolating these findings, it is 
possible that individuals with more autism traits, who are more likely to have poor self-
regulation and be on medication, may experience heightened general distress. It must be 
cautioned that the correlations between autism traits and both affective state and perceived 






Researchers have proposed two opposing types of muscle reactions to perceived pain: 
The first is a freezing reaction to avoid possible harm (i.e., a reduction in muscle activity); the 
second is unconscious, involuntary activity in the muscles, mimicking the observed reactions. 
In this study, participants experienced small but significant increases in activity in both the 
FDI and ADM muscles when observing the pain condition relative to the non-pain 
conditions. This result supports theories of muscle mimicry of observed pain (Lamm et al., 
2008; Sonnby–Borgström, 2002), rather than corticospinal inhibition to perceived pain. My 
study is the only one to look at muscle reactivity in the area that is observed to be hurt. 
Previous studies have either looked at facial expressions to observing pain (e.g., Bavelas et 
al., 1986; Lamm et al., 2008) or at increases in muscle reactivity to first-hand pain when also 
observing another’s pain (e.g., Mailhot et al., 2012). The results of the current study show 
that muscle responses to perceived pain include not only facial expressions of distress or 
concern, but also muscle activity at the site of perceived injury; in this case, the muscles of 
the hand. 
Two different associations between muscle reactivity and autism traits were possible: 
The only previous study of muscle reactivity to pain in ASD (Minio-Paluello, Baron-Cohen, 
et al., 2009) found reduced inhibition of muscle-evoked responses in participants with ASD 
(they did not measure muscle activity itself). Greater inhibition of muscle-evoked responses 
is also associated with better cognitive empathy and lower personal distress (Avenanti, 
Minio-Paluello, Bufalari, et al., 2009). These studies suggest that muscle activity would be 
heightened in participants with high amounts of autism traits. Other studies have suggested 
that muscle mimicry communicates concern (Bavelas et al., 1986), and that muscle activity in 
the presence of noxious stimulation is positively correlated with empathy (Mailhot et al., 
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2012; Vachon-Presseau et al., 2011). From this perspective, the empathy-deficit hypothesis of 
ASD would predict reduced muscle reactivity in response to others’ pain. 
In fact, amount of autism traits was not correlated with amount of muscle activation 
or rate of activation change. These results are in agreement with the nonsignificant 
correlation between autism traits and subjective affective state changes discussed previously. 
The findings suggest that muscle mimicry to another’s pain is intact in ASD, in contrast to 
the findings of Minio-Paluello, Baron-Cohen, et al. (2009). A potential explanation for the 
contradictory findings is that these authors investigated muscle-evoked responses rather than 
muscle reactivity itself, and excluded participants who showed muscle reactivity to the 
videos. Their decision to exclude these participants likely explains the difference in results, 
and excluded any possibility of investigating muscle reactivity as empathy. I also found no 
association between autism traits and rate of change of muscle reactivity. Despite a previous 
report of slower muscle mimicry of facial emotions in ASD (Oberman et al., 2009), there 
were no differences in change in muscle activity (i.e., muscle slope) in this sample. 
Furthermore, medication use – a potential proxy for ASD - was not correlated with amount of 
activation or the rate of change in activation. In sum, autism traits were not associated with 
any differences in muscle reactivity. 
Affective states (both empathic concern and personal distress) and trait empathy 
facets (affective empathy, cognitive empathy and self-regulation) were not significantly 
correlated with muscle activity either. This result was unexpected, as trait empathy has been 
correlated with mimicry of facial affect in non-pain conditions (e.g., Dimberg & Thunberg, 
2012; Sonnby-Borgström et al., 2003) and with the size of a pain-induced muscle flexion 
reflex (Vachon-Presseau et al., 2011). However, it is not unprecedented. Mailhot et al. (2012) 
found no significant correlation between M. corrugator supercilii activity and trait empathy 
when observing others in pain, and Reicherts et al. (2013) found no correlation between M. 
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corrugator supercilii activity and perceived pain intensity. In non-pain studies of facial 
mimicry, the correlation between affective states and muscle activity has also not always 
been upheld: Induced emotion states were not correlated with facial mimicry in a study of 
facial reactions to basic emotions (Hess & Blairy, 2001). It is possible that current 
measurement techniques are too crude to detect an association between empathy and 
mimicry. The non-significant correlation between empathy and EMG activity in this study 
may be due to the fairly small within-subject changes in muscle activity and large between-
subject differences in muscle reactivity within the sample. The changes in muscle activity 
were likely smaller in this study than in previous studies because the participants did not 
experience physical pain themselves, unlike many other studies where participants received a 
painful stimulus such as a mild shock while viewing empathy-inducing stimuli (e.g., Caes et 
al., 2012; Mailhot et al., 2012; Reicherts et al., 2013).  
Surprisingly, muscle reactivity did not differ between the FDI and ADM muscle 
areas. The ADM muscle did not act as a control muscle as was intended; rather, it seems that 
participants tensed their whole hand in response to the stimulus. This finding was not 
correlated with autism traits, so it is not the case that participants higher in autism traits had a 
more generalised muscle response than those lower in autism traits. General tension, as was 
found in this study, could be an indication of distress rather than empathy-related muscle 
mimicry. This possibility needs further investigation. For future studies, the FDI on the 
opposite hand may serve as a better control muscle. Nonetheless, the results can still be 
interpreted, as muscle activity in the non-pain conditions served as a control.  
In summary, the pattern of muscle reactivity was consistent with a mimicry response, 
with muscle reactivity increasing as observed pain increased. Muscle mimicry was not 
associated with autism traits, suggesting intact, but not heightened, physiological responses to 
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observed pain in ASD. Physiological responses to observed pain were also measured at the 
autonomic level, which I turn to next. 
Autonomic Arousal 
Resting state autonomic arousal. Parasympathetic (cardiac vagal control) and 
sympathetic arousal (pre-ejection period and skin conductance), as well as heart rate 
(influenced by both autonomic branches), was measured during a 2-minute baseline. A 
measure of cardiac vagal control unbiased by respiration was estimated by measuring resting 
state RSA and using the residuals of a regression predicting RSA from respiration rate and 
tidal volume. Participants had heart rate, skin conductance, pre-ejection period and RSA 
scores within previously reported normal ranges (de Geus & van Doornen, 1996), which 
supports the validity of the measurements. Two different sets of questions were asked in this 
part of the study. First, does resting state arousal predict amount of autism traits and empathic 
regulation ability? Secondly, are autonomic arousal levels in response to sensory pain stimuli 
correlated with autism traits? I will first discuss the association between resting state 
autonomic measures and autism traits, and then the association between resting state 
autonomic measures and state and trait empathy. The second question is dealt with in the 
section Autonomic reactivity to perceived sensory pain. 
Autism traits. The polyvagal theory proposes that autism is characterised by reduced 
cardiac vagal control, leading to “atypical social and emotion behaviors” (Porges et al., 2013, 
p. 261). Contrary to predictions of the polyvagal theory, there was no correlation between 
amount of autism traits and resting state cardiac vagal control. This study is one of the largest 
samples in which the association between autism traits and RSA has been tested, and 
corresponds to previous findings concluding that resting state parasympathetic regulation in 
ASD is not affected (Benevides & Lane, 2015; Levine et al., 2012; Schaaf, Benevides, Leiby, 
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& Sendecki, 2015; Sheinkopf et al., 2013). Studies of specific genetic syndromes associated 
with ASD, such as fragile X syndrome, have more consistently found atypical 
parasympathetic regulation (Klusek, Roberts, & Losh, 2014), but parasympathetic regulation 
does not seem to be associated with general autism traits. 
Because of the importance that the neurovisceral integration model and polyvagal 
theory place on parasympathetic regulation, and because specialised equipment is needed to 
measure sympathetic cardiac effects, there are very few studies of resting state cardiac 
sympathetic arousal in ASD. Most studies have only investigated resting state 
parasympathetic arousal, or general arousal as measured by skin conductance, which does not 
exclusively reflect cardiac sympathetic arousal (Cacioppo et al., 2007). This study is one of 
the few studies to simultaneously investigate sympathetic and parasympathetic cardiac 
regulation in ASD. Sympathetic cardiac arousal was measured by calculating the pre-ejection 
period. Similar to previous cardiac sympathetic research in ASD, there was no correlation 
between resting state cardiac sympathetic activity and autism traits (Althaus et al., 2004; 
Schaaf et al., 2015). However, resting state heart rate was positively correlated with amount 
of autism traits. This effect is likely due to antidepressant use, as once participants on 
antidepressants were excluded, heart rate was no longer significantly correlated with amount 
of autism traits. In support of this conclusion, previous studies have reported medication 
effects on heart rate in participants with ASD (Daluwatte et al., 2012; Mathewson et al., 
2011), and specific effects of antidepressants on both sympathetic (Licht, Penninx, & de 
Geus, 2012) and parasympathetic regulation (Kemp et al., 2014; Licht et al., 2010) in the 
population at large. It is not clear whether the increased resting state heart rate stems from 
low parasympathetic arousal or high sympathetic arousal (or both) in the current participant 
group, as neither of these indices were significantly correlated with AI or with medication. 
Either cause is conceivable as antidepressants such as selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors 
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have noradrenergic and serotonergic effects on brainstem nuclei, influencing both 
sympathetic and parasympathetic regulation. Other antidepressants such as tricyclic 
antidepressants may increase norepinephrine concentrations in the sinoatrial node of the heart 
itself, thereby directly increasing heart rate (Licht et al., 2010, 2012).  
In sum, this study found no conclusive evidence for atypical autonomic nervous 
system control at rest in participants with high amounts of autism traits. Heightened heart rate 
in participants with high amounts of autism traits is likely due to the use of medication, rather 
than abnormalities in the central autonomic network. 
Empathy. In Chapter 2 I argued that, if the social behaviour and emotion predictions 
of the neurovisceral integration model and polyvagal theory are correct, cardiac vagal control 
will be positively correlated with self-regulation ability as well as empathic concern, and 
negatively related to personal distress. Corresponding to my predictions, resting state 
autonomic arousal predicted changes in personal distress on the day of testing. Relative to 
autonomic co-inhibition (i.e., low sympathetic and parasympathetic arousal), the combination 
of high resting state pre-ejection period (i.e., low sympathetic arousal) and high resting state 
cardiac vagal control (high parasympathetic arousal) predicted reduced changes in personal 
distress in participants. In contrast, empathic concern did not differ between these autonomic 
arousal groups. These findings support the argument that heightened cardiac vagal control 
and reduced sympathetic arousal indicate the capacity for effective self-regulation (e.g., 
Musser et al., 2011; Thayer & Lane, 2000). Similarly, heart rate was significantly correlated 
with trait self-regulation, which could indicate a possible effect of cardiac regulation on 
emotion regulation during distress. However, heart rate was no longer significantly correlated 
with self-regulation when participants using antidepressants were excluded from the analysis. 
Furthermore, resting state cardiac vagal control was not correlated with self-reported trait 
self-regulation, or with trait affective empathy. It is unclear why this study found non-
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significant correlations when other studies (Butler et al., 2006; Huffman et al., 1998) have 
found associations between autonomic arousal and emotion regulation. Participant responses 
had a suitable range, so it is unlikely that nonsignificant results are due to floor or ceiling 
effects on any of the questionnaires. One possible reason why cardiac autonomic regulation 
was not significantly correlated with trait empathy is that participants are not always reliable 
retrospective reporters of their own emotions (Stellar et al., 2015). Measures of behavioural 
self-regulation, such as persistence on difficult tasks (Segerstrom & Nes, 2007) or informant 
reports of problem behaviour (Hinnant & El-Sheikh, 2009; Salomon et al., 2000) have found 
associations between resting state autonomic arousal and self-regulation, and may be useful 
additions to self-reports of emotion in future studies.  
Based on the results of previous studies, I investigated whether higher resting state 
cardiac vagal control would predict better cognitive empathy (Bal et al., 2010; Muhtadie et 
al., 2015). In contrast to previous research, neither resting state cardiac vagal control, nor 
cardiac sympathetic arousal was correlated with trait or performance cognitive empathy. 
These contrasting results may be explained by the fact that Bal and colleagues (2010) only 
found a correlation between cognitive empathy and cardiac vagal control in their ASD group, 
not the neurotypical controls. In this context, cardiac vagal control may have been a marker 
for increased severity of the disorder (children with more severe ASD may also have been 
less likely to sit still for the resting state measurement, potentially compromising the results) 
or severity of language impairment. Cardiac vagal control has been correlated with pragmatic 
language in previous studies (Klusek, Martin, & Losh, 2013; Patriquin et al., 2013), and 
language is strongly correlated with more complex forms of cognitive empathy (Astington, 
2005; Astington & Jenkins, 1999). Correspondingly, the task on which cardiac vagal control 
predicted cognitive empathy in Muhtadie and colleagues’ study, the Reading the Mind in the 
Eyes Test, has been criticised as being a mental state vocabulary test (E. Peterson & Miller, 
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2012). In both these studies, then, language may have been a confounding factor. More 
research is needed to disentangle the association between parasympathetic arousal and 
language, and parasympathetic arousal and cognitive empathy. 
Autonomic reactivity to perceived sensory pain. Apart from measuring baseline 
autonomic arousal, I also measured sympathetic responsiveness to perceived pain. 
Parasympathetic responsiveness was not measured in this study as the videos were too short 
for the minimum recording time needed to calculate RSA. The hypothesis that sympathetic 
arousal would be heightened during observation of the painful conditions was partially 
upheld: Skin conductance increased from non-pain to pain conditions, though cardiac 
autonomic arousal did not differ between conditions. Previous studies to investigate 
sympathetic response in a sensory pain paradigm measured pupil dilation (Azevedo et al., 
2013) and skin conductance response (Fusaro, Tieri, & Aglioti, 2016; Gu et al., 2015; Hein et 
al., 2011). With the exception of Gu et al. (2015), these studies found significantly increased 
sympathetic activity to pain conditions in neurotypical participants; similar to the findings of 
this study. The increase in skin conductance suggests that the stimuli successfully induced an 
affective response in the observers. I will return to the discussion of cardiac arousal later in 
this section. 
The overriding aim of this study was to test whether amount of autism traits would be 
related to physiological indices of affective arousal. Recall that some theorists have proposed 
a general deficit in empathy in ASD (Baron-Cohen, 2009; C. Gillberg, 1992) – which would 
be reflected in reduced sympathetic responses to observed pain – whereas others have argued 
that affective empathy is enhanced in ASD (A. Smith, 2009) – as would be seen in 
heightened sympathetic responses to others’ pain. In contrast to both sets of theories, amount 
of autism traits was not correlated with autonomic activity (heart rate, pre-ejection period or 
skin conductance) to perceiving others’ sensory pain. Moreover, medication use did not 
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predict changes in heart rate, pre-ejection period or skin conductance beyond its influence on 
resting state arousal. I also investigated the possibility of different autonomic habituation 
rates in participants with more autism traits. It could be argued that, if participants with high 
amounts of autism traits have heightened affective empathy or distress, they would also show 
diminished habituation responses. However, although arousal differed between the 
experimental blocks, there were no interactions between block and amount of autism traits in 
any of the autonomic measures. A study using a similar paradigm found that individuals with 
ASD had greater skin conductance responses than neurotypical controls when viewing 
another’s pain (Gu et al., 2015). However, a difference between their study and this one is 
that their neurotypical participants did not show an increase in skin conductance responses to 
the pain condition. This unusual result may have been the reason behind the group 
differences found in their study. Overall, the autonomic results support intact, but not 
heightened, affective empathy in participants with high amounts of autism traits. 
It is unclear why no significant changes in heart rate or pre-ejection period were 
detected in the pain condition. No previous studies have, to my knowledge, used pre-ejection 
period to quantify sympathetic activity in this paradigm, so the cardiac results cannot be 
directly compared to previous findings. The absence of published results may be because 
previous studies have failed to find significant changes in these measures. Alternatively, it 
may be that the stimuli used in this study were not sufficiently arousing to produce a clearly 
discernible and robust cardiac sympathetic response. Some previous studies examining heart 
rate changes to perceived pain versus neutral or positive conditions found reductions in heart 
rate to the pain videos (Craig & Lowery, 1969; Fusaro et al., 2016); however, these studies 
used live actors or a virtual reality setting, and thus the stimuli may have been much more 
arousing than videos of sensory pain. Although participants’ self-reports indicated that the 
stimuli induced feelings of empathy and distress, mild feelings of empathy and distress may 
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not be associated with large cardiac sympathetic responses. In summary, cardiac autonomic 
arousal did not differ between conditions. The videos featuring sensory pain elicited a 
heightened skin conductance response that was not associated with amount of autism traits.  
Coherence between autonomic and subjective measures of empathy. It was 
predicted that greater subjective feelings of personal distress and diminished trait self-
regulation would be reflected in heightened sympathetic arousal. Contrary to what was 
hypothesised, personal distress and self-regulation ratings were not significantly correlated 
with sympathetic arousal. Previous studies that have investigated the relationship between 
self-reported empathy and sympathetic arousal have obtained mixed results, with one study 
finding a significant correlation (Hein et al., 2011) and others no correlation (de Coster, 
Verschuere, Goubert, Tsakiris, & Brass, 2013; Fusaro et al., 2016; Lamm et al., 2008). These 
differences may be due to differences in the way affect is measured, differences in the 
participant samples, or differing intensity of the stimuli. For example, previous studies have 
shown that significant correlations between subjective and physiological affective states are 
only present during fairly intense emotional stimuli (Rosenberg & Ekman, 1994) or 
emotional responses (Schaefer, Larson, Davidson, & Coan, 2014). Hence, the stimuli used in 
this study may not have evoked a large enough response to be able to find coherence of 
responses across measurement levels. Even under amplified emotional conditions, different 
measurement levels of emotion are only weakly associated (Reisenzein, 2000), leading 
several researchers to argue that physiological and subjective reports measure different 
aspects of affective experience, and should not be assumed to be interchangeable (Evers et 
al., 2014; Mauss & Robinson, 2009). This argument will be discussed further in Chapter 8; 
the conclusion to be drawn here is that subjective and physiological responses can be 
meaningfully interpreted separately, and need not be associated. The addition of further 
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levels of measurement, and improved measurement in the current levels of analysis, may 
improve coherence in future studies. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
Some limitations temper the impact of the study. First, the ADM muscle did not act as 
a non-affected control muscle as was expected; rather, findings indicate that participants 
tensed the whole hand while observing painful stimulation, activating both FDI and ADM 
areas. The ADM was chosen because it was used as a control muscle in previous studies 
(e.g., Minio-Paluello, Baron-Cohen, et al., 2009); however, using the FDI muscle on the 
opposite hand may be a better option for a control muscle. Despite the unanticipated 
activation of the ADM, the FDI results can still be interpreted, as muscle activity in the non-
pain conditions served as a comparison to activity during pain observation.  
I used existing experimental videos in this study that featured only white hands; 
however, the sample was comprised of participants from several race groups. Studies have 
shown that arousal to viewing other-race pain is less than own-race pain (Avenanti et al., 
2010; Azevedo et al., 2013). The other-race effect could have contributed to a smaller overall 
empathy effect. However, race was not associated with amount of autism traits, so any 
reduced effect due to race should not have affected the nature of the relationship between 
amount of autism traits and arousal.  
Lastly, it is possible that the absence of a difference in the pre-ejection period 
between pain and non-pain conditions may be because the measurement time (4 s) was too 
short to get a reliable reading for the pre-ejection period. The videos have been used 
successfully in previous studies. Thus, to keep the results comparable, the original video 
length was kept. This limitation is addressed in the next study, where longer measurement 
epochs are used. Limitations that apply to all of the studies will be discussed in the general 
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discussion in Chapter 8. Despite these limitations, the study offers valuable new insights into 
autonomic arousal during empathy. 
Summary and Conclusions 
The aim of this study was to investigate whether autism traits are correlated with 
empathy for others’ sensory pain. Subjective empathic concern, muscle reactivity, and 
sympathetic autonomic reactivity during empathy-induction was measured, and correlated 
with amount of autism traits. Overall, participants displayed increased muscle activity and 
general arousal – as indicated by skin conductance - to viewing others in pain, and reported 
the perceived pain as fairly intense and unpleasant. Empathic concern and personal distress 
responses were highly similar, so that these two sets of responses could not be differentiated 
from each other. 
This study did not find that autism traits are significantly associated with reduced 
physiological or subjective affective responses to others’ physical pain. At the subjective 
level, affective state (both empathic concern and personal distress) and pain perception were 
not correlated with autism traits. Similar to Study 1, these results argue against a global 
empathy deficit in ASD. Furthermore, the self-report results suggest that some individuals 
with high amounts of autism traits may be more prone to experiencing heightened affective 
arousal: Being on medication and having poorer self-regulation ability were correlated with 
greater affective reactions and higher ratings of pain unpleasantness and intensity. To tie this 
in to the empathy imbalance theory of autism (A. Smith, 2009, 2010), autism traits do not 
seem to be associated with higher subjective empathic concern/distress per se, though poor 
self-regulation in this group may lead to heightened subjective experience of affective states. 
However, medication and poor self-regulation were associated with heightened affective 
arousal in general, not only to empathy-related responses. Thus, the weight of the evidence 
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from this study does not support the proposition of heightened affective empathy in ASD 
either. Similarly, at the physiological level, the results support the conclusion that empathy 
for sensory pain is intact in ASD, and do not provide evidence for hyper-arousal in ASD: 
Muscle reactivity to the empathy-for-pain videos was not significantly correlated with 
amount of autism traits, and neither was sympathetic reactivity. The finding that participants 
on medication and those with poor trait self-regulation show heightened subjective reactivity 
to stimuli was not corroborated at the autonomic or muscular levels, which may indicate that 
it is the perception of own emotion that is altered in these groups rather than underlying 
physiology. Alternatively, as resting state arousal was controlled for in the models, the effect 
of medication may not be visible beyond its influence on resting state arousal, but it is 
notable that higher resting state stress arousal was significantly related to higher arousal 
during pain observation. Thus, it is plausible that medication use may heighten resting state 
arousal, thereby increasing autonomic and subjective arousal to stimuli. The implication of 
the affective state results for current theoretical perspectives on ASD is discussed further in 
Chapter 8. 
With regards to predictions of the neurovisceral integration and polyvagal theories, I 
investigated the correlation between resting state autonomic arousal and state as well as trait 
empathy. In particular, I hypothesised that there would be a correlation between resting state 
autonomic arousal and dispositional self-regulation, which would in turn lead to greater 
feelings of empathic concern, as well as less personal distress and sympathetic arousal, at 
observing others’ pain. This study provides limited support for the idea that resting state 
autonomic reactivity is an indicator of the capacity for empathic concern. The combination of 
low sympathetic arousal and high parasympathetic arousal at rest predicted reduced changes 
in self-reported personal distress, but not empathic concern, to painful conditions. The effect 
remained when participants on antidepressants were excluded. This result supports the 
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hypothesis that high resting state parasympathetic arousal is an indicator of the capacity for 
self-regulation. However, resting state sympathetic and parasympathetic arousal did not 
predict absolute affective state levels, as would be predicted from the polyvagal theory. 
Additionally, there was little evidence in this study that either cardiac sympathetic or 
parasympathetic arousal at rest is correlated with amount of autism traits. Though heart rate 
was correlated with autism traits, this relationship was not seen in other autonomic arousal 
measures, and was not upheld once participants taking antidepressants were excluded from 
the analysis. Thus, rather than directly influencing or reflecting capacity for social 
engagement, resting state parasympathetic arousal may reflect emotion regulation, which is 
but one part of social engagement. Furthermore, atypical autonomic arousal does not seem to 
be a general characteristic of the broader autism phenotype. 
In conclusion, the current study found no evidence for deficits in empathy for sensory 
pain in ASD. These findings diverge from portrayals of individuals with ASD as lacking in 
empathic responses (Baron-Cohen, 2009; C. Gillberg, 1992; Hobson et al., 2009). Study 3 






STUDY 3: EMPATHY FOR FACIAL EXPRESSIONS OF PAIN 
 
Look into someone else’s face, and see the consciousness in it, and a particular shade of 
consciousness. You see on it, in it, joy, indifference, interest, excitement, torpor, and so 
on . . . Do you look into yourself in order to recognize the fury in his face? 
(Wittgenstein, 1967, p. 40e [original emphasis]) 
This chapter examines responses to facial expressions of pain. Study 2 found no 
evidence for deficits in affective empathy or empathic concern for sensory pain in ASD. 
However, though the paradigm used in that study is well-tested, it is not the same as 
perceiving pain in everyday life. One aspect of difference is that, in everyday life, only the 
communication of pain may be visible to the observer, and not the painful stimulus. Non-
verbal communication of pain, for example through facial expressions, may not be correctly 
interpreted by individuals with high amounts of autism traits if they have difficulties with 
recognising facial expressions of pain; similar to what was shown in Study 1 for basic 
emotions. Thus, the first aim of Study 3 was to expand on the empathy-for-pain paradigm 
used in Study 2 by presenting participants with facial expressions of pain, rather than the 
sensory application of pain. Similar to the design of Study 2, I tested the correlation between 
empathy for facial expressions of pain and amount of autism traits. Second, as understanding 
of others’ emotions is also closely related to understanding of own emotions, an important 
part of this study was to test the correlation between alexithymia and empathic concern; 




Third, I wished to test whether, if participants were specifically asked to take the 
perspective of the other person – which participants with high amounts of autism traits may 
be less likely to do spontaneously, as was shown in Study 1 – there would be a difference in 
affective empathy at the physiological level or empathic concern at the subjective level.  
Fourth, Study 2 found that two factors related to having ASD, namely being on 
medication and having poorer self-regulation ability, were correlated with greater affective 
reactions and higher ratings of pain unpleasantness and intensity. I wished to test whether 
these associations would be upheld in another empathy-for-pain study, and one that makes 
greater demands on cognitive empathy.  
Lastly, another aim of Study 3 was to replicate the results pertaining to the 
neurovisceral integration and polyvagal theories. Study 2 found that the combination of low 
sympathetic arousal and high parasympathetic arousal at rest, relative to autonomic co-
inhibition, predicted reduced changes in self-reported personal distress to painful conditions, 
but not absolute affective state levels (neither empathic concern nor distress) or trait self-
regulation. Additionally, changes in sympathetic arousal to the empathy-inducing stimuli did 
not predict self-reported empathic concern or personal distress. Study 3 sought to replicate 
and expand these results by using longer-duration empathy-for-pain videos so that both 






The study followed a multilevel correlational design, investigating within-subject 
changes in physiological and subjective affective states, and correlations between 
participants’ autism traits and their empathic responses. Participants were shown recorded 
facial expressions of pain under two different perspective-taking instructions: For half of the 
stimuli, participants were instructed to imagine how the person experiencing the pain is 
feeling (imagine other). For the rest of the stimuli, participants were instructed to imagine 
how they would feel if they were undergoing the painful stimuli (imagine self). Affective 
state, facial muscle activity, cardiac vagal control, pre-ejection period, heart rate, and SCL 
were predicted from the perspective-taking condition and participants’ amount of autism 
traits, as well as cognitive and demographic covariates. Self-reported affective responses and 
resting state physiology were used to predict physiological arousal to the videos. 
Participants 
The full laboratory sample participated in this study (N = 98, see Chapter 4, 
Participants, p. 50). Two participants were excluded from the analysis, one because they 
were answering randomly, and one because of an abnormally slow response time on all tasks 
(> 3 SDs from mean). This left 96 participants who participated in the study, of which one 
only completed one cycle of the stimulus material (the available data for this participant were 
used). Of the 96 participants, one was excluded from EMG analyses because of extremely 
low EMG activity at all time points (N = 95). Furthermore, due to equipment failure, 
autonomic data were not available for one participant (N = 95). Additionally, two participants 
had B-points on the ICG that were not clearly identifiable, and were not included in any of 
the pre-ejection period analyses. Eleven participants had SCL quality ratings below 4/10 (see 
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p. 58 for a description of the ratings), and were left out of all SCL analyses. Refer back to 
Figure 1, p. 52, for the research participation flowchart. 
Materials and Measures 
Previously reported measures.  AI scores, as calculated from ADOS-2 and AQ 
scores in Study 1, were used as an indicator of amount of autism traits. For dispositional 
empathy, the trait affective empathy, trait cognitive empathy, and trait self-regulation 
aggregates calculated in Study 1 were used (see Table 5, p. 84). Again, performance 
cognitive empathy (rather than trait cognitive empathy) was used as the primary indicator of 
cognitive empathy in the analyses. Total scores on the 20-item Toronto Alexithymia Scale 
(TAS-20) were used to indicate alexithymia. Affective states (empathic concern and personal 
distress) and perceived pain during the videos were measured as described in Chapter 6, 
Affective states and perceived pain, p. 115. 
Video stimuli.  The stimuli featured male and female actors initially showing a 
neutral expression (1-3 s; see Figure 18), followed by an expression of pain. All video clips 
have been used in previous studies to measure empathic concern, perceived pain and 
physiological responses to pain (Lamm et al., 2007, 2008). The video clips lasted 





Figure 18. Clips from the painful facial expression videos showing the initial neutral and later 
painful facial expressions. From “The Neural Substrate of Human Empathy: Effects of 
Perspective-Taking and Cognitive Appraisal” by C. Lamm, C. D. Batson and J. Decety, 
2007, Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 19, p. 44. Copyright 2007 by the MIT Press. 
Electromyogram (EMG). Surface EMG electrodes were placed on the left side of 
the face over the M. orbicularis oculi, M. corrugator supercilii and M. medial frontalis areas 
according to international guidelines (Fridlund & Cacioppo, 1986). The reference electrode 
was placed on the forehead below the hairline. Stimulus-evoked EMG activity was scored as 
the change in activity from a 1 s prestimulus baseline and was averaged over 200 ms periods 
from 0 to 3.4 s to create a reasonable number of measurements for subsequent calculations 
(similar to Dimberg & Thunberg, 2012; Dimberg et al., 2000). Trials that had EMG activity 
above 8 µV during the baseline period or activity above 30 µV or below -30 µV during 
stimulus presentation (0.20% of data) were excluded to prevent large resting state differences 
and extreme values that are unlikely to be involuntary reactions (Reicherts et al., 2012). The 
average EMG amplitude during the expression of pain (1.4 – 3.4 ms) was calculated as a 
measure of response magnitude. To get an indication of response latency at pain onset, the 
slope of the average EMG activity over the consecutive 200 ms periods from time 0 (start of 
pain) to 2.4 s was calculated (Malmo & Davis, 1956; Malmo & Malmo, 2000). 
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Autonomic activity. Heart rate, RSA, SCL and pre-ejection period activity were 
recorded during the 2-minute baseline period, as well as over the length of each of the four 
blocks (each approx. 105 s). As in Study 2, EKG artefacts made up 1.12% of the data and 
were corrected by cubic spline interpolation (Berntson & Stowell, 1998; Vrije Universiteit, 
2015). Beats with bad ICG signal quality were automatically detected and removed from 
individual complexes (0.54% of data; as per Sherwood et al., 1990; Willemsen et al., 1996). 
Ensemble-averaged ICG complexes were manually inspected and no distorted complexes 
were found. All complexes were included in averaging. For the SCL analyses, 0.29% of the 
data were identified as artefacts and not included in the calculation of the average (as 
recommended by the Society for Psychophysiological Research Ad Hoc Committee on 
Electrodermal Measures, 2012). To calculate cardiac vagal control, RSA was predicted from 
respiration rate and tidal volume. The residuals of that regression were used as an indicator of 
cardiac vagal control. 
Procedure 
As in Study 2, participants were asked not to smoke, eat, exercise, or drink 
caffeinated beverages or alcohol for 2 hours prior to the experiment. The experiment was 
conducted in a temperature and lighting-controlled room. On arrival at the laboratory, the 
VU-AMS and ActiveTwo electrodes were fitted. Participants were separated from the 
researcher by a curtain, through which the researcher could monitor whether they were 
paying attention to the stimuli and not moving unduly. Participants were asked to remain 
seated and rest their left hand (to which the skin conductance electrodes were attached) on the 
table throughout the procedure. Participants listened to music (Clair de Lune, Schmalfuss, 
2010) for five minutes, after which two minutes of resting state data were collected while 
participants sat with their eyes closed.  
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The video clips were presented using E-Prime 2 (Psychology Software Tools, 
Pittsburgh, PA) on a 19-inch, 4:3 aspect ratio monitor, positioned approximately 65cm away 
from the participants. Participants were told that the video clips showed patients experiencing 
painful auditory stimulation due to medical treatment. Video-clips were preceded by one of 
two instructions: Participants were either told to imagine how they would feel in that 
situation (imagine self) or how the patient felt (imagine other; Lamm et al., 2007). Six clips 
were shown in a block, with two blocks each of the two perspectives (24 videos in total). The 
clips were randomly assigned to one of the two conditions. The order of the blocks and of the 
clips within a block were randomised. Clips that were shown in the imagine-self condition 
were never shown in the imagine-other condition, and vice versa. Between trials, participants 
viewed 10 s luminance-matched scrambled static images to minimise muscular and arousal 
responses to changes in luminance (Lamm et al., 2007, 2008). Stimuli were preceded by a 1 s 
display of a centred fixation cross. At the end of each block, participants rated the intensity 
and unpleasantness of the pain shown in the videos, as well as their level of empathic concern 
for the targets and their personal distress. Participants were asked to remain seated 
throughout the experiment and to refrain from talking or moving excessively.  
Data Analysis 
Descriptive statistics and zero-order correlations between the physiological and 
subjective variables are reported. All analyses were preceded by an investigation of the 
distribution of the data and inspection for outliers. Models were also examined for 
multicollinearity, outliers, heteroscedasticity and other patterning of the residuals. 
Preliminary linear random-effects models with participant ID as the random intercept were 
run to assesses whether the stimuli elicited significant changes in the various physiological 
indices. Next, a series of linear mixed-effects models were run to predict subjective and 
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physiological responses.  
First, two separate mixed-effects models were done to predict pain perception and 
affective state from condition (self or other), AI, self-regulation and performance cognitive 
empathy. The outcome variable for pain perception was rating (where 1 = not at all and 7 = 
extremely), and pain unpleasantness versus pain intensity was entered as a binary predictor 
variable. Thus, pain perception refers to both pain unpleasantness and pain intensity. 
Similarly, the outcome variable for the affective state responses was rating (where 1 = not at 
all and 7 = extremely) and state type (concern versus distress) was coded as a binary predictor 
variable. To model pain perception, participant ID was used as the random intercept, with 
condition and perception type (intensity, unpleasantness) and their interaction as random 
slopes. To model affective state, participant ID was used as the random intercept, with 
condition and state (distress, empathic concern) and their interaction as random slopes. 
Second, muscle reactivity was predicted from condition, muscle (M. corrugator, M. 
frontalis, M. orbicularis), AI, self-regulation and performance cognitive empathy. Separate 
analyses were done for muscle amplitude and muscle slope. Third, separate mixed-effects 
models were done to predict pre-ejection period, SCL, vagal cardiac control, and heart rate 
from the predictors described above. Video cycle (first or second round of perspective-
taking), medication use and alexithymia were included as control variables in all analyses. 
Additionally, baseline arousal was added as a control variable in each of the autonomic 
arousal models.  
For the EMG analyses, participant ID was used as the random intercept with the 
interaction between muscle and condition as random slopes. For the various indices of 
physiological arousal, participant ID was again used as the random intercept, with condition 
as random slope. Similar to Study 1, if a model did not converge, an iterative simplification 
process was followed (Bates, Kliegl, et al., 2015): First, a simpler random slopes structure 
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without an interaction was tried, and if this model also did not converge, a nested intercept 
structure was attempted. Where within-group variance was zero and model fit indices 
indicated a poor fit with a more complex model, responses were aggregated across 
conditions, as detailed in the Results section. 
Results 
Self-Reported Affective State and Perceived Pain 
Are subjective indices of affective empathy and empathic concern correlated with amount of 
autism traits? 
Hypothesis IV: Pain perception (unpleasantness and intensity) will be positively correlated 
with amount of autism traits once alexithymia is controlled for. 
Hypothesis V: Amount of autism traits will be negatively correlated with empathic concern 
and positively correlated with personal distress. 
What other factors are associated with pain perception and empathic concern (versus 
personal distress)? 
Hypothesis VIII: Self-regulation scores will be positively correlated with empathic concern 
and negatively correlated with perception of pain and personal distress. In other words, better 
self-regulation will be associated with higher empathic concern and lower personal distress 
and perceived pain intensity/unpleasantness. 





Pain perception. On average, participants reported high pain intensity and 
unpleasantness to both the imagine-self (MI = 5.35, SDI = 1.29 and MU = 5.45, SDU = 1.31, 
respectively) and imagine-other (MI = 5.39, SDI = 1.27 and MU = 5.48, SDU = 1.25, 
respectively) conditions. Perceived intensity and unpleasantness ratings were highly 
correlated (rself [94] = .85, p < .001; rother [94] = .83, p < .001). A linear mixed-effects model 
with medication, condition (imagine self or imagine other), perception type (unpleasantness 
or intensity), cycle (one or two), AI scores, performance cognitive empathy, self-regulation 
and their interactions was run to predict perceived pain ratings. The results of the final model 
are presented in Table 23. 
Table 23 
Linear Mixed-Effects Model of Pain Perception 
Fixed effects SS MS dfeffect dferror F-value Probability 
Medication 6.59 6.59 1 92.35 12.48 .001 ** 
Cycle 5.80 5.80 1 475.10 10.98 .001 ** 
AI 4.68 4.68 1 92.98 8.85 .004 ** 
Random effects 
   
  
Group N Slope Variance Correlation 
 
ID 96 (Intercept) 0.94 
   
 
 Imagine self 0.08 - .01
  
 
 Pain unpleasantness 0.04 - .01 .58
 
 
 Imagine self *Pain 
unpleasantness 0.00 .26 - .93 - .76 
Residual 764  0.53    
Note. Random effects: ID (intercept), condition (slope), pain perception (slope). R2M = .10, 
R2C = .69. AI = Autism Index.  
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. 
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Medication, cycle and AI significantly predicted pain ratings (see Figure 19). 
Medication use was associated with significantly higher perceived pain, β = 0.98, SE = 0.28, t 
(92.4) = 3.53, p ≤ .0006. Perceived pain ratings were higher in the second cycle than the first, 
β = 0.18, SE = 0.05, t (475.1) = 3.13, p ≤ .0009. AI scores were negatively correlated with 
perceived pain, β = - 0.33, SE = 0.11, t (93) = -2.98, p ≤ .004. There were no significant 
interactions. Condition, self-regulation, performance cognitive empathy and perception type 
did not significantly predict perceived pain. 
 
 
Figure 19. AI (A), medication (B) and cycle (C) significantly predicted pain ratings.  There 
were no significant differences between unpleasantness and intensity ratings. Shaded areas 
indicate 95% confidence intervals around the prediction. The lower and upper whiskers of the 
box plot represent the values within 1.5 times the interquartile range. 
Affective state ratings. On average, participants reported low to moderate levels of 
empathic concern and personal distress during the imagine-self (MEC = 3.78, SDEC = 1.60 and 
MPD = 3.35, SDPD = 1.63) and image-other conditions (MEC = 3.83, SDEC = 1.61 and MPD = 
3.32, SDPD = 1.64). Internal consistency for state empathic concern was very high at each of 
the affective state rating times (αs = 0.91, 0.93, 0.94, 0.96; 95% CIs [0.82, 1.00], [0.85, 1.02], 
183 
 
[0.87, 1.03], [0.88, 1.03]), indicating that item responses were near identical. State personal 
distress had similarly high internal consistency at each time point (αs = .96, .96, .97, .97; 95% 
CIs [0.90, 1.01], [0.91, 1.01], [0.93, 1.02], [0.92, 1.02]). Additionally, state empathic concern 
and personal distress were highly correlated for each condition (rself [94] = .87, p < .001, rother 
[94] = .88, p < .001).  
Affective state responses were first predicted from medication use; the interaction 
between state type (concern, distress), condition and AI; the interaction between state type 
and self-regulation; and the interaction between performance cognitive empathy and state 
type. Medication use, state type, AI and self-regulation significantly predicted affective state 
ratings in this model, R2M = .22, R
2





Linear Mixed-Effects Model of Affective State 
Fixed effects SS MS dfeffect dferror F-value Probability 
State 14.88 14.88 1 93.15 44.65 < .001 *** 
Medication 1.78 1.78 1 90 5.34 .023 * 
AI 4.44 4.44 1 90 13.31 < .001 *** 
Self-regulation 7.05 7.05 1 90 21.15 < .001 *** 
 
Random effects 
   
  
Group N Slope Variance Correlation 
 
ID 94 (Intercept) 1.84 
   
 
 Imagine self 0.06 - .38
  
 
 Distress 0.36 - .12 .42
 
 
 Imagine self *Distress 0.01 .37 -.92 -.02
Residual 752   0.33       
Note. Random effects: ID (intercept), condition (slope), affective state (slope). AI = Autism 
Index.  
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. 
On average, participants reported less personal distress than empathic concern to the 
videos, β = - 0.49, SE = 0.07, t (93.15) = - 6.68, p < .001. Participants using medication had 
significantly higher affective state ratings, β = 0.85, SE = 0.37, t (90) = 2.31, p ≤ .023.  
Affective state ratings were negatively correlated with AI scores, β = - 0.60, SE = 0.16, t (90) 
= - 3.65, p ≤ .0004, and with self-regulation ability, β = - 0.67, SE = 0.15, t (90) = - 4.60,  
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p < .001. There were no interactions, no difference between cycles, and no correlation 
between affective state and performance cognitive empathy.  
 
Figure 20. Significant predictors of affective state arousal to facial pain. AI (A), medication 
use (B), self-regulation (C), and state type (concern versus distress) significantly predicted 
affective state scores when alexithymia was not controlled for. Shaded areas indicate the 95% 
confidence intervals around the prediction. The lower and upper whiskers of the box plot 
represent the values within 1.5 times the interquartile range. 
In a second model, alexithymia was entered first as a fixed effect, followed by the 
other fixed effects as described above. In this model, neither AI scores (β = - 0.28, SE = 0.19) 
nor medication (β = 0.67, SE = 0.35) significantly predicted affective state (see Table 25). 
Alexithymia was significantly negatively correlated with affective state (both empathic 
concern and personal distress), β = - 0.54, SE = 0.16. Self-regulation scores were still 
significantly negatively correlated with affective state, β = - 0.71, SE = 0.14. Similar to the 
previous model, participants reported less personal distress than empathic concern to the 
videos, β = - 0.49, SE = 0.07. There were no significant interactions between affective state 
type (empathic concern or personal distress) and any of the other predictors. This model 
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predicted a greater amount of the variance in affective state than did the first model, R2M = 
.29, R2C = .88
12. The significant interactions are depicted in Figure 21. 
Table 25 
Linear Mixed-Effects Model of Affective State, Controlling for Alexithymia 
Fixed effects SS MS dfeffect dferror F-value Probability 
State 14.87 14.87 1 93.15 44.62 < .001 *** 
Medication 1.20 1.20 1 89.01 3.59 0.061 
 Alexithymia 3.85 3.85 1 89.01 11.55 < .001 *** 
AI 0.74 0.74 1 89.01 2.21 0.140  
Self-regulation 8.81 8.81 1 89.01 26.44 < .001 *** 
 
Random effects 
   
  
Group N Slope Variance Correlation 
 
ID 94 (Intercept) 1.70 
   
 
 Imagine self 0.06 - .45
  
 
 Distress 0.36 - .07  .42
 
 
 Imagine self *Distress 0.00  .24 - .87 - .04
Residual 752   0.33 
   
Note. Random effects: ID (intercept), condition (slope), affective state (slope). AI = Autism 
Index. 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
                                                   
12 The effect size was similar with the two non-significant predictors (AI and medication) excluded, R2M = .28, 




Figure 21. The influence of alexithymia (A) and self-regulation (B) on empathic concern and 
personal distress. Shaded areas indicate the 95% confidence intervals around the prediction. 
Contrary to what was hypothesised, AI scores were negatively correlated with 
perceived pain intensity and unpleasantness (Hypothesis IV). Alexithymia partially mediated 
the relationship between autism traits and affective state: Neither empathic concern nor 
personal distress was correlated with AI scores once alexithymia was controlled for13. Thus, 
Hypothesis V was not upheld. Poorer self-regulation was associated with higher affective 
state ratings – both empathic concern and personal distress – and was not correlated with 
perceived pain (Hypothesis VIII). Contrary to Hypothesis IX, neither pain perception nor 
empathic concern was correlated with cognitive empathy. 
  
                                                   
13 Recall that Study 1 showed that AI scores significantly predict alexithymia, r = 0.55, R2 = .30, F (1,95) = 




Are physiological indices of affective empathy and empathic concern correlated with amount 
of autism traits? 
Hypothesis VI: Amount of autism traits will be positively correlated with muscle activity.  
What other factors are associated with pain perception and empathic concern (versus 
personal distress)? 
Hypothesis XI: Poorer self-regulation and cognitive empathy will be associated with 
increased muscle reactivity. 
On average, muscle activity increased from about 500 ms after the start of the painful 
facial expression. Activity seemed to increase most and fastest in the M. orbicularis oculi 
region, the muscle involved in orbit tightening (Figure 22). However, standard deviations 
were large for muscle slope. Muscle activity was similar between perspective taking 
conditions. Table 26 shows the average muscle activity, relative to baseline, at the start of the 
painful facial expression (0 – 200 ms) and during the painful facial expression (1.4 – 3.4 s), 




Figure 22. Activity in the M. corrugator supercilii, M. medial frontalis and M. orbicularis 
oculi regions from resting state to watching facial expressions of pain. Time 0 indicates the 
onset of the pain expression. 
Table 26 
Change in Muscle Activity and Muscle Slope During Facial Expressions of Pain 
Muscle Condition Pain start During pain Slope 
  
M SD M SD M SD 
M. corrugator Other 0.04 0.58 0.75 2.06 0.83 11.61 
 
Self 0.02 0.48 0.68 2.08 - 0.58 9.12 
M. orbicularis Other 0.04 0.31 1.27 2.58 3.02 12.15 
 
Self 0.04 0.35 1.38 2.65 4.37 10.98 
M. frontalis Other 0.04 0.36 0.39 1.55 1.92 16.94 
 
Self 0.00 0.24 0.53 1.82 1.53 18.36 
Note. Pain start: 0 – 200 ms; during pain: 1.4 – 3.4 s; slope: change in muscle activity over 
time between 0 – 2.4 s.  
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Average activity. Muscle amplitude data were positively skewed. Thus all models of 
muscle amplitude included a variance coefficient to model heterogeneity in the variance. A 
preliminary random effects analysis predicting muscle activity from the interaction between 
time (0 – 200 ms vs. 1.4 – 3.4 s), muscle, and condition was done to test whether the 
empathy-induction worked; in other words, whether muscle activity was higher during pain 
observation than during the start of the video. The model had a random intercept, with 
condition nested within muscle, nested within participant ID, and contained an exponential 
variance structure (δ = 1.95).14 The analysis showed a significant main effect for time  
(F [1, 576] = 91.93, p < .001) and a significant interaction between muscle and time,  
F [2,576] = 4.84, p ≤ .008. Condition and its interactions were not significant (all ps > .2). On 
average, muscle activity was significantly higher while observing pain, β = 0.35, SE = 0.08,  
t (576) = 4.12, p < .001. Specifically muscle activity during pain observation was higher in 
both the M. orbicularis oculi and M. corrugator supercilii muscles than in M. medial frontalis; 
β = 0.88, SE = 0.42, t (576) = 2.08, p ≤ .038, and β = 0.36, SE = 0.18, t (576) = 2.06,  
p ≤ .040, respectively. It should be noted that, though significant, the confidence interval of 
the coefficient estimate for M. corrugator supercilii during pain observation (i.e., for the Time 
x M. corrugator interaction) was close to zero (see Table 44, p. 384, and Figure 30, p. 385, in 
Appendix P). Thus, this significant result should be interpreted with some caution. The 
conclusion from the preliminary analysis is that the videos elicited significant muscle activity 
associated with expressions of pain.  
Muscle type, medication, cycle, alexithymia, performance cognitive empathy, and AI 
scores were used to predict muscle activity during the painful facial expressions. To model 
the heterogeneous variance, a fixed variance structure that increased with AI was included in 
                                                   
14 The model was originally specified with a maximal structure; in other words, with muscle, condition, and 
their interaction as random slopes and participant ID as random intercept, but this model did not converge after 
107 iterations with the ‘optim’ optimiser. 
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the mixed-effects model. Both because there was no significant difference between the video 
conditions, and because models that included condition as a random intercept did not 
converge, the data were averaged within a cycle (i.e., over the different conditions) so that a 
simpler random structure could be used. To test whether AI scores are correlated with 
habituation rates, the interaction between AI and cycle was also added to the model. 
Participant ID, and muscle nested in participant ID, were used as the random intercepts, σ̂ 2 ID 
= 0.97, σ̂ 2 Muscle
 
in ID = 1.06, σ̂ 
2
resid = 0.86. When alexithymia was not controlled for, muscle 
type and AI significantly predicted muscle activity (see Table 27). However, when 
alexithymia was entered into the model, with variance increasing linearly with alexithymia 
scores, AI was no longer significant and cycle was significant. In general, the M. orbicularis 
oculi response (M = 1.33, SD = 2.49) was significantly larger than the comparison response 
in M. medial frontalis (M = 0.99, SD = 2.67), but M. corrugator was not. Cycle 1 (M = 0.47, 
SD = 1.63) also elicited greater reactions than cycle 2 (M = 0.69, SD = 1.85). AI and 
alexithymia were both negatively correlated with muscle activity in the two different models. 
The model containing alexithymia predicted a higher amount of the marginal and the 
conditional variance in muscle activity, and had lower error variance. Figure 23 shows the 
relationship between AI, alexithymia and muscle activity. For comparison, a mixed-effects 
model using square-root transformed muscle amplitude as the outcome variable, and no 
variance structure, was also run. The model yielded similar results as the model reported 





Mixed-Effects Models of Average Muscle Activity Relative to Baseline 
Model Fixed effects β SE dfeffect dferror F-value Probability 
Model 1 M. corrugator 0.25 0.18 2 184 10.62 < .001 *** 
 M. orbicularis 0.82 0.18      
 Cycle - 0.12 0.06 1 278 3.79  .053 . 
 AI - 0.33 0.13 1 91 6.05 .015 * 
         
Model 2a M. corrugator 0.25 0.19 2 184 10.63 < .001 *** 
 M. orbicularis 0.86 0.19      
 Cycle - 0.33 0.09 1 278 13.45 < .001 *** 
 Alexithymia - 0.26 0.13 1 91 4.04 .047 * 
Note. Model 1: R2M = .07, R
2
C = .72; Model 2: R
2
M = .10, R
2
C = .99. Number of observations 
= 558, number of groups: ID = 93, muscle in ID = 279. AI = Autism Index.  




in ID = 1.11, σ̂ 
2
resid = 0.02.  






Figure 23. Predictors of muscle activity during facial expressions of pain. Muscle activity 
was greater in M. orbicularis oculi and during cycle 1. Two alternative models were 
proposed; one with Autism Index as a predictor (A), and one with alexithymia as predictor 
(B). Shaded areas denote 95% confidence intervals around the prediction. 
Slope. To test the hypothesis that muscle reactivity is associated with autism traits, 
muscle slope was predicted from muscle type, medication, condition, cycle, alexithymia, 
performance cognitive empathy, self-regulation and AI. Only muscle significantly predicted 
slope, with M. orbicularis oculi having the steepest slope (M = 3.62, SD = 11.95). As the 
previous factors did not significantly predict muscle slope, an exploratory analysis was done 
using dispositional empathy rather than performance empathy: Muscle slope was predicted 
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from muscle type, trait affective empathy and trait cognitive empathy. As variance inflation 
factors were high and there were no differences between cycles or condition, the data were 
averaged over these points for optimal model fit15. The maximal random structure model did 
not converge, so a simpler random structure was used with participant ID as the random 
effect, σ̂ 2ID = 3.87, σ̂ 
2
resid = 78.90. Change in activity differed significantly between muscles, 
with M. corrugator supercilii associated with the smallest change in slope. There was no 
difference in slope between M. orbicularis oculi and M. medial frontalis. There was a 
statistically significant interaction between muscle type, affective empathy and cognitive 
empathy (see Table 28 and Figure 24). However, this was mainly driven by activity in the 
control muscle, M. medial frontalis. In M. medial frontalis, muscle slope was positively 
correlated with trait affective empathy in those with low cognitive empathy, but negatively 
correlated with trait affective empathy in those with high cognitive empathy. In M. corrugator 
supercilii there was little difference in slopes by either affective or cognitive empathy. The 
interaction between affective empathy and cognitive empathy was not significant in M. 
orbicularis oculi. 
  
                                                   




Random-Effects Model of Change in EMG Activity Over Time (Muscle Slope) 
Fixed effects SS MS dfeffect dferror F-value Probability 
Muscle 669.67 334.83 2 182.14 4.24 .016 * 
Affective empathy (T) 32.42 32.42 1 90.96 0.41 .523  
Cognitive empathy (T) 1.40 1.40 1 91.10 0.02 .894  
Muscle*Affective (T) 292.73 146.37 2 181.57 1.86 .159  
Muscle*Cognitive (T) 353.01 176.51 2 181.70 2.24 .110  
Affective*Cognitive (T) 293.28 293.28 1 91.14 3.72 .057 . 
Muscle*Affective (T)*Cognitive (T) 651.82 325.91 2 181.74 4.13 .018 * 
 
Fixed effects β SE df t-value Probability 
M. corrugator - 3.99 1.53 182.46 - 2.60 .010 * 
M. orbicularis - 0.24 1.53 181.51 - 0.16 .875 
 Affective empathy (T) - 1.96 1.14 270.83 - 1.72 .087 
 Cognitive empathy (T) 0.24 1.16 270.83 0.21 .837 
 M. corrugator *Affective (T)  1.53 1.58 181.60 0.97 .334 
 M. orbicularis*Affective (T)  3.03 1.57 181.51 1.93 .056 
 M. corrugator *Cognitive (T)  1.47 1.60 181.80 0.92 .360 
 M. orbicularis*Cognitive (T)  - 1.91 1.60 181.51 - 1.19 .235 
 Affective (T)*Cognitive (T)  - 3.58 1.05 270.83 - 3.42 .001 ** 
M. corrugator *Affective*Cognitive (T) 3.92 1.45 181.86 2.71 .007 ** 
M. orbicularis*Affective*Cognitive (T)  3.15 1.45 181.51 2.18 .031 
 
Note. R2M = .09, R
2
C = .13. Affective (T) = trait affective empathy; cognitive (T) = trait 
cognitive empathy. Number of observations = 284, number of groups (ID) = 95.  





Figure 24. Predictors of muscle slope.  Low and high trait cognitive empathy (CE) levels are 
represented as those falling below or above the median score. Shaded areas denote 95% 
confidence intervals around the prediction.  
To conclude, the results of the analyses show that muscle reactivity increased when 
observing facial expressions of pain, and that both change in muscle amplitude from baseline 
and muscle slope were greater in M. orbicularis oculi than in M. medial frontalis (the control 
muscle). However, M. corrugator supercilii activity, the muscle responsible for contracting 
the brows, was not significantly greater than M. medial frontalis activity. Furthermore, the 
different perspective-taking conditions did not lead to differences in muscle activity. 
Contrary to the hypothesis, AI scores were not correlated with muscle amplitude or slope 
once alexithymia was controlled for (Hypothesis VI). Additionally, neither trait self-
regulation nor performance cognitive empathy was associated with greater muscle activity 
(Hypothesis XI). However, the combination of high trait affective and trait cognitive empathy 





Resting State Autonomic Arousal, Empathy and Autism 
Is there evidence of resting state autonomic dysregulation in participants with greater autism 
traits? Is resting state autonomic activity associated with empathy? 
Hypothesis III: Higher resting state parasympathetic arousal (vagal cardiac control) will be 
associated with higher trait affective empathy and self-regulation scores.  
Hypothesis X: Higher resting state parasympathetic arousal (vagal cardiac control) will be 
associated with increased state empathic concern, whereas higher resting state sympathetic 
arousal will be associated with increased personal distress. 
Participants’ resting state autonomic arousal values were within the normal range. 
The descriptive statistics and correlations with empathy are presented in Table 29. Regarding 
sympathetic arousal, resting state pre-ejection period and SCL were not correlated, r (80) =  
- .08, p ≤ .449. Thus these scores were not aggregated to a sympathetic arousal variable. 
Regarding cardiac parasympathetic arousal, or cardiac vagal control, respiration was 
significantly correlated with RSA and tidal volume. Thus, RSA was predicted from 
respiration rate and tidal volume. The residuals of that regression were used as a respiration-




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Resting state vagal cardiac control, pre-ejection period, heart rate and the interaction 
between the pre-ejection period and cardiac vagal control were used to predict AI and the 
different facets of empathy in separate linear regression models. To predict affective state, the 
interaction between state type (empathic concern versus personal distress), cardiac vagal 
control and pre-ejection period was also included in the model. As affective state ratings were 
repeated, a random-effects model was used with participant ID as the random intercept (σ̂ 2ID 
= 2.03, σ̂ 2resid = 0.29).  
Resting state vagal cardiac control, pre-ejection period, and their interaction did not 
predict AI scores (see Table 30). AI was positively correlated with heart rate, β = 0.44,  
SE = 0.18, t (88) = 2.49, p = .016. When participants on antidepressants were excluded, heart 
rate was no longer positively correlated with AI, β = 0.28, SE = 0.18,  
t (81) = 1.62, p ≤ .109. The autonomic variables did not significantly predict trait affective 
empathy (R2 adj = 0, F [4, 86] = 0.39, p ≤ .812), affective state (both empathic concern and 
personal distress; R2M = .04, R
2
C = .88), or trait or performance cognitive empathy (R
2 
adj = 0, 
F [4, 86] = 0.18, p ≤ .949, and R2 adj = 0, F [4, 78] = 0.12, p ≤ .973, respectively). Neither did 








Linear Regression Results of Resting State Autonomic Arousal and Autism and Empathy 
Traits 
Fixed effects β SE dferror SS MS F-value Probability 
AIa 
        Vagal control 0.01 0.18  0.02 0.02 0.01  .932 
 PEP 0.04 0.19  0.14 0.14 0.05  .824 
 HR 0.44 0.18  16.82 16.82 6.00  .016 * 
Vagal control * PEP 0.21 0.18  3.68 3.68 1.31  .255 
 Residuals 
  
88 246.80 2.80 
   Affective empathy (T) 
  
      Vagal control 1.74 1.68  262.22 262.22 1.05  .308 
 PEP - 0.36 1.76  27.35 27.35 0.11  .742 
 HR 1.07 1.69  99.78 99.78 0.40  .529 
 Vagal control * PEP 0.23 1.72  4.51 4.51 0.02  .893 
 Residuals 
  
86 21477.97 249.74 
   Affective stateb 
        Statec 0.48 0.08 88 10.39 10.39 35.38 < .001 *** 
Vagal control 0.15 0.17 87 0.23 0.23 0.77  .382 
 PEP 0.01 0.16 87 0.00 0.00 0.01  .908 
 HR 0.14 0.16 87 0.25 0.25 0.84  .362 
 State * Vagal control - 0.01 0.08 88 0.01 0.01 0.02  .893 
 State * PEP 0.02 0.08 88 0.03 0.03 0.10  .757 
 Vagal control * PEP - 0.04 0.16 87 0.03 0.03 0.10  .756 
 State * Vagal control *  
PEP - 0.01 0.08 88 0.01 0.01 0.02  .880 
 Cognitive empathy (T) 
        Vagal control - 0.10 0.57  1.53 1.53 0.05  .815 
 PEP 0.20 0.60  4.55 4.55 0.16  .687 
 HR - 0.27 0.57  6.09 6.09 0.22  .642 
 Vagal control * PEP - 0.31 0.59  7.86 7.86 0.28  .597 
 Residuals 
  
86 2402.40 27.93 







Table 30 (cont.) 
Cognitive empathy (P) 
        Vagal control - 0.01 0.09  0.04 0.04 0.05  .821 
 PEP 0.06 0.10  0.30 0.30 0.43  .515 
 HR 0.00 0.09  0.00 0.00 0.00  .980 
 Vagal control * PEP 0.01 0.09  0.01 0.01 0.02  .899 
 Residuals 
  
78 54.66 0.70 
   Self-regulation 
  
      Vagal control 0.70 0.62  39.00 39.00 1.15 .287 
 PEP - 0.20 0.65  4.37 4.37 0.13  .721 
 HR - 0.04 0.63  0.11 0.11 0.00  .955 
 Vagal control * PEP - 0.56 0.63  26.70 26.70 0.78  .378 
 Residuals     86 2927.49 34.04 
  
  
Note. All models: dfeffect = 1. AI = Autism Index; PEP = pre-ejection period; HR = heart rate; 
T = trait; P = performance.  
a Uncorrected for medication use. b Mixed-effects model; number of observations = 184, 
number of groups (ID) = 92. Coefficients estimates are provided for the fixed effects. The 
model was fit with a random intercept for participant ID, σ̂ 2ID = 2.03, σ̂ 
2
resid = 0.29.  
c Empathic concern versus personal distress (baseline).  
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. 
In summary, the relatively ‘pure’ resting state measures of sympathetic (pre-ejection 
period, SCL) and parasympathetic (vagal cardiac control) arousal were not correlated with AI 
scores. Heart rate was significantly positively correlated with AI, but no longer predicted AI 
when participants on antidepressants were excluded. Similar to Study 1, and contrary to 
hypotheses, resting state parasympathetic arousal (vagal cardiac control) was not associated 
with trait affective empathy, trait or performance cognitive empathy or trait self-regulation 






sympathetic) associated with subjective affective states to facial expressions of pain (neither 
empathic concern nor personal distress; Hypothesis X). 
Autonomic Responses to Stimuli 
Are physiological indices of affective empathy and empathic concern correlated with amount 
of autism traits? 
Hypothesis VII: Amount of autism traits should be positively correlated with sympathetic 
reactivity and/or negatively correlated with parasympathetic reactivity, resulting in over-
arousal. 
What other factors are associated with pain perception and empathic concern (versus 
personal distress)? 
Hypothesis XII: Increased empathic concern and better self-regulation will be associated 
with increased parasympathetic reactivity and potentially increased sympathetic reactivity 
(co-activation). 
Averaging across all blocks, physiological changes to the conditions were small 
compared to resting state values and the variance in responses (see Table 31). SCL showed 















M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Baseline 113.58 20.98 78.17 52.66 - 2.39 16.83 4.61 2.33 73.62 12.30 
Other 113.18 21.04 75.34 48.90 - 0.14 17.12 4.88 2.52 73.28 12.01 
Self 112.90 20.17 76.97 50.49 1.35 15.26 4.90 2.49 73.08 11.83 
 
∆ PEP ∆ RSA 
∆ Vagal cardiac 
control 
∆ SCL ∆ HR 
 
M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Other - 0.19 4.83 - 2.83 30.59 2.26 27.29 0.45 0.72 - 0.23 2.77 
Self - 0.47 4.77 1.20 29.38 3.74 24.60 0.47 0.71 - 0.44 3.10 
Note. PEP = pre-ejection period; RSA = respiratory sinus arrhythmia, SCL = skin 
conductance level; HR = heart rate.  
Preliminary random-effects analyses were run to test whether facial expressions of 
pain elicited changes in autonomic arousal (pre-ejection period, vagal cardiac control, SCL, 
heart rate) or respiration from baseline. When the data were aggregated by condition, there 
were no significant differences from baseline except for SCL, F (2, 166) = 39.54, p < .001, 
R2M = .009. However, arousal was significantly predicted from video block order (four blocks 
in total) for each of the autonomic arousal measures: Both heart rate and pre-ejection period 
decreased significantly from baseline to the first block of pain videos and significantly 






different from baseline. In contrast, vagal control increased from baseline to block 1, and then 
marginally (but not significantly) decreased for the next three blocks, so that these blocks 
were not significantly different from baseline. SCL was increased from baseline for all 
blocks, though block 1 elicited significantly higher responses than subsequent blocks (see 
Table 32). For all the models except cardiac vagal control, interindividual variance was high 
compared to variance between blocks. Residuals of the analyses are shown in Table 47, p. 
388, in Appendix P. Overall, the data suggest co-activation of the parasympathetic and 
sympathetic systems in response to the first block of videos, with a steady return to resting 
state values during the subsequent blocks. Respiration rate was significantly increased from 
rest for all the pain stimuli, emphasising the need to statistically control for the influence of 
respiration rate and tidal volume on RSA. Consequently, I analyse and discuss cardiac vagal 
control rather than RSA in all further analyses. 
Table 32  
Changes in Autonomic Arousal and Respiration Rate Across Experimental Blocks 
Model df F p R2M Differences 
a 
PEP 4, 366 7.33 < .001 .002 Base > Block 1, Block 1 < Blocks 2 - 4 
Vagal control 4, 374 3.27  .012 .027 Base < Block 1 
SCL 4, 330 26.47 < .001 .008 Base < Blocks 1 -4, Block 1 > Blocks 3 - 4 
HR 4, 374 11.66 < .001 .003 Base > Block 1, Block 1 < Blocks 2 - 4 
Respiration 4, 374 9.32 < .001 .019 Base < Blocks 1 - 4 
Note. Fixed effect: Time. PEP = pre-ejection period; SCL = skin conductance level; HR = 
heart rate; base = 2-minute baseline.  






To test whether AI, empathic concern and trait self-regulation were associated with 
autonomic responses to facial expressions of pain, four different linear mixed-effects models 
were run predicting the pre-ejection period, vagal cardiac control, SCL, and heart rate. 
Physiological arousal was predicted from medication use, video cycle (with two blocks, one 
of each condition, within a cycle), condition, AI scores, empathic concern and self-regulation. 
To test whether habituation rates were correlated with AI scores, the interactions between 
condition, AI and cycle were also added to the model. Participant ID was entered as a random 
intercept and condition as a random slope in the starting models. For cardiac vagal control 
and SCL, there was little variance within condition, thus the data were aggregated within 
cycles within a participant, and condition was not included in the model (see Appendix P, 
Table 48, p. 389, for models with condition). There were no differences in the results 
between the maximal and simplified models. Because of the general pattern in habituation 
from block 1 to block 2 within cycle 1, the models were also run using block order (1- 4) 
instead of cycle (1 – 2) as a predictor. As there were no differences between these models and 
the models using cycle, they are not included in the results. The final models, which include 








Linear Mixed-Effects Models of Autonomic Arousal to Pain Observation 
Fixed effects β SE SS MS dfeffect dferror F-value Probability 
PEP 
  
      
 Base PEP 19.37 0.39 24257.88 24257.88 1 90.98 2473.77 < .001 ***
Cycle 0.86 0.23 136.01 136.01 1 276.89 13.87 < .001 *** 
Vagal controla 
         Base vagal 
control - 3.83 0.67 2759.90 2759.90 1 184 32.75 < .001 *** 
AI - 0.14 0.67 3.69 3.69 1 184 0.04 0.834  
Cycle - 2.34 0.94 518.69 518.69 1 184 6.16 0.014 * 
AI*Cycle 1.92 0.95 347.20 347.20 1 184 4.12 0.044 * 
SCL 
         Base SCL 2.39 0.07 131.07 131.07 1 81.00 1099.33 < .001 ***
AI 0.02 0.07 0.01 0.01 1 81.93 0.08 .775 
 Cycle - 0.13 0.04 1.32 1.32 1 81.36 11.08 .001 ** 
AI*Cycle - 0.08 0.04 0.53 0.53 1 82.26 4.44 .038 * 
HR 
         Base HR 11.53 0.24 9025.94 9025.94 1 92.21 2396.88 < .001 ***
Cycle 0.80 0.14 117.95 117.95 1 281.98 31.32 < .001 *** 
AI - 0.07 0.24 0.32 0.32 1 93.53 0.09 .770 








Table 33 (cont.) 
 
Random effects 
  Analysis Group N Slope Variance Correlation 




























 Residual 378   3.77   
Note. Random effects: ID (intercept). PEP: R2M = .95, R
2
C = .98; Vagal cardiac control: R
2
M = 
.17, R2C = .17; SCL: R
2
M = .92, R
2
C = .98; HR: R
2
M = .94, R
2
C = .97. PEP = pre-ejection 
period; SCL = skin conductance level; HR = heart rate; AI = Autism Index. 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. 
In each of the analyses, physiological arousal at resting state significantly predicted 
arousal during pain observation. Corresponding with the preliminary analyses, once resting 
state arousal was controlled, video cycle had a significant effect on all indices: On average, 
pre-ejection period increased during the second cycle of videos, regardless of the 
participant’s amount of autism traits. Vagal cardiac control, heart rate and SCL, on the other 
hand, showed significant interactions between AI scores and cycle: Participants with low AI 
scores showed greater decreases in cardiac vagal control from cycle 1 to cycle 2, indicating 






cardiac vagal control between cycles confirmed that there was a significant decrease in 
cardiac vagal control from cycle 1 to cycle 2 in the low AI group, MD = 4.32, t (31) = 1.87,  
p = .035, d = .35, but not in the high AI group, MD = 0.37, t (28) = 0.17, p ≤ .434, d = .04. 
The groups did not differ in cardiac vagal control during cycle 1, t (51) = 1.02, p ≤ .312,  
d = .26. 
 
Figure 25. Cardiac vagal control showed greater changes in participants with low Autism 
Index (AI) scores. To better see the interaction between cycle and AI, cardiac vagal control 
during pain perception was predicting from resting state vagal cardiac control, and the 
residuals of that analysis (corresponding to changes from resting state) are depicted in plot B. 
The low and high AI groups represent the first and third tertiles, respectively. Shaded areas 







Corresponding to the evidence of decreasing parasympathetic arousal, there was a 
greater increase in heart rate from cycle 1 to cycle 2 in participants with low AI scores 
compared to those with high AI scores (see Figure 26). In contrast, participants with high AI 
scores showed greater sympathetic changes: SCL was higher during cycle 1 for these 
participants than for participants with low AI scores, and then decreased to cycle 2 (see 
Figure 27). The significant interactions were explored further with independent t-tests 
comparing cycle 1 arousal in the low and high autism trait groups: Participants in the high AI 
group had significantly higher heart rates (MHigh = 77.67, SDHigh = 11.61; MLow = 69.88, 
SDLow = 11.61; t [58] = 2.65, p ≤ .010, d = .68) and SCL (MHigh = 5.74, SDHigh = 2.19; MLow = 
4.42, SDLow = 2.33; t [52] = 2.17, p ≤ .034, d = .59) than those in the low AI group.  
These results correspond to heightened sympathetic arousal in cycle 1 and diminished 
reductions in parasympathetic arousal from cycle 1 to cycle 2 in participants with high AI 
scores. For descriptive statistics of the autonomic changes by cycle and AI group, see 
Appendix P, Table 49 and Table 50. Appendix P also shows individual changes in autonomic 
activity by block. Removing participants on antidepressants made no difference to the results 
of the models. Furthermore, empathic concern and self-regulation did not predict autonomic 








Figure 26. Heart rate (HR) responses to facial expressions of pain. Heart rate increased from 
cycle 1 to 2 in participants with low Autism Index (AI) scores, and remained the same in 
participants with high AI scores. To better see the interaction between cycle and AI, heart 
rate during pain perception was predicting from resting state heart rate, and the residuals of 
that analysis (corresponding to changes from resting state) are depicted in plot B. The low 
and high AI groups represent the first and third tertiles, respectively. Shaded areas indicate 







Figure 27. Skin conductance level (SCL) while observing facial expressions of pain. In 
participants with low Autism Index (AI) scores, SCL remained the same from cycle 1 to 2; 
whereas, in participants with high AI scores, SCL decreased. To better see the interaction 
between cycle and AI, SCL during pain perception was predicting from resting state SCL, 
and the residuals of that analysis (corresponding to changes from resting state) are depicted in 
plot B. The low and high AI groups represent the first and third tertiles, respectively. Shaded 
areas indicate 95% confidence intervals around the prediction.  
To conclude, the videos elicited a significant autonomic response: The evidence 
suggests co-activation of the sympathetic and parasympathetic systems to the first cycle of 
pain videos, followed by a decrease in arousal in both systems. AI score was not significantly 
related to physiological changes on its own; however, there was a significant interaction 
between AI and video cycle in vagal cardiac control, heart rate, and skin conductance. 
Participants with low AI scores exhibited a significant reduction in parasympathetic arousal 






not. Additionally, participants with high AI scores displayed a greater threat response marked 
by increased SCLs during the first cycle of videos, which subsequently significantly 
decreased during the second cycle of videos. This pattern of activity is consistent with the 
hypothesis of heightened distress (Hypothesis VII) and reduced flexibility of cardiac vagal 
control in participants with high amounts of autism traits. Contrary to what was hypothesised, 
neither empathic concern nor self-regulation was significantly correlated with physiological 
responses (Hypothesis XII).  
Discussion 
Similar to Study 2, the aim of this study was to investigate whether subjective 
affective states and physiological responses (autonomic and muscular) were diminished, 
intact, or heightened in participants with varying amounts of autism traits. In this study, 
participants did not see the sensory application of pain; only facial affective responses to the 
implied pain. Participants were told that the patients in the videos (who were actually actors) 
were undergoing painful medical treatment. The responses elicited in this study thus 
represent a response to more complex empathy-inducing stimuli than those presented in 
Chapter 6. First, facial expressions of pain are less salient than stimuli featuring sensory 
application of pain. For example, Vachon-Presseau et al. (2011) found that the nociceptive 
muscle flexion reflex was significantly less in response to seeing facial expressions of pain as 
opposed to seeing physical pain being inflicted. Second, individuals higher in autism traits 
find it significantly more difficult to identify facial expressions, as was shown in Study 1. 
Therefore, although affective responses to observed physical pain were not found to be 






greater cognitive empathy – both in terms of emotion recognition and in terms of being able 
to take the perspective of the other person (seeing that the infliction of pain is never directly 
observed) - may reveal subtle differences in empathy for pain in individuals with more autism 
traits. Alexithymia was controlled for in these analyses because Bird and colleagues (2010) 
have argued that it is specifically alexithymia, and not autism, that leads to reduced affective 
and cognitive empathy in people with ASD. Furthermore, a previous study has shown that 
alexithymia can impair emotion recognition, which may have affected empathic concern for 
the target when only seeing their facial expression (Cook et al., 2013). 
As participants with greater amounts of autism traits have poorer perspective taking 
skills, a second aim of this study was to investigate whether, if participants were specifically 
asked to take the perspective of the other person, this would benefit or hinder participants 
with more autism traits, and reflect in participants’ physiological responses or subjective 
empathic concern. A third aim of the study was to investigate whether reduced self-regulation 
and cognitive empathy would be correlated with greater affective reactions and higher ratings 
of pain unpleasantness and intensity, as was found in Study 2. Lastly, Study 2 found no 
correlation between autism traits and cardiac autonomic measures in participants not taking 
antidepressants. This study aimed to replicate that finding. Participants’ self-reported 
affective responses, their facial muscle reactivity while watching the facial expression of 
pain, their resting state arousal, and their sympathetic and parasympathetic responses while 







Self-Reported Affective State and Perceived Pain  
Participants reported the unpleasantness and intensity of the pain and rated their 
affective state (i.e., empathic concern and personal distress) after each block of facial 
expressions. On average, participants reported low to moderate levels of empathic concern 
and personal distress to the videos, suggesting that the videos were effective in eliciting 
affective responses. Although empathic concern and personal distress were again correlated 
at each time point, participants reported significantly less personal distress than empathic 
concern to the videos.  
Video cycle (first or second round of perspective-taking), medication use and amount 
of autism traits significantly predicted perceived pain ratings (both unpleasantness and 
intensity). In terms of habituation to the stimuli, not only did participants’ perceived pain 
ratings not decrease over time, but their ratings actually increased from cycle 1 to cycle 2. 
This increasing pattern of responses to pain is similar to that seen in Reicherts et al. (2013), 
who suggested that pain perception may have a cumulative effect. However, a cumulative 
effect was not found within autonomic or muscle measurements in this study, which instead 
showed diminishing responses after each block. Furthermore, empathic concern and personal 
distress did not differ between cycles. I speculate that the autonomic orienting response seen 
during the first cycle may have heightened participants’ subsequent awareness of the target’s 
pain, without the need for further increases in physiological or subjective distress. Medication 
use was associated with significantly higher perceived pain. This result is similar to Study 2, 
where participants using medication also reported greater pain unpleasantness and intensity. 
Again, it is possible that medication use increased resting state stress-related arousal (as 






potentially threatening stimuli and heightening pain perception. Whereas autism traits were 
not related to perceived pain in Study 2, autism traits were negatively correlated with 
perceived pain in this study. Perceived pain ratings were not correlated with alexithymia; 
similar to what was found in Bird and colleagues (2010) during observation of sensory pain. 
Previous studies investigating self-reported perceived pain in ASD have all used sensory pain 
stimuli, not facial expressions, and thus are not directly comparable. However, it is 
interesting that Bird and colleagues (2010) found no difference in perceived pain between 
ASD and alexithymic controls under high pain conditions, but found that participants with 
ASD rated the low pain conditions as significantly less unpleasant than their non-ASD 
counterparts. Thus, participants with high autism traits may be less sensitive to low-salience 
pain images. This conclusion is tentative, as medication use – which is positively correlated 
with ASD traits - was positively correlated with perceived pain. However, specific 
medications may have separable and converse effects from ASD. Unfortunately, there were 
not enough participants in the different medication groups to be able to tease apart the effects 
of different medications on pain perception. 
Affective states (both empathic concern and personal distress) were predicted by 
medication use, amount of autism traits and self-regulation. However, once alexithymia was 
controlled for, neither autism traits nor medication use significantly predicted affective states. 
These results concur with that of Bird and colleagues (2010), who found that affective 
empathy was intact in ASD once alexithymia was accounted for. As in their study, 
participants with higher levels of alexithymia reported lower affective state ratings. Affective 
state ratings were also negatively correlated with self-regulation ability, as was the case in 






concern and personal distress. Unlike Study 2, poorer self-regulation was not correlated with 
the perceived unpleasantness or intensity of the pain. These results support the view that 
participants with poor self-regulation have poor control over their affective reactions, even 
when they do not perceive the pain as more intense than good regulators do. Again, it was 
expected that the correlations between self-regulation and empathic concern, and self-
regulation and personal distress, would be in opposite directions – with good self-regulation 
predicting high levels of empathic concern but low levels of distress. However, no interaction 
effect was found. As before, the high correlation between the empathic concern and personal 
distress responses may have prevented separable effects from being evident. In this case, 
though poor self-regulators report higher empathic concern, these high ratings may not be 
beneficial for prosocial behaviour. Further studies on the association between empathic 
concern and prosocial behaviour in poor self-regulators are needed to test this proposition. 
For example, in addition to measuring self-reported empathic concern, experimenters can test 
prosocial behaviour using a resource allocation (Decety et al., 2015) or helping task 
(Malcolm-Smith, Woolley, & Ward, 2015). In this way, a possible moderating effect between 
self-regulation, empathic concern and prosocial behaviour can be tested.  
The correlations between self-regulation, alexithymia and empathic concern may 
explain diverging correlations between autism and affective empathy in previous studies: 
High amounts of autism traits per se may not be correlated with empathy, but individuals 
with ASD who have poor self-regulation may show heightened affective responses (as 
predicted by the empathy imbalance hypothesis), whereas individuals with ASD who have 







I expected that cognitive empathy would be required to interpret the facial 
expressions, and thus that performance cognitive empathy would be correlated with pain 
perception and empathic concern. However, neither pain perception nor empathic concern 
was correlated with performance cognitive empathy. These results are similar to those of 
Study 2. Related to cognitive empathy ability, I investigated whether deliberate perspective 
taking would influence pain perception and affective states. Perspective, in other words 
imagining the other’s pain versus imagining how you would feel if experiencing the pain, did 
not significantly affect pain intensity ratings; a finding similar to that of previous studies 
(Lamm et al., 2007, 2008). In contrast to what was predicted, perspective also did not predict 
affective response. Batson and colleagues (1989, 1991, 1997) have argued that imagining 
how you would feel in a situation, versus imaging how someone else would feel, leads to 
different emotional sequelae. Subsequent studies (Batson et al., 1997; Lamm et al., 2007) 
found that self-perspective (“imagine self”) conditions lead to greater feelings of personal 
distress, whereas the other-perspective (“imagine other”) conditions lead to greater feelings 
of empathic concern. In this study there was no interaction between type of affective state and 
perspective. This finding may be explained by the fact that empathic concern and personal 
distress ratings were highly correlated. As in Study 2, the evidence suggests that these 
questions may share an underlying unitary construct. Most importantly for this study, 
deliberately taking a specific perspective did not interact with autism traits to predict 
affective state. This result concurs with the results above, suggesting that complex cognitive 
empathy, specifically perspective taking, is not necessary to feel an affective empathic 






which shows that basic affective empathy and caring behaviour does not require complex 
cognitive empathy (Bartal et al., 2011; Custance & Mayer, 2012). 
 In summary, perceived pain increased over time for all participants. Alexithymia was 
correlated with reduced empathic concern for others’ distress, which may explain reports of 
reduced empathic concern in ASD. Amount of autism traits was negatively correlated with 
perceived pain, but was not correlated with affective state (both empathic concern and 
personal distress) once alexithymia was controlled for. Medication use was associated with 
increased intensity and unpleasantness of pain perception. In contrast, poorer self-regulation 
was associated with higher subjective affective states to the perceived pain, but was not 
correlated with the perceived unpleasantness or intensity of the pain. These findings provide 
explanations for previous results of alternatively diminished or heightened affective arousal 
in ASD, and suggest that alexithymia and self-regulation ability, rather than autism, may 
drive differences in affective empathy. The findings pave the way for studies to explore the 
causal mechanisms of empathy. Lastly, cognitive empathy and perspective were not 
correlated with subjective affective states, suggesting that automatic affective responses to 
others’ pain expressions do not require complex cognitive empathy. 
Muscle Reactivity 
Muscle response to observing facial expressions of pain. The pattern of elicited 
muscle activity shows that the empathy induction was successful. Activity in all three 
muscles, M. orbicularis oculi, M. corrugator supercilii and M. medial frontalis, increased 
significantly from the start of the video to the time of greatest pain display. As expected, 






oculi is responsible for forehead tightening and closing of the eyes, and has been found to be 
active when viewing facial grimaces or pain expressions (Lanzetta & Englis, 1989; Lepron et 
al., 2015; Vaughan & Lanzetta, 1980), as well as being the predominantly active muscle 
when experiencing first-hand pain (Kunz & Lautenbacher, 2014; Prkachin & Craig, 1995). In 
contrast, M. medial frontalis is responsible for lifting the brows and is associated more 
consistently with feelings of fear and surprise rather than pain or concern. These results 
confirm that participants experienced empathic muscular reactions to the facial expressions of 
pain. Similar to study 2, these results show muscle activation to pain observation; consistent 
with the hypothesis of muscle mimicry - and expression of concern for the injured party – 
rather than a freezing response when observing others’ pain.  
Contrary to what was expected, M. corrugator supercilii activity, the muscle 
responsible for pulling the brows inward and together in a frown, was not significantly 
different from M. medial frontalis activity. M. corrugator supercilii shows moderate 
activation to first-hand pain (Kunz & Lautenbacher, 2014) and to unpleasant pictures (Kaye, 
Bradford, & Curtin, 2016). However, muscle reactivity to unpleasant pictures may not be 
comparable to muscle reactivity to facial pain: Facial pain expressions elicit less strong 
responses than first-hand images of sensory pain; and the strongest reactions seem to occur 
when both the actual painful stimulus and the facial expression of pain are visible (Sun et al., 
2015). In contrast to M. orbicularis activity, M. corrugator supercilii reactivity to painful 
expressions may occur in short bursts, if at all; rather than in a sustained way as is the case 
with M. orbicularis oculi activity (Lamm et al., 2008; Sun et al., 2015). Thus, sustained M. 
corrugator supercilii activity, as is most frequently measured in studies, may not be 






2015; though see González-Roldán, Muñoz, Cifre, Sitges, & Montoya, 2013). Thus, overall 
muscle reactivity was consistent with reactions of concern or pain. 
Association between muscle reactivity and amount of autism traits. This study 
was the first to examine facial muscle mimicry to pain in individuals with ASD. I predicted 
that, once alexithymia is controlled, muscle reactivity would be uncorrelated with autism 
traits. Similar to the subjective affective state ratings, autism traits were negatively correlated 
with muscle amplitude while observing pain. However, once alexithymia was controlled for, 
autism traits were no longer correlated with muscle amplitude. These results are similar to 
that of Bird and colleagues (2010), who demonstrated that non-alexithymic individuals with 
ASD do not show deficits in affective empathy. Moreover, Bird and colleagues (2010) 
demonstrated that the relationship between alexithymia and affective empathy was the same 
in participants with and without ASD, thus refuting objections that the non-significant result 
between ASD and empathy was merely a statistical artefact caused by the shared variance 
between ASD and alexithymia. This study extends their work by showing that alexithymia is 
not only correlated with affective empathy at the neural level, but also at the muscular level. 
Specifically, alexithymia was negatively correlated with muscle amplitude to facial 
expressions of pain. The muscle amplitude results also correspond to participants’ subjective 
affective responses discussed above. In other words, alexithymia was negatively correlated 
with both subjective affective states and muscle reactivity to perceived pain. Again, these 
results may explain previous conflicting findings regarding intact (Deschamps et al., 2015; 
Mathersul et al., 2013; Schulte-Rüther et al., 2010) or diminished (Beall, Moody, McIntosh, 
Hepburn, & Reed, 2008; McIntosh et al., 2006) muscle mimicry in ASD, as previous studies 






Moving beyond the relationship between autism traits and the magnitude of muscle 
reactivity, I also investigated the possibility that muscle reactivity patterns – that is to say, 
change in activity over time -  is correlated with autism traits, or that individuals with high 
amounts of autism traits would show different habituation patterns to perceiving facial pain 
than do individuals with low amounts of autism traits. Change in muscle response over time, 
in other words muscle slope, was not correlated with either amount of autism traits or 
alexithymia. Moreover, there was no interaction between amount of autism traits and video 
cycle, suggesting no differences in habituation between low and high autism trait participants. 
The combination of these results suggests that muscle mimicry of facial pain is unaffected in 
non-alexithymic individuals with high amounts of autism traits. This conclusion holds both 
for the magnitude and pattern of muscle responses. 
Empathy, perspective taking and muscle reactivity. Participants with low trait 
affective empathy, who also had high trait cognitive empathy, had greater increases in muscle 
activity (i.e., greater changes in muscle activation) in the M. medial frontalis than participants 
with high trait affective empathy and low trait cognitive empathy. The significance of this 
result is unclear, but it could indicate that participants with low affective empathy and high 
cognitive empathy experienced more surprise – associated with lifting of the brow and hence 
M. medial frontalis activity - than concern for the targets. In contrast, participants with high 
affective empathy, but low cognitive empathy, exhibited greater changes in M. orbicularis 
activity, congruent with pain mimicry. Similar to the empathic concern ratings, these results 
suggest that trait affective empathy is more important for eliciting a congruent facial response 
to perceived pain than trait cognitive empathy is. In contrast with the correlation between trait 






self-regulation ability was associated with muscle activity. This result is similar to Study 2 
and to the results of Reicherts and colleagues, who did not find any association between 
EMG activity and state anxiety (Reicherts et al., 2012, 2013).  
Participants were asked in alternate blocks to either adopt the perspective of the other 
person by imaging how that person felt while experiencing the pain (imagine other), or to 
imagine how they would feel if they were experiencing the pain themselves (imagine self). It 
was hypothesised that whether muscle reactivity is inhibited or activated may depend, in part, 
on the ability to take the perspective of the other person. Specifically, it was hypothesised 
that taking a self-perspective would activate greater defensive muscle activation (as found in 
Lamm et al., 2008), whereas taking the perspective of the other would either reduce muscle 
reactivity (Avenanti et al., 2005; Avenanti, Minio-Paluello, Sforza, et al., 2009) or not lead to 
muscle activation 16. Furthermore, I hypothesised that participants high in autism traits would 
show reduced changes in muscle activity in the imagine-other condition compared to low 
autism trait individuals (as they may find it difficult to take the perspective of the target), and 
heightened muscle reactivity in the imagine-self condition due to reduced self-regulation and 
increased personal distress. 
Lamm and colleagues (2008) found that M. orbicularis oculi activity to observed pain 
was heightened only in the imagine-self condition, not the imagine-other condition. In this 
study, the different perspective-taking conditions did not lead to differences in muscle 
activity. This result was not moderated by amount of autism traits. M. orbicularis oculi 
                                                   
16 Studies of (non-facial) motor imitation of non-pain conditions indicate that participants show reduced motor 
mimicry during high self-focus. However, as these conditions do not involve pain, the physiological response 
may be very different: In non-pain imitation tasks, a self-focused perspective may distract from the task at hand, 







activity was increased from baseline in both the imagine-other and imagine-self conditions, 
and conversely, M. corrugator supercilii activity was not significantly greater than M. medial 
frontalis activity in either perspective. These results differ from Lamm and colleagues’ 
(2008) findings on perspective-specific M. orbicularis oculi activation, but are consistent with 
participant’s subjective affective state reports to the different perspectives. It may be that 
participants did not successfully switch between perspectives, leading to similar 
physiological and subjective responses to the two conditions. Alternatively, it may be that the 
same physiological reactions are activated whether thinking about own-pain or self-pain. 
These unconscious reactions may take place at an earlier stage than cognitive processes such 
as perspective taking. Increasing evidence on the overlap in neural areas that are activated 
when experiencing own pain and when observing others’ pain (Avenanti et al., 2005; Lamm 
et al., 2011) supports this proposition.  
In summary, the pattern of heightened M. orbicularis activity compared to baseline 
and to the M. medial frontalis response suggests that the empathy induction was successful. 
Once alexithymia was controlled for, neither amount of autism traits nor medication use 
predicted muscle amplitude. Deliberately taking the perspective of the target did not result in 
differences in muscle activation. The interaction effect between trait cognitive and affective 
empathy on change in muscle activity over time suggests that participants with high affective 
empathy and low cognitive empathy show heightened mimicry of facial expressions of pain, 
whereas participants with low affective empathy and high cognitive empathy show facial 
reactions consistent with surprise rather than concern. These results confirm the close 







Resting state autonomic arousal. In this study, I wished to replicate the results of 
Study 2 on a different day and time of measurement. Study 2 found no evidence for reduced 
parasympathetic arousal at baseline in participants with ASD. Resting state arousal was also 
not associated with state or trait measures of empathy. This study followed the same method 
for measuring resting state arousal as Study 2. Parasympathetic (cardiac vagal control) and 
sympathetic arousal (pre-ejection period and skin conductance level), as well as heart rate, 
was measured during a 2-minute period in which participants were asked to sit quietly with 
their eyes closed. Similar to the previous measurements, participants had heart rate, skin 
conductance, pre-ejection period and RSA scores within normal ranges (de Geus & van 
Doornen, 1996). 
As was the case in Study 2, pre-ejection period, cardiac vagal control and skin 
conductance were not correlated with amount of autism traits. Heart rate was again 
significantly positively correlated with the amount of autism traits, though the correlation 
coefficient was small, and the effect disappeared when participants taking antidepressants17 
were removed from the analysis. Again, these results do not correspond with predictions of 
the polyvagal theory that resting state parasympathetic arousal is reduced in ASD (e.g., 
Porges, 2005; Porges et al., 2013; Vaughan Van Hecke et al., 2009). Neither was there any 
evidence of heightened sympathetic arousal at rest, as has been found in some studies 
(Anderson & Colombo, 2009). The latter study’s results may be due to heightened anxiety in 
                                                   
17 I specifically focused on antidepressants (rather than medication use in general, as was done for subjective 
and muscle response) because this group of medications have shown the greatest effect on heart rate and heart 







a foreign environment in their (much younger) ASD sample, thus increasing ‘resting state’ 
sympathetic arousal.  
Similar to Study 2, and contrary to hypotheses, cardiac vagal control was not 
associated with trait affective empathy, trait cognitive empathy or trait self-regulation. These 
results agree with previous findings that resting state cardiac vagal control is not correlated 
with dispositional empathy (Stellar et al., 2015). Unlike Study 2, baseline autonomic arousal 
was also not associated with subjective affective state (neither empathic concern nor personal 
distress) while observing pain. The difference in results between this study and Study 2 may 
be explained by the fact that resting state arousal predicted change in affect between non-pain 
and pain conditions in Study 2, not absolute levels of arousal. The current study did not 
contain non-pain stimuli with which to contrast the facial expressions of pain, and thus 
change scores could not be calculated. As arousal was correlated with change in affective 
state, but not absolute level of affective state, resting state arousal may be a better indicator of 
relative or minor regulation of affective states, rather than an indicator of general social-
emotional disposition. Put differently, individuals with high resting state parasympathetic 
arousal reported both high and low levels of affective arousal to the videos (i.e., absolute 
level of affective state was not predicted), but they were better at maintaining their affective 
state levels between pain and non-pain conditions, and did not show big fluctuations between 
the conditions. Thus, there is tentative evidence of a link between resting state arousal and 
regulation of affective states (again, both empathic concern and personal distress).  
As discussed in Chapter 2, few studies have measured the relationship between 
autonomic arousal and empathic concern specifically. One study that did examine this 






dispositional empathic concern and lower self-reported distress (Fabes et al., 1993). 
However, the authors did not separate the predominantly parasympathetic heart rate 
variability frequencies (i.e., RSA) from frequencies related to sympathetic cardiac regulation 
and did not control for respiration. Thus, the association between empathic concern and heart 
rate variability in their study may have been caused by other uncontrolled physiological 
variables. A later study found no correlation between resting state RSA and empathic concern 
(Gill & Calkins, 2003), similar to what was found in the current study. Alternatively, the non-
significant results found in this study may be because the current study consisted mainly of 
male participants, in whom Fabes and colleagues (1993) did not find a significant association 
between RSA and empathic concern. The use of informant reports of empathic concern in 
future work, for example from partners or parents, may provide more insight into the 
relationship between resting state autonomic arousal and empathic concern. 
Autonomic response. A key hypothesis running through this thesis is that, once 
alexithymia is controlled, affective empathy is preserved in individuals with high amounts of 
autism traits. Study 2 measured sympathetic responses to physical pain as one indicator of 
affective empathy, and this study extends those findings (1) by measuring responses to facial 
expressions of pain rather than physical pain, and (2) by using longer stimuli so that 
parasympathetic reactivity could be measured. To my knowledge this is the first study to 
measure parasympathetic reactivity to empathy-for-pain stimuli in participants with ASD.  
The facial expressions of pain elicited synergistic activation of the parasympathetic 
and sympathetic systems. This response was greatest in response to the first block of videos, 
and showed a steady return to resting state values during the subsequent blocks; with skin 






activity is consistent with previous reports of increased RSA (i.e., parasympathetic activation) 
and reduced heart rate when watching others in distress (Stellar et al., 2015; Van Hulle et al., 
2013) or in pain (Lepron et al., 2015); as well as reports of increased skin conductance from 
rest (sympathetic activation) when observing facial expressions of pain (Lanzetta & Englis, 
1989; Vaughan & Lanzetta, 1980). Autonomic co-activation has also been associated with 
feelings of non-crying sadness or concern (Hastings & Miller, 2014; Kreibig, 2010), and as I 
argued in Chapter 2, may best predict empathic concern as it orients the onlooker towards the 
target’s distress but prevents an unchecked fight-or-flight response.  
Unsurprisingly, physiological arousal at baseline significantly predicted arousal 
during pain observation. Once baseline arousal was controlled for, video cycle had a 
significant effect on all indices: On average, cardiac vagal control and skin conductance level 
decreased and heart rate and the pre-ejection period increased during the second cycle of 
videos, corresponding with concomitant reductions in cardiac parasympathetic control and 
beta-adrenergic sympathetic arousal. The reduction in sympathetic arousal from cycle 1 to 
cycle 2 is in keeping with the idea that defensive, sympathetic reactions to witnessing 
another’s pain are swiftly down-regulated to focus the attention on the other person and 
reduce personal distress in the onlooker.  
There was a significant interaction in the effects of amount of autism traits and cycle 
on cardiac vagal control, skin conductance and heart rate. In participants with low amounts of 
autism traits, skin conductance level on average remained elevated while pre-ejection period 
and heart rate increased from the first to the second cycle, indicating decreasing 
parasympathetic arousal and unchanged to decreased sympathetic arousal (lower sympathetic 






corresponds to increased heart rate). As would be expected, arousal was visible for longer in 
skin conductance levels than in cardiac responses. Thus, participants with low autism traits 
had synergistic parasympathetic and sympathetic arousal, followed by a reduction in arousal 
in both systems. This pattern of autonomic change is consistent with the predictions of the 
neurovisceral integration theory, which predicts that active emotion regulation is associated 
with greater vagal flexibility (i.e., greater changes in cardiac vagal control). 
Participants with high amounts of autism traits had significantly higher heart rates and 
skin conductance levels, and had similar cardiac parasympathetic arousal to participants with 
low autism traits during the first cycle of stimuli. This effect remained when participants who 
were on antidepressants were excluded. It is evident that, rather than having a reduced 
response to facial expressions of pain, participants with high amounts of autism traits had a 
heightened sympathetic response, similar to what would be expected in heightened personal 
distress. These results correspond to previous studies that showed heightened skin 
conductance to others’ pain or facial displays of distress in individuals with ASD (Blair, 
1999; Gu et al., 2015).  
During the next cycle of videos, participants with high amounts of autism traits 
showed a reduction in skin conductance while heart rate and cardiac vagal control remained 
the same, indicating decreasing sympathetic activity with less change in parasympathetic 
arousal than was seen in participants with low autism traits. In other words, participants with 
high amounts of autism traits had greater changes in sympathetic arousal and reduced cardiac 
vagal flexibility. Amount of autism traits was not significantly related to physiological 
changes on its own, and again this effect did not change when controlling for antidepressants 






autonomic self-regulation in participants with ASD. These results correspond with previous 
work suggesting that individuals with ASD fail to attenuate empathic neural and autonomic 
responses (Gu et al., 2015). Given that participants with high amounts of autism traits 
reported lower rather than higher affective states (both empathic concern and personal 
distress) when alexithymia was not controlled, an alternative explanation for the reduced 
cardiac vagal control is that high autism trait participants displayed less active coping 
because they were not as distressed by the stimuli as low autism trait participants were. 
However, this explanation does not seem feasible in light of the fact that participants with 
high amounts of autism traits had increased skin conductance – indicative of a threat 
response. Rather, the difference between the subjective reports and the autonomic results is 
most likely due to either poor awareness of bodily states or poor reporting thereof. 
Neither personal distress nor any of the dispositional empathy measures (affective, 
cognitive and self-regulation) were significantly correlated with physiological responses. 
Furthermore, despite evidence of greater distress-related autonomic arousal, participants with 
high amounts of autism traits did not report higher subjective distress: Affective arousal was 
not correlated with autism traits when controlling for alexithymia; and before controlling for 
alexithymia, high autism trait participants reported lower affective arousal (both empathic 
concern and personal distress) than low autism trait participants. The lack of significant 
correlations between physiology and subjective report are consistent with previous research 
(Sun et al., 2015), and may again be related to the relatively small within-subject changes in 
autonomic arousal or suboptimal retrospective reporting of affective states. More research is 
needed to separate distress from concern, and to connect physiological, subjective and 






Limitations and Future Directions 
A limitation of the study design is that only faces showing painful expressions were 
used. This was an established task that has been used before in other adult population groups 
(Lamm et al., 2007, 2008). To test for differences in arousal, the time period during facial 
pain was compared to the time period before pain started. However, participants could have 
had an anticipatory response to the pain. Furthermore, not having non-pain facial expressions 
meant that changes in pain perception and affective state could not be calculated, as was done 
in Study 2. Future studies should use stimuli of neutral and happy faces in addition to painful 
facial expressions to be able to explore the relationship between autonomic self-regulation 
and changes in affective state to different facial expressions. 
To standardise stimuli, experimenters have generally only used videos of the area 
where the pain is applied or the facial expressions of pain. However, studies such as Sun et al. 
(2015) suggest that, for stimuli to have the strongest impact, both the application of pain and 
the facial expression of pain should be visible. Having only the facial expression visible may 
have reduced the size of the empathic response in this study. However, it allowed me to test 
an important aspect of empathy for pain in autism: Given that individuals with autism have 
difficulties interpreting basic facial emotional expressions, would they respond differently to 
faces in pain than to the application of pain? Future studies can vary the type of pain that is 
visible to explore the relationship between alexithymia, autism and empathic concern. 
Lastly, the communicative aspect of facial muscle reactivity to pain should be 
explored further. Many researchers have argued that muscle mimicry indicates to others that 






Hess & Fischer, 2013). Bavelas and colleagues (1986) have previously shown that muscle 
activity is heightened when the injured party faces the observer (versus turning away from the 
observer). This work can be extended by testing muscle reactivity to a person or avatar 
displaying facial pain, and manipulating the eye gaze of the avatar, for example. Muscle 
mimicry should be greater when the avatar makes direct eye contact, where there is greater 
opportunity to convey concern to the other person. 
Summary and Conclusion 
The aim of this study was to investigate whether autism traits are correlated with 
empathy for others’ facial expressions of pain. This study also expanded on the results of 
Study 2 by simultaneously measuring parasympathetic and sympathetic reactivity in an 
empathy-for-pain paradigm; the first to my knowledge to do so. This study followed the same 
multilevel approach as in Study 2; measuring response to empathy induction via muscle 
reactivity, sympathetic and parasympathetic autonomic reactivity, along with subjective 
report. 
There were several important findings in the study: Subjectively, participants reported 
feeling more empathic concern than personal distress. At the muscular level, the stimuli 
elicited significant increases in M. orbicularis activity, associated with narrowing the eyes. At 
the autonomic level, participants showed short-term co-activation of the sympathetic and 
parasympathetic autonomic nervous systems, followed by a concomitant reduction in cardiac 
parasympathetic control and beta-adrenergic sympathetic arousal. At the same time, 
participants reported heightened awareness of the target’s pain, but not heightened affective 
states during the second cycle of videos. In other words, both pain intensity and pain 






representing a different perspective), but neither empathic concern nor personal distress 
changed between cycles. These findings are consistent with the theory that effective 
autonomic arousal primes the individual for empathic concern, and inhibits personal distress. 
Amount of autism traits was negatively correlated with perceived pain, but was not 
correlated with affective state once alexithymia was controlled for. Relatedly, amount of 
autism traits was not correlated with change in muscle activity over time, or raw muscle 
activity once alexithymia was controlled for. Also at the autonomic level, participants with 
high amounts of autism traits had similar increases in cardiac vagal control and showed 
heightened skin conductance and heart rate responses in comparison with those with low 
autism traits. These results show that to react with concern to facial expressions seems to 
require greater own-emotion understanding than does observation of physical pain, as 
alexithymia did not influence empathic concern for sensory pain in Study 2. 
 In contrast to alexithymia, poorer subjective self-regulation was associated with 
higher subjective affective states in response to the perceived pain, but was not correlated 
with the perceived unpleasantness or intensity of the pain. Though subjective trait self-
regulation was not directly related to autonomic reactivity, there was some indication of poor 
autonomic self-regulation in ASD: Participants with higher autism traits had greater skin 
conductance and higher heart rates at cycle 1, and did not show changes in cardiac vagal 
regulation between cycles 1 and 2. This result is interpreted in terms of the neurovisceral 
integration model as poorer autonomic regulation of affect in the high autism trait 
individuals. To be able to draw firm conclusions, these results need to be replicated in future 
research. However, they resonate with the results of Studies 1 and 2 that show that affective 






In terms of the predictions of the neurovisceral integration model and polyvagal 
theory regarding the influence of resting state parasympathetic arousal on empathy and 
emotion regulation, baseline sympathetic and parasympathetic arousal were once again not 
associated with subjective ratings of trait or state affective empathy, trait cognitive empathy 
or trait self-regulation. Similar to study 2, these results do not support conclusions that resting 
state autonomic - and particularly parasympathetic – regulation is associated with 
dispositional socio-emotional factors. Muscle and autonomic reactivity were also not 
associated with state empathic concern or distress scores. In general, a goal for future 
empathy studies is to achieve greater coherence among different levels of measurement. 
To conclude this chapter where it started, though the results do not speak to 
recognition of emotion, perhaps you do have to understand your own emotions – to “look into 











The Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) project has set researchers the aim of 
identifying the transdiagnostic biobehavioural mechanisms, at multiple converging levels of 
analysis, that trigger mental disorders (Cuthbert, 2014; Kozak & Cuthbert, 2016). In 
agreement with this aim, the motivation for this thesis was to describe the autonomic, 
muscular, cognitive, and subjective reactions associated with empathy in a group of 
individuals with varying levels of autism traits. The major theoretical proposition of this 
thesis is that empathy is not globally impaired in individuals with ASD, and that evidence of 
this supposition can be found at the various levels of analysis described above.  
To test my proposition, I investigated affective empathy, cognitive empathy and self-
regulation at the dispositional level using self-report. Cognitive empathy was also measured 
by two performance tasks, namely emotion recognition and recognition of social faux pas. 
Furthermore, I measured affective empathy, autonomic self-regulation, subjective empathic 
concern and communication of empathy (via facial and bodily muscle mimicry) in response 
to observed physical pain and facial expressions of pain. Autonomic regulation served as a 
marker for both affective empathy and the ability to regulate affective arousal (i.e., self-
regulation). In this chapter I will integrate the empirical evidence from Studies 1 to 3 with the 
principal arguments of the previous chapters. I will describe the evidence for intact, impaired 






mechanism to explain the divide between (intact) affective arousal and (reduced) social 
engagement in ASD. 
The Characteristics of Empathy in ASD 
Amount of autism traits was not correlated with affective empathy to sensory pain at 
the trait or state level in self-report measures, nor with measures of autonomic reactivity. 
Similarly, muscle reactivity to sensory pain was not associated with amount of autism traits. 
In contrast, the relationship between autism traits and empathy for facial expressions of pain 
was mediated by alexithymia: Autism traits were negatively correlated with perceived pain, 
affective state and muscle amplitude; however, once alexithymia was controlled for, autism 
traits no longer predicted affective state or muscle amplitude in response to facial expressions 
of pain. At the autonomic level, participants with higher amounts of autism traits had intact 
parasympathetic and heightened sympathetic arousal to facial expressions of pain. These 
results suggest that non-alexithymic adolescents and adults with high levels of autism do not 
have reduced affective empathy for pain, regardless of whether they are observing sensory 
pain or facial expressions of pain. However, alexithymia is negatively correlated with 
affective arousal, empathic concern and muscle mimicry when observing facial expressions 
of pain (but not sensory pain). Subgroups of individuals with ASD may therefore present 
with reduced affective empathy and empathic concern, but this does not necessarily define 
individuals with high amounts of autism traits as a whole. Similarly, lack of awareness of 
bodily traits has been found to be associated with alexithymia, rather than ASD per se 
(Garfinkel et al., 2016; Shah, Hall, Catmur, & Bird, 2016). A caveat to this interpretation is 






more participants with ASD had alexithymia than those with low autism traits. More studies 
such as that of Bird and colleagues (2010), where participants were matched on alexithymia, 
are needed to properly disentangle the effects of alexithymia and ASD. However, alexithymia 
was a better predictor of affective empathy than ASD in the statistical models. Moreover, 
alexithymia presents a possible reason for lower affective empathy to facial expressions in 
some individuals with ASD, and thus opens up new lines of enquiry. Furthermore, affective 
empathy and empathic concern were only reduced in alexithymic participants for complex 
pain stimuli, and were not affected when observing physical pain. In short, global deficits in 
empathy in ASD were not found. 
Supporting evidence that affective empathy is intact in individuals with ASD comes 
from the psychopathy and morality literature. The profile of diminished affective empathy 
but intact cognitive empathy in psychopathy has been well established (e.g., Pfabigan et al., 
2015; Schwenck et al., 2012). This profile makes psychopathy an ideal comparison group for 
ASD, in which cognitive empathy is impaired, but affective empathy skills are disputed. 
Individuals with psychopathic and disruptive behaviour show diminished autonomic and 
neural reactivity to viewing others’ distress and pain (Decety, Chen, Harenski, & Kiehl, 
2013; Jones et al., 2010), and report lower levels of dispositional affective empathy 
(Schwenck et al., 2012). They also evidence callous behaviour, disregard of others’ welfare 
and emotion, and lack of remorse (Blair, 2008). In contrast, these behaviours are not normally 
associated with ASD. Individuals with ASD also show moral reasoning and behaviour, and 
reduced utilitarian behaviour (Patil, Melsbach, Hennig-Fast, & Silani, 2016); constructs that 
are positively correlated with affective empathy and reduced in psychopathy (Aaltola, 2014; 






Why did initial studies of ASD report global deficits in empathy? As I argued in 
Chapter 2, part of the explanation is that different definitions are used. Some authors equate 
not understanding others’ emotions, or even having limited social behaviour, with having a 
general deficit in empathy. For example, C. Gillberg (1996, p. 52) writes that “The failing 
skills in reciprocal social interaction and the theory of mind deficiencies could be seen to 
reflect or be synonymous with empathy deficits” [own emphasis]. Working on the definition 
of empathy as social behaviour, investigators have evaluated eye contact and consoling 
behaviour to measure empathy (e.g., Hobson et al., 2009). However, these constructs are not 
the same as empathy, and require additional skills.  
The importance of not relying on outward behaviours to infer inner states cannot be 
stressed enough. For example, individuals with ASD often have reduced verbal and 
nonverbal communication of pain; and this has long been taken as a sign of reduced 
sensitivity to pain (Kolvin, Ounsted, Humphrey, & McNay, 1971; Militerni et al., 2000). 
However, more recent studies of physiological reactivity have shown intact or even 
heightened perception of own pain in ASD (Rattaz et al., 2013; Tordjman et al., 2009). To 
bring this back to empathy, participants high in affective empathy may not show prosocial 
behaviour because they have disrupted emotional regulation or do not have the cognitive 
skills or social experience to provide appropriate consoling behaviour. Alternatively, 
participants may have high affective empathy but avoid direct eye contact because of the 
intensity of affect sharing, as is often anecdotally reported by individuals with ASD (and has 
recently been shown in physiological studies, Kylliäinen et al., 2012; Kylliäinen & Hietanen, 
2006). To illustrate this point, a recent population-based twin study (Van Hulle et al., 2013) 






eye contact, consoling behaviour, or communicative attempts) experienced greater arousal 
during the distress episode than children who showed either concern or active disregard (i.e., 
antisocial behaviours). Lack of behaviour expression does not indicate lack of affect. 
With the increasing availability of psychophysiological equipment, affective arousal 
can be measured without having to rely solely on external behaviours that depend on many 
other factors besides empathy. Even so, the high rate of alexithymia in ASD has not always 
been accounted for, though it clearly influences subjective responses (Bird et al., 2010; 
Moriguchi et al., 2007). Visual attention has also not always been adequately controlled for, 
though it has been shown to influence empathy-related behaviours such as contagious 
yawning in ASD (Senju et al., 2009). Thus, another reason for the apparent global empathy 
deficits in ASD may be inadequate control of confounding variables. 
Others, such as Baron-Cohen (Baron-Cohen & Wheelright, 2004; Golan & Baron-
Cohen, 2006) and Frith (2003), have defined empathy in such a way that cognitive empathy 
is necessary for all other forms of empathy. These definitions presuppose a cognitive 
understanding of others’ minds before any affective arousal sharing can take place. The 
emphasis on cognitive empathy is necessarily reflected in empathy questionnaires developed 
from this theoretical stance: Although Baron-Cohen and Wheelright (2004) describe empathy 
as having a cognitive and an affective component, their Empathy Quotient asks primarily 
about understanding others’ emotions and thoughts. Only eight of the 60 questions in the full 
questionnaire, and two questions in the 22-item short form (Wakabayashi, Baron-Cohen, 
Wheelwright, Goldenfeld, et al., 2006), do not need intact cognitive empathy. Furthermore, 
of the two questions on the short form (“I really enjoy caring for other people”, and “I tend to 






motivation more than it does empathy. Most research reporting reduced empathy in ASD has 
used the Empathy Quotient, and equated poor scores to a global deficit in empathy, when in 
fact, the Empathy Quotient measures cognitive empathy almost exclusively (see Appendix 
Q). However, as I have argued in Chapter 2, developmental and neural studies of empathy do 
not support the idea that cognitive empathy is a necessary first step to affective empathy. 
These studies report affective arousal sharing in the first year of life, before basic mental state 
attribution skills have developed (Geangu, Hauf, et al., 2011; Roth-Hanania et al., 2011). The 
point to be made is that previous authors have concluded that individuals with ASD lack 
affective empathy because they measured related but functionally separate behaviours, only 
measured one part of empathy, or did not adequately control for confounding factors.  
In contrast to the global empathy deficit hypothesis, the empathy imbalance 
hypothesis (A. Smith, 2009) speculates that individuals with ASD have increased affective 
arousal. I found tentative evidence of increased affective arousal in this thesis: Participants 
with high amounts of autism traits had higher heart rates and higher skin conductance when 
observing facial expressions of pain, though this was not true in the sensory pain condition. 
At the subjective level, neither affective states nor perceptions of pain were positively 
correlated with autism traits. However, I did find indications that individuals with high 
amounts of autism traits might be at greater risk of experiencing affective hyperarousal when 
observing the infliction of pain. Participants using medication, who mostly had high amounts 
of autism traits, reported greater subjective affective reactions (Study 2) and higher ratings of 
pain unpleasantness and intensity (Study 2)18. Participants with poor trait self-regulation also 
had increased affective responses (Studies 2 and 3) and heightened pain perception (Study 2). 
                                                   
18 Participants using medication also had higher ratings of pain unpleasantness and intensity in Study 3, but this 






Similar to medication use, poor trait self-regulation was associated with more autism traits in 
Study 1. However, at least in Study 2, these responses were associated with heightened 
subjective reports of affective states in all the conditions, not only to pain. This result implies 
that certain individuals with high amounts of autism traits may be prone to subjectively 
experiencing heightened affective states in general, not heightened empathy-specific arousal 
as proposed in the empathy imbalance hypothesis.  
If reduced affective empathy is not at the heart of diminished or abnormal social 
behaviour, what is? Study 1 found negative correlations between cognitive empathy and 
autism traits at both the self-report and performance levels. Deficits in cognitive empathy in 
ASD are well-documented, and account for some of the social behaviour deficits in ASD. For 
example, better cognitive skills are associated with improved adherence to social rules 
(Baurain & Nader-Grosbois, 2013) in typically developing and intellectually disabled 
children and better social interaction skills in ASD (Bosacki & Astington, 2001). However, 
cognitive empathy is not correlated with many other aspects of social competence: Children 
with ASD who perform well on cognitive empathy (or theory of mind) tasks have better 
social insight than their ASD peers, but are no more sociable (Frith, Happé, & Siddons, 
1994). Furthermore, cognitive empathy is not correlated with severity of social impairment in 
ASD (Joseph & Tager-Flusberg, 2004). Tellingly, interventions that teach cognitive empathy 
have not been very successful at improving social competence in ASD (Fletcher-Watson, 
McConnell, Manola, & McConachie, 2014; Solomon, Goodlin-Jones, & Anders, 2004). Poor 
cognitive empathy is thus unlikely to be the only cause of social-communicative difficulties 






If affective responses are not reduced in all individuals with ASD, and cognitive 
empathy does not predict the extent of social deficits, what else could explain the 
presentation of ASD? Alexithymia may explain some, but not all, social-communication 
deficits as it is not universally present in ASD (Berthoz et al., 2013). In addition to 
alexithymia, deficits in self-regulation may explain the impairments in social engagement 
seen in ASD.  
Self-Regulation and Autonomic Arousal 
Another possible contributor to the discrepancy between intact affective arousal and 
diminished social behaviour in individuals with high amounts of autism traits may be the 
ability to self-regulate. I found that amount of autism traits was negatively correlated with 
dispositional self-regulation ability in Study 1. These results agree with several other studies 
that suggest that emotion regulation is impaired in ASD (Dijkhuis, Ziermans, Rijn, Staal, & 
Swaab, 2016; Mazefsky et al., 2013; Samson et al., 2012). In this thesis, I specifically wanted 
to test whether (1) there is autonomic evidence of dysregulated affect while observing 
another’s pain, and (2) whether resting state arousal could predict efficient autonomic 
regulation, and thus affective outcomes, during pain observation. 
 (1) Study 3 presented exploratory evidence of atypical autonomic regulation during 
affective empathy in participants with high amounts of autism traits: Participants with more 
autism traits tended to have higher sympathetic arousal during the first cycle of pain 
observation, and reduced changes in parasympathetic vagal regulation between cycles, 
indicative of poor regulation. Reduced vagal flexibility has been associated with challenging 






& Keane, 2007; Calkins & Keane, 2004). Thus, there is tentative evidence for atypical 
autonomic regulation in response to empathy-inducing tasks in individuals with high amounts 
of autism traits, and evidence from other studies that such autonomic regulation differences 
can lead to difficulties in social behaviour.  
(2) Regarding the use of resting state autonomic arousal as a predictor of self-
regulation and social engagement, Study 2 demonstrated that participants with predominantly 
parasympathetic arousal (i.e., high parasympathetic arousal and low sympathetic arousal) at 
rest reported smaller changes in personal distress relative to those with autonomic co-
inhibition (i.e., low parasympathetic and sympathetic arousal). In contrast, changes in 
empathic concern did not differ between the predominantly parasympathetic and co-
inhibition groups. However, resting state sympathetic and parasympathetic arousal did not 
predict absolute affective state levels, as would be predicted from the neurovisceral 
integration (Thayer & Lane, 2000, 2009) and polyvagal (Porges, 2001, 2005) theories. 
Resting state autonomic arousal was also not correlated with dispositional self-regulation 
once alexithymia was controlled for. Thus, the proposed link between resting state autonomic 
arousal – in particular parasympathetic arousal - and social engagement was not sufficiently 
demonstrated in the current studies. Resting state autonomic arousal may be correlated with 
self-regulation ability; however, the evidence from this set of studies is limited.   
In neither study was resting state respiratory sinus arrhythmia, cardiac vagal control 
(RSA controlled for respiration and tidal volume) or pre-ejection period associated with 
amount of autism traits. Initial findings of increased heart rate in individuals with high 






neurological regulation. However, the effects of different types of medication on resting state 
heart rate and emotion regulation merit further investigation. In particular, more research is 
necessary to explore whether increased affective arousal to stimuli observed in Study 2 is due 
to the direct effects of medication on resting state autonomic arousal, the effect of comorbid 
psychiatric or subclinical disorders such as poor self-regulation that necessitate the use of 
medication, or due to other associated factors. Until such a time, it is important for clinicians 
to be aware of potentially heightened arousal in individuals with ASD who are on medication 
or show signs of poor self-regulation, and to consider including regulation techniques in 
interventions. 
In short, autonomic regulation in ASD during affective tasks requires more attention. 
Most studies have focused on resting state arousal; yet atypical autonomic arousal does not 
seem to be a general characteristic of the broader autism phenotype. Cognitive empathy, 
affective empathy (wrongly, I’ve argued) and more recently alexithymia, have received 
attention as potential causes of the social behavioural impairments in ASD. Autonomic 
flexibility (though not necessarily arousal at rest) is another potential mechanism, and one 
that has not received much attention. Reduced autonomic flexibility may explain why, despite 
the ability to feel affective empathy for others, social reciprocity in impaired in ASD.  
Limitations 
A strength of this thesis is that multiple modalities were used to measure empathy. As 
each modality has its own methodological limitations, it is unlikely that error variance 
associated with a specific method is reflected in other modalities. Such a multimodal or 






Empathy was also broken down into smaller components to separate constructs that likely 
arise from different neural areas, have different functions, and are differentially affected 
(Harari, Shamay-Tsoory, Ravid, & Levkovitz, 2010; Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2007; Völlm et 
al., 2006). A disadvantage of the multimodal approach is that it introduces complexity when 
measures do not show coherence across levels. The lack of correlation between autonomic, 
muscular and subjective forms of empathy is neither wholly unexpected nor indicative of 
failure to measure the construct. It is widely acknowledged that the correlation between 
multiple measures of emotion is weak (Cacioppo, Berntson, Sheridan, & McClintock, 2000; 
Mauss, Levenson, McCarter, Wilhelm, & Gross, 2005; Mauss & Robinson, 2009). Lack of 
convergence may partly be due to psychometric properties of the measures and the 
complexity of physiological processes. However, it is increasingly acknowledged that 
affective processes are multiply determined, and that different levels of analysis provide 
different information. For example, one study examining convergence of emotion measures 
found that, whereas self-report of personality traits and state affect was not correlated with 
physiological measures (in their case, EEG and startle responses), informant report was 
(Lieberman et al., 2016). On the other hand, self-reported experience is more closely linked 
to behaviour than physiological processes are (Mauss et al., 2005). Similarly, skin 
conductance is sensitive to arousal, whereas facial EMG appears to be more sensitive to 
emotion valence (Mauss & Robinson, 2009). The bottom line is that the more converging 
lines of evidence future studies have available, the better emotions and social functioning can 
be predicted. Asking participants to rate their emotions on a moment-to-moment basis during 
emotion-elicitation may provide a more accurate measure of affective states than 






measures (Stellar et al., 2015). Future multilevel studies can use such ‘online’ ratings of 
affective states and empathic concern, as well as other sources of information such as 
informant report to increase measure convergence. Additionally, direct measures of attention, 
such as eye gaze monitoring, and central nervous system functioning, such as 
electroencephalogram (EEG) or functioning magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) during the 
experience of empathy will make it easier to connect specific peripheral physiological 
changes to brain activation and mental state changes. 
It has been shown that antipsychotics and antidepressants have anticholinergic 
properties which could have reduced the measured skin conductance levels (Society for 
Psychophysiological Research Ad Hoc Committee on Electrodermal Measures, 2012) and 
affected cardiac autonomic arousal at rest and in response to stressors. Antidepressants in 
particular have been shown to increase resting heart rate due to dampening of cardiac vagal 
control (Kemp et al., 2014; Licht et al., 2010). Different antidepressants also have different 
effects on sympathetic arousal (Licht et al., 2012). The use of medication was statistically 
controlled for in all the analyses, and the use of antidepressants was specifically controlled 
for in the cardiac autonomic analyses, where it was most likely to have an effect. However, 
this study did not have a big enough sample size to control for all the different effects of 
different types of medication. As most individuals with ASD are on some type of chronic 
medication, it would not have been possible to recruit a large enough sample of individuals 
who are medication-free. As many as 54 - 70% of individuals with ASD are on at least one 
psychotropic medication (Buck et al., 2014; Esbensen, Greenberg, Seltzer, & Aman, 2009) 
and if non-psychotropic medications are included, this number increases to 81%, or four out 






sample participants who are medication-free is that such a group would not present a true 
picture of ASD; and would represent only a minority of cases – likely those who are least 
affected. More collaborative, multi-site investigations of ASD are needed so that 
investigators can obtain large enough sample sizes to control for the effect of medication use. 
Relatedly, future studies should control for the effects of comorbid psychiatric disorders, such 
as depression and psychosis, that may influence cardiac autonomic arousal separately from 
medication use (Alvares et al., 2016). 
The affective state questions did not adequately distinguish between other-oriented 
feelings of empathic concern and self-oriented feelings of personal distress.  At face value, 
the questions seem to address different concepts; for example, “how sympathetic did you 
feel?” (empathic concern) versus “how perturbed did you feel?” (personal distress). The 
questions have also been used in a number of previous studies, who report and interpret the 
two states as independent of each other. However, statistical analyses in this and other studies 
(Batson et al., 1991, 1997) show that the questions are not measuring entirely separate 
concepts. Better measurement of these two constructs is needed. Measuring empathic concern 
and personal distress accurately is important for theories of empathy, as empathic concern 
and personal distress are hypothesised to be separable and to lead to different types of 
behaviour. If these two constructs cannot be separately elicited or assessed in empathy-for-
pain paradigms, the theories around the separation of self- versus other-focused distress need 
to be revised. Future research needs to create and test different self-report questions, and use 
behaviour measures in conjunction with self-report in order to distinguish appropriately 






Because of constraints on the amount of time that participants could come for 
assessments, intellectual functioning was not assessed. All participants were able to answer 
the questions, and most participants were recruited from schools and universities. Fitness 
level, height, weight, body mass index, smoking and sleeping habits, and other physiological 
characteristics of the participants that could have influenced the autonomic measures were 
also not recorded. Participants were asked not to exercise, smoke, eat, and drink caffeinated 
substances before coming to their sessions, but it is possible that there could have been a 
systematic bias in, for example, weight or fitness according to autism traits. Such a 
systematic bias could potentially affect cardiac measures (e.g., Grant, Viljoen, Janse van 
Rensburg, & Wood, 2012). Future studies should attempt to either statistically control for 
these factors, or recruit participants with similar physiological characteristics. Additionally, 
though participants ranged in their amount of autism traits, the sample was limited to 
participants who were able to respond to questions and attend to the stimuli. Thus, the results 
of this study may not be generalizable to individuals with severe forms of ASD. 
RSA and pre-ejection period were measured during fairly short time-periods (< 5 
minutes). It is possible that the nonsignificant correlations between physiological indices and 
autism traits or empathy were due to equipment and methods that are not sensitive enough to 
changes over a short time-period. However, there is evidence for high reliability of ultra-
short-term heart rate variability; with both inter-day and intra-day measures having high test-
retest consistency (Esco & Flatt, 2014; Nakamura et al., 2016). Furthermore, time periods 
were of the same length for different stimuli so that recording time would not influence 







There is much debate in the literature about what comes first: The physiological 
mirroring of an affective state, followed by the triggering of that affective state (Gallese, 
2007), or the automatic activation of neural states similar to the target’s perceived emotional 
state, leading to physiological sequelae such as motor and autonomic reactions (Preston, 
2007). The studies in this thesis were not designed to tease apart what comes first, emotion or 
physiology, and in fact, we will need much more time-sensitive measures and carefully 
controlled studies if we are ever to do that. There is likely also a two-way interaction between 
emotion and physiology, where either may augment or suppress the other. The aim of this 
thesis is to show how and whether these processes are affected in ASD, not the causal 
sequence of reactions when observing empathy-inducing stimuli. Future studies, such as 
studies of individuals with paralysed muscles (Oberman, Winkielman, & Ramachandran, 
2007; Rives Bogart & Matsumoto, 2010) or the congenital inability to feel pain (Danziger, 
Prkachin, & Willer, 2006) are needed to tease apart the two processes.  
Despite the limitations described above, the current studies provide important 
information on different facets of empathy in people with high amounts of autism traits. The 
studies also provide information towards characterising autonomic states and reactivity in 
individuals with different levels of autism. 
Future Directions 
The current studies focused on empathy for observed pain and facial expressions of 
pain. These results can be taken further by studying empathy for social pain, as was recently 
done by Krach and colleagues (2015) in an experiment on embarrassment. Previous research 






investigate whether individuals with ASD are as sensitive to social influences on empathy as 
neurotypical individuals are. For example, several studies have shown that people do not 
react in the same way to displays of pain from competitors or those they dislike as they do to 
likeable characters and those with whom they have an affiliation (Bourgeois & Hess, 2008; 
Lanzetta & Englis, 1989; Likowski, Mühlberger, Seibt, Pauli, & Weyers, 2008; Weyers, 
Mühlberger, Kund, Hess, & Pauli, 2009). It is conceivable that people with higher ASD traits 
may be less prone to show these social biases in empathy. Furthermore, watching videos of 
pain or distress is not the same as witnessing someone experience pain or distress off-screen. 
Our current knowledge of empathy can be expanded by testing empathy for pain in 
naturalistic social interactions. For example, an experimenter can feign getting hurt, and can 
code participants’ displays of concern, as well record participants’ ratings about how 
distressed or concerned they felt during the event. 
This study did not measure cognitive or behavioural emotion regulation strategies. 
Future research should test the association between autonomic regulation and cognitive self-
regulation, empathy and distress in ASD by using self-report emotion regulation 
questionnaires such as the Emotional Control Questionnaire (Roger & Najarian, 1989) or 
Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (Gross & John, 2003). Autonomic and cognitive 
regulation measurements could also be supplemented by behavioural observations of 
regulation, such as behaviour during frustrating non-reward conditions, disappointment 
paradigms, or reward delay assessments (Mazefsky et al., 2013). Furthermore, studies have 
indicated that whether individuals are likely to use self-regulation strategies is not the only 






strategies are being used (Gross, 2001; Lebowitz & Dovidio, 2015). Thus, future studies 
should distinguish between the effects of different types of regulation strategies.  
The areas of overlap and non-overlap between alexithymia and ASD, and their 
associations with empathy, need further investigation. Studies need to recruit different 
psychiatric and non-psychiatric populations with and without alexithymia to tease apart the 
effects of these conditions on empathy and prosocial behaviour. Moreover, a limitation in 
most alexithymia studies is that self-report is predominantly used to measure lack of insight 
into own emotions. Though previous research has shown that self and observer reports of 
alexithymia are significantly correlated (Berthoz, Perdereau, Godart, Corcos, & Haviland, 
2007), it may be prudent for researchers to include multiple paradigms for measuring 
alexithymia. Observer measures of alexithymia such as the California Q-Set Alexithymia 
Prototype (Haviland & Reise, 1996) or Beth Israel Hospital Psychosomatic Questionnaire 
(Sifneos, 1973) can be included in future studies.  
There is preliminary evidence that resting state cardiac vagal control only predicts 
empathy in individuals with low attachment anxiety (Diamond et al., 2012). Future studies 
should investigate whether attachment, anxiety and emotion regulation mediate the 
relationship between physiological arousal, particularly cardiac vagal control, and empathy.  
Summary and Conclusions 
This thesis is the first to investigate the autonomic contributions to the regulation of 
empathy within ASD. Sympathetic and parasympathetic reactivity to empathy was measured 
concurrently in order to study the interaction effect of the two autonomic branches on 






muscle mimicry were measured at different levels of analysis. Using this multilevel approach, 
evidence for global deficits in empathy in ASD was not found: A higher amount of autism 
traits was not associated with reduced autonomic, muscular or subjective affective responses 
to observed physical pain or facial expressions of pain once alexithymia was controlled for. 
These findings were the same across multiple modalities and across several studies conducted 
over different days. In fact, contrary to the global empathy deficit hypothesis, there was 
evidence that individuals with high amounts of autism traits may be more likely to possess 
traits that are associated with heightened affective reactions, particularly to physical pain: 
Autism traits were negatively correlated with trait self-regulation, and poor trait self-
regulation was associated with heightened subjective affective states. Medication use was 
also associated with heightened affective reactivity, potentially related to the effects of 
psychotropic medications such as antidepressants on resting state arousal. Alexithymia, 
however, was associated with lower subjective and muscular responses to perceived facial 
expressions of pain. Thus, autism traits were not associated with atypical affective empathy 
per se, though individuals with poor self-regulation or those on medication may show 
heightened affective arousal to others’ pain, whereas individuals with comorbid alexithymia 
may show reduced arousal to painful expressions.  
There was limited evidence of the neurovisceral integration and polyvagal theories’ 
assertions that resting state arousal affects the ability to self-regulate: Heightened 
parasympathetic arousal and low sympathetic arousal at rest predicted smaller changes in 
personal distress to the pain stimuli. Furthermore, though resting state arousal was not 
associated with amount of autism traits, there was evidence of reduced changes in 






during observation of pain expressions in participants with high amounts of autism traits. 
These results suggest dysregulated emotion regulation; however, this conclusion must remain 
speculative for now as the autonomic data were not correlated to subjective reports of affect. 
Expanding research paradigms to also include informant report, a behavioural component, 
brain imaging, or other forms of affect measurement, may help to clarify the link between 
autonomic arousal, empathy and prosocial behaviour. 
Finally, I did not find correlations between resting state parasympathetic or 
sympathetic arousal and autism traits once antidepressants were controlled for. Moreover, 
resting state arousal was not associated with dispositional empathy or with absolute levels of 
affective states during pain observation. The non-significant findings regarding resting state 
autonomic arousal show that we need to understand the basic mechanisms in the link between 
autonomic regulation and social engagement much better before we can apply basic research 
in this area to physiological interventions, whether for ASD or for other disorders. In the last 
few years there has been an increasing interest in physiological interventions for ASD 
stemming from the optimism of the polyvagal theory’s proposal that social engagement 
deficits in ASD may be reversible, and that the pathways between cardiac vagal control and 
social engagement are understood. For example, there are several lines of intervention 
research on stimulation of the vagus nerve (Oberman & Enticott, 2015; Y. Wang et al., 2015) 
and on physiology-based affect recognition by robots (Liu, Conn, Sarkar, & Stone, 2008). 
The negative results of this thesis caution against the premature use of potentially expensive 
and ineffectual physiological interventions before the nature of autonomic regulation in ASD 
is well understood and the relationship between autonomic arousal and social-communication 






autism traits in the sample in general. Theories of parasympathetic dysregulation may only 
apply to a small subset of ASD. In this regard, more research on autonomic regulation is 
needed on well-defined, genetically similar subgroups in ASD, such as fragile X syndrome, 
in which the most promising evidence for resting state autonomic dysregulation has thus far 
been found. For now, hope of a biomarker or targeted physiological intervention in ASD 
remains elusive.  
Of course, the results of this thesis are not only of relevance to the autism population, 
but increase our understanding of the physiological correlates of empathy in general. For 
example, as the first study to measure both sympathetic and parasympathetic arousal during 
empathy for pain, this work shows a clear co-activation of the sympathetic and 
parasympathetic branches of the nervous system when feeling empathy; a very different 
response than what has been shown for sustained attention or threat-induction tasks, where 
parasympathetic inhibition is the norm. The results also highlight the importance of own 
emotion understanding in the formation of empathy to more complex distress cues. 
Alexithymia was negatively correlated with affective states and with muscle mimicry when 
perceiving others’ facial expressions of pain. Interventions to improve social behaviour 
would do well to include own-emotion understanding skills as part of the programme. This 
approach could be beneficial both in ASD and in other psychiatric groups with high 
comorbidities with alexithymia. Similarly, improving self-regulation skills may benefit not 
only individuals with ASD, but also others with emotion regulation difficulties. 
A strength of this study was its dimensional approach. It is important to study 
disorders using a continuous approach not only because it allows for more statistical power, 






subclinical traits. Studies have shown that older individuals who fall on the broader autism 
phenotype are at greater risk for depression, lack of social support and anxiety (Wallace, 
Budgett, & Charlton, 2016). Yet little is known about this group of people. The results from 
this thesis suggest that they may be vulnerable to alexithymia, poor self-regulation and lower 
cognitive empathy. However, as these individuals are not diagnosed, they may also be less 
able to access clinical support. More research is needed on the empathy and social 
engagement profile of this group. By better describing the mechanisms of empathy and social 
engagement in all individuals, we generate insight into how to create targeted interventions 









Aaltola, E. (2014). Affective empathy as core moral agency: psychopathy, autism and reason 
revisited. Philosophical Explorations, 17, 76–92. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2013.825004 
aan het Rot, M., & Hogenelst, K. (2014). The influence of affective empathy and autism 
spectrum traits on empathic accuracy. PLOS ONE, 9, e98436. 
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0098436 
Abell, F., Happé, F., & Frith, U. (2000). Do triangles play tricks? Attribution of mental states 
to animated shapes in normal and abnormal development. Cognitive Development, 15, 
1–16. 
Adolphs, R. (2008). Fear, faces, and the human amygdala. Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 
18, 166–172. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.conb.2008.06.006 
Akitsuki, Y., & Decety, J. (2009). Social context and perceived agency affects empathy for 
pain: An event-related fMRI investigation. NeuroImage, 47, 722–734. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2009.04.091 
Alkon, A., Goldstein, L. H., Smider, N., Essex, M. J., Kupfer, D. J., & Boyce, W. T. (2003). 
Developmental and contextual influences on autonomic reactivity in young children. 
Developmental Psychobiology, 42, 64–78. https://doi.org/10.1002/dev.10082 
Althaus, M., Van Roon, A. M., Mulder, L. J. M., Mulder, G., Aarnoudse, C. C., & Minderaa, 
R. B. (2004). Autonomic response patterns observed during the performance of an 
attention-demanding task in two groups of children with autistic-type difficulties in 







Alvares, G. A., Quintana, D. S., Hickie, I. B., & Guastella, A. J. (2016). Autonomic nervous 
system dysfunction in psychiatric disorders and the impact of psychotropic 
medications: a systematic review and meta-analysis. Journal of Psychiatry & 
Neuroscience, 41, 89–104. https://doi.org/10.1503/jpn.140217 
American Psychiatric Association. (2013). Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (5th ed.). Arlington, VA: Author. 
Anagnostou, E., & Hansen, R. (2011). Medical treatment overview: Traditional and novel 
psycho-pharmacological and complementary and alternative medications. Current 
Opinion in Pediatrics, 23, 621–627. https://doi.org/10.1097/MOP.0b013e32834cba3e 
Anderson, C. J., & Colombo, J. (2009). Larger tonic pupil size in young children with autism 
spectrum disorder. Developmental Psychobiology, 51, 207–211. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/dev.20352 
Appelhans, B. M., & Luecken, L. J. (2006). Heart rate variability as an index of regulated 
emotional responding. Review of General Psychology, 10, 229–240. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/1089-2680.10.3.229 
Ardizzi, M., Martini, F., Umiltà, M. A., Sestito, M., Ravera, R., & Gallese, V. (2013). When 
early experiences build a wall to others’ emotions: An electrophysiological and 
autonomic study. PLOS ONE, 8, e61004. 
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0061004 
Astington, J. W. (2005). Why language matters for theory of mind (Vol. XII). New York, 






Astington, J. W., & Jenkins, J. M. (1999). A longitudinal study of the relation between 
language and theory-of-mind development. Developmental Psychology, 35, 1311–
1320. https://doi.org/10.1037//0012-1649.35.5.1311 
Avenanti, A., Bueti, D., Galati, G., & Aglioti, S. M. (2005). Transcranial magnetic 
stimulation highlights the sensorimotor side of empathy for pain. Nature 
Neuroscience, 8, 955–960. https://doi.org/10.1038/nn1481 
Avenanti, A., Minio-Paluello, I., Bufalari, I., & Aglioti, S. M. (2009). The pain of a model in 
the personality of an onlooker: Influence of state-reactivity and personality traits on 
embodied empathy for pain. NeuroImage, 44, 275–283. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2008.08.001 
Avenanti, A., Minio-Paluello, I., Sforza, A., & Aglioti, S. M. (2009). Freezing or escaping? 
Opposite modulations of empathic reactivity to the pain of others. Cortex, 45, 1072–
1077. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cortex.2008.10.004 
Avenanti, A., Paluello, I. M., Bufalari, I., & Aglioti, S. M. (2006). Stimulus-driven 
modulation of motor-evoked potentials during observation of others’ pain. 
NeuroImage, 32, 316–324. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2006.03.010 
Avenanti, A., Sirigu, A., & Aglioti, S. M. (2010). Racial bias reduces empathic sensorimotor 
resonance with other-race pain. Current Biology, 20, 1018–1022. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2010.03.071 
Azevedo, R. T., Macaluso, E., Avenanti, A., Santangelo, V., Cazzato, V., & Aglioti, S. M. 
(2013). Their pain is not our pain: Brain and autonomic correlates of empathic 
resonance with the pain of same and different race individuals. Human Brain 






Bagby, R. M., Parker, J. D. A., & Taylor, G. J. (1994). The twenty-item Toronto Alexithymia 
Scale—I. Item selection and cross-validation of the factor structure. Journal of 
Psychosomatic Research, 38, 23–32. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-3999(94)90005-1 
Bagby, R. M., Taylor, G. J., & Parker, J. D. A. (1994). The twenty-item Toronto Alexithymia 
Scale—II. Convergent, discriminant, and concurrent validity. Journal of 
Psychosomatic Research, 38, 33–40. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-3999(94)90006-X 
Bailey, P. E., Henry, J. D., & Von Hippel, W. (2008). Empathy and social functioning in late 
adulthood. Aging & Mental Health, 12, 499–503. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13607860802224243 
Bal, E., Harden, E., Lamb, D., Van Hecke, A. V., Denver, J. W., & Porges, S. W. (2010). 
Emotion recognition in children with autism spectrum disorders: Relations to eye 
gaze and autonomic state. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 40, 358–
370. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10803-009-0884-3 
Baron-Cohen, S. (2000). Theory of mind and autism: A review. International Review of 
Research in Mental Retardation, 23, 169–184. 
Baron-Cohen, S. (2008). Autism, hypersystemizing, and truth. The Quarterly Journal of 
Experimental Psychology, 61, 64–75. 
Baron-Cohen, S. (2009). Autism: The empathizing–systemizing (E-S) theory. Annals of the 
New York Academy of Sciences, 1156, 68–80. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-
6632.2009.04467.x 
Baron-Cohen, S., Leslie, A. M., & Frith, U. (1985). Does the autistic child have a ‘theory of 






Baron-Cohen, S., O’Riordan, M., Stone, V. E., Jones, R., & Plaisted, K. (1999). Recognition 
of faux pas by normally developing children and children with Asperger syndrome or 
high-functioning autism. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 29, 407–
418. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1023035012436 
Baron-Cohen, S., & Wheelright, S. (2004). The empathy quotient: an investigation of adults 
with Asperger syndrome or high functioning autism, and normal sex differences. 
Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 34, 163–175. 
https://doi.org/10.1023/B:JADD.0000022607.19833.00 
Baron-Cohen, S., Wheelwright, S., Skinner, R., Martin, J., & Clubley, E. (2001). The 
Autism-Spectrum Quotient (AQ): Evidence from Asperger syndrome/high-
functioning autism, males and females, scientists and mathematicians. Journal of 
Autism and Developmental Disorders, 31, 5–17. 
https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005653411471 
Barr, D. J., Levy, R., Scheepers, C., & Tily, H. J. (2013). Random effects structure for 
confirmatory hypothesis testing: Keep it maximal. Journal of Memory and Language, 
68, 255–278. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jml.2012.11.001 
Bartal, I. B.-A., Decety, J., & Mason, P. (2011). Empathy and pro-social behavior in rats. 
Science, 334, 1427–1430. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1210789 
Bartoń, K. (2016). MuMIn: Multi-Model Inference (Version 1.15.6). Retrieved from 
https://CRAN.R-project.org/package=MuMIn 
Bates, D. (2006, May 19). [R] lmer, p-values and all that [electronic mailing list message]. 






Bates, D., Kliegl, R., Vasishth, S., & Baayen, H. (2015). Parsimonious mixed models. 
arXiv:1506.04967 [Stat]. Retrieved from http://arxiv.org/abs/1506.04967 
Bates, D., Maechler, M., Bolker, B., & Walker, S. (2015). Fitting linear mixed-effects models 
using   lme4. Journal of Statistical Software, 67, 1–48. 
https://doi.org/10.18637/jss.v067.i01 
Batson, C. D. (2009). These things called empathy: Eight related but distinct phenomena. In 
J. Decety & W. Ickes (Eds.), The social neuroscience of empathy (pp. 3–15). 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Batson, C. D., Batson, J. G., Griffitt, C. A., Barrientos, S., Randall, J., Sprengelmeyer, P., & 
Bayly, M. J. (1989). Negative-state relief and the empathy—altruism hypothesis. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 56, 922–933. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.56.6.922 
Batson, C. D., Batson, J. G., Slingsby, J. K., Harrell, K. L., Peekna, H. M., & Todd, R. M. 
(1991). Empathic joy and the empathy-altruism hypothesis. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 61, 413–426. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.61.3.413 
Batson, C. D., Early, S., & Salvarani, G. (1997). Perspective taking: Imagining how another 
feels versus imaging how you would feel. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 
23, 751–758. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167297237008 
Baurain, C., & Nader-Grosbois, N. (2013). Theory of mind, socio-emotional problem-
solving, socio-emotional regulation in children with intellectual disability and in 







Bavelas, J. B., Black, A., Lemery, C. R., & Mullett, J. (1986). ‘I show how you feel’: Motor 
mimicry as a communicative act. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 50, 
322–329. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.50.2.322 
Beall, P. M., Moody, E. J., McIntosh, D. N., Hepburn, S. L., & Reed, C. L. (2008). Rapid 
facial reactions to emotional facial expressions in typically developing children and 
children with autism spectrum disorder. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 
101, 206–223. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2008.04.004 
Beauchaine, T. P., Gatzke-Kopp, L., & Mead, H. K. (2007). Polyvagal Theory and 
developmental psychopathology: Emotion dysregulation and conduct problems from 
preschool to adolescence. Biological Psychology, 74, 174–184. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.biopsycho.2005.08.008 
Beaupré, M. G., & Hess, U. (2005). Cross-cultural emotion recognition among Canadian 
ethnic groups. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 36, 355–370. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0022022104273656 
Bedford, R., Elsabbagh, M., Gliga, T., Pickles, A., Senju, A., Charman, T., … the BASIS 
Team. (2012). Precursors to social and communication difficulties in infants at-risk 
for autism: gaze following and attentional engagement. Journal of Autism and 
Developmental Disorders, 42, 2208–2218. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10803-012-1450-
y 
Benarroch, E. E. (1993). The Central Autonomic Network: Functional organization, 







Benevides, T. W., & Lane, S. J. (2015). A review of cardiac autonomic measures: 
Considerations for examination of physiological response in children with autism 
spectrum disorder. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 45, 560–575. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10803-013-1971-z 
Bentler, P. M., & Bonett, D. G. (1980). Significance tests and goodness of fit in the analysis 
of covariance structures. Psychological Bulletin, 88(3), 588–606. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.88.3.588 
Berntson, G. G., Cacioppo, J. T., & Grossman, P. (2007). Whither vagal tone. Biological 
Psychology, 74, 295–300. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.biopsycho.2006.08.006 
Berntson, G. G., Cacioppo, J. T., Quigley, K. S., & Fabro, V. T. (1994). Autonomic space 
and psychophysiological response. Psychophysiology, 31, 44–61. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-8986.1994.tb01024.x 
Berntson, G. G., & Stowell, J. R. (1998). ECG artifacts and heart period variability: Don’t 
miss a beat! Psychophysiology, 35, 127–132. https://doi.org/10.1111/1469-
8986.3510127 
Berthoz, S., & Hill, E. L. (2005). The validity of using self-reports to assess emotion 
regulation abilities in adults with autism spectrum disorder. European Psychiatry, 20, 
291–298. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eurpsy.2004.06.013 
Berthoz, S., Lalanne, C., Crane, L., & Hill, E. L. (2013). Investigating emotional impairments 
in adults with autism spectrum disorders and the broader autism phenotype. 
Psychiatry Research, 208, 257–264. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.psychres.2013.05.014 
Berthoz, S., Perdereau, F., Godart, N., Corcos, M., & Haviland, M. G. (2007). Observer- and 






three measures. Journal of Psychosomatic Research, 62, 341–347. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpsychores.2006.10.008 
Bildt, A. de, Sytema, S., Meffert, H., & Bastiaansen, J. A. C. J. (2015). The Autism 
Diagnostic Observation Schedule, module 4: Application of the revised algorithms in 
an independent, well-defined, Dutch sample (n = 93). Journal of Autism and 
Developmental Disorders, 46, 21–30. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10803-015-2532-4 
Bird, G., & Cook, R. (2013). Mixed emotions: the contribution of alexithymia to the 
emotional symptoms of autism. Translational Psychiatry, 3, e285. 
https://doi.org/10.1038/tp.2013.61 
Bird, G., Silani, G., Brindley, R., White, S., Frith, U., & Singer, T. (2010). Empathic brain 
responses in insula are modulated by levels of alexithymia but not autism. Brain, 133, 
1515–1525. https://doi.org/10.1093/brain/awq060 
Blair, R. (1999). Psychophysiological responsiveness to the distress of others in children with 
autism. Personality and Individual Differences, 26, 477–485. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0191-8869(98)00154-8 
Blair, R. (2008). Fine cuts of empathy and the amygdala: Dissociable deficits in psychopathy 
and autism. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 61, 157–170. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/17470210701508855 
Blair, R. (2011). Should affective arousal be grounded in perception-action coupling? 
Emotion Review, 3, 109–110. https://doi.org/10.1177/1754073910384157 






Boria, S., Fabbri-Destro, M., Cattaneo, L., Sparaci, L., Sinigaglia, C., Santelli, E., … 
Rizzolatti, G. (2009). Intention understanding in autism. PLOS ONE, 4, e5596. 
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0005596 
Bos, P. A., Montoya, E. R., Hermans, E. J., Keysers, C., & van Honk, J. (2015). Oxytocin 
reduces neural activity in the pain circuitry when seeing pain in others. NeuroImage, 
113, 217–224. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2015.03.049 
Bosacki, S., & Astington, J. W. (2001). Theory of mind in preadolescence: Relations between 
social understanding and social competence. Social Development, 8, 237–255. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9507.00093 
Bourgeois, P., & Hess, U. (2008). The impact of social context on mimicry. Biological 
Psychology, 77, 343–352. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.biopsycho.2007.11.008 
Briggs, S. R., & Cheek, J. M. (1986). The role of factor analysis in the development and 
evaluation of personality scales. Journal of Personality, 54, 106–148. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6494.1986.tb00391.x 
Brosschot, J. F., Van Dijk, E., & Thayer, J. F. (2007). Daily worry is related to low heart rate 
variability during waking and the subsequent nocturnal sleep period. International 
Journal of Psychophysiology, 63, 39–47. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpsycho.2006.07.016 
Brownell, C. A. (2013). Early development of prosocial behavior: Current perspectives. 
Infancy, 18, 1–9. https://doi.org/10.1111/infa.12004 
Buck, T. R., Viskochil, J., Farley, M., Coon, H., McMahon, W. M., Morgan, J., & Bilder, D. 






disorder. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 44, 3063–3071. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10803-014-2170-2 
Butler, E. A., Wilhelm, F. H., & Gross, J. J. (2006). Respiratory sinus arrhythmia, emotion, 
and emotion regulation during social interaction. Psychophysiology, 43, 612–622. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-8986.2006.00467.x 
Butterworth, G. (1992). Origins of self-perception in infancy. Psychological Inquiry, 3, 103–
111. https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327965pli0302_1 
Cacioppo, J. T. (2002). Social neuroscience: Understanding the pieces fosters understanding 
the whole and vice versa. American Psychologist, 57, 819–831. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.57.11.819 
Cacioppo, J. T., Berntson, G. G., Sheridan, J. F., & McClintock, M. K. (2000). Multilevel 
integrative analyses of human behavior: Social neuroscience and the complementing 
nature of social and biological approaches. Psychological Bulletin, 126, 829–843. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.126.6.829 
Cacioppo, J. T., Tassinary, L. G., & Berntson, G. (2007). Handbook of psychophysiology. 
New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 
Caes, L., Uzieblo, K., Crombez, G., De Ruddere, L., Vervoort, T., & Goubert, L. (2012). 
Negative emotional responses elicited by the anticipation of pain in others: 
Psychophysiological evidence. The Journal of Pain, 13, 467–476. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpain.2012.02.003 
Calkins, S. D., Graziano, P. A., & Keane, S. P. (2007). Cardiac vagal regulation differentiates 







Calkins, S. D., & Keane, S. P. (2004). Cardiac vagal regulation across the preschool period: 
Stability, continuity, and implications for childhood adjustment. Developmental 
Psychobiology, 45, 101–112. https://doi.org/10.1002/dev.20020 
Campbell, M. W., & de Waal, F. B. M. (2014). Chimpanzees empathize with group mates 
and humans, but not with baboons or unfamiliar chimpanzees. Proceedings of the 
Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 281, 20140013. 
https://doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2014.0013 
Carlo, G., Allen, J. B., & Buhman, D. C. (1999). Facilitating and disinhibiting prosocial 
behaviors: the nonlinear interaction of trait perspective taking and trait personal 
distress on volunteering. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 21, 189–197. 
https://doi.org/10.1207/S15324834BASP2103_3 
Caron, M.-J., Mottron, L., Rainville, C., & Chouinard, S. (2004). Do high functioning 
persons with autism present superior spatial abilities? Neuropsychologia, 42, 467–
481. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2003.08.015 
Carter, C. S., Harris, J., & Porges, S. W. (2009). Neural and evolutionary perspectives on 
empathy. In J. Decety (Ed.), The social neuroscience of empathy. Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press. 
Chen, E., Matthews, K. A., Salomon, K., & Ewart, C. K. (2002). Cardiovascular reactivity 
during social and nonsocial stressors: Do children’s personal goals and expressive 







Cheng, Y., Lin, C.-P., Liu, H.-L., Hsu, Y.-Y., Lim, K.-E., Hung, D., & Decety, J. (2007). 
Expertise modulates the perception of pain in others. Current Biology, 17, 1708–
1713. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2007.09.020 
Clark, T. F., Winkielman, P., & McIntosh, D. N. (2008). Autism and the extraction of 
emotion from briefly presented facial expressions: Stumbling at the first step of 
empathy. Emotion, 8, 803–809. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0014124 
Cohen, S., Masyn, K., Mastergeorge, A., & Hessl, D. (2015). Psychophysiological responses 
to emotional stimuli in children and adolescents with autism and fragile X syndrome. 
Journal of Clinical Child & Adolescent Psychology, 44, 250–263. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/15374416.2013.843462 
Constantino, J. N. (2011). The quantitative nature of autistic social impairment. Pediatric 
Research, 69, 55R–62R. https://doi.org/10.1203/PDR.0b013e318212ec6e 
Constantino, J. N., & Todd, R. (2003). Autistic traits in the general population: A twin study. 
Archives of General Psychiatry, 60, 524–530. 
https://doi.org/10.1001/archpsyc.60.5.524 
Cook, R., Brewer, R., Shah, P., & Bird, G. (2013). Alexithymia, not autism, predicts poor 
recognition of emotional facial expressions. Psychological Science, 
956797612463582. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797612463582 
Cools, A. K. A., Van Hout, A. J.-M., & Nelissen, M. H. J. (2008). Canine reconciliation and 
third-party-initiated postconflict affiliation: Do peacemaking social mechanisms in 







Cowell, J. M., Lee, K., Malcolm-Smith, S., Selcuk, B., Zhou, X., & Decety, J. (2016). The 
development of generosity and moral cognition across five cultures. Developmental 
Science, n/a-n/a. https://doi.org/10.1111/desc.12403 
Craig, K. D., & Lowery, H. J. (1969). Heart-rate components of conditioned vicarious 
autonomic responses. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 11, 381–387. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/h0027250 
Craig, K. D., Versloot, J., Goubert, L., Vervoort, T., & Crombez, G. (2010). Perceiving pain 
in others: automatic and controlled mechanisms. The Journal of Pain, 11, 101–108. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpain.2009.08.008 
Cuff, B. M. P., Brown, S. J., Taylor, L., & Howat, D. J. (2014). Empathy: A review of the 
concept. Emotion Review, 1754073914558466. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1754073914558466 
Cureton, E. E. (1966). On correlation coefficients. Psychometrika, 31, 605–607. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02289528 
Custance, D., & Mayer, J. (2012). Empathic-like responding by domestic dogs (Canis 
familiaris) to distress in humans: an exploratory study. Animal Cognition, 15, 851–
859. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10071-012-0510-1 
Cuthbert, B. N. (2014). The RDoC framework: facilitating transition from ICD/DSM to 
dimensional approaches that integrate neuroscience and psychopathology. World 
Psychiatry, 13, 28–35. https://doi.org/10.1002/wps.20087 
Dahlgren, S. O., & Trillingsgaard, A. (1996). Theory of mind in non-retarded children with 
autism and Asperger’s syndrome. A research note. Journal of Child Psychology and 






Dalton, K. M., Nacewicz, B. M., Johnstone, T., Schaefer, H. S., Gernsbacher, M. A., 
Goldsmith, H. H., … Davidson, R. J. (2005). Gaze fixation and the neural circuitry of 
face processing in autism. Nature Neuroscience, 8, 519. 
https://doi.org/10.1038/nn1421 
Daluwatte, C., Miles, J. H., Christ, S. E., Beversdorf, D. Q., Takahashi, T. N., & Yao, G. 
(2012). Atypical pupillary light reflex and heart rate variability in children with 
autism spectrum disorder. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 43, 1910–
1925. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10803-012-1741-3 
Danziger, N., Prkachin, K. M., & Willer, J.-C. (2006). Is pain the price of empathy? The 
perception of others’ pain in patients with congenital insensitivity to pain. Brain, 129, 
2494–2507. https://doi.org/10.1093/brain/awl155 
Davidov, M., Zahn-Waxler, C., Roth-Hanania, R., & Knafo, A. (2013). Concern for others in 
the first year of life: Theory, evidence, and avenues for research. Child Development 
Perspectives, 7, 126–131. https://doi.org/10.1111/cdep.12028 
Davis, M. (1980). A multidimensional approach to individual differences in empathy. JSAS 
Catalog of Selected Documents in Psychology, 10, 2–19. 
de Coster, L., Andres, M., & Brass, M. (2014). Effects of being imitated on motor responses 
evoked by pain observation: Exerting control determines action tendencies when 
perceiving pain in others. The Journal of Neuroscience, 34, 6952–6957. 
https://doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.5044-13.2014 
de Coster, L., Verschuere, B., Goubert, L., Tsakiris, M., & Brass, M. (2013). I suffer more 






seeing someone else in pain. Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral Neuroscience, 13, 
519–532. https://doi.org/10.3758/s13415-013-0168-4 
de Coster, L., Wiersema, J. R., Deschrijver, E., & Brass, M. (n.d.). The influence of being 
imitated on empathy for pain in adults with high functioning autism. Manuscript 
Submitted for Publication. 
de Geus, E. J. C., & van Doornen, L. J. P. (1996). Ambulatory assessment of 
parasympathetic/sympathetic balance by impedance cardiography. In J. Fahrenberg & 
M. Myrtek (Eds.), Ambulatory assessment:  Computer-assisted psychological and 
psychophysiological methods in monitoring and field studies (pp. 141–163). Ashland, 
OH: Hogrefe & Huber. 
de Geus, E. J. C., Willemsen, G. H. M., Klaver, C. H. A. M., & van Doornen, L. J. P. (1995). 
Ambulatory measurement of respiratory sinus arrhythmia and respiration rate. 
Biological Psychology, 41, 205–227. https://doi.org/10.1016/0301-0511(95)05137-6 
de Vignemont, F., & Singer, T. (2006). The empathic brain: how, when and why? Trends in 
Cognitive Sciences, 10, 435–441. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2006.08.008 
de Waal, F. B. M. (2008). Putting the altruism back into altruism: The evolution of empathy. 
Annual Review of Psychology, 59, 279–300. 
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.59.103006.093625 
de Wied, M., Boxtel, A., Matthys, W., & Meeus, W. (2011). Verbal, facial and autonomic 
responses to empathy-eliciting film clips by disruptive male adolescents with high 







Decety, J. (2011). Dissecting the neural mechanisms mediating empathy. Emotion Review, 3, 
92–108. https://doi.org/10.1177/1754073910374662 
Decety, J., Chen, C., Harenski, C., & Kiehl, K. A. (2013). An fMRI study of affective 
perspective taking in individuals with psychopathy: imagining another in pain does 
not evoke empathy. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 7, 489. 
https://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2013.00489 
Decety, J., Cowell, J. M., Lee, K., Mahasneh, R., Malcolm-Smith, S., Selcuk, B., & Zhou, X. 
(2015). The negative association between religiousness and children’s altruism across 
the world. Current Biology, 25(22), 2951–2955. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2015.09.056 
Decety, J., & Jackson, P. L. (2004). The functional architecture of human empathy. 
Behavioral and Cognitive Neuroscience Reviews, 3, 71–100. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1534582304267187 
Decety, J., & Meyer, M. (2008). From emotion resonance to empathic understanding: A 
social developmental neuroscience account. Development and Psychopathology, 20, 
1053. 
Decety, J., & Svetlova, M. (2012). Putting together phylogenetic and ontogenetic 
perspectives on empathy. Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience, 2, 1–24. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dcn.2011.05.003 
Decety, J., Yang, C.-Y., & Cheng, Y. (2010). Physicians down-regulate their pain empathy 







Demurie, E., De Corel, M., & Roeyers, H. (2011). Empathic accuracy in adolescents with 
autism spectrum disorders and adolescents with attention-deficit/hyperactivity 
disorder. Research in Autism Spectrum Disorders, 5, 126–134. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rasd.2010.03.002 
Derntl, B., Finkelmeyer, A., Eickhoff, S., Kellermann, T., Falkenberg, D. I., Schneider, F., & 
Habel, U. (2010). Multidimensional assessment of empathic abilities: Neural 
correlates and gender differences. Psychoneuroendocrinology, 35, 67–82. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.psyneuen.2009.10.006 
Deschamps, P. K. H., Been, M., & Matthys, W. (2014). Empathy and empathy induced 
prosocial behavior in 6- and 7-year-olds with autism spectrum disorder. Journal of 
Autism and Developmental Disorders, 44, 1749–1758. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10803-014-2048-3 
Deschamps, P. K. H., Coppes, L., Kenemans, J. L., Schutter, D. J. L. G., & Matthys, W. 
(2015). Electromyographic responses to emotional facial expressions in 6–7 year olds 
with autism spectrum disorders. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 45, 
354–362. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10803-013-1890-z 
DeWall, C. N., Baumeister, R. F., Gailliot, M. T., & Maner, J. K. (2008). Depletion makes 
the heart grow less helpful: Helping as a Function of self-regulatory energy and 
genetic relatedness. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 34, 1653–1662. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167208323981 
Diamond, L. M., Fagundes, C. P., & Butterworth, M. R. (2012). Attachment style, vagal tone, 
and empathy during mother–adolescent interactions. Journal of Research on 






Dijkhuis, R. R., Ziermans, T. B., Rijn, S. V., Staal, W. G., & Swaab, H. (2016). Self-
regulation and quality of life in high-functioning young adults with autism. Autism, 
1362361316655525. https://doi.org/10.1177/1362361316655525 
Dimberg, U., & Thunberg, M. (2012). Empathy, emotional contagion, and rapid facial 
reactions to angry and happy facial expressions: Empathy and rapid facial reactions. 
PsyCh Journal, 1, 118–127. https://doi.org/10.1002/pchj.4 
Dimberg, U., Thunberg, M., & Elmehed, K. (2000). Unconscious facial reactions to 
emotional facial expressions. Psychological Science, 11, 86–89. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9280.00221 
Doherty, R. W. (1997). The Emotional Contagion Scale: A measure of individual differences. 
Journal of Nonverbal Behavior, 21, 131–154. 
https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1024956003661 
Dondi, M., Simion, F., & Caltran, G. (1999). Can newborns discriminate between their own 
cry and the cry of another newborn infant? Developmental Psychology, 35, 418–426. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/0012-1649.35.2.418 
Doshi-Velez, F., Ge, Y., & Kohane, I. (2014). Comorbidity clusters in autism spectrum 
disorders: An electronic health record time-series analysis. Pediatrics, 133, e54–e63. 
https://doi.org/10.1542/peds.2013-0819 
Duffy, K. A., & Chartrand, T. L. (2015). Mimicry: causes and consequences. Current 
Opinion in Behavioral Sciences, 3, 112–116. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cobeha.2015.03.002 
Durand, K., Gallay, M., Seigneuric, A., Robichon, F., & Baudouin, J.-Y. (2007). The 






Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 97, 14–27. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2006.12.001 
Dziobek, I., Fleck, S., Kalbe, E., Rogers, K., Hassenstab, J., Brand, M., … Convit, A. (2006). 
Introducing MASC: A movie for the assessment of social cognition. Journal of 
Autism and Developmental Disorders, 36, 623–636. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10803-
006-0107-0 
Dziobek, I., Rogers, K., Fleck, S., Bahnemann, M., Heekeren, H. R., Wolf, O. T., & Convit, 
A. (2007). Dissociation of cognitive and emotional empathy in adults with Asperger 
syndrome using the Multifaceted Empathy Test (MET). Journal of Autism and 
Developmental Disorders, 38, 464–473. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10803-007-0486-x 
Edmiston, E. K., Jones, R. M., & Corbett, B. A. (2016). Physiological response to social 
evaluative threat in adolescents with autism spectrum disorder. Journal of Autism and 
Developmental Disorders, 46, 2992–3005. 
Eisenberg, N., Eggum, N. D., & Di Giunta, L. (2010). Empathy-related responding: 
Associations with prosocial behavior, aggression, and intergroup relations. Social 
Issues and Policy Review, 4, 143–180. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1751-
2409.2010.01020.x 
Eisenberg, N., Fabes, R. A., Miller, P. A., Fultz, J., Shell, R., Mathy, R. M., & Reno, R. R. 
(1989). Relation of sympathy and personal distress to prosocial behavior: A 
multimethod study. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57, 55–66. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.57.1.55 
Eisenberg, N., Fabes, R. A., Murphy, B., Karbon, M., Maszk, P., Smith, M., … Suh, K. 






empathy-related responding. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 66, 776–
797. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.66.4.776 
English, T., John, O. P., Srivastava, S., & Gross, J. J. (2012). Emotion regulation and peer-
rated social functioning: A 4-year longitudinal study. Journal of Research in 
Personality, 46, 780–784. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2012.09.006 
Erhabor, S. I., & Ndlovu, N. J. (2013). How happy are married people? Psychological 
indicators of marital satisfaction of married men and women in Gauteng Province, 
South Africa. Gender and Behaviour, 11, 5486–5498. 
Esbensen, A. J., Greenberg, J. S., Seltzer, M. M., & Aman, M. G. (2009). A longitudinal 
investigation of psychotropic and non-psychotropic medication use among 
adolescents and adults with autism spectrum disorders. Journal of Autism and 
Developmental Disorders, 39, 1339–1349. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10803-009-0750-
3 
Esco, M. R., & Flatt, A. A. (2014). Ultra-short-term heart rate variability indexes at rest and 
post-exercise in athletes: Evaluating the agreement with accepted recommendations. 
Journal of Sports Science & Medicine, 13, 535–541. 
Etkin, A., Egner, T., & Kalisch, R. (2011). Emotional processing in anterior cingulate and 
medial prefrontal cortex. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 15, 85–93. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2010.11.004 
Evers, C., Hopp, H., Gross, J. J., Fischer, A. H., Manstead, A. S. R., & Mauss, I. B. (2014). 







Fabes, R. A., Eisenberg, N., & Eisenbud, L. (1993). Behavioral and physiological correlates 
of children’s reactions to others in distress. Developmental Psychology, 29, 655–63. 
Fan, Y., & Han, S. (2008). Temporal dynamic of neural mechanisms involved in empathy for 
pain: An event-related brain potential study. Neuropsychologia, 46, 160–173. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2007.07.023 
Fan, Y.-T., Chen, C., Chen, S.-C., Decety, J., & Cheng, Y. (2014). Empathic arousal and 
social understanding in individuals with autism: evidence from fMRI and ERP 
measurements. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 9, 1203–1213. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/scan/nst101 
Faul, F., Erdfelder, E., Buchner, A., & Lang, A.-G. (2009). Statistical power analyses using 
G*Power 3.1: Tests for correlation and regression analyses. Behavior Research 
Methods, 41, 1149–1160. https://doi.org/10.3758/BRM.41.4.1149 
Field, T. M., Woodson, R., Greenberg, R., & Cohen, D. (1982). Discrimination and imitation 
of facial expression by neonates. Science, 218, 179–181. 
https://doi.org/10.1126/science.7123230 
Flavell, J. H. (1999). Cognitive development: Children’s knowledge about the mind. Annual 
Review of Psychology, 50, 21–45. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.50.1.21 
Fletcher-Watson, S., McConnell, F., Manola, E., & McConachie, H. (2014). Interventions 
based on the theory of mind cognitive model for autism spectrum disorder (ASD). In 








Fox, J., & Weisberg, S. (2011). An R companion to applied regression (2nd ed.). Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Sage. Retrieved from 
http://socserv.socsci.mcmaster.ca/jfox/Books/Companion 
Francis, K. (2005). Autism interventions: a critical update. Developmental Medicine and 
Child Neurology, 47, 493–9. 
Franz, P. D. M., Popp, K., Schaefer, R., Sitte, W., Schneider, C., Hardt, J., … Braehler, E. 
(2007). Alexithymia in the German general population. Social Psychiatry and 
Psychiatric Epidemiology, 43, 54–62. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00127-007-0265-1 
Fraser, O. N., & Bugnyar, T. (2011). Ravens reconcile after aggressive conflicts with 
valuable partners. PLOS ONE, 6, e18118. 
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0018118 
Fridlund, A. J., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1986). Guidelines for human electromyographic research. 
Psychophysiology, 23, 567–589. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-8986.1986.tb00676.x 
Frith, U. (2003). Autism: Explaining the enigma (2nd ed.). Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. 
Retrieved from http://eu.wiley.com/WileyCDA/WileyTitle/productCd-
0631229019.html 
Frith, U., Happé, F., & Siddons, F. (1994). Autism and theory of mind in everyday life. 
Social Development, 3, 108–124. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9507.1994.tb00031.x 
Fusaro, M., Tieri, G., & Aglioti, S. M. (2016). Seeing pain and pleasure on self and others: 
Behavioural and psychophysiological reactivity in immersive virtual reality. Journal 






Gallese, V. (2007). Before and below ‘theory of mind’: embodied simulation and the neural 
correlates of social cognition. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: 
Biological Sciences, 362, 659–669. https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2006.2002 
Garfinkel, S. N., Tiley, C., O’Keeffe, S., Harrison, N. A., Seth, A. K., & Critchley, H. D. 
(2016). Discrepancies between dimensions of interoception in autism: Implications 
for emotion and anxiety. Biological Psychology, 114, 117–126. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.biopsycho.2015.12.003 
Geangu, E., Benga, O., Stahl, D., & Striano, T. (2011). Individual differences in infants’ 
emotional resonance to a peer in distress: Self–other awareness and emotion 
regulation. Social Development, 20, 450–470. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-
9507.2010.00596.x 
Geangu, E., Hauf, P., Bhardwaj, R., & Bentz, W. (2011). Infant pupil diameter changes in 
response to others’ positive and negative emotions. PLOS ONE, 6, e27132. 
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0027132 
Geisler, F. C. M., Kubiak, T., Siewert, K., & Weber, H. (2013). Cardiac vagal tone is 
associated with social engagement and self-regulation. Biological Psychology, 93, 
279–286. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.biopsycho.2013.02.013 
Geschwind, D. H., & Levitt, P. (2007). Autism spectrum disorders: developmental 
disconnection syndromes. Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 17, 103–111. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.conb.2007.01.009 
Gill, K. L., & Calkins, S. D. (2003). Do aggressive/destructive toddlers lack concern for 






children. Development and Psychopathology, 15, 55–71. 
https://doi.org/10.1017.S095457940300004X 
Gillberg, C. (1992). The Emanuel Miller Memorial Lecture 1991: Autism and autistic-like 
conditions: Subclasses among disorders of empathy. Journal of Child Psychology and 
Psychiatry, 33, 813–842. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-7610.1992.tb01959.x 
Gillberg, C. (1996). The long-term outcome of childhood empathy disorders. European Child 
& Adolescent Psychiatry, 5, 52–56. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00538545 
Gini, G., Albiero, P., Benelli, B., & Altoè, G. (2007). Does empathy predict adolescents’ 
bullying and defending behavior? Aggressive Behavior, 33, 467–476. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/ab.20204 
Goedhart, A. D., Kupper, N., Willemsen, G., Boomsma, D. I., & de Geus, E. J. C. (2006). 
Temporal stability of ambulatory stroke volume and cardiac output measured by 
impedance cardiography. Biological Psychology, 72, 110–117. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.biopsycho.2005.08.004 
Goedhart, A. D., van der Sluis, S., Houtveen, J. H., Willemsen, G., & de Geus, E. J. C. 
(2007). Comparison of time and frequency domain measures of RSA in ambulatory 
recordings. Psychophysiology, 44, 203–215. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-
8986.2006.00490.x 
Golan, O., & Baron-Cohen, S. (2006). Systemizing empathy: Teaching adults with Asperger 
syndrome or high-functioning autism to recognize complex emotions using interactive 







Goldstein, H., Browne, W., & Rasbash, J. (2002). Partitioning variation in multilevel models. 
Understanding Statistics, 1, 223–231. https://doi.org/10.1207/S15328031US0104_02 
González-Roldán, A. M., Muñoz, M. A., Cifre, I., Sitges, C., & Montoya, P. (2013). Altered 
psychophysiological responses to the view of others’ pain and anger faces in 
fibromyalgia patients. The Journal of Pain, 14, 709–719. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpain.2013.01.775 
Gotham, K., Pickles, A., & Lord, C. (2008). Standardizing ADOS scores for a measure of 
severity in autism spectrum disorders. Journal of Autism and Developmental 
Disorders, 39, 693–705. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10803-008-0674-3 
Grant, C. C., Viljoen, M., Janse van Rensburg, D. c., & Wood, P. S. (2012). Heart rate 
variability assessment of the effect of physical training on autonomic cardiac control. 
Annals of Noninvasive Electrocardiology, 17, 219–229. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1542-474X.2012.00511.x 
Gross, J. J. (2001). Emotion regulation in adulthood: Timing is everything. Current 
Directions in Psychological Science, 10, 214–219. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-
8721.00152 
Gross, J. J., & John, O. P. (2003). Individual differences in two emotion regulation processes: 
Implications for affect, relationships, and well-being. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 85, 348–362. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.85.2.348 
Grossman, P., Karemaker, J., & Wieling, W. (1991). Prediction of tonic parasympathetic 
cardiac control using respiratory sinus arrhythmia: The need for respiratory control. 






Grossman, P., & Taylor, E. W. (2007). Toward understanding respiratory sinus arrhythmia: 
Relations to cardiac vagal tone, evolution and biobehavioral functions. Biological 
Psychology, 74, 263–285. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.biopsycho.2005.11.014 
Grossman, P., van Beek, J., & Wientjes, C. (1990). A comparison of three quantification 
methods for estimation of respiratory sinus arrhythmia. Psychophysiology, 27, 702–
714. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-8986.1990.tb03198.x 
Grynberg, D., Luminet, O., Corneille, O., Grèzes, J., & Berthoz, S. (2010). Alexithymia in 
the interpersonal domain: A general deficit of empathy? Personality and Individual 
Differences, 49, 845–850. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2010.07.013 
Gu, X., Eilam-Stock, T., Zhou, T., Anagnostou, E., Kolevzon, A., Soorya, L., … Fan, J. 
(2015). Autonomic and brain responses associated with empathy deficits in autism 
spectrum disorder. Human Brain Mapping, 36, 3323–3338. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/hbm.22840 
Hadjikhani, N., Zürcher, N. R., Rogier, O., Hippolyte, L., Lemonnier, E., Ruest, T., … 
Prkachin, K. M. (2014). Emotional contagion for pain is intact in autism spectrum 
disorders. Translational Psychiatry, 4, e343. https://doi.org/10.1038/tp.2013.113 
Han, S., Fan, Y., & Mao, L. (2008). Gender difference in empathy for pain: An 
electrophysiological investigation. Brain Research, 1196, 85–93. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.brainres.2007.12.062 
Hänsel, A., & von Känel, R. (2008). The ventro-medial prefrontal cortex: A major link 
between the autonomic nervous system, regulation of emotion, and stress reactivity? 






Happé, F., & Frith, U. (1996). The neuropsychology of autism. Brain, 119, 1377–1400. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/brain/119.4.1377 
Harari, H., Shamay-Tsoory, S. G., Ravid, M., & Levkovitz, Y. (2010). Double dissociation 
between cognitive and affective empathy in borderline personality disorder. 
Psychiatry Research, 175, 277–279. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.psychres.2009.03.002 
Harms, M. B., Martin, A., & Wallace, G. L. (2010). Facial emotion recognition in autism 
spectrum disorders: a review of behavioral and neuroimaging studies. 
Neuropsychology Review, 20, 290–322. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11065-010-9138-6 
Harrell, F. E., & Alzola, C. (2006). An introduction to S and the Hmisc and design libraries. 
Retrieved from http://biostat.mc.vanderbilt.edu/RS/sintro.pdf 
Hastings, P. D., & Miller, J. G. (2014). Autonomic regulation, polyvagal theory and 
children’s prosocial development. In L. M. Padilla-Walker & G. Carlo (Eds.), 
Prosocial development: A multidimensional approach. New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press. 
Haviland, M. G. (1996). Structure of the Twenty-Item Toronto Alexithymia Scale. Journal of 
Personality Assessment, 66, 116–125. https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327752jpa6601_9 
Haviland, M. G., & Reise, S. P. (1996). A California Q-set alexithymia prototype and its 
relationship to ego-control and ego-resiliency. Journal of Psychosomatic Research, 
41, 597–607. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0022-3999(96)00223-1 
Heaton, P., & Wallace, G. L. (2004). Annotation: The savant syndrome. Journal of Child 







Hein, G., Lamm, C., Brodbeck, C., & Singer, T. (2011). Skin conductance response to the 
pain of others predicts later costly helping. PLOS ONE, 6, e22759. 
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0022759 
Hess, U., & Blairy, S. (2001). Facial mimicry and emotional contagion to dynamic emotional 
facial expressions and their influence on decoding accuracy. International Journal of 
Psychophysiology, 40, 129–141. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-8760(00)00161-6 
Hess, U., & Fischer, A. (2013). Emotional mimicry as social regulation. Personality and 
Social Psychology Review. https://doi.org/10.1177/1088868312472607 
Hess, U., & Fischer, A. (2014). Emotional mimicry: Why and when we mimic emotions. 
Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 8, 45–57. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/spc3.12083 
Hinnant, J. B., & El-Sheikh, M. (2009). Children’s externalizing and internalizing symptoms 
over time: The role of individual differences in patterns of RSA responding. Journal 
of Abnormal Child Psychology, 37, 1049. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10802-009-9341-1 
Hirstein, W., Iversen, P., & Ramachandran, V. S. (2001). Autonomic responses of autistic 
children to people and objects. Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological 
Sciences, 268, 1883–1888. https://doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2001.1724 
Hobson, J. A., Harris, R., García-Pérez, R., & Hobson, R. P. (2009). Anticipatory concern: A 
study in autism. Developmental Science, 12, 249–263. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-
7687.2008.00762.x 
Hoekstra, R. A., Bartels, M., Cath, D. C., & Boomsma, D. I. (2008). Factor structure, 






Dutch population and patient groups. Journal of Autism and Developmental 
Disorders, 38(8), 1555–1566. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10803-008-0538-x 
Hoekstra, R. A., Vinkhuyzen, A. A. E., Wheelwright, S., Bartels, M., Boomsma, D. I., Baron-
Cohen, S., … Sluis, S. van der. (2010). The construction and validation of an abridged 
version of the Autism-Spectrum Quotient (AQ-Short). Journal of Autism and 
Developmental Disorders, 41, 589–596. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10803-010-1073-0 
Hofvander, B., Delorme, R., Chaste, P., Nydén, A., Wentz, E., Ståhlberg, O., … Leboyer, M. 
(2009). Psychiatric and psychosocial problems in adults with normal-intelligence 
autism spectrum disorders. BMC Psychiatry, 9, 35. https://doi.org/10.1186/1471-
244X-9-35 
Hollocks, M. J., Howlin, P., Papadopoulos, A. S., Khondoker, M., & Simonoff, E. (2014). 
Differences in HPA-axis and heart rate responsiveness to psychosocial stress in 
children with autism spectrum disorders with and without co-morbid anxiety. 
Psychoneuroendocrinology, 46, 32–45. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.psyneuen.2014.04.004 
Hoogenhout, M., & Malcolm-Smith, S. (2014). Theory of mind in autism spectrum disorder: 
Does DSM classification predict development? Research in Autism Spectrum 
Disorders, 8, 597–607. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rasd.2014.02.005 
Hothorn, T., Bretz, F., & Westfall, P. (2008). Simultaneous inference in general parametric 
models. Biometrical Journal, 50, 346–363. 
Howell, D. C. (2004). Fundamental statistics for the behavioral sciences (5th edition). 






Hu, L., & Bentler, P. M. (1999). Cutoff criteria for fit indexes in covariance structure 
analysis: Conventional criteria versus new alternatives. Structural Equation 
Modeling: A Multidisciplinary Journal, 6(1), 1–55. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/10705519909540118 
Hubert, B. E., Wicker, B., Monfardini, E., & Deruelle, C. (2009). Electrodermal reactivity to 
emotion processing in adults with autistic spectrum disorders. Autism, 13, 9–19. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1362361308091649 
Huffman, L. C., Bryan, Y. E., del Carmen, R., Pedersen, F. A., Doussard-Roosevelt, J. A., & 
Forges, S. W. (1998). Infant temperament and cardiac vagal tone: Assessments at 
twelve weeks of age. Child Development, 69, 624–635. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8624.1998.tb06233.x 
Jackson, P. L., Meltzoff, A. N., & Decety, J. (2005). How do we perceive the pain of others? 
A window into the neural processes involved in empathy. NeuroImage, 24, 771–779. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2004.09.006 
Johnson, P. C. D. (2014). Extension of Nakagawa & Schielzeth’s R2GLMM to random 
slopes models. Methods in Ecology and Evolution, 5, 944–946. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/2041-210X.12225 
Jones, A. P., Happé, F. G. E., Gilbert, F., Burnett, S., & Viding, E. (2010). Feeling, caring, 
knowing: different types of empathy deficit in boys with psychopathic tendencies and 







Joseph, R. M., & Tager-Flusberg, H. (2004). The relationship of theory of mind and 
executive functions to symptom type and severity in children with autism. 
Development and Psychopathology, 16, 137–55. https://doi.org/PMC1201455 
Joshi, G., Petty, C., Wozniak, J., Henin, A., Fried, R., Galdo, M., … Biederman, J. (2010). 
The heavy burden of psychiatric comorbidity in youth with autism spectrum 
disorders: A large comparative study of a psychiatrically referred population. Journal 
of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 40, 1361–1370. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10803-010-0996-9 
Kaland, N., Møller-Nielsen, A., Callesen, K., Mortensen, E. L., Gottlieb, D., & Smith, L. 
(2002). A new ‘advanced’ test of theory of mind: evidence from children and 
adolescents with Asperger syndrome. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry 
and Allied Disciplines, 43, 517–528. https://doi.org/10.1111/1469-7610.00042 
Kanner, L. (1943). Autistic disturbances of affective contact. Nervous Child, 2, 217–250. 
Kaye, J. T., Bradford, D. E., & Curtin, J. J. (2016). Psychometric properties of startle and 
corrugator response in NPU, affective picture viewing, and resting state tasks. 
Psychophysiology, 53, 1241–1255. https://doi.org/10.1111/psyp.12663 
Kemp, A. H., Brunoni, A. R., Santos, I. S., Nunes, M. A., Dantas, E. M., Carvalho de 
Figueiredo, R., … Lotufo, P. A. (2014). Effects of depression, anxiety, comorbidity, 
and antidepressants on resting-state heart rate and its variability: An ELSA-Brasil 







Klein, K. J. K., & Hodges, S. D. (2001). Gender differences, motivation, and empathic 
accuracy: When it pays to understand. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 
27, 720–730. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167201276007 
Kline, R. B. (2010). Principles and practice of structural equation modeling (3rd edition). 
New York, NY: The Guilford Press. 
Kloosterman, P. H., Keefer, K. V., Kelley, E. A., Summerfeldt, L. J., & Parker, J. D. A. 
(2011). Evaluation of the factor structure of the Autism-Spectrum Quotient. 
Personality and Individual Differences, 50, 310–314. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2010.10.015 
Klusek, J., Martin, G. E., & Losh, M. (2013). Physiological arousal in autism and fragile X 
syndrome: Group comparisons and links with pragmatic language. American Journal 
on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities, 118, 475–495. 
https://doi.org/10.1352/1944.7558-118.6.475 
Klusek, J., Roberts, J. E., & Losh, M. (2014). Cardiac autonomic regulation in autism and 
fragile X syndrome: A review. Psychological Bulletin, 141, 141–175. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/a0038237 
Kogan, A., Oveis, C., Carr, E. W., Gruber, J., Mauss, I. B., Shallcross, A., … Keltner, D. 
(2014). Vagal activity is quadratically related to prosocial traits, prosocial emotions, 
and observer perceptions of prosociality. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 107, 1051–1063. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0037509 
Kohn, N., Eickhoff, S. B., Scheller, M., Laird, A. R., Fox, P. T., & Habel, U. (2014). Neural 






analysis. NeuroImage, 87, 345–355. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2013.11.001 
Kok, B. E., & Fredrickson, B. L. (2010). Upward spirals of the heart: Autonomic flexibility, 
as indexed by vagal tone, reciprocally and prospectively predicts positive emotions 
and social connectedness. Biological Psychology, 85, 432–436. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.biopsycho.2010.09.005 
Kokkonen, P., Karvonen, J. T., Veijola, J., Läksy, K., Jokelainen, J., Järvelin, M.-R., & 
Joukamaa, M. (2001). Prevalence and sociodemographic correlates of alexithymia in 
a population sample of young adults. Comprehensive Psychiatry, 42, 471–476. 
https://doi.org/10.1053/comp.2001.27892 
Kollai, M., & Mizsei, G. (1990). Respiratory sinus arrhythmia is a limited measure of cardiac 
parasympathetic control in man. The Journal of Physiology, 424, 329–342. 
Kolvin, I., Ounsted, C., Humphrey, M., & McNay, A. (1971). The phenomenology of 
childhood psychoses. The British Journal of Psychiatry, 118, 385–395. 
https://doi.org/10.1192/bjp.118.545.385 
Konstantareas, M. M., & Stewart, K. (2006). Affect regulation and temperament in children 
with autism spectrum disorder. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 36, 
143–154. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10803-005-0051-4 
Kooiman, C. G., Spinhoven, P., & Trijsburg, R. W. (2002). The assessment of alexithymia: A 
critical review of the literature and a psychometric study of the Toronto Alexithymia 







Kozak, M. J., & Cuthbert, B. N. (2016). The NIMH Research Domain Criteria initiative: 
Background, issues, and pragmatics. Psychophysiology, 53, 286–297. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/psyp.12518 
Krach, S., Kamp-Becker, I., Einhäuser, W., Sommer, J., Frässle, S., Jansen, A., … Paulus, F. 
M. (2015). Evidence from pupillometry and fMRI indicates reduced neural response 
during vicarious social pain but not physical pain in autism. Human Brain Mapping, 
36, 4730–4744. https://doi.org/10.1002/hbm.22949 
Krahn, T., & Fenton, A. (2009). Autism, empathy and questions of moral agency. Journal for 
the Theory of Social Behaviour, 39, 145–166. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-
5914.2009.00402.x 
Kreibig, S. D. (2010). Autonomic nervous system activity in emotion: A review. Biological 
Psychology, 84, 394–421. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.biopsycho.2010.03.010 
Kucharska-Pietura, K., & Mortimer, A. (2013). Can antipsychotics improve social cognition 
in patients with schizophrenia? CNS Drugs, 27, 335–343. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s40263-013-0047-0 
Kunz, M., & Lautenbacher, S. (2014). The faces of pain: A cluster analysis of individual 
differences in facial activity patterns of pain. European Journal of Pain, 18, 813–823. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/j.1532-2149.2013.00421.x 
Kuroda, M., Wakabayashi, A., Uchiyama, T., Yoshida, Y., Koyama, T., & Kamio, Y. (2011). 
Determining differences in social cognition between high-functioning autistic disorder 
and other pervasive developmental disorders using new advanced ‘mind-reading’ 







Kuznetsova, A., Brockhoff, P. B., & Christensen, R. H. B. (2015). lmerTest: Tests in linear 
mixed effects models (Version 2.0-29). Retrieved from https://CRAN.R-
project.org/package=lmerTest 
Kylliäinen, A., & Hietanen, J. K. (2006). Skin conductance responses to another person’s 
gaze in children with autism. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 36, 
517–525. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10803-006-0091-4 
Kylliäinen, A., Wallace, S., Coutanche, M. N., Leppänen, J. M., Cusack, J., Bailey, A. J., & 
Hietanen, J. K. (2012). Affective–motivational brain responses to direct gaze in 
children with autism spectrum disorder. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 
53, 790–797. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-7610.2011.02522.x 
Lakin, J. L., & Chartrand, T. L. (2003). Using nonconscious behavioral mimicry to create 
affiliation and rapport. Psychological Science, 14, 334–339. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9280.14481 
Lamm, C., Batson, C. D., & Decety, J. (2007). The neural substrate of human empathy: 
Effects of perspective-taking and cognitive appraisal. Journal of Cognitive 
Neuroscience, 19, 42–58. https://doi.org/10.1162/jocn.2007.19.1.42 
Lamm, C., Decety, J., & Singer, T. (2011). Meta-analytic evidence for common and distinct 
neural networks associated with directly experienced pain and empathy for pain. 
NeuroImage, 54, 2492–2502. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2010.10.014 
Lamm, C., Porges, E. C., Cacioppo, J. T., & Decety, J. (2008). Perspective taking is 
associated with specific facial responses during empathy for pain. Brain Research, 






Lane, R. D., Sechrest, L., Reidel, R., Weldon, V., Kaszniak, A., & Schwartz, G. E. (1996). 
Impaired verbal and nonverbal emotion recognition in alexithymia. Psychosomatic 
Medicine, 58, 203–210. 
Lane, R. D., Sechrest, L., & Riedel, R. (1998). Sociodemographic correlates of alexithymia. 
Comprehensive Psychiatry, 39, 377–385. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0010-
440X(98)90051-7 
Lane, R. D., Sechrest, L., Riedel, R., Shapiro, D. E., & Kaszniak, A. W. (2000). Pervasive 
emotion recognition deficit common to alexithymia and the repressive coping style. 
Psychosomatic Medicine, 62, 492–501. 
Lanzetta, J. T., & Englis, B. G. (1989). Expectations of cooperation and competition and their 
effects on observers’ vicarious emotional responses. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 56, 543–554. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.56.4.543 
Lazarus, A. (2009). Assessing the impact of culture on Theory of Mind performance in South 
African adults (Unpublished honours thesis). University of Cape Town, Rondebosch, 
South Africa. 
Lebowitz, M. S., & Dovidio, J. F. (2015). Implications of emotion regulation strategies for 
empathic concern, social attitudes, and helping behavior. Emotion, 15, 187–194. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/a0038820 
Lee, Y. J., Yu, S.-H., Cho, S.-J., Cho, I. H., Koh, S.-H., & Kim, S. J. (2010). Direct and 
indirect effects of the temperament and character on alexithymia: a pathway analysis 







Leppänen, J. M., Niehaus, D. J. H., Koen, L., Du Toit, E., Schoeman, R., & Emsley, R. 
(2006). Emotional face processing deficit in schizophrenia: A replication study in a 
South African Xhosa population. Schizophrenia Research, 84, 323–330. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.schres.2006.02.007 
Leppänen, J. M., Niehaus, D. J. H., Koen, L., Du Toit, E., Schoeman, R., & Emsley, R. 
(2008). Deficits in facial affect recognition in unaffected siblings of Xhosa 
schizophrenia patients: Evidence for a neurocognitive endophenotype. Schizophrenia 
Research, 99, 270–273. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.schres.2007.11.003 
Lepron, E., Causse, M., & Farrer, C. (2015). Responsibility and the sense of agency enhance 
empathy for pain. Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 282, 
20142288. https://doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2014.2288 
Levine, T. P., Sheinkopf, S. J., Pescosolido, M., Rodino, A., Elia, G., & Lester, B. (2012). 
Physiologic arousal to social stress in children with autism spectrum disorders: A pilot 
study. Research in Autism Spectrum Disorders, 6, 177–183. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rasd.2011.04.003 
Lewis, C. S. (1940). The problem of pain (Revised ed.). San Francisco, CA: HarperOne. 
Li, W., & Han, S. (2010). Perspective taking modulates event-related potentials to perceived 
pain. Neuroscience Letters, 469, 328–332. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neulet.2009.12.021 
Licht, C. M. M., de Geus, E. J. C., van Dyck, R., & Penninx, B. W. J. H. (2010). 
Longitudinal evidence for unfavorable effects of antidepressants on heart rate 







Licht, C. M. M., Penninx, B. W. J. H., & de Geus, E. J. C. (2012). Effects of antidepressants, 
but not psychopathology, on cardiac sympathetic control: a longitudinal study. 
Neuropsychopharmacology, 37, 2487–2495. https://doi.org/10.1038/npp.2012.107 
Lieberman, L., Liu, H., Huggins, A. A., Katz, A. C., Zvolensky, M. J., & Shankman, S. A. 
(2016). Comparing the validity of informant and self-reports of personality using 
laboratory indices of emotional responding as criterion variables. Psychophysiology, 
53, 1386–1397. https://doi.org/10.1111/psyp.12680 
Liew, J., Eisenberg, N., Losoya, S. H., Fabes, R. A., Guthrie, I. K., & Murphy, B. C. (2003). 
Children’s physiological indices of empathy and their socioemotional adjustment: 
Does caregivers’ expressivity matter? Journal of Family Psychology, 17, 584–597. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/0893-3200.17.4.584 
Liew, J., Eisenberg, N., Spinrad, T. L., Eggum, N. D., Haugen, R. g., Kupfer, A., … Baham, 
M. E. (2011). Physiological regulation and fearfulness as predictors of young 
children’s empathy-related reactions. Social Development, 20, 111–134. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9507.2010.00575.x 
Likowski, K. U., Mühlberger, A., Seibt, B., Pauli, P., & Weyers, P. (2008). Modulation of 
facial mimicry by attitudes. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 44, 1065–
1072. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2007.10.007 
Likowski, K. U., Mühlberger, A., Seibt, B., Pauli, P., & Weyers, P. (2011). Processes 
underlying congruent and incongruent facial reactions to emotional facial expressions. 
Emotion, 11, 457–467. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0023162 
Lindinger, N. M., Malcolm-Smith, S., Dodge, N. C., Molteno, C. D., Thomas, K. G. F., 






alcohol spectrum disorders. Alcoholism: Clinical and Experimental Research, 40, 
367–376. https://doi.org/10.1111/acer.12961 
Liu, C., Conn, K., Sarkar, N., & Stone, W. (2008). Online affect detection and robot behavior 
adaptation for intervention of children with autism. IEEE Transactions on Robotics, 
24, 883–896. https://doi.org/10.1109/TRO.2008.2001362 
Lombardo, M. V., Barnes, J. L., Wheelwright, S. J., & Baron-Cohen, S. (2007). Self-
referential cognition and empathy in autism. PLOS ONE, 2, e883. 
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0000883 
London, E. B. (2014). Categorical diagnosis: a fatal flaw for autism research? Trends in 
Neurosciences, 37, 683–686. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tins.2014.10.003 
Lord, C., Risi, S., Lambrecht, L., Cook, E. H., Leventhal, B. L., DiLavore, P. C., … Rutter, 
M. (2000). The Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule—generic: A standard 
measure of social and communication deficits associated with the spectrum of autism. 
Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 30, 205–223. 
https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005592401947 
Lord, C., Rutter, M., DiLavore, P. C., Risi, S., Gotham, K., & Bishop, S. L. (2012). Autism 
Diagnostic Observation Schedule, second edition (ADOS-2) manual (part 1): 
Modules 1-4. Torrance, CA: Western Psychological Services. 
Losh, M., Childress, D., Lam, K., & Piven, J. (2008). Defining key features of the broad 
autism phenotype: A comparison across parents of multiple- and single-incidence 
autism families. American Journal of Medical Genetics Part B: Neuropsychiatric 






Lozier, L. M., Vanmeter, J. W., & Marsh, A. A. (2014). Impairments in facial affect 
recognition associated with autism spectrum disorders: A meta-analysis. Development 
and Psychopathology, 26, 933–945. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0954579414000479 
Lüdecke, D. (2016). sjPlot: Data visualization for statistics in social science (Version 2.0.2). 
Retrieved from https://CRAN.R-project.org/package=sjPlot 
MacNamara, A., & Phan, K. L. (2016). Psychobiological operationalization of RDoC 
constructs: Methodological and conceptual opportunities and challenges. 
Psychophysiology, 53, 406–409. https://doi.org/10.1111/psyp.12587 
MacRitchie, V. (2006). Secondary traumatic stress, level of exposure, empathy and social 
support in trauma workers (Unpublished masters thesis). University of the 
Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa. 
Magnée, M. J. C. M., De Gelder, B., Van Engeland, H., & Kemner, C. (2007). Facial 
electromyographic responses to emotional information from faces and voices in 
individuals with pervasive developmental disorder. Journal of Child Psychology and 
Psychiatry, 48, 1122–1130. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-7610.2007.01779.x 
Mailhot, J.-P., Vachon-Presseau, E., Jackson, P. L., & Rainville, P. (2012). Dispositional 
empathy modulates vicarious effects of dynamic pain expressions on spinal 
nociception, facial responses and acute pain. European Journal of Neuroscience, 35, 
271–278. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-9568.2011.07953.x 
Malcolm-Smith, S., Woolley, D., & Ward, C. L. (2015). Examining empathy and its 
association with aggression in young Western Cape children. Journal of Child & 







Malmo, R. B., & Davis, J. F. (1956). Physiological gradients as indicants of ‘arousal’ in 
mirror tracing. Canadian Journal of Psychology/Revue Canadienne de Psychologie, 
10, 231–238. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0083674 
Malmo, R. B., & Malmo, H. P. (2000). On electromyographic (EMG) gradients and 
movement-related brain activity: significance for motor control, cognitive functions, 
and certain psychopathologies. International Journal of Psychophysiology, 38, 143–
207. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-8760(00)00113-6 
Malpas, S. C. (2010). Sympathetic nervous system overactivity and its role in the 
development of cardiovascular disease. Physiological Reviews, 90, 513–557. 
https://doi.org/10.1152/physrev.00007.2009 
Marcoux, L.-A., Michon, P.-E., Voisin, J. I. A., Lemelin, S., & Jackson, P. L. (2013). The 
modulation of somatosensory resonance by psychopathic traits and empathy. 
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 7, 274. https://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2013.00274 
Marsh, P., Beauchaine, T. P., & Williams, B. (2008). Dissociation of sad facial expressions 
and autonomic nervous system responding in boys with disruptive behavior disorders. 
Psychophysiology, 45, 100–110. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-8986.2007.00603.x 
Mathersul, D., McDonald, S., & Rushby, J. A. (2013). Autonomic arousal explains social 
cognitive abilities in high-functioning adults with autism spectrum disorder. 
International Journal of Psychophysiology, 89, 475–482. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpsycho.2013.04.014 
Mathersul, D., McDonald, S., & Rushby, J. A. (2013). Psychophysiological correlates of 






International Journal of Psychophysiology, 87, 88–94. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpsycho.2012.11.005 
Mathersul, D., McDonald, S., & Rushby, J. A. (2013). Understanding advanced theory of 
mind and empathy in high-functioning adults with autism spectrum disorder. Journal 
of Clinical and Experimental Neuropsychology, 35, 655–668. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13803395.2013.809700 
Mathewson, K. J., Drmic, I. E., Jetha, M. K., Bryson, S. E., Goldberg, J. O., Hall, G. B., … 
Schmidt, L. A. (2011). Behavioral and cardiac responses to emotional Stroop in adults 
with autism spectrum disorders: influence of medication. Autism Research, 4, 98–108. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/aur.176 
Matsushima, K., Matsubayashi, J., Toichi, M., Funabiki, Y., Kato, T., Awaya, T., & Kato, T. 
(2016). Unusual sensory features are related to resting-state cardiac vagus nerve 
activity in autism spectrum disorders. Research in Autism Spectrum Disorders, 25, 
37–46. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rasd.2015.12.006 
Mauss, I. B., Levenson, R. W., McCarter, L., Wilhelm, F. H., & Gross, J. J. (2005). The tie 
that binds? Coherence among emotion experience, behavior, and physiology. 
Emotion, 5, 175–190. https://doi.org/10.1037/1528-3542.5.2.175 
Mauss, I. B., & Robinson, M. D. (2009). Measures of emotion: A review. Cognition & 
Emotion, 23, 209–237. https://doi.org/10.1080/02699930802204677 
Mazefsky, C. A., Herrington, J., Siegel, M., Scarpa, A., Maddox, B. B., Scahill, L., & White, 
S. W. (2013). The role of emotion regulation in autism spectrum disorder. Journal of 







Mazza, M., Pino, M. C., Mariano, M., Tempesta, D., Ferrara, M., De Berardis, D., … Valenti, 
M. (2014). Affective and cognitive empathy in adolescents with autism spectrum 
disorder. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 8, 791. 
https://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2014.00791 
Mc Grath, M. (2009). Assessing the effect of culture on theory of mind performance in South 
African students (Unpublished honours thesis). University of Cape Town, 
Rondebosch, South Africa. 
McIntosh, D. N., Reichmann-Decker, A., Winkielman, P., & Wilbarger, J. L. (2006). When 
the social mirror breaks: Deficits in automatic, but not voluntary, mimicry of 
emotional facial expressions in autism. Developmental Science, 9, 295–302. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7687.2006.00492.x 
Meiring, L., Subramoney, S., Thomas, K. G., Decety, J., & Fourie, M. M. (2014). Empathy 
and helping: effects of racial group membership and cognitive load. South African 
Journal of Psychology, 44, 426–438. https://doi.org/10.1177/0081246314530280 
Melamed, S., Ugarten, U., Shirom, A., Kahana, L., Lerman, Y., & Froom, P. (1999). Chronic 
burnout, somatic arousal and elevated salivary cortisol levels. Journal of 
Psychosomatic Research, 46, 591–598. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0022-
3999(99)00007-0 
Melzig, C. A., Weike, A. I., Hamm, A. O., & Thayer, J. F. (2009). Individual differences in 
fear-potentiated startle as a function of resting heart rate variability: Implications for 







Merlo, J., Yang, M., Chaix, B., Lynch, J., & Råstam, L. (2005). A brief conceptual tutorial on 
multilevel analysis in social epidemiology: Investigating contextual phenomena in 
different groups of people. Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health, 59, 729–
736. https://doi.org/10.1136/jech.2004.023929 
Militerni, R., Bravaccio, C., Falco, C., Puglisi-Allegra, S., Pascucci, T., & Fico, C. (2000). 
Pain reactivity in children with autistic disorder. The Journal of Headache and Pain, 
1, 53–56. https://doi.org/10.1007/s101940050011 
Miller, A. L., Seifer, R., Crossin, R., & Lebourgeois, M. K. (2015). Toddler’s self-regulation 
strategies in a challenge context are nap-dependent. Journal of Sleep Research, 24, 
279–287. https://doi.org/10.1111/jsr.12260 
Ming, X., Julu, P. O. O., Brimacombe, M., Connor, S., & Daniels, M. L. (2005). Reduced 
cardiac parasympathetic activity in children with autism. Brain and Development, 27, 
509–516. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.braindev.2005.01.003 
Minio-Paluello, I., Baron-Cohen, S., Avenanti, A., Walsh, V., & Aglioti, S. M. (2009). 
Absence of embodied empathy during pain observation in Asperger Syndrome. 
Biological Psychiatry, 65, 55–62. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.biopsych.2008.08.006 
Minio-Paluello, I., Lombardo, M. V., Chakrabarti, B., Wheelwright, S., & Baron-Cohen, S. 
(2009). Response to Smith’s letter to the editor ‘Emotional empathy in autism 
spectrum conditions: Weak, intact, or heightened?’ Journal of Autism and 
Developmental Disorders, 39, 1749–1754. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10803-009-0800-
x 
Montag, C., Neuhaus, K., Lehmann, A., Krüger, K., Dziobek, I., Heekeren, H. R., … 






degree relatives of schizophrenia patients. European Archives of Psychiatry and 
Clinical Neuroscience, 262, 217–226. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00406-011-0250-2 
Moriguchi, Y., Decety, J., Ohnishi, T., Maeda, M., Mori, T., Nemoto, K., … Komaki, G. 
(2007). Empathy and judging other’s pain: An fMRI study of alexithymia. Cerebral 
Cortex, 17, 2223–2234. https://doi.org/10.1093/cercor/bhl130 
Mottron, L., Dawson, M., Soulières, I., Hubert, B., & Burack, J. (2006). Enhanced Perceptual 
Functioning in Autism: An Update, and Eight Principles of Autistic Perception. 
Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 36, 27–43. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10803-005-0040-7 
Muhtadie, L., Koslov, K., Akinola, M., & Mendes, W. B. (2015). Vagal flexibility: A 
physiological predictor of social sensitivity. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 109, 106–120. https://doi.org/10.1037/pspp0000016 
Musser, E. D., Backs, R. W., Schmitt, C. F., Ablow, J. C., Measelle, J. R., & Nigg, J. T. 
(2011). Emotion regulation via the autonomic nervous system in children with 
attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). Journal of Abnormal Child 
Psychology, 39, 841–852. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10802-011-9499-1 
Nakagawa, S., & Schielzeth, H. (2013). A general and simple method for obtaining R2 from 
generalized linear mixed-effects models. Methods in Ecology and Evolution, 4, 133–
142. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2041-210x.2012.00261.x 
Nakamura, F. Y., Pereira, L. A., Esco, M. R., Flatt, A. A., Moraes, J. E., Cal Abad, C. C., & 
Loturco, I. (2016). Intra- and inter-day reliability of ultra-short-term heart rate 
variability in rugby union players. Journal of Strength and Conditioning Research, 






Napadow, V., Dhond, R., Conti, G., Makris, N., Brown, E. N., & Barbieri, R. (2008). Brain 
correlates of autonomic modulation: Combining heart rate variability with fMRI. 
NeuroImage, 42, 169–177. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2008.04.238 
Neuhaus, E., Bernier, R. A., & Beauchaine, T. P. (2015). Children with autism show altered 
autonomic adaptation to novel and familiar social partners. Autism Research, 9, 579–
591. https://doi.org/10.1002/aur.1543 
Nuske, H. J., Vivanti, G., & Dissanayake, C. (2013). Are emotion impairments unique to, 
universal, or specific in autism spectrum disorder? A comprehensive review. 
Cognition & Emotion, 27, 1042–1061. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/02699931.2012.762900 
Oberman, L. M., & Enticott, P. G. (2015). The Safety and Efficacy of Noninvasive Brain 
Stimulation in Development and Neurodevelopmental Disorders. Frontiers Media SA. 
Oberman, L. M., Winkielman, P., & Ramachandran, V. S. (2007). Face to face: Blocking 
facial mimicry can selectively impair recognition of emotional expressions. Social 
Neuroscience, 2, 167–178. https://doi.org/10.1080/17470910701391943 
Oberman, L. M., Winkielman, P., & Ramachandran, V. S. (2009). Slow echo: Facial EMG 
evidence for the delay of spontaneous, but not voluntary, emotional mimicry in 
children with autism spectrum disorders. Developmental Science, 12, 510–520. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7687.2008.00796.x 
Obradović, J., Bush, N. R., Stamperdahl, J., Adler, N. E., & Boyce, W. T. (2010). Biological 
sensitivity to context: The interactive effects of stress reactivity and family adversity 







Oveis, C., Cohen, A. B., Gruber, J., Shiota, M. N., Haidt, J., & Keltner, D. (2009). Resting 
respiratory sinus arrhythmia is associated with tonic positive emotionality. Emotion, 
9, 265–270. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0015383 
Ozonoff, S., & McEvoy, R. E. (1994). A longitudinal study of executive function and theory 
of mind development in autism. Development and Psychopathology, 6, 415–431. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0954579400006027 
Ozonoff, S., & Miller, J. N. (1995). Teaching theory of mind: A new approach to social skills 
training for individuals with autism. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 
25, 415–433. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02179376 
Pandey, R., Mandal, M. K., Taylor, G. J., & Parker, J. D. A. (1996). Cross-cultural 
alexithymia: Development and validation of a Hindi translation of the 20-item 
Toronto alexithymia scale. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 52, 173–176. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1097-4679(199603)52:2<173::AID-JCLP8>3.0.CO;2-V 
Pantelis, P. C., & Kennedy, D. P. (2016). Estimation of the prevalence of autism spectrum 
disorder in South Korea, revisited. Autism, 20, 517–527. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1362361315592378 
Park, G., & Thayer, J. F. (2014). From the heart to the mind: cardiac vagal tone modulates 
top-down and bottom-up visual perception and attention to emotional stimuli. 
Emotion Science, 5, 278. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00278 
Parker, J. D. A., Taylor, G. J., & Bagby, R. M. (2003). The 20-Item Toronto Alexithymia 
Scale: III. Reliability and factorial validity in a community population. Journal of 







Parr, L. A. (2001). Cognitive and physiological markers of emotional awareness in 
chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). Animal Cognition, 4, 223–229. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s100710100085 
Patil, I., Melsbach, J., Hennig-Fast, K., & Silani, G. (2016). Divergent roles of autistic and 
alexithymic traits in utilitarian moral judgments in adults with autism. Scientific 
Reports, 6, 23637. https://doi.org/10.1038/srep23637 
Patriquin, M. A., Lorenzi, J., Scarpa, A., & Bell, M. A. (2014). Developmental trajectories of 
respiratory sinus arrhythmia: Associations with social responsiveness. Developmental 
Psychobiology, 56, 317–326. https://doi.org/10.1002/dev.21100 
Patriquin, M. A., Scarpa, A., Friedman, B. H., & Porges, S. W. (2013). Respiratory sinus 
arrhythmia: A marker for positive social functioning and receptive language skills in 
children with autism spectrum disorders. Developmental Psychobiology, 55, 101–112. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/dev.21002 
Paynter, J., & Peterson, C. (2010). Language and ToM development in autism versus 
Asperger syndrome: Contrasting influences of syntactic versus lexical/semantic 
maturity. Research in Autism Spectrum Disorders, 4, 377–385. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rasd.2009.10.005 
Peterson, C. (2014). Theory of mind understanding and empathic behavior in children with 
autism spectrum disorders. International Journal of Developmental Neuroscience, 39, 
16–21. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdevneu.2014.05.002 
Peterson, E., & Miller, S. F. (2012). The Eyes Test as a measure of individual differences: 







Pfabigan, D. M., Seidel, E.-M., Wucherer, A. M., Keckeis, K., Derntl, B., & Lamm, C. 
(2015). Affective empathy differs in male violent offenders with high- and low-trait 
psychopathy. Journal of Personality Disorders, 29(1), 42–61. 
https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/101521pedi201428145 
Pinheiro, J., & Bates, D. (2000). Mixed-effects models in S and S-PLUS. New York, NY: 
Springer. 
Pinheiro, J., Bates, D., DebRoy, S., Sarkar, D., & R Core Team. (2016). nlme: Linear and 
nonlinear mixed effects models (Version 3.1-126). Retrieved from http://CRAN.R-
project.org/package=nlme 
Pinto, D., Delaby, E., Merico, D., Barbosa, M., Merikangas, A., Klei, L., … Scherer, S. W. 
(2014). Convergence of genes and cellular pathways dysregulated in autism spectrum 
disorders. The American Journal of Human Genetics, 94, 677–694. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ajhg.2014.03.018 
Piven, J. (2001). The broad autism phenotype: A complementary strategy for molecular 
genetic studies of autism. American Journal of Medical Genetics, 105, 34–35. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/1096-8628(20010108)105:1<34::AID-AJMG1052>3.0.CO;2-
D 
Piven, J., & Palmer, P. (1999). Psychiatric disorder and the broad autism phenotype: 
Evidence from a family study of multiple-incidence autism families. American 
Journal of Psychiatry, 156, 557–563. https://doi.org/10.1176/ajp.156.4.557 
Ponnet, K., Buysse, A., Roeyers, H., & De Corte, K. (2005). Empathic accuracy in adults 






typically developing stranger. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 35, 
585–600. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10803-005-0003-z 
Ponnet, K., Roeyers, H., Buysse, A., De Clercq, A., & Van Der Heyden, E. (2004). Advanced 
mind-reading in adults with Asperger syndrome. Autism, 8, 249–266. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1362361304045214 
Porges, S. W. (1992). Autonomic regulation and attention. In B. A. Campbell, H. Hayne, & 
R. Richardson (Eds.), Attention and information processing in infants and adults: 
Perspectives from human and animal research. New York, NY: Psychology Press. 
Porges, S. W. (2001). The polyvagal theory: phylogenetic substrates of a social nervous 
system. International Journal of Psychophysiology, 42, 123–146. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-8760(01)00162-3 
Porges, S. W. (2003a). Social engagement and attachment. Annals of the New York Academy 
of Sciences, 1008, 31–47. https://doi.org/10.1196/annals.1301.004 
Porges, S. W. (2003b). The Polyvagal Theory: Phylogenetic contributions to social behavior. 
Physiology & Behavior, 79, 503–513. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0031-9384(03)00156-
2 
Porges, S. W. (2005). The vagus: A mediator of the behavioral and physiologic features 
associated with autism. In M. L. Bauman & T. L. Kemper (Eds.), The neurobiology of 
autism. Baltimore, MD: JHU Press. 
Porges, S. W., Macellaio, M., Stanfill, S. D., McCue, K., Lewis, G. F., Harden, E. R., … 
Heilman, K. J. (2013). Respiratory sinus arrhythmia and auditory processing in 






Journal of Psychophysiology, 88, 261–270. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpsycho.2012.11.009 
Powell, M. J. (2009). The BOBYQA algorithm for bound constrained optimization without 
derivatives. England: Department of Applied Mathematics and Theoretical Physics, 
Cambridge University. Retrieved from damtp.cam.ac.uk 
Premack, D., & Woodruff, G. (1978). Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind? 
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1, 515–526. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00076512 
Press, C., Richardson, D., & Bird, G. (2010). Intact imitation of emotional facial actions in 
autism spectrum conditions. Neuropsychologia, 48, 3291–3297. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2010.07.012 
Preston, S. D. (2007). A perception-action model for empathy. Empathy in Mental Illness. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511543753.024 
Preston, S. D., & de Waal, F. B. M. (2002). Empathy: Its ultimate and proximate bases. 
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 25, 1–20. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X02000018 
Prkachin, K. M., & Craig, K. D. (1995). Expressing pain: The communication and 
interpretation of facial pain signals. Journal of Nonverbal Behavior, 19, 191–205. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02173080 
R Core Team. (2015). R: A language and environment for statistical computing. Vienna, 







Rattaz, C., Dubois, A., Michelon, C., Viellard, M., Poinso, F., & Baghdadli, A. (2013). How 
do children with autism spectrum disorders express pain? A comparison with 
developmentally delayed and typically developing children. PAIN®, 154, 2007–2013. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pain.2013.06.011 
Reicherts, P., Gerdes, A. B. M., Pauli, P., & Wieser, M. J. (2013). On the mutual effects of 
pain and emotion: Facial pain expressions enhance pain perception and vice versa are 
perceived as more arousing when feeling pain. PAIN®, 154, 793–800. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pain.2013.02.012 
Reicherts, P., Wieser, M. J., Gerdes, A. B. M., Likowski, K. U., Weyers, P., Mühlberger, A., 
& Pauli, P. (2012). Electrocortical evidence for preferential processing of dynamic 
pain expressions compared to other emotional expressions. PAIN®, 153, 1959–1964. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pain.2012.06.017 
Reisenzein, R. (2000). Exploring the strength of association between the components of 
emotion syndromes: the case of surprise. Cognition and Emotion, 14, 1–38. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/026999300378978 
Revelle, W. (2015). psych: Procedures for psychological, psychometric, and personality 
research (Version 1.6.6). Evanston, IL: Northwestern University. Retrieved from 
http://CRAN.R-project.org/package=psych 
Riese, H., Groot, P. F. C., Berg, M., Kupper, N. H. M., Magnee, E. H. B., Rohaan, E. J., … 
de Geus, E. J. C. (2003). Large-scale ensemble averaging of ambulatory impedance 







Rinker, T. W., & Kurkiewicz, D. (2015). pacman: Package management for R (Version 
0.4.1). Buffalo, NY: University at Buffalo/SUNY. Retrieved from 
http://github.com/trinker/pacman 
Rives Bogart, K., & Matsumoto, D. (2010). Facial mimicry is not necessary to recognize 
emotion: Facial expression recognition by people with Moebius syndrome. Social 
Neuroscience, 5, 241–251. https://doi.org/10.1080/17470910903395692 
Robins, P. M., Meltzer, L., & Zelikovsky, N. (2009). The experience of secondary traumatic 
stress upon care providers working within a children’s hospital. Journal of Pediatric 
Nursing, 24, 270–279. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pedn.2008.03.007 
Roeyers, H., Buysse, A., Ponnet, K., & Pichal, B. (2001). Advancing advanced mind-reading 
tests: Empathic accuracy in adults with a pervasive developmental disorder. The 
Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry and Allied Disciplines, 42, 271–278. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021963001006680 
Roger, D., & Najarian, B. (1989). The construction and validation of a new scale for 
measuring emotion control. Personality and Individual Differences, 10, 845–853. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/0191-8869(89)90020-2 
Rogers, K., Dziobek, I., Hassenstab, J., Wolf, O. T., & Convit, A. (2006). Who cares? 
Revisiting empathy in Asperger syndrome. Journal of Autism and Developmental 
Disorders, 37, 709–715. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10803-006-0197-8 
Romero, T., Castellanos, M. A., & de Waal, F. B. M. (2010). Consolation as possible 
expression of sympathetic concern among chimpanzees. Proceedings of the National 






Rosenberg, E. L., & Ekman, P. (1994). Coherence between expressive and experiential 
systems in emotion. Cognition and Emotion, 8, 201–229. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/02699939408408938 
Rosseel, Y. (2012). lavaan: An R package for structural equation modeling. Journal of 
Statistical Software, 48, 1–36. 
Roth-Hanania, R., Davidov, M., & Zahn-Waxler, C. (2011). Empathy development from 8 to 
16 months: Early signs of concern for others. Infant Behavior and Development, 34, 
447–458. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.infbeh.2011.04.007 
Rozga, A., King, T. Z., Vuduc, R. W., & Robins, D. L. (2013). Undifferentiated facial 
electromyography responses to dynamic, audio-visual emotion displays in individuals 
with autism spectrum disorders. Developmental Science, 16, 499–514. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/desc.12062 
RStudio Team. (2015). Rstudio: Integrated development for R. Boston, MA: RStudio, Inc. 
Retrieved from http://www.rstudio.com/ 
Rueckert, L., & Naybar, N. (2008). Gender differences in empathy: The role of the right 
hemisphere. Brain and Cognition, 67, 162–167. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bandc.2008.01.002 
Rueda, P., Fernández-Berrocal, P., & Schonert-Reichl, K. A. (2014). Empathic abilities and 
theory of mind in adolescents with Asperger syndrome: Insights from the twenty-first 







Rump, K. M., Giovannelli, J. L., Minshew, N. J., & Strauss, M. S. (2009). The development 
of emotion recognition in individuals with autism. Child Development, 80, 1434–
1447. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8624.2009.01343.x 
Sakaki, M., Yoo, H. J., Nga, L., Lee, T.-H., Thayer, J. F., & Mather, M. (2016). Heart rate 
variability is associated with amygdala functional connectivity with MPFC across 
younger and older adults. NeuroImage. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2016.05.076 
Salomon, K., Matthews, K. A., & Allen, M. T. (2000). Patterns of sympathetic and 
parasympathetic reactivity in a sample of children and adolescents. Psychophysiology, 
37, 842–849. https://doi.org/10.1111/1469-8986.3760842 
Samson, A. C., Huber, O., & Gross, J. J. (2012). Emotion regulation in Asperger’s syndrome 
and high-functioning autism. Emotion, 12, 659–665. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/a0027975 
Sarkar, D. (2008). Lattice: Multivariate data visualization with R. New York, NY: Springer. 
Retrieved from http://lmdvr.r-forge.r-project.org 
Sasson, N. J., Lam, K. S. L., Childress, D., Parlier, M., Daniels, J. L., & Piven, J. (2013). The 
Broad Autism Phenotype Questionnaire: Prevalence and diagnostic classification. 
Autism Research, 6, 134–143. https://doi.org/10.1002/aur.1272 
Sato, W., Uono, S., & Toichi, M. (2013). Atypical recognition of dynamic changes in facial 
expressions in autism spectrum disorders. Research in Autism Spectrum Disorders, 7, 
906–912. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rasd.2013.04.008 
Savina, I., & Beninger, R. J. (2007). Schizophrenic patients treated with clozapine or 






or typical antipsychotic medications. Schizophrenia Research, 94, 128–138. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.schres.2007.04.010 
Schaaf, R. C., Benevides, T. W., Leiby, B. E., & Sendecki, J. A. (2015). Autonomic 
dysregulation during sensory stimulation in children with autism spectrum disorder. 
Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 45, 461–472. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10803-013-1924-6 
Schaefer, H. S., Larson, C. L., Davidson, R. J., & Coan, J. A. (2014). Brain, body, and 
cognition: Neural, physiological and self-report correlates of phobic and normative 
fear. Biological Psychology, 98, 59–69. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.biopsycho.2013.12.011 
Scheeren, A. M., Koot, H. M., Mundy, P. C., Mous, L., & Begeer, S. (2013). Empathic 
responsiveness of children and adolescents with high-functioning autism spectrum 
disorder. Autism Research, 6, 362–371. https://doi.org/10.1002/aur.1299 
Schmalfuss, P. (2010). Clair De Lune. Germany (original work published 1905): ZYX 
Classic. 
Schreiter, S., Pijnenborg, G. H. M., & aan het Rot, M. (2013). Empathy in adults with clinical 
or subclinical depressive symptoms. Journal of Affective Disorders, 150, 1–16. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jad.2013.03.009 
Schulte-Rüther, M., Greimel, E., Markowitsch, H. J., Kamp-Becker, I., Remschmidt, H., 
Fink, G. R., & Piefke, M. (2010). Dysfunctions in brain networks supporting 
empathy: An fMRI study in adults with autism spectrum disorders. Social 






Schwenck, C., Mergenthaler, J., Keller, K., Zech, J., Salehi, S., Taurines, R., … Freitag, C. 
M. (2012). Empathy in children with autism and conduct disorder: group-specific 
profiles and developmental aspects. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 53, 
651–659. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-7610.2011.02499.x 
Segerstrom, S. C., & Nes, L. S. (2007). Heart rate variability reflects self-regulatory strength, 
effort, and fatigue. Psychological Science, 18, 275–281. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01888.x 
Senju, A., Kikuchi, Y., Akechi, H., Hasegawa, T., Tojo, Y., & Osanai, H. (2009). Brief 
Report: Does Eye Contact Induce Contagious Yawning in Children with Autism 
Spectrum Disorder? Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 39, 1598–1602. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10803-009-0785-5 
Sergi, M. J., Green, M. F., Widmark, C., Reist, C., Erhart, S., Braff, D. L., … Mintz, J. 
(2007). Social cognition and neurocognition: Effects of risperidone, olanzapine, and 
haloperidol. The American Journal of Psychiatry, 164, 1585–1592. 
https://doi.org/10.1176/appi.ajp.2007.06091515 
Shah, P., Hall, R., Catmur, C., & Bird, G. (2016). Alexithymia, not autism, is associated with 
impaired interoception. Cortex, 81, 215–220. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cortex.2016.03.021 
Shamay-Tsoory, S. G., Shur, S., Barcai-Goodman, L., Medlovich, S., Harari, H., & 
Levkovitz, Y. (2007). Dissociation of cognitive from affective components of theory 
of mind in schizophrenia. Psychiatry Research, 149, 11–23. 
Sheinkopf, S. J., Neal-Beevers, A. R., Levine, T. P., Miller-Loncar, C., & Lester, B. (2013). 






autistic disorder. Autism Research and Treatment, 2013, 868396. 
https://doi.org/10.1155/2013/868396 
Sherwood, A., Allen, M. T., Fahrenberg, J., Kelsey, R. M., Lovallo, W. R., & Doornen, L. J. 
P. (1990). Methodological guidelines for impedance cardiography. Psychophysiology, 
27, 1–23. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-8986.1990.tb02171.x 
Sifneos, P. E. (1973). The prevalence of ‘alexithymic’ characteristics in psychosomatic 
patients. Psychotherapy and Psychosomatics, 22, 255–262. 
https://doi.org/10.1159/000286529 
Sigman, M. D., Kasari, C., Kwon, J.-H., & Yirmiya, N. (1992). Responses to the negative 
emotions of others by autistic, mentally retarded, and normal children. Child 
Development, 63, 796–807. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8624.1992.tb01662.x 
Silani, G., Bird, G., Brindley, R., Singer, T., Frith, C., & Frith, U. (2008). Levels of 
emotional awareness and autism: An fMRI study. Social Neuroscience, 3, 97–112. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/17470910701577020 
Simon, D., Craig, K. D., Gosselin, F., Belin, P., & Rainville, P. (2008). Recognition and 
discrimination of prototypical dynamic expressions of pain and emotions. PAIN®, 
135, 55–64. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pain.2007.05.008 
Simonoff, E., Pickles, A., Charman, T., Chandler, S., Loucas, T., & Baird, G. (2008). 
Psychiatric disorders in children with autism spectrum disorders: Prevalence, 
comorbidity, and associated factors in a population-derived sample. Journal of the 







Singer, T., Seymour, B., O’Doherty, J., Kaube, H., Dolan, R. J., & Frith, C. D. (2004). 
Empathy for pain involves the affective but not sensory components of pain. Science, 
303, 1157–1162. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1093535 
Singer, T., Seymour, B., O’Doherty, J. P., Stephan, K. E., Dolan, R. J., & Frith, C. D. (2006). 
Empathic neural responses are modulated by the perceived fairness of others. Nature, 
439, 466–469. https://doi.org/10.1038/nature04271 
Smith, A. (1790). The Theory of Moral Sentiments (6th ed.). Sao Paulo, Brazil: MetaLibri. 
Retrieved from https://www.ibiblio.org/ml/libri/s/SmithA_MoralSentiments_p.pdf 
Smith, A. (2009). The empathy imbalance hypothesis of autism: A theoretical approach to 
cognitive and emotional empathy in autistic development. The Psychological Record, 
59, 489–510. 
Smith, A. (2010). Cognitive empathy and emotional empathy in human behavior and 
evolution. The Psychological Record, 56. Retrieved from 
http://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/tpr/vol56/iss1/1 
Smith, L., Malcolm-Smith, S., & de Vries, P. J. (2016). Translation and cultural 
appropriateness of the Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule-2 in Afrikaans. 
Autism, Published online ahead of print, 1362361316648469. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1362361316648469 
Smith, R. L., & Rose, A. J. (2011). The ‘cost of caring’ in youths’ friendships: Considering 
associations among social perspective taking, co-rumination, and empathetic distress. 






Society for Psychophysiological Research Ad Hoc Committee on Electrodermal Measures. 
(2012). Publication recommendations for electrodermal measurements. 
Psychophysiology, 49, 1017–1034. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-8986.2012.01384.x 
Solomon, M., Goodlin-Jones, B. L., & Anders, T. F. (2004). A social adjustment 
enhancement intervention for high functioning autism, Asperger’s syndrome, and 
pervasive developmental disorder nos. Journal of Autism and Developmental 
Disorders, 34, 649–668. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10803-004-5286-y 
Sonnby–Borgström, M. (2002). Automatic mimicry reactions as related to differences in 
emotional empathy. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, 43, 433–443. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9450.00312 
Sonnby-Borgström, M., Jönsson, P., & Svensson, O. (2003). Emotional empathy as related to 
mimicry reactions at different levels of information processing. Journal of Nonverbal 
Behavior, 27, 3–23. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1023608506243 
Spek, A. A., Scholte, E. M., & Berckelaer-Onnes, I. A. (2009). ToM in adults with HFA and 
Asperger syndrome. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 40, 280–289. 
Stellar, J. E., Cohen, A., Oveis, C., & Keltner, D. (2015). Affective and physiological 
responses to the suffering of others: Compassion and vagal activity. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 108, 572–585. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/pspi0000010 
Stifter, C. A., Dollar, J. M., & Cipriano, E. A. (2011). Temperament and emotion regulation: 







Stone, V. E., Baron-Cohen, S., & Knight, R. (1998). Frontal lobe contributions to theory of 
mind. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 10, 640–656. 
https://doi.org/10.1162/089892998562942 
Sun, Y.-B., Wang, Y.-Z., Wang, J.-Y., & Luo, F. (2015). Emotional mimicry signals pain 
empathy as evidenced by facial electromyography. Scientific Reports, 5, 16988. 
https://doi.org/10.1038/srep16988 
Sze, J. A., Gyurak, A., Goodkind, M. S., & Levenson, R. W. (2012). Greater emotional 
empathy and prosocial behavior in late life. Emotion, 12, 1129–1140. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/a0025011 
Taylor, G. J., Bagby, R. M., & Parker, J. D. A. (2003). The 20-Item Toronto Alexithymia 
Scale: IV. Reliability and factorial validity in different languages and cultures. 
Journal of Psychosomatic Research, 55, 277–283. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0022-
3999(02)00601-3 
Thayer, J. F., Hansen, A. L., Saus-Rose, E., & Johnsen, B. H. (2009). Heart rate variability, 
prefrontal neural function, and cognitive performance: The neurovisceral integration 
perspective on self-regulation, adaptation, and health. Annals of Behavioral Medicine, 
37, 141–153. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12160-009-9101-z 
Thayer, J. F., & Lane, R. D. (2000). A model of neurovisceral integration in emotion 
regulation and dysregulation. Journal of Affective Disorders, 61, 201–216. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0165-0327(00)00338-4 
Thayer, J. F., & Lane, R. D. (2009). Claude Bernard and the heart–brain connection: Further 
elaboration of a model of neurovisceral integration. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral 






Tone, E. B., & Tully, E. C. (2014). Empathy as a ‘risky strength’: A multilevel examination 
of empathy and risk for internalizing disorders. Development and Psychopathology, 
26, 1547–1565. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0954579414001199 
Torchiano, M. (2016). effsize: Efficient Effect Size Computation (Version 0.6.4). Retrieved 
from https://CRAN.R-project.org/package=effsize 
Tordjman, S., Anderson, G. M., Botbol, M., Brailly-Tabard, S., Perez-Diaz, F., Graignic, R., 
… Bronsard, G. (2009). Pain reactivity and plasma β-endorphin in children and 
adolescents with autistic disorder. PLOS ONE, 4, e5289. 
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0005289 
Tsai, L. Y. (1996). Brief report: comorbid psychiatric disorders of autistic disorder. Journal 
of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 26, 159–163. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02172004 
Uljarevic, M., & Hamilton, A. (2012). Recognition of emotions in autism: A formal meta-
analysis. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 43, 1517–1526. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10803-012-1695-5 
Vachon-Presseau, E., Martel, M. O., Roy, M., Caron, E., Jackson, P. L., & Rainville, P. 
(2011). The multilevel organization of vicarious pain responses: Effects of pain cues 
and empathy traits on spinal nociception and acute pain. PAIN®, 152, 1525–1531. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pain.2011.02.039 
van der Graaff, J., Branje, S., de Wied, M., Hawk, S., van Lier, P., & Meeus, W. (2014). 
Perspective taking and empathic concern in adolescence: Gender differences in 







van Goozen, S. H. M., Fairchild, G., Snoek, H., & Harold, G. T. (2007). The evidence for a 
neurobiological model of childhood antisocial behavior. Psychological Bulletin, 133, 
149–182. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.133.1.149 
Van Hulle, C., Zahn-Waxler, C., Robinson, J. L., Rhee, S. H., Hastings, P. D., & Knafo, A. 
(2013). Autonomic correlates of children’s concern and disregard for others. Social 
Neuroscience, 8, 275–290. https://doi.org/10.1080/17470919.2013.791342 
Vaughan, K. B., & Lanzetta, J. T. (1980). Vicarious instigation and conditioning of facial 
expressive and autonomic responses to a model’s expressive display of pain. Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 38, 909–923. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-
3514.38.6.909 
Vaughan Van Hecke, A., Lebow, J., Bal, E., Lamb, D., Harden, E., Kramer, A., … Porges, S. 
W. (2009). Electroencephalogram and heart rate regulation to familiar and unfamiliar 
people in children with autism spectrum disorders. Child Development, 80, 1118–
1133. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8624.2009.01320.x 
Vivanti, G., McCormick, C., Young, G. S., Abucayan, F., Hatt, N., Nadig, A., … Rogers, S. 
J. (2011). Intact and impaired mechanisms of action understanding in autism. 
Developmental Psychology, 47, 841–856. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0023105 
Völlm, B. A., Taylor, A. N. W., Richardson, P., Corcoran, R., Stirling, J., McKie, S., … 
Elliott, R. (2006). Neuronal correlates of theory of mind and empathy: A functional 







Vrije Universiteit. (2015). Data analysis and management software (DAMS) for the Vrije 
Universiteit ambulatory monitoring system (VU-AMS) (Version 1.2). Retrieved from 
http://www.vu-ams.nl/support/instruction-manual/ 
Wakabayashi, A., Baron-Cohen, S., Wheelwright, S., Goldenfeld, N., Delaney, J., Fine, D., 
… Weil, L. (2006). Development of short forms of the empathy quotient (EQ-Short) 
and the systemizing quotient (SQ-Short). Personality and Individual Differences, 41, 
929–940. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2006.03.017 
Wakabayashi, A., Baron-Cohen, S., Wheelwright, S., & Tojo, Y. (2006). The Autism-
Spectrum Quotient (AQ) in Japan: A cross-cultural comparison. Journal of Autism 
and Developmental Disorders, 36, 263–270. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10803-005-
0061-2 
Wallace, G. L., Budgett, J., & Charlton, R. A. (2016). Aging and autism spectrum disorder: 
Evidence from the broad autism phenotype. Autism Research, Published online ahead 
of print. https://doi.org/10.1002/aur.1620 
Wang, Y., Hensley, M. K., Tasman, A., Sears, L., Casanova, M. F., & Sokhadze, E. M. 
(2015). Heart rate variability and skin conductance during repetitive TMS course in 
children with autism. Applied Psychophysiology and Biofeedback, 41, 1–14. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10484-015-9311-z 
Wang, Z., Lü, W., & Qin, R. (2013). Respiratory sinus arrhythmia is associated with trait 







Weiss, J. A., Thomson, K., & Chan, L. (2014). A systematic literature review of emotion 
regulation measurement in individuals with autism spectrum disorder. Autism 
Research, 7, 629–648. https://doi.org/10.1002/aur.1426 
West, B. T., Welch, K. B., & Galecki, A. T. (2006). Linear mixed models: A practical guide 
using statistical software (1st edition). Boca Raton: Chapman and Hall/CRC. 
Weyers, P., Mühlberger, A., Kund, A., Hess, U., & Pauli, P. (2009). Modulation of facial 
reactions to avatar emotional faces by nonconscious competition priming. 
Psychophysiology, 46, 328–335. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-8986.2008.00771.x 
White, S. W., Mazefsky, C. A., Dichter, G. S., Chiu, P. H., Richey, J. A., & Ollendick, T. H. 
(2014). Social-cognitive, physiological, and neural mechanisms underlying emotion 
regulation impairments: understanding anxiety in autism spectrum disorder. 
International Journal of Developmental Neuroscience, 39, 22–36. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdevneu.2014.05.012 
Wicker, B., Keysers, C., Plailly, J., Royet, J.-P., Gallese, V., & Rizzolatti, G. (2003). Both of 
us disgusted in my insula: the common neural basis of seeing and feeling disgust. 
Neuron, 40, 655–664. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0896-6273(03)00679-2 
Wickham, H. (2007). Reshaping data with the reshape package. Journal of Statistical 
Software, 21, 1–20. 
Wickham, H. (2009). ggplot2: Elegant graphics for data analysis. New York, NY: Springer-
Verlag. 
Wickham, H. (2011). The split-apply-combine strategy for data analysis. Journal of 






Wickham, H. (2016). tidyr: Easily tidy data with ‘spread()’ and ‘gather()’ functions (Version 
0.6.0). Retrieved from https://CRAN.R-project.org/package=tidyr 
Wickham, H., & Francois, R. (2016). dplyr: A Grammar of data manipulation. Retrieved 
from https://CRAN.R-project.org/package=dplyr 
Wilke, C. O. (2016). cowplot: Streamlined plot theme and plot annotations for ‘ggplot2’ 
(Version 0.6.2). Retrieved from https://CRAN.R-project.org/package=cowplot 
Willemsen, G. H. M., de Geus, E. J. C., Klaver, C. H. A. M., van Doornen, L. J. P., & 
Carrofl, D. (1996). Ambulatory monitoring of the impedance cardiogram. 
Psychophysiology, 33, 184–193. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-8986.1996.tb02122.x 
Wittgenstein, L. (1967). Zettel. (G. E. M. Anscombe & G. H. von Wright, Eds., G. E. M. 
Anscombe, Trans.). Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 
Woodbury-Smith, M. R., Robinson, J., Wheelwright, S., & Baron-Cohen, S. (2005). 
Screening adults for Asperger syndrome using the AQ: A preliminary study of its 
diagnostic validity in clinical practice. Journal of Autism and Developmental 
Disorders, 35, 331–335. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10803-005-3300-7 
Wu, M., Kujawa, A., Lu, L. H., Fitzgerald, D. A., Klumpp, H., Fitzgerald, K. D., … Phan, K. 
L. (2016). Age-related changes in amygdala–frontal connectivity during emotional 
face processing from childhood into young adulthood. Human Brain Mapping, 37, 
1684–1695. https://doi.org/10.1002/hbm.23129 
Wyller, V. B., Eriksen, H. R., & Malterud, K. (2009). Can sustained arousal explain the 







Xie, Y. (2015). Dynamic documents with R and knitr (2nd ed.). Boca Raton, FL: Chapman 
and Hall/CRC. 
Yang, C.-Y., Decety, J., Lee, S., Chen, C., & Cheng, Y. (2009). Gender differences in the mu 
rhythm during empathy for pain: An electroencephalographic study. Brain Research, 
1251, 176–184. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.brainres.2008.11.062 
Zahn-Waxler, C., Cole, P. M., Welsh, J. D., & Fox, N. A. (1995). Psychophysiological 
correlates of empathy and prosocial behaviors in preschool children with behavior 
problems. Development and Psychopathology, 7, 27–48. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0954579400006325 
Zahn-Waxler, C., & Radke-Yarrow, M. (1990). The origins of empathic concern. Motivation 
and Emotion, 14, 107–130. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00991639 
Zalla, T., Sav, A.-M., Stopin, A., Ahade, S., & Leboyer, M. (2008). Faux pas detection and 
intentional action in Asperger syndrome. A replication on a French sample. Journal of 
Autism and Developmental Disorders, 39, 373–382. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10803-
008-0634-y 
Zhou, W., Hou, P., Zhou, Y., & Chen, D. (2011). Reduced recruitment of orbitofrontal cortex 
to human social chemosensory cues in social anxiety. NeuroImage, 55, 1401–1406. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2010.12.064 
Zuur, A. F., Ieno, E. N., & Elphick, C. S. (2010). A protocol for data exploration to avoid 







Zuur, A. F., Ieno, E. N., Walker, N., Saveliev, A. A., & Smith, G. M. (2009). Mixed effects 




















ETHICAL APPROVAL FOR STUDY AMENDMENT  
The study titled, “Examining Empathy in Autism Spectrum Disorders: Cognitive, Behavioural 
and Autonomic Responses to Facial Emotional Recognition, Perception of Pain and the 
Detection of Social Transgressions” has been amended and requires ethical approval for this 
amendment, in addition to the already approved ethics to conduct psychological research 
with human subjects (reference number PSY2012/003). 
Proposed Additions to the Study 
The proposed change in procedure entails adding another assessment session to the 
currently approved two assessment sessions. The additional assessment session will be the 
first of the three assessment sessions to be completed, and will be used as a means to 
confirm a diagnosis of Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) using a trusted, reliable and 
standardized assessment tool called the Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule-2 (ADOS-
2). This tool has been designed to elicit ASD characteristics.  
Participants will attend UCT’s Child Guidance Clinic or the Division of Child and Adolescent 
Psychiatry for the additional assessment. Individuals highly trained in the ADOS-2 and 
deemed research reliable in the measure will then administer the ADOS-2. The ADOS-2 
assessment consists of several play-based tasks and questions about the participant’s school 
and work life, relationships and aspirations, all designed to elicit autism behaviours. This 
assessment takes approximately 1 hour. Participants will be seen in a private assessment 
room and the session will be recorded for later diagnostic viewing to confirm the ADOS-
result. Three professional clinicians highly experienced in ASD diagnoses and blind to the 
results of the ADOS-2 assessment, will then watch the recorded ADOS-2 assessment and 
together reach a consensus diagnosis based on the reviewed material and their clinical 
judgement. The diagnostic assessments and the consensus diagnoses reached by the 
clinicians will confirm whether or not the participants have ASD. The recording of the 
session and review by expert clinicians is necessary as the ADOS-2 has not yet been 
validated as a diagnostic tool in South Africa. 
Rationale for Amendments to Study 
The need for the extra diagnostic session arises from two developments. Firstly, it is 
becoming more common in published research that using clinician diagnosis on its own is 
not enough to establish ASD diagnosis; rather most published studies now include an ADOS 
diagnostic assessment. Secondly, the data collected from this study will contribute towards 








The current consent form will be amended to include consent to be filmed during the 
diagnostic assessment. The recorded material, like the rest of the data, will only be available 
to the research team and the expert clinicians involved, and will be stored securely at UCT in 
a locked file cabinet or password-secured computer. Participants will be told about the 
study and the assessment sessions and encouraged to ask any questions they may have 
before giving informed consent. They will be notified that their information will be kept 
strictly confidential, and their data will be used in the study, but they will remain entirely 
anonymous in published material. Moreover, their information will be kept without their 
names or personal identifiers, and only codes will be used. Participants will also be told that 
they may discontinue their participation in the study at any time without any negative 
consequences. Once the participants are comfortable with the study and the procedure, the 
assessment session will commence.  
There is minimal added risk to partaking in this additional assessment session. If participants 
request information about the diagnostic session, they will be given feedback about the 
outcome of the assessment after clinical consensus diagnosis has been reached. If 
participants require further support after the diagnostic session, they will be given contact 
details of local clinicians specialising in ASD. 
Should you require any more information concerning the amendment or the study, please 
do not hesitate to contact the principal researchers Michelle Hoogenhout (082 597 8518) or 




































Consent Form: Adult Participants 
 
UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN 
DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY  
 
Examining the Physiological Response to Perceiving Another’s Emotions  
 
You are invited to take part in a research study. 
 
Principal Researchers:  
Dr. Susan Malcolm-Smith 
Lecturer 
Department of Psychology 





Department of Psychology 
University of Cape Town 
082 597 8518 
 
This study will look at how your body responds (through changes in heart rate, sweating and muscle 
movements, for example) to seeing another person’s emotions or seeing another person in pain. We 
would like to see whether people with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) respond the same as or 
different to neurotypical individuals. Approximately 100 people between the ages of 14 and 45 will 
participate.   
 
Procedure 
If you consent to participating in this study, you will be asked to come to the Department of Psychology 
for 3 sessions. The first session will be a diagnostic session of about 1-hour long. The first session will 
be recorded for diagnostic purposes. The tapes will only be watched by authorized researchers at UCT, 
and will be erased afterwards. These tapes will also not be published. 
 
The next two sessions are each 2 hours long. During these two sessions you will be shown short video 
clips of people in physically painful or emotionally distressing situations. You will also be shown videos 
of people experiencing various emotions. During the videos, heart rate, sweating and muscle 






procedure. Participation is voluntary.  
 
Risks, Discomforts & Inconveniences 
Participants will be required to wear electrodes on their chest, face and hands to measure bodily 
responses. You may find this uncomfortable. However, the electrodes are not harmful in any way. You will 
also be asked to watch videos of people in physically painful or emotionally distressing situations. If you 
think that this footage might be upsetting to you, you are under no obligation to participate. Also, if you 
participate and find any of the procedures uncomfortable at any time during the experiment, you are 
free to discontinue participation without penalty.  
 
Benefits 
The information from this study may help improve our understanding of how people with ASD perceive 
and experience other people’s emotions, specifically with regard to painful experiences. 
 
Privacy and Confidentiality  
We will take strict precautions throughout the study to keep your personal information safe and 
confidential. Your information will be kept without your name or other personal identifiers, only a code, in a 
locked file cabinet or on a password-protected, secure computer. Only certain people have the right to 
review these research records. These people include the researchers for this study and certain University 
of Cape Town officials. The data gathered from this research may be published, but your contribution 
will remain anonymous.   
 
Money Matters 
If you have been recruited through the Student Research Participation Programme (SRPP), you will 
receive 10 SRPP points upon completion of the study. If you have been recruited outside of the SRPP 
system, you will receive R100 for participation in the study. 
 
 
Should you have any questions or queries about the research or your participation, please do not 










The study has been explained to me, and my questions have been answered. 
 
I understand that participation in this study is voluntary, and that I may withdraw at any point. 
 
I understand that I will not be identified except by an initial, and that this anonymity will be 
maintained throughout the study and when the research is published. 
 







I have explained the study to the participant, and in my opinion he understands that participation is 






Use of Samples/Data for Future Research 
With your permission, we would like to store the unused parts of your tests for use in future 
research.  This is your choice entirely and you are free to say no; you will still be able to take part in 
the study.  Please check the boxes that apply to your choice: 
 
 I do not want my samples to be used for any future research.  ___ 
 
 You may use my samples for any future research.  ___ 
 
Please indicate below if you would like to be notified of future research projects conducted by our 
research group:  
 
______________ (initial) Yes, I would like to be added to your research participation pool and be 
notified of research projects in which I might participate in the future.  
 
Method of contact:  
 
Phone number:   ________________________________ 
Cell phone number:  ________________________________ 
E-mail address:   ________________________________  
Mailing address:  ________________________________  
    ________________________________  






Consent Form: Adolescent Participants 
 
UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN  
DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY  
 
Examining the Physiological Response to Perceiving Another’s Emotions and Pain:  
Information for parents 
Dear Parents, we need your help! 
 
This study looks at how people's bodies respond (through changes in heart rate and 
sweating, for example) to seeing another person’s emotions or seeing another person in 
pain. We would like to see whether people with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) respond 
the same as or different to typical individuals without ASD. The ultimate aim of the study is 
to provide better interventions for people who have autism. Participating learners will have 
the opportunity to advance scientific knowledge, gain insight into the university research 
process and, in the long run, improve interventions for developmental disabilities. Learners 
who have an interest in medicine, psychology or sport should find the study particularly 
interesting. They will have the opportunity to get real-time feedback about their heart rate 
and fitness.  The study has approval from the Western Cape Education Department and the 
Department of Psychology Ethics Committee. 
 
If your child would like to participate, please return the consent form to the school 
secretary by no later than Friday 1 May, sign up at http://uctautism.com or call Michelle 
Hoogenhout on 082 597 8518. 
 
Approximately 100 people between the ages of 14 and 45 will participate. Just because you 
have received this letter, does not mean that your child has Autism Spectrum Disorder. We 









Dr. Susan Malcolm-Smith 
Lecturer 
Department of Psychology 





Department of Psychology 
University of Cape Town 
082 597 8518 
 
Procedure 
If you consent to your child participating in this study, your child will be asked to come to 
the Department of Psychology for 3 sessions. These sessions can be after school hours to 
not affect your child’s school work. In the first session, your child will play some games and 
be asked some questions about themselves. The first session will be recorded for diagnostic 
purposes. The tapes will only be watched by authorized researchers at UCT, and will be 
erased afterwards. These tapes will also not be published. The first session is approximately 
one-hour long. 
 
The next two sessions are each 2 hours long. During these two sessions your child will be 
shown short video clips of people in physically painful or emotionally distressing situations. 
However, none of the movies have more than a PG (parental guidance advised) rating. Your 
child will also be shown videos of people experiencing various emotions. During the videos, 
heart rate, sweating and muscle movements will be measured by placing electrodes on the 
skin. There are no risks involved in the procedure. Participation is voluntary.  
 
Benefits 
The information from this study may help improve our understanding of how people with 




Your child will receive R100 for participation in the study. 
 
Risks, Discomforts & Inconveniences 
Participants will be required to wear electrodes on their chest, face and hands to measure 
bodily responses. Your child may find this uncomfortable. However, the electrodes are not 
harmful in any way. Your child will also be asked to watch videos of people in physically 
painful or emotionally distressing situations. If you think that this footage might be upsetting 
to him or her, you are under no obligation to participate. Also, if your child decides to 






experiment, they are free to discontinue participation without penalty.  
 
Privacy and Confidentiality  
We will take strict precautions throughout the study to keep your personal information safe 
and confidential. Your child’s information will be kept without your name or other personal 
identifiers, only a code, in a locked file cabinet or on a password-protected, secure computer. 
Only certain people have the right to review these research records. These people include the 
researchers for this study and certain University of Cape Town officials. The data gathered 
from this research may be published, but your child's contribution will remain anonymous.   
 
 
For more information visit http://uctautism.com.  Should you have any questions or queries 
about the research or your participation, please do not hesitate to contact Michelle 









The study has been explained to me, and my questions have been answered. 
 
I understand that my child’s participation in this study is voluntary, and that he may 
withdraw at any point. 
 
I understand that my child will not be identified except by an initial, and that this anonymity 
will be maintained throughout the study and when the research is published. 
 
I consent to allow my child to participate in this study. 
 
Name of child_____________________________ 





Phone number:   ________________________________ 
Cell phone number:  ________________________________ 
E-mail address:   ________________________________  
Mailing address:  ________________________________  
    ________________________________  
    ________________________________ 
 
Future Research 
With your permission, we would like to store the unused parts of your tests for use in future 
research.  This is your choice entirely and you are free to say no; you will still be able to take 
part in the study.  Please check the boxes that apply to your choice: 
 
 I do not want my child’s samples to be used for any future research.  ___ 
 




Please indicate below if you would like to be notified of future research projects 
conducted by our research group:  
 
______________ (initial) Yes, I would like to be added to your research participation pool 









Hello! We want to tell you about a research study we are doing. A research study is a way to learn more 
about something.  
Our study looks at how your body responds (through changes in heart rate, sweating and muscle 
movements, for example) to seeing another person’s emotions or seeing another person in pain. 
People between the ages of 16 and 30 can take part.  
Procedure 
If you agree to join this study, you will be asked to come to the Department of Psychology at the 
University of Cape Town for 3 sessions. The first session will be approximately an hour long, and the 
next two sessions approximately 2 hours long. You will watch short video clips of people in physically 
painful or emotionally distressing situations. You will also see people experiencing various emotions. If 
you think that this might be upsetting to you, you do not have to participate. 
During the videos, we will measure your heart rate and sweating by placing recording disks on the skin. 
Recording disks are like plasters with wires on them. The recording disks will be put on your chest, face 
and hands and can tell us what is happening inside your body. The recording disks are not harmful in 
any way. You may find the recording disks uncomfortable though. In that case, you do not need to 
participate in the study. It is your choice and no one will force you to take part. Also, if you participate and 
find any of the procedures uncomfortable at any time during the experiment, you are free to discontinue 
participation without penalty.  
 
Benefits 
The information from this study may help improve our understanding of how people perceive and 
experience other people’s emotions, specifically with regard to painful experiences. You will also receive 
















Thank you for participating in the research study.  
 
This form provides you with information about the study in which you have just participated, 
and explains in full the methods of collection of data for this research study. If there is 
anything else that you would like to know, the person in charge of this research will also 
explain this study to you in full and answer all of your questions.  
 




2. Title of Research Study  
Examining Empathy in Autism Spectrum Disorders: Cognitive, Behavioural and Autonomic 
Responses  
 
3. Principal Investigators, Ethics Committee, and Telephone Numbers  
Dr. Susan Malcolm-Smith 
Lecturer 
Department of Psychology 





Department of Psychology 
University of Cape Town 
082 597 8518 
 
Department of Psychology Research Ethics Committee 








4. What is the purpose of this research study?  
The purpose of this research study is to better understand how your body responds (through 
changes in heart rate, sweating and muscle movements, for example) to seeing another 
person’s emotions or seeing another person in pain. Specifically, we wanted to see whether 
people with autism spectrum disorder respond in the same way or differently to emotional 
stimuli. 
  
5. What was done during this research study? 
This study required you to take part in three research sessions. During this study, you were 
required to watch people in physical pain (for example, being stabbed by a needle) or 
emotional distress. Your physiological response to these stimuli was assessed through the 
collection of self-report data, and through measurement of heart rate, skin conductance, and 
muscle movement.  
 
6. Was any deception used in this research study? 
We said that you were watching videos of patients undergoing painful medical treatment. 
However, the people you saw were student actors, and were not in any pain. Similarly, the 
videos you saw of people in emotional distress, all contained actors. Lastly, you witnessed to 
an altercation between the researcher and a “research assistant”. This was part of the 
experiment, and everything was staged. Anything that you said or did during the sessions 
will be kept completely confidential.  
You were also told that the recording disks on your face measured sweating (skin 
conductance). These recording disks actually measure muscle reactivity to the videos. You 
were not told this beforehand, in case the knowledge of being recorded changed your 
reactions to the videos. 
 
7. Is anything further required of you? 
Please do not disclose anything that happened during this research session to anyone else, 
as this may bias future participants and their performance.  
If you are still feeling stressed at the end of the research study, we can provide contact 









As a representative of this study, I have explained to the participant, in detail, the purpose, the 
procedures, and any deception used in this research study. 
 
______________________________________________ _____________________ 
Signature of Person Obtaining Consent and Authorization Date 
 
You have been informed, in detail, about this study’s purpose, procedures, and deceptions. 
You have been given the opportunity to ask questions before you sign. By signing this form, 
you are not waiving any of your legal rights. 
 
______________________________________________ _____________________ 








LIST OF STATISTICAL PACKAGES USED 
 
Package Version Reference 
car 2.1-2 (Fox & Weisberg, 2011) 
cowplot  0.6.2 (Wilke, 2016) 
dplyr   0.5.0 (Wickham & Francois, 2016) 
coefplot2 0.1.3.2 (Bolker & Su, 2011) 
effsize 0.6.4 (Torchiano, 2016) 
ggplot2 2.1.0 (Wickham, 2009) 
Hmisc   3.17-4 (Harrell & Alzola, 2006) 
knitr  1.13 (Xie, 2015) 
lattice  0.20-33 (Sarkar, 2008) 
lavaan  0.5-20 (Rosseel, 2012) 
lme4  1.1-12 (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015) 
lmerTest   2.0-32 (Kuznetsova et al., 2015) 
multcomp  1.4-6 (Hothorn et al., 2008) 
MuMIn  1.15.6 (Bartoń, 2016) 
nlme 3.1-124 (Pinheiro et al., 2016) 
pacman 0.4.1 (Rinker & Kurkiewicz, 2015) 
plyr  1.8.4 (Wickham, 2011) 
psych 1.6.6 (Revelle, 2015) 
reshape2 1.4.1 (Wickham, 2007) 
sjPlot 2.0.2 (Lüdecke, 2016) 


























INTERPERSONAL REACTIVITY INDEX 
 
The following statements inquire about your thoughts and feelings in a variety of situations.  
For each item, indicate how well it describes you by choosing the appropriate letter on the 
scale at the top of the page:  A, B, C, D, or E.  When you have decided on your answer, fill in 
the letter on the answer sheet next to the item number.  READ EACH ITEM CAREFULLY 




 A                B                C                D          E 
 DOES NOT                                                     DESCRIBES ME 
 DESCRIBE ME                                                  VERY 
 WELL                                                               WELL 
 
1.  I daydream and fantasize, with some regularity, about things that might happen to me. 
(FS) 
2.  I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me. (EC) 
3.  I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the "other guy's" point of view. (PT) (-) 
4.  Sometimes I don't feel very sorry for other people when they are having problems. (EC)(-) 
5.  I really get involved with the feelings of the characters in a novel. (FS) 
6.  In emergency situations, I feel apprehensive and ill-at-ease. (PD) 






caught up in it. (FS) (-) 
8.  I try to look at everybody's side of a disagreement before I make a decision. (PT) 
9.  When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of protective towards them. 
(EC) 
10.  I sometimes feel helpless when I am in the middle of a very emotional situation. (PD) 
11. I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things look from their 
      perspective. (PT) 
12.  Becoming extremely involved in a good book or movie is somewhat rare for me. (FS) (-) 
13.  When I see someone get hurt, I tend to remain calm. (PD) (-) 
14.  Other people's misfortunes do not usually disturb me a great deal. (EC) (-) 
15. If I'm sure I'm right about something, I don't waste much time listening to other people's 
      arguments. (PT) (-) 
16.  After seeing a play or movie, I have felt as though I were one of the characters. (FS) 
17.  Being in a tense emotional situation scares me. (PD) 
18. When I see someone being treated unfairly, I sometimes don't feel very much pity for 
them.  
      (EC) (-) 
19.  I am usually pretty effective in dealing with emergencies. (PD) (-) 
20.  I am often quite touched by things that I see happen. (EC) 
21.  I believe that there are two sides to every question and try to look at them both. (PT) 
22.  I would describe myself as a pretty soft-hearted person. (EC) 
23.  When I watch a good movie, I can very easily put myself in the place of a leading 






24.  I tend to lose control during emergencies. (PD) 
25.  When I'm upset at someone, I usually try to "put myself in his shoes" for a while. (PT) 
26. When I am reading an interesting story or novel, I imagine how I would feel if the events 
in the story were happening to me. (FS) 
27.  When I see someone who badly needs help in an emergency, I go to pieces. (PD) 
28.  Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I would feel if I were in their place. 
(PT) 
 
NOTE: (-) denotes item to be scored in reverse fashion 
  PT = perspective-taking scale 
  FS = fantasy scale 
  EC = empathic concern scale 
















INTERNAL CONSISTENCY AND CONFIRMATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS OF EMPATHY SCALES 
Items on the Emotional Contagion Scale and Interpersonal Reactivity Index were 
divided into affective empathy, cognitive empathy and self-regulation scales. The list of items 
and their correlations with other items on the scales are given in the tables below. 
Table 34  
Reliability Analysis of Affective Empathy Items 
  α  r   
Item  Raw SE S/ N Ave Raw Cor M SD 
IRI2 tender, concerned 
feelings for the less 
fortunate  
0.90 0.02 9.15  .28  .67  .67 2.47 1.15 
IRI4a sometimes don't feel 
very sorry for people 
having problems 
0.90 0.02 9.58  .29  .50  .48 2.35 1.33 
IRI5 get involved with 
feelings of characters in 
a novel 
0.90 0.02 9.64  .30  .50  .46 1.94 1.32 
IRI7 a objective when watching 
a movie / play; not 
caught up in it 
0.91 0.02 9.81  .30  .42  .38 2.09 1.27 
IRI9 feel protective towards 
people being taken 
advantage of 
0.90 0.02 9.60  .29  .49  .47 2.96 1.03 
IRI13 a remain calm when 
seeing someone get hurt 
0.90 0.02 9.46  .29  .56  .53 1.98 1.27 
IRI14 a not disturbed by others’ 
misfortunes 
0.90 0.02 9.00  .28  .74  .74 2.49 1.18 
IRI16 felt like one of the 
characters after seeing a 
play / movie 
0.90 0.02 9.43  .29  .58  .55 1.89 1.32 
IRI18 a doesn't feel pity for 
someone treated unfairly 






Table 34 (cont.) 
IRI20 touched by things that I 
see happen 
0.90 0.02 8.94  .28  .76  .76 2.51 1.08 
IRI22 soft-hearted person 0.90 0.02 9.32  .29  .61  .59 2.27 1.28 
IRI23 can easily put self in the 
place of a leading 
character in movie 
0.90 0.02 9.42  .29  .57  .55 2.27 1.28 
IRI26 when reading a story, I 
imagine how I would 
feel if events were 
happening to me  
0.90 0.02 9.67  .30  .48  .45 2.31 1.33 
ECS1 get teary eyed when 
someone cries 
0.90 0.02 9.13  .28  .68  .68 1.45 1.08 
ECS2 being with happy person 
picks me up 
0.90 0.02 9.46  .29  .54  .54 2.47 1.09 
ECS3 smile back at someone 
smiling and feel warm 
inside 
0.90 0.02 9.15  .28  .67  .67 2.84 1.09 
ECS4 filled with sorrow when 
people talk about death 
0.90 0.02 8.96  .28  .75  .75 2.29 1.14 
ECS5 clench jaws and tighten 
shoulders when seeing 
angry faces 
0.90 0.02 9.66  .30  .46  .44 1.15 1.05 
ECS6 looking into eyes of 
loved one, mind is filled 
with romance 
0.90 0.02 9.52  .29  .52  .52 2.51 1.10 
ECS9 melt when one I love 
holds me 
0.90 0.02 9.65  .30  .47  .46 2.44 1.21 
ECS10 tense when overhearing 
quarrel 
0.91 0.02 9.82  .30  .40  .38 2.21 1.21 
ECS11 being around happy 
people fills mind with 
happy thoughts 
0.90 0.02 9.19  .29  .65  .65 2.63 1.04 
ECS12 my body responds when 
one I love touches me 
0.90 0.02 9.60  .29  .48  .47 2.83 1.01 
ECS14 cry at sad movies 0.90 0.02 9.26  .29  .64  .62 1.81 1.41 
Note. S/N = signal to noise ratio; rave = average inter-item correlation; rraw = correlation of 
each item with the total score, not corrected for item overlap; rcor = item whole correlation 
corrected for item overlap and scale reliability. IRI = Interpersonal Reactivity Index; ECS = 
Emotional Contagion Scale.  






Table 35  
Reliability Analysis of Cognitive Empathy Items 
  α  r   
Item  Raw SE S/ N Ave Raw Cor M SD 
IRI3 try to look at everybody's 
side of a disagreement 
0.72 0.07 2.61  .30  .49  .31 2.73 1.20 
IRI8 a difficult to see things from 
other guy's viewpoint 
0.69 0.07 2.29  .28  .56  .48 2.67 1.14 
IRI11 try to understand friends 
better by imagining their 
perspective 
0.65 0.08 1.89  .24  .71  .63 2.48 1.20 
IRI21 believe there are two sides 
to every question and try 
to look at them both 
0.67 0.07 2.08  .26  .63  .57 2.81 1.12 
IRI25 when upset at someone, I 
try to put myself in his 
shoes 
0.67 0.07 2.03  .25  .65  .58 1.61 1.16 
IRI28 before criticizing 
somebody, I imagine how 
I would feel 
0.63 0.08 1.75  .23  .75  .73 2.00 1.12 
ECS8 seeing fearful faces makes 
me try to imagine how 
they are feeling 
0.72 0.07 2.63  .30  .48  .35 2.20 1.22 
Note. IRI = Interpersonal Reactivity Index; ECS = Emotional Contagion Scale.  








Table 36  
Reliability Analysis of Self-Regulation Items 
  α  r   
Item  Raw SE S/ N Ave Raw Cor M SD 
IRI6 a feel apprehensive and ill-
at-ease in emergencies 
0.78 0.05 3.58 .34  .68  .62 1.87 1.23 
IRI10 a feel helpless in an 
emotional situation 
0.81 0.05 4.36  .38  .49  .38 2.43 1.10 
IRI13 remain calm when seeing 
someone get hurt 
0.78 0.05 3.68  .34  .66  .59 1.98 1.27 
IRI17 a tense emotional 
situations scare me 
0.78 0.05 3.61  .34  .69  .62 2.14 1.36 
IRI24 a lose control during 
emergencies 
0.77 0.06 3.34  .32  .71  .71 0.97 0.93 
IRI19 effective in dealing with 
emergencies 
0.79 0.05 3.77  .35  .61  .57 1.57 1.09 
IRI27 a go to pieces when seeing 
someone who needs help 
in emergency 
0.77 0.06 3.51  .33  .70  .65 1.12 1.25 
ECS15 a listening to child’s 
screams at dentist makes 
me nervous 
0.78 0.05 3.69  .35  .67  .59 1.67 1.34 
Note. IRI = Interpersonal Reactivity Index; ECS = Emotional Contagion Scale.  







Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
I ran a confirmatory factor analysis on the full online sample, using the package lavaan 
(Rosseel, 2012), to predict cognitive empathy, affective empathy and self-regulation from the 
items listed in the tables above. maximum likelihood modelling was used. The assumption of 
multivariate normality was checked beforehand. Missing data (n = 2) were excluded listwise.  
One thousand bootstrapped samples were used to test the maximum likelihood 
estimates model. The model converged normally after 47 iterations. The model performed 
significantly better than the null model, χ2 (703) = 3351.98, p ≤ .0001, though it still 
performed significantly worse than the over-identified model, χ2 (661) = 7862.72, p ≤ .0001. 
The relative and absolute fit indices did not meet the recommended cut-offs of .95 and .05, 
respectively (Hu & Bentler, 1999; Kline, 2010). However, the root mean squared error of 
approximation (RMSEA) and standardised root mean squared error of approximation (SRMR) 
did meet Bentler and Bonnet’s (1980) cut-off of .1, and the standard errors were suitable for 
the estimate size. Additionally, all items were significantly correlated with their latent 







Table 37  
Confirmatory Factor Analysis Fit Indices 
Index Estimate     
Relative fit indices (compared to null model) 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI)  .624 
  Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI)  .600 
  
    Absolute fit indices 
 
95% CI Significance 
RMSEA .089 [.086, .092] ≤ .0001 
SRMR .095     
Note. RMSEA = Root mean squared error of approximation; SRMSEA = Square root mean 







Table 38  
Standardised Coefficients: Affective Empathy 
  Estimate 
Standard 
error Z-value Significance 
IRI2 1 
   IRI4 0.88 0.08 10.85 ≤ .0001 
IRI5 0.89 0.09 10.07 ≤ .0001 
IRI7 0.69 0.08 8.29 ≤ .0001 
IRI9 0.65 0.07 9.95 ≤ .0001 
IRI13 0.56 0.09 6.63 ≤ .0001 
IRI14 1.02 0.08 12.32 ≤ .0001 
IRI16 0.86 0.09 9.67 ≤ .0001 
IRI18 0.68 0.07 10.13 ≤ .0001 
IRI20 1.05 0.08 13.56 ≤ .0001 
IRI22 0.94 0.08 11.63 ≤ .0001 
IRI23 0.90 0.08 10.67 ≤ .0001 
IRI26 0.85 0.09 9.87 ≤ .0001 
ECS1 1.00 0.08 12.40 ≤ .0001 
ECS2 0.67 0.07 10.32 ≤ .0001 
ECS3 0.71 0.06 11.43 ≤ .0001 
ECS4 1.11 0.09 12.81 ≤ .0001 
ECS5 0.61 0.07 8.58 ≤ .0001 
ECS6 0.73 0.07 9.83 ≤ .0001 
ECS9 0.81 0.08 10.49 ≤ .0001 
ECS10 0.73 0.08 9.14 ≤ .0001 
ECS11 0.71 0.07 10.74 ≤ .0001 
ECS12 0.66 0.07 9.85 ≤ .0001 
ECS14 1.01 0.09 10.87 ≤ .0001 







Table 39  
Standardised Coefficients: Cognitive Empathy and Self-Regulation 
  Estimate 
Standard 
error Z-value Significance 
Cognitive empathy 
   IRI3 1 
   IRI8 1.18 0.18 6.37 ≤ .0001 
IRI11 1.96 0.27 7.30 ≤ .0001 
IRI21 1.51 0.22 6.93 ≤ .0001 
IRI25 1.78 0.25 7.06 ≤ .0001 
IRI28 1.90 0.26 7.26 ≤ .0001 
ECS8 1.60 0.24 6.80 ≤ .0001 
Self-regulation 
   IRI6 1 
   IRI10 0.65 0.09 7.46 ≤ .0001 
IRI13 0.45 0.09 5.09 ≤ .0001 
IRI17 0.89 0.10 9.15 ≤ .0001 
IRI24 0.85 0.08 10.46 ≤ .0001 
IRI19 0.69 0.08 8.62 ≤ .0001 
IRI27 1.00 0.10 10.43 ≤ .0001 
ECS15 0.69 0.10 7.03 ≤ .0001 
Note. IRI = Interpersonal Reactivity Index; ECS = Emotional Contagion Scale. 
Given the significant item-latent variable correlations and good-to-excellent internal 
consistency in all three factors (see Table 34 - Table 36), it can be concluded that the model 
performed adequately, though there is room for improvement. The realtively poor model 
performance may be due to measurement error on the items. As it is not recommended to 
perform extensive post hoc modification to a CFA model unless there are strong theoretical 
reasons to do so (Kline, 2010), the model was not modified. As expected, the cognitive and 
affective empathy facets covaried significantly (see Table 40), though cognitive empathy and 







Table 40  
Empathy Facet Covariance 
Covariances Estimate 
Standard 
Error Z-value Significance 
Affective empathy ~ 
        Cognitive empathy .65 .09 7.46 ≤ .0001 
    Self-regulation .45 .09 5.09 ≤ .0001 
Cognitive empathy ~ 













TORONTO ALEXITHYMIA SCALE 
 
Difficulty Identifying Feelings 
1. I am often confused about what emotion I am feeling. 
3. I have physical sensations that even doctors don’t understand. 
6. When I am upset, I don’t know if I am sad, frightened or angry. 
7. I am often puzzled by sensation in my body. 
9. I have feelings that I can’t quite identify. 
13. I don’t know what’s going on inside me. 
14. I often don’t know why I am angry.  
 
Difficulty Describing Feelings 
2. It is difficult for me to find the right words for my feelings. 
4. I am able to describe my feelings easily. 
11. I find it hard to describe how I feel about people. 
12. People tell me to describe feelings more. 
17. It is difficult for me to reveal my innermost feelings, even to close friends. 
 
Externally-Oriented Thinking  
5. I prefer to analyse problems rather than just describe them. 
8. I prefer to just let things happen rather than to understand why they turned out that way. 
10. Being in touch with emotions is essential. 
15. I prefer talking to people about their daily activities rather than their feelings. 
16. I prefer to watch “light” entertainment shows rather than psychological dramas. 
18. I can feel close to someone, even in moments of silence. 
19. I find examination of my feelings useful in solving personal problems. 
20. Looking for hidden meanings in movies or plays distracts for their enjoyment.  
 



















































































APPENDIX N  
AFFECTIVE STATE QUESTIONS 
 
Table 41  
List of Empathic Concern and Personal Distress Questions 


















Alarmed: Feeling frightened, disturbed, or in danger 
Compassionate: Feeling sympathy and concern for others 
Distressed: Suffering from extreme anxiety, sorrow, or pain 
Disturbed: Feeling agitated, distressed, unsettled, upset or distraught 
Grieved: Feeling intense sorrow 
Moved: A strong feeling, especially of sorrow or sympathy, for someone or about something 
Perturbed: Feeling anxious or unsettled; upset 
Upset: Feeling unhappy, disappointed, or worried 
Soft-hearted: Feeling kind and compassionate towards someone/something 
Sympathetic: Feeling, showing, or expressing sympathy. Feeling pity or sorrow for someone 
else’s misfortune. 
Tender: Feeling gentleness, kindness, and affection 
Troubled: Feeling beset by problems; feeling distress or anxiety 
Warm-hearted: Feeling sympathetic and kind 








LIST OF MEDICATIONS 
Table 42  
List of Medications 
Medication Class Count 
Antidepressants   
Escitalopram Selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor 1 
Fluoxetine Selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor 1 
   
Antidepressant & other   
Citalopram, amitriptyline, simvastatin Selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor,  
tricyclic antidepressant,  
statin (HMG CoA reductase inhibitor) 
1 
Citalopram, ziprasidone Selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor,  
atypical antipsychotic 
1 
Amitriptyline, sodium valproate,  
joint supplement 
Tricyclic antidepressant 1 
Fluoxetine, contraceptive Selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor 1 
Antidepressant (unspecified), 
methylphenidate 
Antidepressant (unspecified), stimulant 1 
   
Stimulant   
Methylphenidate Simulant 1 
   
Stimulant & other   
Methylphenidate, risperidone Simulant, atypical antipsychotic 1 
Methylphenidate, antidepressant 
(unspecified) 
Simulant, antidepressant (unspecified)  
   
Anticonvulsants   
Lamotrigine Triazine anticonvulsant 1 
Phenytoin Hydantoin anticonvulsant 1 
Sodium Valproate Fatty acid derivative anticonvulsant 1 






Table 42 (cont.) 
Antipsychotic   
Risperidone Atypical antipsychotic 2 
Risperidone, methylphenidate CNS stimulant, atypical antipsychotic  
Ziprasidone, citalopram Selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor,  
atypical antipsychotic 
 
Other   
Antihistamine (unspecified)  2 
Antihistamine &  
asthma medication (unspecified) 
 1 
Contraceptive (unspecified)  2 
Statin HMG CoA reductase inhibitor 2 








ADDITIONAL FIGURES AND TABLES 
 
Study 1 
When all participants were included in the analyses of Faux Pas Total and Faux Pas 
Emotion Recognition scores, Faux Pas control scores significantly predicted both sets of 
scores. However, as shown in Figure 28 and Figure 29, both the Faux Pas Total and Faux Pas 
Emotion Recognition model fits were improved by removing two influential cases. The same 
two cases/participants were removed in both models. The models without the two influential 







Table 43  
Generalised Linear Model Coefficients of Faux Pas Total and Emotion Recognition Scores 
(with Influential Values) 
Fixed effects β SE dfeffect dferror F-value Probability 
FP Total a 
       
Control Score 7.88 2.38 1 87 23.09  < .001 *** 
Medication - 4.92 2.45 1 87 5.05 .027 * 
AI - 4.72 1.41 1 87 11.14   .001 ** 
FP Emotion 
Recognitionb 
      Control Score 1.09 0.39 1 87 15.75 < .001 *** 
Medication - 0.82 0.47 1 87 4.13 .045 * 
AI - 0.39 0.25 1 87 2.39 .126   
Note. FP = Faux Pas; AI = Autism Index.  
a variance covariate exponent δ = 0.28, residual SE = 9.76 b variance covariate exponent  
δ = 0.22, residual SE = 1.76.  








Figure 28. Residual plots of the generalised least squares model predicting Faux Pas (FP) 
total scores. Two influential cases, with very low predicted values, were removed in the final 







Figure 29. Residual plots of the generalised least squares model predicting Faux Pas emotion 
recognition (FP Emo Recog) scores. Two influential cases, with very low predicted values, 










Preliminary Random-Effects Muscle Amplitude Model 
Fixed effects dfeffect dferror F-value Probability 
Time 1 576 91.93 < .001 *** 
Condition 1 288 0.18  .670  
Muscle 2 192 0.72  .488  
Time * Condition 1 576 1.63  .202  
Time * Muscle 2 576 4.84  .008 ** 
Condition * Muscle 2 288 0.07  .933  
Time * Condition * Muscle 2 576 0.45  .638  
 
Fixed effects β SE df t-value Probability 
Time: Pain 0.35 0.08 576 4.12 < .001 *** 
Condition: Self - 0.04 0.05 288 - 0.84  .403  
M. corrugator 0.00 0.05 192 - 0.08  .933  
M. orbicularis 0.00 0.05 192 - 0.03  .978  
Time * Condition 0.18 0.13 576 1.35  .176  
Pain * M. corrugator 0.36 0.18 576 2.06  .040 * 
Pain * M. orbicularis 0.88 0.42 576 2.08  .038 * 
Self condition * M. corrugator 0.02 0.07 288 0.33  .742  
Self condition * M. orbicularis 0.04 0.07 288 0.48  .628  
Pain * Self condition * M. corrugator - 0.23 0.24 576 - 0.95  .344  
Pain * Self condition * M. orbicularis  - 0.08 0.66 576 - 0.12  .906  
Note. Model 1: R2M = .65, R
2
C = .65.  Number of observations = 1164. Number of groups: ID 
= 97 (σ̂ 2 = 5.93 x 10-20), muscle in ID = 291 (σ̂ 2 = 2.19 x 10-9), condition in muscle in ID = 
582 (σ̂ 2 = 2.44 x 10-6); σ̂ 2resid = 0.34. 








Figure 30. Confidence intervals of the coefficient estimates for the preliminary random-
effects model predicting muscle amplitude from time (pain vs. no pain), condition (self vs. 







Alternative Mixed-Effects Models of Average Muscle Activity (Square Root Transformed) 
Model Fixed effects SS MS dfeffect dferror F-value Probability 
Model 1 Muscle 0.29 0.15 2 184.00 11.19 < .001 *** 
 Cycle 0.15 0.15 1 278.00 11.58 .001 ** 
 AI 0.08 0.08 1 91.00 6.20 .015 * 
         
Model 2 Muscle 0.29 0.15 2 184.00 11.19 < .001 *** 
 Cycle 0.15 0.15 1 278.00 11.58 .001 ** 
 Alexithymia 0.05 0.05 1 91.00 4.00 .048 * 
 
Model Fixed effects β SE df t-value Probability 
 Model 1 M. corrugator 0.03 0.02 184.00 1.35 .177 
 M. orbicularis 0.10 0.02 184.00 4.60 < .001 *** 
 Cycle 2 - 0.03 0.01 278.00 -3.40 .001 ** 
 AI - 0.04 0.01 91.00 -2.49 .015 * 
        
Model 2 M. corrugator 0.03 0.02 184.00 1.35 .177  
 M. orbicularis 0.10 0.02 184.00 4.60 < .001 *** 
 Cycle 2 - 0.03 0.01 278.00 -3.40 .001 ** 
 Alexithymia - 0.03 0.01 91.00 -2.00 .048 * 
Note. Model 1: R2M = .06, R
2
C = .69; Model 2: R
2
M = .08, R
2
C = .69. AI = Autism Index.  







Table 46  
Linear Mixed-Effects Model Predicting Muscle Slope (incl. Cycle and Condition) 
Fixed effects SS MS dfeffect dferror F-value Probability 
Muscle 1252.28 626.14 2 85.43 4.83 .010 * 
Cycle 1.33 1.33 1 587.13 0.01 .919  
Condition (Cond) 3.46 3.46 1 109.69 0.03 .871  
Alexithymia (Alex) 20.08 20.08 1 81.89 0.15 .695  
AI 0.01 0.01 1 82.63 0.00 .992  
Self-regulation (Self-reg) 148.41 148.41 1 83.16 1.14 .288  
P. cognitive empathy (PCE) 115.04 115.04 1 82.67 0.89 .349  
 Cor Orb Cycle 2 Cond: Self Alex AI Self-reg PCE 
VIF 2.02 2.01 1.00 1.03 1.61 2.04 1.23 1.31 
Note. R2M = .01, R
2
C = .34. AI = Autism Index; P = performance; VIF = variance inflation 
factor; Cor = Corrugator supercilii; Orb = Orbicularis oculi. 









Table 47  
Linear Mixed-Effects Model Outcomes Predicting Autonomic Arousal 
Model dfeffect dferror







PEP 4 366 7.33 < .001 .002 .975 395.95 10.02 
Vagal control 4 374 3.27  .012 .027 .027 0.00 262.73 
SCL 4 330 26.47 < .001 .008 .969 5.91 0.19 
HR 4 374 11.66 < .001 .003 .973 138.35 3.87 
Respiration 4 374 9.32 < .001 .019 .760 5.01 1.62 








Table 48  
Linear Mixed-Effects Models of Cardiac Vagal Control and Skin Conductance (incl. 
Condition) 
Fixed effects β SE SS MS dferror F-value Probability 
Vagal controla 
        Base vagal control - 3.77 0.83 5257.75 5257.75 358.99 20.78 < .001 ***
Medication - 0.95 2.31 43.39 43.39 358.99 0.17 .679  
Condition 1.44 1.66 189.61 189.61 358.99 0.75 .387  
AI - 0.17 1.07 6.22 6.22 358.99 0.02 .876  
Cycle - 2.37 1.17 1033.25 1033.25 358.99 4.08 .044 * 
Self-regulation - 0.43 0.96 50.98 50.98 358.99 0.20 .654 
 Concern - 0.43 0.94 52.15 52.15 358.99 0.21 .650  
AI * Cycle 1.83 1.24 547.06 547.06 358.99 2.16 .142  
SCLb        
 Base SCL 2.38 0.07 151.68 151.68 76.55 1027.64 < .001 ***
Medication - 0.01 0.20 0.00 0.00 78.60 0.00  .965  
Condition 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 232.98 0.00  .949  
AI 0.02 0.09 0.01 0.01 81.57 0.06  .805  
Cycle - 0.12 0.03 2.46 2.46 242.26 16.65 < .001 *** 
Self-regulation 0.02 0.08 0.01 0.01 82.51 0.07  .792  
Concern 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 298.96 0.01  .930  
AI * Cycle  - 0.07 0.03 0.76 0.76 242.08 5.13  .024 * 
Note. Both models: dfeffect = 1. 
a R2M = .07. 







Average Autonomic Arousal During the First and Second Cycles of Painful Facial 
Expressions 
Cycle PEP (ms) Vagal control SCL (μS) HR (bpm) 
 
M SD M SD M SD M SD 
1 112.60 20.87 2.25 17.63 5.00 2.56 72.75 12.14 
2 113.49 20.33 - 1.06 14.50 4.78 2.44 73.62 11.68 
 
∆ PEP (ms) ∆ Vagal control ∆ SCL (μS) ∆ HR (bpm) 
 
M SD M SD M SD M SD 
1 -0.77 4.43 4.65 26.50 0.56 0.76 -0.83 3.09 
2 0.11 5.12 1.32 25.37 0.37 0.65 0.16 2.69 









Table 50  
Autonomic Arousal During the First and Second Cycles of Painful Facial Expressions by AI 
Group 
Cycle AI Group PEP (ms) Vagal control SCL (μS) HR (bpm) 
 
  M SD M SD M SD M SD 
1 Low 113.11 22.75 2.74 20.33 4.42 2.33 70.81 11.41 
 
Medium 114.96 22.21 3.29 18.74 4.92 2.92 69.68 11.44 
 
High 109.43 16.90 0.59 12.76 5.68 2.23 78.19 12.02 
2 Low 114.53 22.31 - 1.57 13.29 4.33 2.13 72.12 11.45 
 
Medium 115.22 20.80 - 1.63 17.61 4.75 3.00 70.91 10.85 
 
High 110.35 17.38 0.15 11.79 5.29 1.91 78.37 11.62 
 
  ∆ PEP (ms) ∆ Vagal control ∆ SCL (μS) ∆ HR (bpm) 
 
  M SD M SD M SD M SD 
1 Low -1.14 4.73 4.76 35.97 0.54 0.64 -0.65 3.10 
 
Medium -0.42 4.46 5.61 23.42 0.53 0.68 -1.16 2.82 
 
High -0.76 4.12 3.50 16.15 0.60 0.95 -0.64 3.38 
2 Low 0.28 5.01 0.44 29.06 0.46 0.60 0.66 2.80 
 
Medium -0.17 6.11 0.69 28.14 0.36 0.64 0.07 2.27 
 High 0.27 3.92 3.03 16.44 0.28 0.71 -0.26 2.98 










Figure 31. Pre-ejection period (PEP) over the different empathy-for-facial-pain conditions. 
The colours indicate whether participants primarily showed PEP augmentation or withdrawal 
from baseline, or whether there were no/small changes only in PEP. Individual lines show 









Figure 32. Cardiac vagal control over the different empathy-for-facial-pain conditions. The 
colours indicate whether participants primarily showed cardiac vagal control augmentation or 
withdrawal from baseline, or whether there were no/small changes only in cardiac vagal 








Figure 33. Skin conductance levels (SCL) over the different empathy-for-facial-pain 
conditions. The colours indicate whether participants primarily showed SCL augmentation or 
withdrawal/no change from baseline. As very few participants showed reductions in SCL 
from baseline, the withdrawal and ‘no change’ conditions were aggregated. Individual lines 
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